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PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

No. 4, 1979

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Translation of the Russian-language journal PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA published quarterly in Moscow by the Far East Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences.

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MOVEMENT FOR NON-ALIGNMENT AND BEIJING INTRIGUES (SOME RESULTS OF THE HAVANA CONFERENCE)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1979 pp 3-13

[Article by Yu. M. Ryakin and V. S. Stepanov]

[Text] The sixth conference of the heads of state and government of the non-aligned countries was held in the beginning of September 1979 in Havana, the capital of socialist Cuba. The Havana conference was the non-alignment movement's first summit conference in Latin America. It was also the most representative forum in all the 18-year history of the movement: It was attended by representatives of more than 100 countries and national liberation movements. A conference resolution appointed Cuba the country responsible for coordinating the movement in the coming 3 years.

The increased foreign policy activity of the developing countries and the heightened significance of the movement for non-alignment in the international arena are most closely connected with the consolidation of the worldwide socialist community. It is socialism that has overthrown forever imperialism's monopoly on deciding the fate of many countries and peoples. Imperialism's opportunity to influence the liberated countries has been sharply limited by the growth and consolidation of the power and influence of the Soviet Union and other states of the socialist community. The young liberated states have a reliable basis of support in their implementation of an anti-imperialist, anticolonial policy and in their struggle for peace--the worldwide socialist community. The interests of the socialist and non-aligned countries objectively coincide with respect to many major issues in world politics. The Soviet Union has always defended the cause of peace and opposed imperialism, colonialism and all forms of injustice and oppression.

People in the Soviet Union have invariably commended the positive role played by the movement for non-alignment in the international arena. In a congratulatory message addressed to the Havana conference of the non-aligned countries, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, remarked: "From forum to forum, the non-aligned states are making their impressive contribution to the consolidation of peace and international security, to the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism, racism and apartheid, and to the fight for recognition of the right of people to determine their own fate and for the stronger political and economic independence of the liberated countries."[1]

The same stand has been taken by the other socialist countries. A declaration adopted in November 1978 by the Warsaw Pact states stressed that, in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism, and for peace, security and stronger detente, the socialist countries attach "great significance to the development of cooperation and interaction with the non-aligned states. They regard the movement of the non-aligned states as a positive factor in international politics and they have noted their increasingly important role in world affairs."

The objective of preserving and strengthening the unity and cohesion of the non-aligned countries and their solidarity with other anti-imperialist forces was voiced with particular insistence at the forum. The political debates which took place at the Havana conference, the statements made by speakers and the final document adopted by forum participants testify that the movement for non-alignment is a strong and dynamic international force which has taken an anti-imperialist stand and is resolutely fighting for the peace and security of peoples.

This overall result of the non-aligned conference is all the more significant because the movement was subjected to imperialist pressure, unprecedented in all its history in terms of ferocity, while preparations were made for the Havana conference and during the conference. The fact that the conference was convened in Havana, not to mention the fact that it was successful, obviously ran counter to the interests of the imperialist powers, particularly the United States, for a number of reasons.

In the first place, the conference was held in the capital of a socialist state which is resolutely opposing the aggressive and colonial actions of imperialism. Imperialist strategists certainly realized that the conference would give Cuba and its policies even more international prestige, which obviously does not fit in with the plans of the West. Washington naturally also realized that this conference was being held in Latin America, which has "traditionally" been regarded by U.S. imperialism as its exclusive sphere of influence. It is therefore understandable that the United States and its partners in the aggressive NATO bloc associated the Havana conference with the fear that it would stimulate the Latin American countries' desire to escape from the channel of imperialist policy, would make the movement for non-alignment more appealing to them and would increase the number of its adherents in Latin America.

Throughout the period after the conference in Colombo, the West made increasingly energetic attempts to minimize the anti-imperialist essence of the movement for non-alignment and undermine relations between the non-aligned and socialist countries. In particular, imperialism tried to achieve this by spreading the slanderous allegations that the world situation was being destabilized through the fault of the Soviet Union, Cuba and the socialist community as a whole, and that the acceptance of their assistance to ward off aggression was "incompatible" with the principles of non-alignment. It was said that the treaties concluded in the interval between the two last conferences by Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Vietnam on friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union would supposedly "automatically" take these nations out of the bounds of the non-aligned movement. Just before the conference in Havana began, imperialist propaganda tried to undermine it by instituting a provocative commotion over the issues of Kampuchean representation and the disagreements within the movement in connection with this issue, and the "right" of Cuba to organize the conference. All of these intrigues failed, however, and the movement for non-alignment not only withstood imperialist pressure, but has now become even stronger.

This is made all the more important by the fact that the movement for non-alignment is now being subjected to pressure and coercion by more than just imperialism. The events connected with the preparations for the Havana conference and the conference itself proved that Beijing's hegemonistic intrigues now represent a great danger for the non-aligned countries and the movement for non-alignment as a whole.

It is known that Beijing took an extremely negative view of the movement of the non-aligned states from the very moment of its inception. The organization and reinforcement of the movement in the early 1960's coincided with the beginning of Beijing's departure from socialist foreign policy principles, when it began to tear the national liberation movement away from worldwide socialism and the international communist movement, when it began to encourage the national liberation movement as a whole and its individual detachments to accept "ultra-revolutionary" theories of world development for the purpose of utilizing the considerable revolutionary potential of this anti-imperialist force for the attainment of the great-power, hegemonistic goals of the Maoist leaders. At that time, the denial of the Leninist policy of struggle for peace, international security and disarmament and the rejection of the policy of peaceful coexistence as one allegedly incompatible with the national liberation struggle became an important part of Maoist foreign policy concepts.[2]

In contrast to these fundamentally provocative aims of the Beijing leaders, the movement for non-alignment, which was anti-imperialist and anticolonial in its general purpose, proclaimed from the very beginning of its existence and organization its adherence to such fundamental principles as the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, the peaceful regulation of international conflicts, struggle for disarmament and the cessation of the arms race, and so forth. The movement's platform was the reason for the openly negative attitudes displayed by the PRC leadership toward the movement in the 1960's. It is indicative that in its "rejection" of the non-aligned movement, Beijing was already actually allying itself with imperialism, which, through the mouth of J. F. Dulles, called the movement for non-alignment "amoral."

Seeing the movement for non-alignment as one of the obstacles in the way of Chinese hegemony in the national liberation movement, the Maoists launched a fierce struggle against it. This struggle was waged in several areas. It included attacks on the very meaning of the non-alignment concept and on the basic principles of the movement, particularly the principle of peaceful coexistence, which was constantly described by Beijing as "reactionary." In the early 1960's, the Maoists were already trying to discredit some of the countries involved in the movement (for example, Burma, Yugoslavia, India and some others), including the use of armed force in several cases. At that same time, in an attempt to disorganize the movement, Beijing tried to counter it with a movement for Afro-Asian solidarity. In particular, the Maoists openly opposed the second summit-level conference of the non-aligned countries (1964) with a second Bandung-type conference, with the PRC taking an active part in the preparations for it. Finally, Beijing tried to weaken and break up the non-aligned movement from within--for example, by insistently promoting the theory of "new growing forces," which was advanced by then President Sukarno of Indonesia, in the international arena.[3]

The foreign policy program of the "Cultural Revolution," which was marked by the most radical extremism and flagrant, unconcealed intervention by Beijing in the domestic affairs of other states, including many of the non-aligned countries (for example, Burma, India, Indonesia, Kampuchea, Kenya, Mali, Tunisia, Sri Lanka and others), introduced nothing new into the negative, and sometimes even hostile, attitude of the Chinese leadership toward the movement for non-alignment.

The turnabout of the late 1960's and early 1970's in the policy of the Maoist leadership in the direction of alliance with imperialism and more pronounced hostility toward worldwide socialism was accompanied by tactical modifications of Beijing foreign policy, which also affected China's approach to the non-aligned movement. From that time on, the Maoists stopped offending the non-aligned movement and began to utilize it in the interests of their own hostile policy toward the socialist world.

The interest Beijing displayed in the movement for non-alignment stemmed from several important factors. Since the beginning of the 1970's the movement of the non-aligned states has become more active and has evolved into an influential factor in international life. There was considerable quantitative expansion of the group of countries involved in the movement: 25 countries participated in the first conference of the heads of state and government of non-aligned countries (1961, Belgrade), 47 participated in the second conference (1964, Cairo), 54 participated in the third (1970, Lusaka), 75 participated in the fourth (1973, Algiers), and 86 full members of the movement, or almost two-thirds of all UN members, participated in the fifth conference (1976, Colombo). The Maoist leaders had to acknowledge that the failure to consider the significance and role of the non-aligned movement in world politics would have seriously limited Beijing's opportunity for maneuvering in the international arena.

The fairly rapid quantitative growth of the movement, as a result of the involvement of the most diverse countries in terms of socioeconomic and political leanings, compounded the definite differences between individual members. This required, in particular, that the members of the movement make a much greater effort to make and implement decisions. This is attested to, for example, by the conference in Colombo and a number of subsequent non-aligned forums. This fact was pointed out by L. I. Brezhnev in his speech at the October (1976) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, when he remarked that the documents of the conference in Colombo were adopted "as a result of long and sometimes, as we have learned, difficult debates."[4]

This situation is a favorite in the practice of Maoist foreign policy because it gives Beijing some leeway for manipulating countries and bringing them into conflict with one another. The political diversity of the countries and forces involved in the movement for non-alignment provides Beijing, according to its calculations, with an opportunity to introduce false theories into the movement, which conceal the essential and basic aspects of the present era, its motivating forces, its basic contradictions and so forth. There is no question that the acceptance, even if only partial and limited, of these theories would aid in divorcing the non-aligned movement from worldwide socialism and other progressive forces of the present day. One of the theories Beijing wanted to foist on the movement was the thesis of the "equidistance" of the non-aligned movement from the two main opposing worldwide forces--imperialism and socialism. This thesis, which has been set forth in several variations (the "collective" or "equal" responsibility of the developed powers for the economic difficulties of the former colonial countries, "equal" opposition to the NATO bloc and the Warsaw Pact countries, and so forth), quite obviously ignored the fundamental differences between the imperialist and socialist states.

The total anti-Sovietism of the Chinese leadership, its hostility toward the socialist world, its overt alliance with imperialism and reaction and its attempts to use all possibilities and all world forces (reflected, in particular, in the slogan regarding the "broadest possible international united front") to inflict maximum injury on the nations of the socialist community, on the one hand, and the abovementioned features of the non-aligned movement, on the other, dictated Beijing's increased "interest" in this movement in the 1970's. "We highly commend and definitely support the movement for non-alignment, which is playing an active role in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism," Premier Hua Guofeng of the PRC State Council said, for example, in February 1978.[5]

Beijing's overall approach to the non-aligned movement and the place of this movement in the foreign policy line of the Chinese leadership have been colored by the inclusion of the movement in the notorious Maoist doctrine of the "three worlds." "The non-aligned countries, which are located on all five continents, constitute an important part of the third world," Vice Premier Geng Biao of the PRC State Council declared in June 1978. "The powerful movement for non-alignment is an effective force in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism."[6] Guided by this general description, the Chinese leadership is encouraging the non-aligned countries to accept its interpretation of the movement's goals and its place and role in international affairs. Beijing has made persistent attempts to strip this movement of its anti-imperialist content, push it over to the right and give it an antisocialist purpose.

Concurrent with their attempts to break up the movement for non-alignment and to isolate progressive forces within the movement, the Chinese leaders are implying that the unity of the movement can only be achieved on an anti-Soviet, antisocialist basis. It is for this reason that when Beijing politicians discuss the group of problems debated in the non-aligned movement and provide anti-Soviet interpretations for virtually all of these problems, they primarily concentrate on the so-called "antihegemonistic" aspect of the movement as something alleged to be its main purpose and main principle. At the same time, attempts are being made in Beijing, for anti-Soviet and antisocialist purposes, to falsify the history of the inception and establishment of the movement, which is known to represent a reaction on the part of the young states which had won their independence after World War II to the imperialist powers' attempts to involve them in Western military and political blocs. According to a NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY report of 15 August 1976, Chinese politicians are trying to prove that the movement supposedly "was born and is growing in the flames of struggle against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism," that it "began with the resistance to the military blocs of the great powers, and its struggle against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism is constantly growing in breadth and depth." These allegations, which are being widely spread about by Chinese propaganda, also reflect Beijing's attempts to "sow" false ideas in the movement for non-alignment, deprive it of the correct political guidelines and ultimately divert it from the mainstream of the development of world history.

The Chinese leadership was exceptionally interested in the summit-level Havana non-aligned conference, hoping to make use of this large international forum in the interests of its own anti-Soviet, antisocialist policy. By doing this, the Chinese leaders actually served the imperialist powers as accomplices in their struggle to break up the movement and to discredit and isolate its progressive forces.

Just before the Havana conference, the Beijing leaders tried to subvert, within the movement, the influence of states which are absolutely committed to the preservation and reinforcement of the overtly anti-imperialist purpose of non-alignment, and stronger cooperation by the movement with the socialist world and with other progressive and democratic forces. Cuba, as the country organizing the conference and subsequently serving as the movement chairman, was subjected to particularly fierce attacks by Beijing.

Echoing the anti-Cuban statements of imperialist propaganda, Beijing tried to wreck the Havana conference by striving for its transfer to another country and by making it less representative and authoritative through the persuasion, and even the coercion, of some heads of government to take no part in the conference. After learning, however, that these attempts had failed, the Chinese leaders made some tactical changes and began to appeal to the non-aligned countries that they restrict Cuba's role as the organizer of the conference and the future chairman of the movement.

Beijing has made equally ferocious attacks on Vietnam, and the Beijing leaders have even denied its right to be a non-aligned country. Beijing has accused Vietnam, just as Cuba, of aggressive actions against other states, including non-aligned countries, and of intervention in their domestic affairs. But Beijing's main "accusation" has been that both of these countries have maintained relations of friendship and fraternal cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community. "Some non-aligned countries and unbiased public opinion have already noticed that Cuba has turned into an instrument for the implementation of Soviet social-imperialism's global counterrevolutionary strategy and has no right to consider itself a member of the non-aligned movement," RENMIN RIBAO slanderously declared.[7] Another RENMIN RIBAO article on non-alignment contained the statement that Vietnam and Cuba are the "eastern and western pawns of Soviet social-imperialism." By means of this kind of brazen slander, the Chinese leadership is trying to suggest to the movement that relations of friendly cooperation with the Soviet Union allegedly not only undermine the international position of certain non-aligned countries, but are incompatible in general with their membership in the movement. The hostile attitude of the Chinese leadership toward a number of socialist countries belonging to the movement for non-alignment (Cuba, Vietnam, Laos and others) also extends to countries with a socialist orientation, such as Angola, Ethiopia and Afghanistan.

An important element of Beijing's "preparations" for the Havana conference was an extensive campaign in support of representation for the Pol Pot Regime and against full participation in the movement by the representative of the sovereign People's Republic of Kampuchea. The Maoists deliberately indulged in widespread exaggeration of this issue in the hope that certain disagreements between the non-aligned countries over this matter, which had already been resolved by the people of Kampuchea, could divert attention at the coming conference away from key issues in contemporary international affairs, which would be in line with Beijing's plans.

The results of the Havana forum were distressing for the Chinese leadership, which was alleging, on the one hand, that the non-aligned movement had interests and goals in common with China in the international arena and was making a tremendous effort, on the other, to disorient and disorganize this movement. The general discussion at the conference and its final document conclusively proved that Chinese propaganda's declarations were far from true and that the movement did not in any sense agree with the goals and principles lying at the basis of the current Chinese leadership's foreign policy doctrine and international activity.

The Havana conference reaffirmed the determination of the non-aligned countries to make their contribution to the struggle for peace, international security, disarmament and international detente and to extend this process to all parts of the world.

In their political declaration, conference participants advocated further efforts by the European states in the spirit and on the basis of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which was signed in Helsinki, and applauded the signing of the SALT II treaty by the Soviet Union and the United States, expressing the hope that these two countries would continue their talks in the field of disarmament, particularly nuclear. In this respect, the position of the non-aligned nations completely diverges from Beijing's approach to the questions of detente, security and disarmament. The Chinese leaders' negative attitude toward the Helsinki agreement is well known. Beijing's approach to the SALT II treaty was also negative. "We have doubts about the consequences of this treaty," Vice Premier Li Xiannian of the PRC State Council announced in July of this year to the American NEWSWEEK magazine, "because this treaty has not solved any problems."

The Chinese leadership's attempts to reorient the non-aligned movement failed, as well as its efforts to strip it of its anti-imperialist purpose and urge it to oppose the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. In its political and economic declarations, the Havana conference resolutely condemned imperialism, colonialism and racism as the chief enemies of national independence and freedom, as the source of international crises and the arms race, and as the main obstacle in the way of the economic establishment of the young states and the establishment of new international political and economic relations based on the principles of equality and justice.

When the bourgeois press analyzed the general nature of conference debates, it had to admit that anti-Western feelings prevailed at the conference. "Since the time of the movement's birth in 1961, 94 members have quite severely condemned the West," the WASHINGTON POST noted on 13 September 1979. On 17 September, the American magazine NEWSWEEK wrote: "American officials viewed the Havana conference of the leaders of the non-aligned movement as something of a kangaroo court." The Italian newspaper IL GIORNO stated on 6 September that "the movement of the non-aligned states, from the conference in Belgrade to the present day, has expressed increasingly clear anti-Western, and not anti-Soviet, views."

Decisively condemning the policy of imperialism, the conference participants advocted cooperation by the non-aligned countries with all peaceful, progressive and democratic forces. In this connection, the principled policy of the USSR and other countries of the socialist community in support of struggle for national freedom and sovereignty and for peace and disarmament was highly commended. In the opening speech of the conference, F. Castro, head of the Cuban Government, expressed Cuba's gratitude to the Soviet Union for its cooperation with the Cuban people in their most difficult moments and went on to say that not only Cuba, but also "Vietnam, the Arab countries which have become the victims of aggression, the people of the former Portuguese colonies, revolutionary processes in many nations and the liberation movement against oppression, racism, Zionism and fascism in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Palestine and other parts of the world owe a great deal to the solidarity of the socialist community."[8] The need to strengthen solidarity between the non-aligned movement and forces for socialism and other progressive forces throughout the world was discussed in the speeches by SRV Premier Pham Van Dong, Jamaican Prime Minister M. Manley, Mozambique's President S. Machel and other speakers at the Havana meeting. Gratitude to the socialist countries, which have always supported national liberation movements, was expressed from the conference rostrum by O. Tambo, representing the African National Congress of Southern Africa.

The proceedings of the sixth conference of the non-aligned countries in Havana, the participation in it by the greatest number of heads of state and government of non-aligned countries in the movement's entire history, and the profound gratitude and respect expressed by many conference participants in regard to heroic Cuba all attested to the failure of the anti-Cuban slanderous campaign launched by Beijing in conjunction with the imperialists to wreck the Havana conference or to denigrate its significance and discredit Cuba in the international arena. Yugoslavia's President J. Tito expressed gratitude to the Cuban Government in his speech at the conference for its important contribution in the preparations for the sixth conference. "The people of Yugoslavia," he said, "have sincere affection for the friendly people of Cuba and highly commend their achievements in the struggle for the freedom and transformation of their country." Speaking on behalf of African conference participants, Zambian President K. Kaunda highly commended Cuba's role in the movement for non-alignment and in the anti-imperialist struggle of the world public.

Particular gratitude to Cuba for this role was expressed by the Latin American countries participating in the conference. By its successes in socialist construction, its consistent and principled position in international affairs and its internationalism, Jamaican Prime Minister M. Manley said, Cuba had earned respect and prestige throughout the world. The same high praise of Cuba was voiced by D. Ortega, member of the administrative council of the Nicaraguan government of national reconstruction.

The respect displayed by many Latin American countries for Cuba had to be acknowledged by the London DAILY TELEGRAPH, which reported on 7 September that "the increasing influence of the Cuban communist government among the former British colonies in the Caribbean basin was quite apparent at the conference of the heads of state and government of non-aligned countries in Havana."

Beijing's campaign of unbridled attacks on the Socialist Republic of Vietnam also suffered a failure. The purpose of this campaign was to diminish the high international prestige of heroic Vietnam, complicate its international position and cast doubts on the right of the SRV to participate in the movement for non-alignment. The Havana conference did not become a rostrum for slanderous attacks on Vietnam, as the Beijing reactionaries and their new-found allies in the imperialist camp had hoped, but, on the contrary, became a rostrum for the declaration of solidarity with the long-suffering Vietnamese people who had become the victims of aggressive actions by the Chinese regime.

As soon as China committed its aggressive actions against socialist Vietnam at the beginning of this year, the governments or official representatives of Algeria, Angola, Afghanistan, India, Mozambique, the People's Republic of the Congo, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the Palestine Liberation Organization, Ethiopia and many other non-aligned countries condemned the Chinese aggression, demanded its cessation and the withdrawal of Chinese troops from SRV territory and declared solidarity with Vietnam. Not one non-aligned country expressed direct and open support for this aggressive act by the Beijing hegemonists and expansionists.

Beijing's intrigues against Vietnam were properly repulsed at the conference in Havana, primarily in the speech by the representative of Vietnam itself, and also by many other countries. Pham Van Dong, premier of the SRV Government, said in his speech [illegible] Havana that the Vietnamese people were starving for peace after more than 30 years of war and wanted to concentrate all of their energy on national reconstruction. "But independent and sovereign Vietnam," he went on, "which has established relations of friendship and cooperation with various countries, represents the most serious obstacle to the hegemonism of a certain Asian power, which is using a thousand and one underhanded and cruel tricks to prevent the peaceful reconstruction of Vietnam. All of its intrigues and plots in the military, political, economic and diplomatic spheres, however, have only led to shameful failure.... In spite of their lack of success, the hegemonists are still feverishly conducting a policy of hostility toward Vietnam, threatening to launch a new aggressive war against it, intensifying their intervention in the domestic affairs of Laos and threatening it with aggression, trying to restore the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime of genocide in Kampuchea and undermining peace and stability in this part of the world."[9]

The anti-Soviet campaign launched by the United States and China, Pham Van Dong remarked, is related to the hostile campaigns they are waging against Cuba and the movement for non-alignment for the purpose of undermining the struggle of people throughout the world against imperialism and hegemonism and for peace, independence and social progress.

Cuban leader F. Castro expressed definite support for Vietnam, the victim of treachery, conspiracy and aggression on the part of the Chinese Government, and said that the ruling Chinese clique had neither the authority nor the moral right to "teach Vietnam lessons." The representative of Ethiopia condemned the Beijing hegemonists in his speech for their plans for new aggressive acts against Vietnam. Solidarity with Vietnam was expressed by the representatives of Laos and many other countries. At a mass-meeting in Managua, held to honor SRV Premier Pham Van Dong on his arrival in Nicaragua after the Havana conference, A. Robelo, member of the administrative council of the Nicaraguan government, expressed the solidarity of the Nicaraguans with the Vietnamese people, who have had to withstand Beijing's hegemonistic pretensions in the midst of their efforts to build a new life.

The political declaration of the Havana conference noted the mounting tension in Southeast Asia and stressed that peace and stability can only prevail in this region if there is respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states.

The greatest fiasco suffered by the ruling Chinese clique, however, was probably the result of its attempts to have the conference accept a representative of the overthrown pro-Beijing Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique as a representative of Kampuchea. Beijing politicians hoped that the question of Kampuchean representation would disrupt the work of the conference, lead to the disagreement and alienation of non-aligned countries and ultimately divert the attention of conference participants away from more urgent matters.

Delegates from many countries declared at the Havana forum that only representatives of the legal Kampuchean government--the People's Revolutionary Council--had the right to take part in the movement for non-alignment and its meetings. Due to the absence of unanimity on the question of Kampuchean representation, however, the conference presidium decided that the Kampuchean seat would remain vacant and that a special commission of presidium members would compile a detailed report on Kampuchean representation in the non-aligned movement, which would then be discussed at the conference of the foreign ministers of countries belonging to the movement.

Although the legal government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea still has no opportunity to take part in the non-aligned movement, this decision was a step forward in comparison to the situation at the last meeting of the non-aligned countries--the conference of foreign ministers of the countries belonging to the coordinating bureau of the movement, which was held in June in Colombo and which permitted Pol Pot's representative to attend in the capacity of an observer, without voting rights. The Havana decision is indisputably a step toward the final and fair resolution of this problem. This is attested to by the increasing international recognition of the People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea. Exactly 2 days before the beginning of the Havana conference, the new regime in Nicaragua announced its recognition of the PRK and the Nicaraguan representative was one of those who insisted that the PRK Government should take its rightful place in the non-aligned movement.

Commenting on this answer to the "Kampuchean question," NHAN DAN quite justifiably reported on 10 September that "this was a defeat for the clique of Chinese reactionaries and all other elements attempting, by means of various dishonest tricks and lies, to impose the political corpse of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime on the non-aligned movement."

The conference political resolution's condemnation of the Camp David agreements and the separate treaty between Egypt and Israel as restrictions on the inalienable rights of the Arab race and the Palestinian Arabs, which will aid in prolonging the occupation of Arab territories, was actually also an indirect condemnation of Beijing's policy in the Middle East. The Chinese leadership, which applauds the actions of Egyptian President Sadat and which has signed an agreement with Egypt on "military cooperation," promising to supply Egypt with 60 Chinese military planes, is striving to play some part in carrying out American-Israeli-Egyptian plans in the Middle East and is essentially opposing the Arab countries, the overwhelming majority of which condemned the separate Egyptian-Israeli bargain at the conference and demanded the expulsion of Egypt from the movement for non-alignment.

It is quite interesting that the Beijing press, in reports on the preparations for the Havana conference, only commented in passing on a matter being widely debated by the non-aligned countries--the demand of a group of Arab states for Egypt's expulsion from the movement--and provided no explanation whatsover of the motives for this demand.

We could continue this examination of the problems and situations testifying that Chinese views and Beijing's actual behavior in the area of foreign policy were either directly or indirectly criticized by the non-aligned countries during the preparations for the conference in Havana and at the conference itself. The preceding discussion, however, provides quite sufficient proof that the position of the Chinese leadership is completely contrary to the ideas and principles of the movement for non-alignment, and that Beijing's policy toward the movement itself is of a subversive and reactionary nature.

In essence, Beijing was sitting in the same prisoner's dock with the West in Havana, as an accessory to the crimes committed by the imperialist powers against the revolutionary struggle of the world public. "The Havana proceedings were proceedings against imperialism, with the United States at the head," the Vietnamese newspaper NHAN DAN reported on 10 September, "and with the clique of Chinese expansionists representing the shock forces of counterrevolution in our day." Apparently, it was no coincidence that diplomats from the United States and PRC, who were invited to the opening ceremonies along with diplomatic representatives of other countries, arrived together and indignantly left the conference hall during F. Castro's brilliant opening speech. Analyzing the results of the Havana conference, the Singapore STRAITS TIMES newspaper had every reason to state on 11 September that not one country, with one or two exceptions, expressed support for Beijing at the conference, and that "a distinguishing feature of the sixth conference of the non-aligned countries was the almost total isolation of China." The Western press also had to acknowledge this fact, although not very willingly. On 14 September, the NEW YORK TIMES stated that, at the conference, China was not accorded the sympathy it once enjoyed in the Third World.

Beijing's obstructionist position on the urgent matters of struggle for peace, stronger detente and total and universal disarmament diverges fundamentally from the basic concepts of the movement for non-alignment, which took a line contrary to the Chinese platform at its sixth conference in Havana, thereby refuting the false statements made by Chinese politicians regarding the common interests of the non-aligned countries and Beijing. The Chinese leaders have no positive program in regard to the movement for non-alignment. Beijing essentially prefers to speculate on existing tendencies within the movement, with which it is experiencing serious conflicts and disagreements on virtually all major issues of the present day.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 3 September 1979.

2. See "Vneshnyaya politika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya Kitayskoy Narodnoy Respubliki" [The Foreign Policy and International Relations of the People's Republic of China], vol I, Moscow, 1974, pp 223-230.

3. Ibid., vol II, pp 59-64.

4. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [Following the Leninist Course. Speeches and Articles], vol 6, Moscow, 1978, p 162.

5. RENMIN RIBAO, 7 March 1978.

6. Ibid., 24 June 1978.

7. Ibid., 1 June 1978.

8. NOVOYE VREMYA, No 38, 14 September 1979, p 22.

9. Ibid., p 30.

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PROBLEM OF CONSOLIDATING PEACE ON KOREAN PENINSULA

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1979 pp 14-26

[Article by Yu. I. Ognev, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] The defeat suffered by aggressive U.S. circles in Indochina, the resulting formation of a united socialist Vietnam, the joining of the socialist world by the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the victory of progressive national forces in Kampuchea, the disintegration of the military SEATO bloc and other factors all created the necessary conditions, in spite of the opposition of Maoist China, for further progressive changes and advances on the entire Asian continent. In connection with this, official Washington reassessed the role of its allies in this region, including the South Korean dictatorial regime, in the hope of using South Korea as a military beachhead with an important strategic location on the Asian continent. The interest of the United States in the Korean peninsula has increased considerably as a result of the present political and economic convergence of the United States, Japan and China.

A struggle between two opposite political tendencies on the Korean peninsula has become more intense in recent years: On one side there is the desire for peace, security and the peaceful attainment of the goal of Korean reunification, while on the other there is a tendency toward the escalation of tension and preparations for the non-peaceful and violent unification of the country. For this reason, there is a special need for political initiatives which can aid in preserving and consolidating peace and security in this zone. Events have shown, however, that the initiatives recently taken by the governments of the United States and its allies in regard to Korea have a completely opposite purpose, which is attested to by the recent visit of U.S. President J. Carter to Seoul.

Carter's visit to South Korea took place from 29 June through 1 July of this year, following the Tokyo meeting of the heads of seven developed capitalist powers. In Carter's talks with Pak Chong-hui, the American side was also represented by U.S. Secretary of State C. Vance, Secretary of Defense H. Brown, National Security Adviser Z. Brzezinski and Assistant Secretary of State R. Holbrooke.

It should be noted that Carter's visit was preceded by reports in the Western and Japanese press which suggested that the American President's visit to Seoul could put South Korean dictator Pak Chong-hui in a difficult position due to the earlier publicity in the United States regarding the negative attitude of U.S. political circles and the Carter Administration toward the Seoul regime's repressive treatment of the opposition. But these assumptions were incorrect. Carter's visit to South Korea demonstrated the United States' firm intention to continue giving all-round support to Pak Chong-hui's inhumane regime in line with U.S. strategic plans in Asia. According to the text of the communique on the results of the visit, Carter assured Pak Chong-hui that no changes had been made in the U.S. policy of rendering all-round assistance, primarily military, to South Korea. Carter also promised his negotiating partner that the U.S. military presence in South Korea would be maintained and that South Korea would be given "immediate and effective" assistance in the event of "armed invasion," stating that the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" would serve as an "additional guarantee of its security."

President Carter essentially did not raise the issue of "human rights" in South Korea and, to the contrary, made every effort to express support for the dictator's domestic and foreign policy lines and, as the communique notes, invited Pak Chong-hui to visit the United States. The South Korean president accepted this invitation.

Carter's visit to Seoul was actually a demonstration of open support for the repressive regime which has remained in power in South Korea by means of brute force and the cruel repression of its political opponents. Pak Chong-hui announced early vacations for South Korean universities and arrested and jailed hundreds of democratic activists to prevent mass demonstrations by opposition forces during Carter's visit. While Carter was in Seoul, he--the same man who vigorously defends "human rights" whenever the socialist countries are concerned--apparently closed his eyes to the fascist repression and flagrant violation of human rights in South Korea. As NODONG SINMUN remarked, Carter's visit to South Korea demonstrated the insincerity of his statements about the "defense of human rights." "If he had any real respect for human rights," the newspaper stressed, "he should not even have come to South Korea."[1]

The results of Carter's visit to South Korea naturally aroused a pointedly negative reaction in the DPRK. Editorials in the Pyongyang press called the U.S. President's Seoul visit a "visit pursuing the goals of aggression, war and the disintegration of the Korean nationality."[2] The DPRK Government and public protested the Carter Administration's refusal to withdraw its troops from South Korea, calling these troops "the main obstacle to national reunification and a source of tension and threats of war on the Korean peninsula." Recalling Carter's campaign promise to quickly withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea, NODONG SINMUN noted that, as soon as Carter took office, he began a gradual and quite cautious retreat from the fulfillment of his promise to the voters. At first he began to talk about a "sequential withdrawal," then a "partial reduction," attaching more and more new conditions to this, and, finally, in July of this year Carter decided to openly and frankly announce that the presence of U.S. troops (around 40,000) in South Korea would be prolonged indefinitely. To soften the reaction of American political circles to this decision, "new intelligence data" on DPRK armed forces, which were supposedly superior to South Korean forces, were publicized in the United States prior to Carter's trip to Seoul.

Carter's decision to keep U.S. troops in South Korea attested to the present U.S. Administration's contempt for the recommendations of the United Nations, which had already adopted a resolution by an absolute majority vote at the 30th Session of the General Assembly "On the Creation of Favorable Conditions for Turning the Armistice in Korea into Lasting Peace and Accelerating the Independent and Peaceful Unification of Korea," which envisaged the withdrawal from South Korea of all foreign troops stationed there under the UN flag, and the replacement of the military agreement on armistice in Korea with a peace treaty as a way of accomplishing detente and of preserving and consolidating peace in Korea.

Now we already have reason to believe that the world community's recommendations were completely rejected. Carter has not only refused to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea, but has even taken steps to reinforce and technically perfect his military units located in South Korea, as well as the armed forces of the South Korean regime. This means that the American military presence in South Korea will be expanded. The United States intends to enlarge its air force in this region by 20 percent. American military aid to South Korea will total 275 million dollars in 1979 and 900 million in 1980. At the same time, at the request of the United States, South Korea will increase its own military spending by 500 million dollars a year, which will lead to its further militarization, the disruption of the balance of power on the Korean peninsula and the escalation of tension in relations between South and North Korea.

The events connected with the assassination of President Pak Chong-hui on 26 October of this year clearly demonstrated the actual purpose of the retention of U.S. troops in South Korea and the buildup of South Korean armed forces. After Pak Chong-hui had been eliminated, these forces were immediately brought into a state of combat readiness to prevent mass public demonstrations for democratic rights. Power in the nation was transfered to the South Korean army command, controlled by the American military establishment. The flagship of the 7th Fleet and an aircraft carrier of the U.S. Air Force were sent to South Korean ports to intimidate the opposition and guarantee that the balance of political power in South Korea after the dictator's death would be convenient for Washington.

The United States and its South Korean allies are also trying to justify the maintenance of American troops in South Korea on the pretext of the so-called "threat of attack from the North." The entire world knows, however, that this "threat" does not really exist. The slanderous propaganda about the "threat from the North" is nothing more than a screen to conceal intensive military preparations in South Korea and the buildup of the South Korean regime's armed forces. The United States intends to use these forces to carry out its own aggressive plans in Asia, as was the case during the period of U.S. armed aggression in Indochina.

The DPRK is consistently adhering to a peaceful policy and has officially announced more than once that it has no intention of "attacking the South."

After the Korean War, which ended in July 1953 with the failure of the aggressive plans of the United States and its South Korean puppets, the DPRK Government worked out a constructive program for national unification by peaceful democratic means. This would be a suitable place to mention at least some of North Korea's numerous peaceful initiatives.

Realistic proposals regarding peaceful regulation and unification were set forth by the DPRK Government at the Geneva conference of the foreign ministers of five great powers in 1954, to which representatives of the DPRK and South Korea were invited to participate in the discussion of the Korean question. The DPRK proposals envisaged the organization of Korea-wide elections through the efforts of the Koreans themselves (by creating an all-Korean commission made up of representatives of North and South Korea to draft a voting law and guarantee truly democratic elections), the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea to prevent their intervention in the domestic affairs of the Korean people and, finally, the assumption of responsibility by states most interested in the preservation of peace in the Far East to aid in the peaceful development of Korea and create the necessary conditions for its rapid unification. The DPRK representative recommended that conference participants sign an agreement "on the guarantee of peaceful conditions in Korea," which would note their willingness to continue working toward an agreement on peaceful regulation in Korea.

The proposals of the DPRK minister of foreign affairs envisaged the reduction of the forces of each side to 100,000 troops, the gradual eradication of the military situation in the country and the creation, on the basis of equality, of joint organs to take measures aimed at the economic and cultural convergence of North and South Korea.[3] Participants in the Geneva meeting were supposed to promise to aid in the peaceful development of Korea. The Western powers, however, sabotaged the DPRK Government's reasonable proposals.

Even after the Geneva conference, the DPRK continued to vigorously work toward lasting peace on the Korean peninsula. "The line of our party," said Kim Il-song at the Third KWP Congress in 1956, "is aimed at the peaceful unification of our homeland on the basis of democratic principles, or at the attainment of the main objective of the present stage of the Korean revolution, and is the only correct line under existing conditions inside and outside the nation."[4]

The DPRK Government set forth exceptionally broad proposals regarding the peaceful unification of Korea in 1960 after the April demonstrations in South Korea, the dismissal of Syngman Rhee and the creation of a more or less democratic government in South Korea. On 14 August 1960, in a report presented at a festive meeting commemorating the 15th anniversary of Korea's liberation, Kim Il-song said: "Free all-Korean elections, organized on the basis of democratic principles and with no outside intervention whatsoever, will be the most constructive and realistic way of achieving peaceful unification.... But if the South Korean regime, in the fear that South Korea will become communist, does not agree to free nationwide elections, transitional measures will have to be worked out.... We propose the creation of a confederation of South and North Korea as one measure of this kind. The confederated system we propose could be created by forming a Supreme National Committee, made up of representatives of the governments of the DPRK and the Republic of Korea, which would coordinate the unified economic and cultural development of South and North Korea. This confederation would be created with the provisional retention of existing political regimes in North and South Korea and would ensure the independence of both governments. The creation of this kind of confederation, ensuring contacts and dialogs between South and North Korea, will make mutual understanding and cooperation possible and will eliminate mutual suspicion. We feel that the peaceful unification of our homeland could then be accomplished as a result of free all-Korean elections."[5] The DPRK proposals envisaged economic assistance to South Korea and mutual exchange in science, culture, art, sports and other spheres. As a means of alleviating tension in Korea, the DPRK advised that the question of the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea be resolved, that the burden of military spending be lightened and that the size of the South and North Korean armies be reduced to 100,000 troops each.[6]

This extensive program for the peaceful unification of Korea was approved at the Eighth Session of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly on 19-22 November 1960, which sent a letter to the "National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, the political parties, public organizations and population of South Korea."

The proposal of a confederation was completely in line with the political situation that had evolved by that time on the Korean peninsula and was consistent with the wishes of people in both halves of Korea. It aroused widespread response in the world and became the subject of debates in broad segments of the population and in the National Assembly of South Korea. The American Administration announced, through the command of the "UN troops," however, that the United States would use all of its influence to prevent the South Korean regime from being tempted by the DPRK's proposal, and that if it should wish to enter into negotiations with the North, it would have to receive "advance permission from the command of the UN troops"--that is, the command of the American troops stationed in South Korea. In 1961 the democratic forces of South Korea were cruelly suppressed by the South Korean military establishment and a dictatorial military junta was set up there, not without U.S. assistance. This was the response of South Korean reaction and the American militarists to the peaceful proposals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Ostentatious military preparations in South Korea, accompanied by overt appeals by the Seoul dictators for the buildup of South Korean military and economic potential with the aid of the United States and Japan for the purpose of solving the problem of Korean unification from a position of strength, ultimately escalated tension on the Korean peninsula, endangering the cause of peace in this region.

Incessant armed incidents have been taking place along the cease-fire line for many years; although these have been of a local nature and have not grown into large-scale military confrontations, they have sometimes brought events to the verge of armed conflict. On 13 April 1967, for example, an exchange of artillery fire took place along this border. The situation in Korea became particularly tense in connection with the violation of DPRK territorial waters by the U.S. intelligence ship "Pueblo" on 23 January 1968. A serious situation also arose in Korea in connection with the violation of the DPRK air space on 15 April 1969 by a U.S. military reconnaissance plane. Just as in the case involving the "Pueblo," appeals for "revenge," for military operations against the DPRK, were heard in the United States and in South Korea. According to a DPRK Government announcement of 23 April 1969, "more than 2,180 cases of armed invasion, gun and rifle fire and other provocative actions committed by American troops in the border region were recorded just between January and 10 April 1969."[7]

An abrupt change in the views of the Seoul regime in regard to the situation on the Korean peninsula took place in 1971 and coincided with the adoption of anti-Soviet objectives by the Ninth CCP Congress and the reinforcement of Sino-American contacts. And this is not surprising. Apparently, due to the Sino-American rapprochement, the bosses of the South Korean regime decided not to create additional impediments for the U.S. Government's China policy and resolved to reap certain benefits for themselves from this policy.

In September 1971 the South Korean rulers responded to the DPRK proposal and consented to official contacts between South and North Korea through the Red Cross societies of both countries to "negotiate joint activity to find displaced persons and reunite relatives who had been separated from one another."

In 1972 the South Korean rulers even consented to direct negotiations with official representatives of the DPRK Government. Intergovernmental contacts and dialogs took place between South and North Korea and were expressed in the published "Joint Declaration of the North and South" of 4 July 1972.[8] The agreement between the governments of South and North Korea was based on the three fundamental principles of unification that had been set forth by DPRK President Kim Il-song, secretary general of the

KWP Central Committee. The two sides agreed, the joint declaration states, that "firstly, the question of unification must be settled independently, without reliance on external forces and with no outside intervention; secondly, it must be accomplished by peaceful means; and thirdly, it must be achieved by means of 'mass-scale national consolidation.'"

The direct contacts between the South and North Korean regimes, which aided in alleviating tension on the Korean peninsula, won the full support of the international public. But the dialog between representatives of the two sides on specific aspects of the reunification problem did not produce any practical results. Although the South Korean authorities signed the document stipulating the abovementioned three principles of reunification, they had no intention, as later events showed, of observing a single one of them. They went against the principle of independence by appealing for the preservation of the U.S. military presence in South Korea. The intensive buildup of South Korean armed forces was totally inconsistent with the principle of peaceful reunification. And they began their observance of the principle of "national consolidation" by intensifying fascist repressive action against the particular political forces in South Korea that sincerely desired national reunification. Subverting the very idea of reunification, the South Korean authorities began to insist on "reciprocal recognition" of South Korea and the DPRK--that is, recognition of the DPRK by the United States and Japan, and of South Korea by the Soviet Union and PRC--and the simultaneous admission of the DPRK and South Korea into the United Nations. The DPRK Government described Seoul's proposals as an attempt to avoid reunification and legitimize the division of Korea.

On 23 June 1973, DPRK President Kim Il-song set forth new proposals regarding unification, which became known as the "five-point program." This program envisaged: 1) the liquidation of the state of military confrontation and the elimination of tension between North and South; 2) the accomplishment of cooperation between the two sides and exchange in various spheres of politics, diplomacy, military affairs, economics and culture; 3) the convening of a Grand National Assembly made up of representatives of various population strata, political parties and public organizations in the North and South to discuss national reunification; 4) the establishment of a confederation of North and South prior to unification, under the single title "Confederated Republic of Korea"; 5) the admission of both halves of Korea into the United Nations under the single title "Confederated Republic of Korea." These proposals, however, were also opposed by Seoul officials.

It was not until January 1979 that South Korea again took steps to resume talks with the North. At a press conference in Seoul on 19 January 1979, Pak Chong-hui announced the South's willingness to begin negotiations with the North "any time, any place, on any level." According to experts, Seoul apparently made this move "in response to the rapid development of relations between the United States and China." The NEW YORK TIMES, in an article dated 31 January 1979, and several other American and Japanese newspapers stressed the fact that South Korea's statement in favor of the resumption of the dialog was made just before Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping of the PRC State Council was to arrive in Washington, and recalled the events of 1972, when the relaxation of tension in Korea and the establishment of contacts between official representatives of the South and North coincided with U.S. President Nixon's visit to Beijing.

By taking steps to alleviate the tension in relations with the DPRK, the Seoul authorities were evidently striving to create favorable conditions for the establishment of far-reaching ties and cooperation with China, making use of the services of their influential allies--the United States and Japan. Just before Deng Xiaoping's visit to Washington, Seoul asked the United States and Japan to play the role of middleman in organizing talks between Seoul and Beijing.[9]

The new round of Sino-American rapprochement evidently convinced Seoul that China could change its attitude toward the South Korean regime. The Seoul newspaper HANGOOK ILBO, expressing the opinions of official South Korean circles, frankly wrote that the normalization of Sino-American diplomatic relations would aid in the realization of their wishes and that South Korea, for its part, would strive to improve relations with China in the hope of using this as an opportunity to exert influence on the DPRK leaders. There was the belief that China would "have to conduct a realistic reassessment of its policy." Judging by some reports, the establishment of contacts with Beijing after its rapprochement with the United States and Japan--South Korea's closest partners--did not seem a difficult task to the Pak Chong-hui regime. Practical measures for the establishment of contacts with China even began to be planned in South Korea. It was reported, for example, that the South Korean Ministry of Commerce and Industry had taken steps to establish contacts with "non-hostile communist countries" through the development of economic exchange with them and that the ministry intended to appoint several commercial firms to participate in the development of trade with the "communist bloc" countries, utilizing ties with related organizations in West Germany and French and Australian firms maintaing trade relations with these countries. It was also reported that Seoul proposed to Beijing, through the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that economic, cultural and sports contacts be established between the PRC and South Korea as the first steps toward convergence, and, in particular, suggested the opening of exhibits in Beijing and Seoul, where the export commodities of the two states could be displayed along with works of applied art.

As the NEW YORK TIMES reported, however, the South Koreans were somewhat disillusioned with the results of Deng Xiaoping's visit to Washington and Tokyo. According to reports in the Japanese press, Deng Xiaoping allegedly declared that "this is not the time" for Chinese participation in the inter-Korean dialog. In Seoul, this led to the assumption that China's assistance could only be hoped for after a while, after China had considerably strengthened its own position in Asia. Even now, however, China, according to the official Seoul opinion, has a "much more realistic attitude toward South Korea than in the past."[10] "Real detente between Washington and Beijing," commented the Seoul newspaper CHOSON ILBO, "will be difficult to achieve as long as the danger of war exists in Korea."[11]

The Korean Workers Party and the DPRK Government nonetheless again displayed a sincere wish for peaceful regulation in Korea and the provision of the necessary conditions for independent and peaceful unification by democratic means. On 23 January 1979, the Central Committee of the United Democratic Fatherland Front of Korea (UDFF)[12] addressed all population strata, political parties and public organizations in South Korea, the South Korean authorities and Koreans living abroad, proposing the following: 1) a return to the basic idea and principles of the Joint Declaration of North and South of 4 July 1972; 2) the rapid cessation of all slanderous statements and attacks on one another, and "effort to create an atmosphere of national unity"; 3) the rapid and unconditional renunciation of all military actions constituting a threat to the other side, particularly the stockpiling of weapons, the conduct of military operations and the concentration of armed forces "on the front line"--that is, near the military line of demarcation--and the cessation of all military exercises by 1 March; 4) the convening of an all-Korean congress, representing all political parties and public organizations in the North and South, as well as overseas Korean organizations and individuals living abroad, to discuss the problem of Korean reunification. It was proposed that the congress be convened in the beginning of September of this year in Pyongyang or Seoul, and that a preliminary conference, attended by representatives of all Korean political parties and organizations active in Korea and abroad, be held in Pyongyang in the beginning of June.[13]

In response to these proposals, Seoul consented to the organization of preliminary talks in Pyongyang or Seoul "as soon as possible," stressing that the talks would have to be conducted only between "responsible officials." In this way, Seoul made it known from the very beginning that it did not wish to have dealings with representatives of various strata of the DPRK population.

Later events showed that, in spite of Seoul's constant statements about its positive attitude toward the question of resuming the dialog, the South's reluctance to discuss the reunification problem seriously and to solve it was evident in its very approach to the matter. The South Korean authorities apparently insisted on direct intergovernmental negotiations between North and South in the belief that a broader forum, such as the one proposed by the North, would force them to communicate not only with representatives of the DPRK, but also with South Korean political forces opposing Pak Chong-hui.

On 5 February 1979, the UDFF Central Committee issued another statement, proposing that a preparatory committee on national unification be established in place of the North-South Coordinating Committee. The statement noted that the coordinating committee had played a definite part in the restoration of severed national ties and the regulation of North-South relations, but in the present stage, now that the historic tasks of total unification are on the agenda, this committee has become unnecessary. As a consultative body with the responsibility of arranging for nationwide dialog and negotiations, the Central Committee statement said, the preparatory committee on national unification should be made up of representatives of Korean political parties and organizations, including Korean organizations abroad, and representatives of the North and South Korean governments. This kind of committee could discuss the convening of an nationwide conference, as well as other matters pertaining to preparations for the final unification of the country.[14]

The numerous meetings between representatives of South and North, held in Panmunjom, did not produce any mutually acceptable solutions, although compromises were suggested by the DPRK. In particular, it proposed that the preparatory committee include representatives of the South and North Korean regimes. The DPRK's attempt to resume the use of the direct ("hot") line between Seoul and Pyongyang, which was established in 1972, also encountered the resistance of Seoul authorities, as they did not wish to communicate by telephone with the representative of the UDFF who had been authorized by the North Korean side to perform this duty.

Differences in North and South Korean views were reflected primarily in the fact that Seoul tried to avoid negotiating Korean reunification although it had advocated the resumption of the inter-Korean dialog. The Seoul rulers believe that South Korea will benefit from the preservation of the "status quo" on the Korean peninsula. This conclusion is backed up by the allegation that the South Korean economy is developing more successfully and more rapidly than the economy of North Korea, and it is in this field that the Seoul regime sees "favorable" prospects for the exertion of pressure on the DPRK. Seoul also plans to achieve absolute military superiority over the DPRK by 1985 by building up and modernizing its own armed forces and arms with U.S. assistance.

In March of this year, when the North-South dialog was taking place and the North Korean side had proposed the cessation of all actions constituting a threat to the other side, the United States conducted mass-scale South Korean and American joint tactical exercises. These military maneuvers were the South Korean side's unique "response" to the peaceful proposals of North Korea.

The UDFF proposal, envisaging the negotiation of national unification by representatives of South and North Korean political parties and public organizations, appears to be a constructive and, one could say, even the ideal solution to the Korean problem. Serious obstacles, however, are being set up to impede the implementation of this proposal. These obstacles are being set up primarily by the antinational regime in South Korea and by influential imperialist circles in the United States and Japan, which, acting in their own selfish interests, are striving to perpetuate the division of Korea and, for this purpose, are inciting the South Korean authorities to conduct a corresponding policy.

A lack of interest in the formation of a united Korean state was openly displayed by the United States, protecting its military presence and strong political and economic influence in South Korea. It should be borne in mind that the United States is guided by more than just military considerations in its relations with the South Korean regime. Economic factors, particularly the South Korean market with its multimillion-strong army of cheap labor, have recently acquired greater significance in these relations. When U.S. ruling circles determine the prospects for the development of U.S.-South Korean relations, they anticipate the continuation of rapid economic development in South Korea in the future and expect this country to become "one of the most important trade partners and one of the main markets for American exports" in the 1980's. The U.S. Government also expects South Korea to modernize its armed forces at a much more rapid rate than the DPRK. It is hardly necessary to prove that the implementation of these plans will complicate the resolution of the unification problem even more.

Japan has no interest in creating a united state on the Korean peninsula either. Japanese ruling circles view a militarized South Korea, a U.S. ally, as a reliable buffer zone, safeguarding Japanese "security." In addition, Japan fears that the unification of Korea would cause it to lose a valuable sphere for the application of Japanese capital and a quite voluminous sales market. According to reports in the Japanese press, at the Japanese-American talks held just before Carter's visit to Seoul, Japan tried to influence the American President. M. Ohira tried to convince him that his proposed plan for the withdrawal of American troops, as well as the U.S. criticism of the South Korean regime for suppressing "human rights," had a negative effect on the domestic political situation in South Korea. All of this was supposedly undermining the authority and weakening the real power of Pak Chong-hui. Reports in the Japanese press on the results of the Japanese-American talks noted that the two sides reached a "mutual understanding" on the Korean problem.

Judging by the example of Vietnam, Beijing has no interest in the creation of a united independent Korea either. The Chinese leaders are only concerned that events in Korea might impede the process of China's rapprochement with the United States and Japan. The Chinese leaders have displayed total indifference to the problem of the national reunification of the Korean people. At a press conference in Japan, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping of the PRC, lumping together the totally diverse issues of Vietnam, the "two Koreas," the "two Germanys," the "two Chinas" and even the provocative claims made by Japanese revanchistes on the Soviet Union regarding the so-called "northern territories," cynically "expressed the conviction" that these problems would be solved, "if not in ten or a hundred years, then surely in a thousand."[15] Given this approach to the problem of the national unity of the Korean people, the Beijing leaders should have no trouble finding a common language with the Seoul rulers. Pak Chong-hui also argued that the resolution of the reunification problem was an objective of the distant future, which, in his opinion, had to be postponed indefinitely.

Japan's AKAHATA newspaper stated that the decision of the Carter Administration to keep American troops in South Korea in spite of Carter's previous promises and to continue intervening in Korean domestic affairs was based on consideration for many circumstances related to U.S. policy in the Far East. In connection with this, AKAHATA stated that the joint communique of Presidents Carter and Pak Chong-hui was backed up by China, which applauds and supports the presence of American troops in Asia.

The Korean question was on the agenda of the Sino-American talks at the time of U.S. Vice-President Mondale's recent official visit to the PRC. It is no secret that Beijing expressed support for U.S. expansionist plans in the Far East during the course of talks with Mondale. And Mondale, in a speech at Beijing University, underscored the "determination" of the United States to work with China to "safeguard a multitude of parallel strategic interests." At this time, he also felt the need to issue a "warning" to "any country" that might take a stand contrary to these interests.

In connection with Carter's visit to Seoul, South Korea's position on questions of regulation on the Korean peninsula acquired some new characteristics. Just before the visit, the South Korean minister of foreign affairs said in a televised interview that Seoul was prepared to begin a positive investigation of the possibility of a trilateral meeting, participated in by the two Koreas and the United States, for the purpose of establishing peace on the Korean peninsula on the condition that South and North Korea would be the main negotiating sides in the talks. In essence, President Carter totally supported the stand of the South Korean authorities on the Korean question. As the joint communique on the results of the visit said, "President Carter and President Pak Chong-hui of South Korea resolved to jointly propose a meeting of high-level U.S. representatives"--that is, a meeting under the aegis of the United States. Both presidents also instructed the South Korean minister of foreign affairs and U.S. Secretary of State C. Vance to jointly establish contacts with the North Korean minister of foreign affairs to learn his views on the matter. A U.S. and South Korean message, proposing a trilateral meeting, was sent to the DPRK through the Indonesian ambassador in Pyongyang. Judging by the reports of South Korean news agencies, the United States attempted to make use of Beijing's assistance in this instance as well. The reports cited, in particular, diplomatic sources, according to which U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke for East Asian and Pacific Affairs was instructed to request the Chinese authorities, during his visit to Beijing, to use their influence to urge Pyongyang to accept the joint proposal of Pak Chong-hui and Carter. Holbrooke's mission was expected to be successful, since "Beijing has always displayed a positive attitude toward the idea of trilateral negotiations."

An official statement of 10 July by a representative of the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs contained the official, essentially negative reply to the U.S.-South Korean proposal regarding trilateral talks.[16] The ministry called this proposal absolutely unrealistic and unreasonable. The proposals regarding the "reciprocal recognition" of North and South Korea and their simultaneous admission to the United Nations were described as "perfidious intrigues" aimed at "perpetuating the division of Korea through the international recognition of the existing dependent South Korean regime, which has no sovereign rights." The statement stressed that two different questions had to be negotiated: firstly, the question of the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea and the replacement of the armistice agreement with an agreement on peace, which would have to be resolved by the actual signatories of the armistice--that is, the DPRK and the United States--and secondly, the question of Korean unification, which would have to be discussed at the talks by the Koreans.[17] The United States would have nothing to do with these talks. Taking the insistent demands of the American side into account, however, the DPRK consented to the participation of the South Korean authorities in the discussion of the first question in the capacity of observers.

According to a report of Seoul's HAPDONG NEWS AGENCY, after the South Korean minister of foreign affairs had consulted with the U.S. ambassador in Seoul, the two sides resolved to continue working toward a trilateral conference, despite the fact that the DPRK had already rejected this proposal. It was also reported that the South Korean Government and the Carter Administration will take joint steps regarding their proposed trilateral negotiations on the Korean question.

The United States' attempt to take a direct part in Korean negotiations modeled on the Camp David talks is apparently motivated by the desire to lend additional strength to the South Korean regime and exert additional pressure on the DPRK. The United States evidently believes that the American military presence in South Korea gives it the right to serve as an arbiter in relations between South and North Korea. And the United States is trying to fortify this "right" with force. The South Korean army of 600,000 is being equipped with modern weapons with an American trademark. Seoul is also organizing the mass production of its own weapons. And the so-called Agency on the National Unification of Korea has even called for the production of nuclear weapons.[18] There is no question that the militarization of South Korea would be impossible without the help of the United States, which is trying to influence events in this region by building up the collective military strength of its own forces and those of its allies. The Pentagon is augmenting its air force, intelligence, rear and other units in South Korea. Instead of working toward lasting peace on the Korean peninsula, the NEW YORK TIMES wrote, the United States, "by overloading the peninsula with weapons, is maximizing the possibility of conflict."[19]

These are the positions from which the United States and the South Korean regime want to conduct "peaceful" negotiations with the DPRK Government.

The United States' refusal to withdraw its troops from Korea and the militarization of the South Korean regime are only part of a general program to strengthen U.S. military-political positions in Asia.

The Western press has reported U.S. plans to reinforce the ANZUS military-political bloc (the United States, Australia and New Zealand) and expand it by admitting Japan to this alliance. The idea of giving the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) a military-political nature has also been discussed. Broader military assistance has been offered to some of these countries on a bilateral basis. Making use of the Chinese myth about the "threat" the SRV represents to the ASEAN countries, the United States has expanded deliveries of weapons to these nations and is trying to coordinate their military policies to use them as a counterweight to the socialist countries of Indochina. When tension escalated in Indochina at the end of 1978, the United States concluded an agreement to prolong the use of military bases on the Philippines by U.S. armed forces. These bases are being used, in particular, by the American 7th Fleet, which began a provocative military-political operation "to save the refugees" along the SRV coastline in July 1979 on Carter's orders. Work is also being continued on the enlargement of the American air force and naval base on the Island of Diego Garcia, in the middle of the Indian Ocean.

According to foreign sources, approximately 1,800 nuclear weapons are now located on American bases and facilities in Asia, not counting the tactical nuclear weapons on ships of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

The situation in Korea and around it, therefore, is reaching a point at which the peaceful and fair policy line of the DPRK Government will be actively opposed by the United States, Japan and, following their lead, the South Korean regime and Maoist China

A show of strength on the Korean peninsula on the imaginary pretext of the "Soviet military threat" or the "threat from the North" can only be interpreted as the Carter Administration's slide down an icy slope erected by the particular forces in the United States that oppose detente and are trying to return the world to the days of the cold war. This kind of U.S. behavior is in sharp contrast to the overall state of Soviet-American relations, which, according to our firm conviction, should be governed primarily by the results of L. I. Brezhnev's meetings and talks with J. Carter in Vienna on 15-18 June. Moreover, the joint communique on the results of the Vienna talks contained the important stipulation that neither side would "strive for military superiority."

The Soviet Union is countering the policy of escalating tension and military confrontation on the Korean peninsula with an absolutely different line--a line aimed at lasting peace and at the extension of detente to this explosive part of the Far East that is so exceptionally important to the fate of the world. The DPRK is not standing alone in its struggle to achieve peaceful national reunification and consolidate peace on the Korean peninsula. It has the international support of the Soviet Union, all of the countries of the socialist community and the majority of non-aligned states on its side. Peace on the Korean peninsula and the peaceful unification of Korea are the common desires of the entire Korean population and all peace-loving people in the world.

FOOTNOTES

1. NODONG SINMUN, 3 July 1979.

2. Ibid., 4 July 1979.

3. See the report by DPRK Minister of Foreign Affairs Nam Il at the Eighth Session of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly, "On the Work of the DPRK Governmental Delegation at the Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Regulation of the Korean Question,"--"For the Peaceful Unification of the Homeland. Collected Documents" (in Korean), Pyongyang, 1954.

4. Kim Il-song, "Selected Articles and Speeches," Moscow, 1962, p 235.

5. Ibid., pp 685, 686.

6. Ibid., p 689.

7. NODONG SINMUN, 24 April 1969.

8. Ibid., 5 July 1972.

9. See MAINICHI, 25 January 1979.

10. NEW YORK TIMES, 12 February 1979.

11. CHOSON ILBO, 3 February 1979.

12. The United Democratic Fatherland Front of Korea is made up of all DPRK political parties and public organizations. The leading force in the front is the Korean Workers Party.

13. NODONG SINMUN, 24 January 1979.

14. Ibid., 6 February 1979.

15. RENMIN RIBAO, 26 October 1978.

16. See NODONG SINMUN, 11 July 1979.

17. Ibid.

18. PRAVDA, 22 August 1978.

19. Ibid., 22 July 1978.

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CHINA AT UNCTAD-V

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1979 pp 27-37

[Article by M. A. Andreyev]

[Text] The fifth session of the UN Conference on Trade and Development was held in Manila in May and June of this year. The agenda of UNCTAD-V included more than 20 topics, among them the assessment of the state of the world economy and international economic relations, protectionism in world trade, multilateral trade negotiations, the implementation of the integrated program on raw material commodities, the availability of finished items and semimanufactured goods in world markets, currency and financial relations, technology exchange, world shipping, special steps to aid the least developed intracontinental and insular developing countries, trade between states with different social systems, and the economic cooperation of the developing countries. The intensification of conflicts between developing and developed capitalist states was apparent at the conference and was reflected in the liberated countries' firm and specific demands for the reorganization of international economic relations on a democratic basis.

After UNCTAD-IV in Nairobi (Kenya, 1976) the crisis in Chinese foreign policy became even more pronounced and this put the Chinese delegation at UNCTAD-V in a peculiar position. Above all, the reorientation of Chinese foreign economic relations toward the imperialist powers became a reality. Combined with Beijing's political alliance with the West, the reorientation aroused silent but unwavering dissatisfaction in the majority of liberated states in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The Chinese aggression against the SRV in spring 1979 shattered Beijing propaganda's myth about China's peaceful disposition, and the developing countries learned through personal experience that China had become a source of tension throughout the world, particularly in Asia. The Beijing-inspired mass illegal emigration of Chinese nationals from Vietnam and Kampuchea to the countries of Southeast Asia created additional difficult problems of a political and economic nature for China's neighboring Asian developing countries, including the Philippines--the country where UNCTAD-V was held.

At the two previous UNCTAD sessions--in Chile (1972) and Kenya (1976)--China had disillusioned the developing countries with its blatant and unconstructive approach to the problem of reorganizing international economic relations on a democratic basis. It did not make any positive suggestions in regard to fundamental issues in international economic relations and tried to merely reassess the positive experience accumulated by the developing countries in the struggle to correct their inferior status in international capitalist division of labor, attempting to gain the support of the developing countries for its great-power maneuvers in the spirit of the Maoist theory of the "three worlds." Beijing's maneuvers did not gain any support to speak of in UNCTAD.

In connection with this, China was isolated with respect to the representation of its interests in UNCTAD and day-to-day cooperation with other countries in conference organs.

In accordance with the universally accepted division of states in today's world into socialist, developing and developed capitalist countries, several large groups, representing the interests of states with similar socioeconomic systems, took shape in the UNCTAD organs. The socialist CEMA countries were represented primarily in Group "D." The developed capitalist states--the United States, the members of the European Economic Community, the Scandinavian countries, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand--make up Group "B." The developing countries of Asia and Africa (Group "A") and Latin American (Group "C") act as a united front within the larger Group of 77, which now takes in 119 developing countries. In UNCTAD, which now has 159 members, China, with its unique foreign policy line, could not find a place in any of these groups. Adhering to its antisocialist line in international affairs, it refused to join Group "D," which expresses the interests of the socialist states. The Group of 77 has refrained from admitting China, despite its desire to join this group and acquire the status of a developing country. For many reasons, China is not striving for membership in Group "B," and the developed capitalist countries do not want this either. China therefore had no choice but to act on its own in UNCTAD. According to Philippine press reports, at the conference China "had its own group, of which it was the sole member." The Malaysian press described the organizational mechanism of UNCTAD at its fifth session and noted that, in each negotiating committee, the Group of 77 would be facing representatives of the chief capitalist powers, united in one group, representatives of the socialist countries, united in another group, and the representative of China, acting "on his own behalf."[1] In order to judge the degree of China's isolation in UNCTAD, we should remember that only one other country is in a similar position in this organization--Israel.

China's status in UNCTAD offers it the possibility of two tactical advantages--independent representation in all working bodies of the conference and the absolutely precise expression of its views on topics of discussion, since it is not bound by the interests and views of any other nation.

Several facts testify that China made painstaking preparations for UNCTAD-V. This was the third conference session in which China participated and it could no longer plead unfamiliarity with procedure and the essence of discussion topics, as it did at the previous two sessions. It is a fact that UNCTAD-V received a message from Hua Guofeng, wishing the conference success in its work. The Chinese delegation at the fifth session was quite large (24 members) and impressive. It was headed by Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Liu Xiwen. Other members of the delegation were officials from the ministries of foreign affairs and foreign trade, the Bank of China, the Scientific Research Institute of International Trade, the permanent PRC delegation for liaison with international organizations in Geneva and the Chinese Embassy in the Philippines. There is no question that the members of the Chinese delegation were competent, having the necessary authority with respect to the topics of discussion and the capability to comply with the directives and instructions issued by Beijing.

Besides this, China timed several initiatives in the sphere of Sino-Philippine relations to coincide with the conference in order to create a favorable atmosphere for the work of the Chinese delegation. An agreement establishing direct air communications between China and the Philippines was signed in the first days of the conference in Manila. The head of the Chinese delegation negotiated with the Philippine minister of trade, announcing the intention of the Chinese side to buy 60,000 tons of copper concentrate, lumber, chromium ore, ferrosilicon and 200,000 tons of raw sugar from this country and to supply it with a number of Chinese commodities. Preliminary discussions were also held on the use of Chinese ships to carry Philippine foreign trade cargo to Western European ports on preferential terms.[2] A troupe of Chinese circus performers from Wuhan, invited to the Philippines by local organizations, toured Manila and other cities in May. Chinese diplomacy stubbornly fought for representation in all conference administrative bodies during the preparations for UNCTAD-V. China received a separate seat in the 35-member conference bureau. China was on the committee for the verification of the authority of delegations. Finally, China also received independent representation in the Committee of 19, headed by Philippine Minister of Foreign Affairs C. Romulo, conference chairman, and created in the final stage of the conference to settle all undecided issues.

All of this attested to China's well-planned and painstaking preparations for UNCTAD-V.

The position taken by the Chinese delegation at the conference was governed by two basic factors--China's adherence to the Maoist theory of the "three worlds" and the rechanneling of Chinese foreign economic relations in the direction of the developed capitalist states.

Chinese support for the developing countries was not as extensive and energetic at UNCTAD-V as at previous sessions. The Chinese stand on a number of issues was in sharp contrast to that of the developing countries.

The Chinese delegation has traditionally supported the demand of the developing countries for the reorganization of international economic relations, but this time the support was more moderate in tone and in the range of issues. China supported the platform of the developing countries at UNCTAD-V, as set forth in the "Arusha Program for Collective Self-Sufficiency and Guidelines for Negotiation," adopted in February 1979 at a ministerial conference of Asian, African and Latin American countries. It was announced that "the Chinese delegation applauds this document. We feel that the Group of 77 has contributed to the work of UNCTAD by issuing this document, and we are willing to accept it as the basis for our discussion at this session." It is interesting that the Chinese delegation did not transcend the bounds of the Arusha program--that is, it did not go further than the developing countries--in the discussion of the majority of topics connected with the state of world economics and international trade, as well as the means of reorganizing international economic relations.

China particularly supported the intention of the developing countries to promote more intensive economic cooperation within the framework of the Group of 77, which "is playing a positive role in the reorganization of the old international economic relations, in the establishment of a new economic order and in the development of the national economies of the Third World countries," but it did not assume any specific obligation to support economic cooperation by the developing countries. As the Chinese representative stated, "the establishment of a new international economic order is the common desire and demand of all developing countries, it has become an irreversible historical tendency, but everyone must give consideration to the difficulty and diversity of this struggle."

China apparently feels that its interpretation of problems in international economic relations according to the theory of the "three worlds" represents its contribution to this struggle. It is striving to inject the spirit of the Maoist theory of "self-reliance" into the developing countries' idea of collective self-sufficiency. For this purpose, the Chinese delegation at UNCTAD-V continued to propagandize the theory of "self-reliance," making references to China's firm adherence to the "policy of independence," "self-reliance," "realistic thinking" and a "better-planned and balanced style of management."

Nonetheless, China had to admit that it "will learn from the instructive experience of foreign countries and import progressive foreign technology and equipment.... It will engage widely in economic exchange and economic and technological cooperation," but did not mention the fact that it will be engaging, and already is engaging, in this exchange and cooperation with the imperialist powers rather than with the developing countries. It is becoming increasingly apparent to the developing countries that the

Maoist interpretation of "self-reliance" is not applicable to the conditions of their economies, which require regular and intensive exchange with the rest of the world, that China is not capable of compensating for the losses the developing countries may suffer if they follow the recipes of "self-reliance," that "self-reliance" has already failed in China and that the Maoists are moving away from it more and more. Under these conditions, the Chinese delegation's recommendations regarding "self-reliance" did not meet with the approval of the developing countries at UNCTAD-V, and it is more probable that they aroused silent indignation in the delegates from these countries.

China supported the developing countries' suggestions concerning the reorganization of international economic relations, the eradication of the restrictive business practices and protectionism of some developed capitalist powers in the area of imports of finished commodities and semimanufactured goods from the Asian, African and Latin American countries, and the reform of the capitalist currency and financial system with a view to the interests of the developing countries, as well as their intention to make the "Program of Action To Establish a New International Economic Order" the "central element" of UN development in the 1980's. This is obviously an inadequate contribution to the "elaboration of fair and just rules and procedures in the interests of economic prosperity and world development," on which the Chinese delegation was insisting at UNCTAD-V.

China is still hoping to be categorized as a developing country.

The Chinese delegation at UNCTAD-V was unable to take any concrete action to corroborate Maoist propaganda's thesis concerning the invariable and effective support China has given to the developing countries in their struggle for the reorganization of international economic relations on a democratic basis. The only specific commitment taken on by China was its delegation's announcement that the PRC was willing to join the general fund for the stabilization of raw material prices. As the Chinese representative stated, "we (China--M. A.) have decided to become party to the final and official agreement on the general fund and to make a definite contribution through the proper channels." Immediately afterwards, however, the Chinese representatives hastily stressed: "All of you know that Chinese foreign trade represents an extremely small portion of world trade. Nonetheless, we want to make as much of an effort as possible to contribute to the common cause of the Third World countries to strengthen our unity and reorganize the old international economic and trade relations."

First of all, this means that China's contribution to the general fund will be close to the minimum amount, set at the negotiations in the amount of 1 million American dollars from each member. For the sake of comparison, we will note that the Philippines, for example, promised to contribute 25 million dollars to the fund. Besides this, China's declaration reflects its traditional avoidance of serious participation, including financial, in the resolution of international economic problems. In its customary fashion, China informed the developing countries that it would not be able to make a larger contribution to mankind's development until after it had carried out its program of "four modernizations"--that is, after the year 2000. Moreover, the program of "four modernizations"--and this was underscored in the Chinese delegation's statement at UNCTAD-V--is encountering certain difficulties.

Naturally, China's position on specific matters pertaining to assistance did not evoke an enthusiastic response in delegates from the developing countries.

For two extremely substantial reasons, the Chinese delegation at UNCTAD-V refrained from advertising China's experience in economic relations with the developing countries, although it has customarily taken this opportunity for self-advertisement at all international forums attended by representatives of the developing countries.

The first reason for the Chinese delegation's unusual restraint at this session was that too many obvious elements of inequality and exploitation had accumulated in economic relations with the developing countries through the fault of Beijing. In foreign trade, these include the forcing of Chinese exports on the developing countries in excess of the economically substantiated needs of these countries with the aid of crafty means of foreign trade expansion; the stubborn restriction of imports from these countries, particularly the finished items of young national industry; the dramatic and chronic imbalance of trade between China and the developing countries in China's favor. The Chinese program of economic aid to the developing countries is distinguished by extremely meager and diminishing scales, a sizeable discrepancy between promised and utilized aid, outdated physical and material content and the concentration of all the benefits and privileges resulting from this form of economic exchange on the Chinese side. By means of the combination of foreign property and pro-Beijing segments of the overseas Chinese bourgeoisie, China is participating in the exploitation of people in the liberated countries and is receiving exploitative revenues in the amount of 1-1.2 billion American dollars each year. This diminishes the value of Chinese economic aid to the developing countries and, what is more, refutes all Beijing assertions about the mutually beneficial and egalitarian nature of economic exchange between China and the liberated countries. China's approach to economic cooperation with the developing states is marked by hypocrisy: Inciting these countries to the maximum exacerbation of relations with the outside world, especially the socialist states, it is simultaneously declining to give this cooperation any real support and is thereby inflict serious economic injury on the developing countries. Fearing the public exposure of the numerous elements of inequality and exploitation of the developing countries by China, the Chinese delegation felt it would be wise to omit the details of China's economic relations with these countries at UNCTAD-V.

The second reason for the Chinese delegation's restraint on this matter at UNCTAD-V was the reorientation of Chinese foreign economic relations in the direction of the developed capitalist states after UNCTAD-IV, and this circumstance, as the developing countries are fully aware, will automatically reduce China's relations with them. This reorientation and its negative effects on the developing countries were no secret to the latter, and the Chinese delegation, having no wish to suffer the pointed criticism of the Group of 77, felt it would be best to remain silent and not engage in self-advertisement.

A new feature in China's position at UNCTAD-V was its unequivocal divergence from the Group of 77 in its assessment of the approach of the developed capitalist countries to the resolution of the foreign economic problems of developing states. This was not the result of an accidental blunder or a lack of unawareness on China's part, since the developing countries had already set forth their precise views on this matter in the Arusha Program, adopted 3 months prior to the beginning of UNCTAD-V.

The Arusha Program sharply criticizes all basic aspects of the foreign economic policy of the imperialist powers toward the developing countries. The Group of 77 noted that the worldwide capitalist economy was experiencing the most severe economic crisis since World War II. The West is stubbornly opposing the establishment of a new international economic order, impeding the successful conclusion of negotiations on specific problems in the reorganization of international economic relations, ignoring decisions that have already been made, transferring the burden of the crisis in the developed capitalist countries to the developing states and so forth.[3] The thesis that the imperialist powers' lack of "political will" was impeding the reorganization of international economic relations on a democratic basis was justifiably echoed in the speeches of the overwhelming majority of delegates from the developing countries at the session. The West's position kept the developing countries from moving ahead on many important matters at UNCTAD-V.

Against the background of this sound criticism of the position taken by the imperialist powers, the Chinese representative's assessment of the present state of economic relations between developing and developed capitalist states sounded a sharp note of discord at UNCTAD-V. In his opinion, "several developed countries have demonstrated a realistic approach in recent years to the resolution of some international economic problems; to varying degrees, they have responded to the appeals of the developing countries, thereby improving their cooperation with the latter. The noticeable growth of economic and commercial exchange between the European Economic Community and the Afro-Arab countries has been seen in these years. The same is true of the relations of the countries of Northern Europe and the Asian and Pacific zone (that is, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, as well as Canada and the United States--M. A.) with the developing countries. A dozen developed nations have canceled the debts of some of the least developed countries, and this is creating a favorable atmosphere for North-South dialog."

China's assessment was in sharp contrast to that of the liberated nations. It was not corroborated at all by the results of UNCTAD-V, which took place in an atmosphere of acute conflicts between the developing and imperialist states, as a result of which resolutions were not passed on many important items on the conference agenda.

The Chinese delegation went even further by essentially defending the negative position of the developed capitalist nations in regard to the problems of the new economic order. China corroborated the statements of delegates from these countries by saying that the consequences of the economic crisis were keeping the West from taking a more constructive stand on the issues being discussed--that is, it virtually expressed solidarity with the developed capitalist powers on this matter. Statements by Chinese delegates simply referred to the numerous difficulties of the developing countries in the sphere of international economic relations, but did not reveal the true causes of these difficulties and did not suggest any specific ways of overcoming them.

The change in China's position toward the developed capitalist states at UNCTAD-V did not escape the notice of the developing countries. The Malaysian press reported: "Today China praised some of the developed countries for their realistic approach to world economic problems.... In particular, it pointed out the increased economic and commercial exchange between the European Economic Community and the Afro-Arab countries."[4] According to the Indian press, there was nothing surprising about the position taken by the Chinese representatives, as China ceased to assist the developing countries long ago. The position taken by China at the UNCTAD session demonstrated once again how close Beijing is to the neocolonial powers and how hostile it now is to the real interests of the developing countries.[5]

China's foreign economic reorientation toward the West, which became a reality in recent years, obligates it to join the developed capitalist states in preventing the adoption and implementation of decisions benefiting the developing countries. Besides this, the logic of the Maoist theory of "three worlds," according to which the developing countries must cooperate closely with the "second world," by which Beijing means all of the developed capitalist countries with the exception of the United States, has led China into a blind alley, and it has therefore been forced to sow harmful illusions among the developing countries, contrary to self-evident facts, and simultaneously defend the developed capitalist states.

At UNCTAD-V, China actually announced the reduction of the sphere and level of its economic and political cooperation with the liberated states and simultaneously indicated, unequivocally, that it was prepared to develop intensive relations with the West to the detriment of the interests of the Asian, African and Latin American people. Beijing's desire for alliance with the West is so pronounced that it assumed the responsibility at UNCTAD-V of protecting the interests of the imperialist powers, which are trying to preserve the colonial system of international economic relations and interfere with the current reorganization of these relations on a democratic basis. If this tendency should continue, China might be closer to Group "B" than to the Group of 77 at the next UNCTAD session. At UNCTAD-V, China again betrayed the interests of the developing countries and openly assumed the role of the West's advocate.

In the spirit of the Maoist theory of "three worlds," the Chinese delegation tried to blame all of the difficulties in international economic relations on the maneuvers and intrigues of the "superpowers," but the groundless and harmful nature of this interpretation of international economic affairs was apparent to all delegations at the conference. At UNCTAD-V, however, the Chinese delegation's criticism of the superpowers was more moderate than in the past and did not name names. According to Liu Xiwen, head of the Chinese delegation, "the superpowers are doing everything possible to transfer the burden of their economic crisis to the shoulders of others, and are thereby seriously influencing the economic development of the Third World and widening the gap between the rich and poor nations even more." In view of the fact that national economic development in the socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, is crisis-free and they are not involved in the colonial robbery of the people in the developing countries, just as they are not involved in the neocolonial exploitation of these people, the Maoist criticism of the "superpowers" does not apply to the Soviet Union in this respect. The Chinese representative went on to say that "the superpowers will never voluntarily give up their monopoly and control in the international economic and commercial system. Even now, they are stubbornly trying to oppose the sound demands of the developing countries. Let us consider, for example, the problem of the general fund. One of the superpowers ceased its stubborn opposition and reluctantly recognized the general fund in principle, but only under the pressure of the joint struggle of the Third World countries, while the other has only given this fund verbal recognition and has actually declined to assume any responsibility for its financing. Naturally, this practice of saying one thing and doing another is arousing dissatisfaction and objections in more and more developing countries."

If the Chinese representative was referring to the Soviet Union, his statement falsifies the fundamental Soviet stand on the general fund and is therefore another one of the slanderous statements China so frequently makes in the international arena. Finally, the Chinese delegate's denunciation concerning the refusal of the "superpowers" to lift protectionist barriers in international trade does not apply to the Soviet Union either, since this nation, as the entire world knows, had already established the most favorable customs regulations possible for the developing countries as early as the mid-1960's.

The interesting thing about the approach of the Chinese delegation at UNCTAD-V to the "superpowers" is not the content of the groundless, as usual, criticism of the foreign policy activities of the Soviet Union, which China strives to depict to the world public as a "superpower," but the frequency with which the United States and the USSR are called "superpowers." The ratio is the following: three references to the United States and one to the Soviet Union.

Just before the Soviet-Chinese talks on bilateral intergovernment relations between the USSR and China, the Chinese delegation at UNCTAD-V was apparently instructed to adhere to a moderate tone in its criticism of the USSR. Although the "superpowers" were mentioned in the statement by the head of the Chinese delegation at the plenary meeting of UNCTAD-V on 10 May and in statements by Chinese representatives in the discussion groups, the Soviet Union was not identified as one of these, with the exception of one reference, and even this one was more than dubious. What is more, the Chinese delegates did not use their customary tactic of starting fierce arguments with Soviet representatives over a multitude of issues; this time they refrained from arguing and did not even respond to the criticism of China. At one of the meetings of the sixth discussion group, when the draft resolution on special measures to benefit intracontinental developing countries was being debated, the representative of Group "D" said that one large Asian power, having a common border with such intracontinental countries as Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Laos and Mongolia, was escalating tension on this border and thereby impeding the successful resolution of specific problems in these nations. The Chinese representative, who took the floor immediately after this statement by the representative of Group "D," did not comment on the statement at all, which is quite unusual behavior for China at an international conference.

It appears that Chinese diplomacy's eloquence regarding the "superpowers" in line with the Maoist theory of "three worlds" is starting to run dry, as even Beijing is becoming aware of the unproductive nature of the thesis that "the USSR is a superpower," and this thesis, judging by past experience, was the element of greatest value to the Maoists in the theories of the "two superpowers" and the "three worlds." This nuance of the Chinese delegation's position at UNCTAD-V deserves further investigation, accompanied by the discrediting of the Maoist theses concerning the "superpowers" and the "three worlds."

According to a tradition of long standing, China did not refrain from bringing up political problems during the discussion of economic matters at UNCTAD-V. The Chinese delegation brought a "representative" of the overthrown criminal regime of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary to UNCTAD-V and launched a campaign on the so-called "Kampuchean question" in conference chambers. During this process, the Chinese representatives were backed up by the silent support of several Western powers and took advantage of the erroneous UN position on this question. Despite the recommendations of several delegates from the socialist and developing countries, who believed that the discussion of the "Kampuchean question" was "unrelated to conference objectives" and that the representative of the Pol Pot regime should therefore have no opportunity to speak at the conference, China stubbornly insisted that Pol Pot's "representative" be given the floor. According to some observers, Beijing intended to provoke disagreements between delegations from the developing countries in the hope that the states supporting Vietnam in this matter would form one bloc, while the rest of the developing countries would support the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime and, consequently, China itself, and form their "own bloc."[6] The Chinese delegation exerted pressure on the conference administrators, and Pol Pot's "representative" was allowed to speak at the plenary meeting.

The Bulgarian representative, however, speaking on behalf of the countries of Group "D," declared that the recognition of the representative of the deposed Pol Pot and Ieng Sary clique at this UNCTAD session was an illegal act and an expression of hostility toward the Kampuchean people. Ignoring this reality could only introduce undesirable complications into the work of the session He was supported by representatives of Vietnam, Cuba and Afghanistan. Nonetheless, the conference chairman allowed Pol Pot's "representative" to take the floor, and at this time the delegations from the socialist nations and some developing countries left the conference hall. It goes without saying that the speech of the "representative" of the Pol Pot regime was tendentious, full of political ruses, and made no constructive contribution to the work of the conference. Later, conference Chairman C. Romulo made the following comment on this speech: "There are secondary matters that do not lie at the heart of what we are trying to accomplish."[7] In this way, he was evidently explaining his vulnerability to the pressure exerted by China and simultaneously expressing the views of the majority of delegates, who did not support the Chinese maneuvers revolving around the "Kampuchean question" and did not indulge in disagreements, in spite of the Chinese delegation's provocation. China itself made no official statement on this matter. Its stand on the so-called "Kampuchean question" was given a fitting principled assessment in a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Kampuchea on 31 May 1979: "The Chinese rulers verbally support the national rights of Kampuchea. In reality, however, they are the instigators and the only source of military and financial assistance of the clique of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, who served as their lackeys for the murder of 3 million Kampucheans and the imprisonment of another 4 million Kampuchean citizens, and as a beachhead for the accomplishment of Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia. Today they are still supporting the remnants of the army of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, forcing them to oppose the Kampuchean people. They are maliciously denouncing the People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea because they have lost their most obedient lackeys and their only beachhead in Southeast Asia, which they needed for the continuation of their policy in this region."

The developing countries did not support this maneuver at UNCTAD-V in regard to the "Kampuchean question" and did not display the discord Beijing had hoped for.

China made another covert attempt to inject political complications into the work of the conference. At a meeting of the first discussion group, which was assessing the state of the world economy in light of the current reorganization of international economic relations, the Chinese delegate proposed on 1 June that the draft resolution being discussed include a point on the withdrawal of foreign troops and the dismantling of military bases on foreign territory, threatening that China would refuse to support the entire draft resolution if this proposal should be rejected.[8]

The Chinese proposal brought the already difficult debate to an impasse and served as one of the reasons why a resolution was not passed on this extremely important item on the agenda. Beijing's proposal did not have to be passed by the Committee of 19 and was included among the "other business" on the UNCTAD agenda.[9] According to the Philippine press, China, which remained silent for most of the conference, loudly advocated that the draft agreement on the world economic situation include a paragraph proposing the removal of colonialist forces and military bases from foreign states.[10]

The reaction of the developing countries to this proposal was more than reserved. It bewildered them. For this reason, the Chinese delegation abandoned its original plan to submit this proposal as a separate draft resolution for discussion at a conference plenary meeting and merely mentioned it at the final meeting of the conference, in the morning of 3 June.

On the whole, the Chinese delegation in Manila demonstrated profound indifference toward UNCTAD and the economic problems with which it is concerned and which pertain primarily to the developing countries. China did not submit a single draft resolution on any of the many items on the conference agenda. China declined to serve as chairman or vice chairman of any of the eight discussion groups at UNCTAD-V, where most of the work to coordinate session documents took place. For this reason, these groups are fittingly called the "workhorses" of the conference. Participation by the Chinese representatives in the discussion groups was negligible. In a number of groups, the Chinese delegates either remained silent or limited themselves to brief and abstract statements. The Chinese representatives did not take part in the work of a number of editorial groups set up to draft resolutions on specific matters. Bursts of activity by the Chinese delegation were only witnessed in those rare cases when it tried to extend some of the privileges of the developing countries to China or to give "political emphasis" to certain economic problems.

Beijing's political maneuvers in the last tense days of the conference's work only diverted the delegates' attention away from complex economic matters and thereby impeded the attainment of maximum results. In this respect, China's unjustified political initiatives at the conference did the developing countries a bad turn. In the future, they will have to realize that China will be less likely to support their proposals concerning the reorganization of international economic relations on a democratic basis and will have several views in common with the developed capitalist states in the sphere of international economic relations. As the line of the Chinese delegation at UNCTAD-V indicated, China is working toward more intensive economic relations with the West by departing from its previous support of the initiatives of the developing countries regarding the reorganization of international economic relations on a democratic basis. This represents the Maoists' latest betrayal of the interests of the people in the liberated countries.

FOOTNOTES

1. THE MANILA JOURNAL, 21-27 May 1979; PHILIPPINE PANORAMA, 13 May 1979, p 38; BUSINESS TIMES, 14 May 1979.
2. BULLETIN TODAY, 22 May 1979.
3. UNCTAD Document TD/236, pp 1-6.
4. BUSINESS TIMES, 11 May 1979.
5. PRAVDA, 17 April 1979.
6. BULLETIN TODAY, 18 May 1979.
7. PHILIPPINE PANORAMA, 27 May 1979.
8. BULLETIN TODAY, 1 June 1979.
9. Ibid., 2 June 1979.
10. TIMES JOURNAL, 1 June 1979.

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JAPAN ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE 1980'S

Moscow PROBLEM DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1979 pp 38-51

[Article* by N. V. Vladimirov]

[Text] The elapsing 1970's will enter the history of world capitalism as a decade of sharp intensification in all its contradictions, as a period of severe economic, political and social upheavals in the depths of contemporary bourgeois society. "It is precisely in these years," the accountability report of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to the 25th Party Congress stresses, "that an economic crisis broke out in the capitalist world, a crisis of such severity and depth that, as bourgeois spokesmen themselves admit, it can only be compared to the crisis of the early 1930's. It simultaneously spread through all of the main centers of the world capitalist economy. It is indicative that a crisis of this force crippled the highly developed state-monopolistic economy that had grown up during the postwar period. Capitalism has made every effort to keep, so to speak, in step with the times and to use various methods of economic regulation. This has stimulated economic growth, but, just as the communists predicted, could not eradicate the contradictions of capitalism. Sharp production cuts and increased unemployment in the majority of capitalist countries were accompanied by such severe upheavals in the world capitalist economy as the currency, energy and raw material crises. Inflation made these crises particularly acute. Escalated by constantly growing military expenditures, it reached proportions unprecedented in times of peace."[1]

This profoundly scientific Marxist-Leninist assessment of the state and development of world capitalism in the 1970's has been vividly corroborated, in particular, by the example of contemporary Japan--the second

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* This article is an analytical summary of the basic premises and conclusions set forth in the materials of seven published Japan almanacs of the USSR Academy of Sciences ("Yaponiya" [Japan], Almanac, Nos I-VII, Editor-in-chief--Doctor of Historical Sciences I. I. Kovalenko, Nauka, 1973-1979).

[1] "Materialy XXI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976. p 28.

greatest capitalist power in the world in terms of gross national product levels. An important role in the study of this country, our neighbor in the Far East, has been played by an almanac published in the Soviet Union since the beginning of the current decade--"Yaponiya"--the organ of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Scientific Council for the Coordination of Research in the Field of Orientology. A look at this periodical, which encompasses the works of all Soviet experts on Japan and has acquired solid prestige with a broad segment of the reading public, aids in a more thorough understanding of the intricate complex of economic, political and social problems now being encountered by the Japanese and of the prospects for Japan's development in the near future.

1. From 'Economic Miracle' to Economic Difficulties

Just recently, the capitalist order's fans were taking every opportunity to publicize the so-called "Japanese economic miracle." For more than a decade and a half, between the mid-1950's to the beginning of the 1970's, it was a cause celebre. The result of several favorable temporary factors of a domestic and foreign nature (the high standard of accumulation, the mass renovation of fixed capital, the relatively low cost of labor, the active trading in foreign markets and others), this "miracle" took the form of unprecendented economic growth in Japan and was intensively propagandized by the world and Japanese bourgeoisie as proof of capitalism's "possibility" of crisis-free development and stabilization at a time of technological revolution. The latter, in turn, was depicted as a panacea. The combination of all this was used to substantiate the new theory according to which high rates of economic growth were supposedly a normal phenomenon, characteristic of the contemporary capitalist society.

Reality completely refuted these unscientific fantasies. With the coming of the 1970's, most of the abovementioned factors, which were temporary in nature, ceased to have any effect. As a result, Japan began to experience increasingly serious economic difficulties. The overproduction of many types of industrial products was discovered in the fall of 1970. Many companies noticeably limited their activity. This applied above all to key branches--ferrous metallurgy, machine building, the chemical industry, the construction materials industry and others. In the second half of 1970, the growth rate of industrial production declined dramatically, and this growth came to a complete halt in the last months of this year. The recession extended into 1971. It was the most severe and prolonged recession ever experienced by the Japanese economy. Its direct results were a sharp increase in the number of bankruptcies of small and medium-sized enterprises, the perceptible de-escalation of the investment boom and the intensification of so-called "stagflation"--the incredible rise of retail prices at a time of recession.

Only all-round government intervention, which took the form of the elimination of credit control by commercial banks, the reduction of official bank interest rates, the reduction of official bank rates 4 times and, consequently, the reduction of commercial bank rates, and the institution of other stimulatory measures temporarily corrected the situation and gave rise to livelier business activity.

In the period following the recession of 1970-1971, particularly in 1973, Japanese economic development reached its postwar peak. The overall level of industrial production was more than 17 percent higher than in the preceding year. In the nation, 368 billion kilowatt-hours of electric energy, almost 90 million tons of pig iron, 120 million tons of steel, 91 million tons of rolled steel products, 24.5 million radios and 12.5 million television sets were produced, almost 16 million gross registered tons of ships were launched, more than 7 million motor vehicles (including 4.5 million passenger cars) were built, more than 77 million tons of cement and 470,000 square meters of woolen fabric were produced, and so forth.

By December 1973, however, a prolonged economic crisis of unprecedented severity for the postwar period had begun in Japan. It lasted until February 1975--that is, for 15 months--and was followed by a period of difficult and extremely slow recovery.

The severity of the crisis is attested to by the degree of decline in industrial production. In these 15 months, the decline reached 22.8 percent, whereas the figure was only 10.7 percent in the 22 months of the most severe cyclical crisis in Japanese history in 1929-1931. We will note in passing that the same indicator was 13.5 percent in the United States, 10.5 percent in the FRG and 7.5 percent in England.

The lengthy nature of the crisis was reflected in Japan's extraordinarily unstable and slow emergence from the crisis phase of the cycle. During the course of the recovery stage which began in March 1975, the growth of total capital investments, in particular, was extremely sluggish (3.1 percent in 1976, less than 5 percent in 1977 and so forth). Personal consumption in the nation rose only 3-4 percent a year. Right up to the beginning of 1978, the load of production capacities was at an extremely low level. In the processing industry, for example, one-fifth of all equipment was not being used. The pre-crisis maximum industrial output (November 1973) was not surpassed until the very end of 1977. This means that it took Japan 34 months to overcome the crisis. In all, 50 months elapsed between the beginning and end of the crisis. The corresponding indicators for the United States, France and the FRG were 13 and 22 months, 15 and 24 months, and 13 and 21 months respectively. In other words, the Japanese economy returned to its pre-crisis level much later than the economies of other highly developed capitalist countries.

The cyclical crisis of 1974-1975, which became acute as a result of the effects of the world energy, raw material and structural crises, affected all socioeconomic development in Japan. It had a particularly negative effect on the status of broad segments of the working population. Many workers' families suffered a sharp reduction in income both during the years of crisis and during the period of recovery, which lingered on until the end of 1977. Unemployment acquired unprecedented proportions. Even according to official statistics, the figure exceeded 1.2 million, or 2.2 percent of the entire labor force, in 1976-1978, not to speak of the crisis years. The actual level of unemployment, however, was much higher. According to the data of democratic organizations, it reached 4-5 million in these years. The prices of food, the vital necessities and services rose dramatically. The number of bankruptcies among small and medium-sized enterprises rose catastrophically.

The crisis of 1974-1975, therefore, dealt a crushing blow to all of the mythological fantasies about the stabilization of contemporary capitalism and the possibility of creating a "society of universal prosperity" under capitalist conditions. "Now everyone can see: One of the chief myths invented by reformists and bourgeois ideologists has been refuted--the myth that the capitalism of our day can escape crisis. The instability of capitalism is becoming increasingly evident. Promises to 'restore the health' of capitalism and create a 'society of universal prosperity' within its framework have obviously failed. A heavy burden has been placed on the shoulders of the masses."[2]

This conclusion of the 25th CPSU Congress, which applies to the capitalism of the 1970's in general, is quite graphically illustrated by the example of Japan today. This is attested to, in particular, by the currently ending decade, which has been marked by a sudden turnabout in the development of the Japanese economy. The so-called "economic miracle," in which ruling circles in the nation placed great hopes, was followed by a period of relatively low growth rates and serious economic difficulties which will only increase in severity. In other words, the Japanese economy has entered a new and disturbing stage in its development. This turnabout has also affected all other aspects of life in present-day Japanese society.

2. The Declining Influence of the Ruling Party and the Intensification of Internal Political Struggle

The decade of the 1970's was not only marked by the beginning of a new stage in Japan's economic development, but also by considerable changes in domestic political life. And this is quite understandable. Economic changes gave rise to changes in domestic politics. The most significant of these was the sharp decline in the political influence of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), representing monopoly interests, and the ensuing exacerbation of the domestic political struggle. These changes were not only quantitative, but also led to a qualitatively new atmosphere, which put the solidity of the Liberal Democrats' one-party rule in question.

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[2] Ibid.

For more than two decades, from the time of its founding (1955) to the mid-1970's, the LDP kept a relatively firm grasp on political power and conducted one-party rule unimpeded. This was due to the effects of several temporary factors benefiting it. The principal one was the high level of economic activity in the nation. It allowed the Liberal Democrats to pass themselves off as the organizers of certain positive changes in the life of the working public. This heightened their prestige.

In the second half of the 1960's, however, the LDP's political positions gradually became weaker. This primarily took the form of a decline in LDP influence in parliament and local government. The culminating points of this process were the unprecedented defeats suffered by the LDP in the general elections to the lower house of parliament in December 1976 and the upper house in July 1977. For the first time in its history, the party won less than half of the seats in both houses. Only a few "independent" deputies who joined the Liberal Democrats after the elections gave them an extremely shaky majority here.

The LDP's position in local government is also far from firm. Despite some success in the April 1979 elections, it holds the majority of deputy mandates only in prefectural assemblies. Its influence is still weak in the legislative bodies of special districts, in the municipal assemblies of large cities and in urban and rural municipalities.

The weakening of LDP political positions has been the result of several factors. Above all, the sharp deterioration of economic conditions in the nation dealt a serious blow to the prestige of the ruling party. The crisis of 1974-1975 and the subsequent unstable and lengthy period of recovery confirmed the groundlessness of the LDP's demagogic promises to "restore the health of capitalism" and create a "society of universal prosperity" within its framework. Moreover, they provided new and vivid proof of the anti-public nature of its policies--its attempts to escape economic difficulties by exploiting the working masses even more and launching an offensive against the public standard of living. All of this naturally aroused dissatisfaction in broad segments of the general public.

An equally serious reason for the decline in the LDP's political influence was the exacerbation of intraparty disagreements, particularly the unprecedented intensification of the factional struggle. The latter became so acute that it actually broke up the party. In June 1976, a group of relatively young members of parliament ostentatiously withdrew from the LDP and formed the so-called New Liberal Club (NLC)--a political organization advocating a "new conservative policy" and subjecting the LDP to quite pointed criticism for its "destruction of the liberal system."

The final reason for the declining influence of the LDP was the unprecedented spread of political corruption, which became the norm in party life in recent years and permeated all of the activity of the ruling party. The most vivid illustration of this was the huge scandal that broke out not long before the general elections of 1976 in connection with the many millions in graft accepted by LDP leaders from the American Lockheed Aircraft Company to guarantee aircraft orders from Japan. It clearly demonstrated the mercenary nature of the LDP and seriously undermined the Japanese public's faith in the party.

The declining influence of the Liberal Democrats alarmed Japanese ruling circles. To prevent the further decline of their political party's prestige and to restore its strength in the legislative branch of government, they resorted first of all to organized party reform. The first step in this unprecedented undertaking was the gradual elimination of factions. By the middle of April 1977, they had formally ceased to exist. Not long before this, however, the so-called "policy study group" grew out of these factions in a fairly stormy process.

The dissolution of the previous factions and the creation of the "policy study group" on their basis marked the beginning of a new stage in LDP activity, a period involving some regrouping and the definite consolidation of relatively young and more "forward-looking" party forces. In essence, however, these groups did not differ in principle from the previous factions and simply represented modifications of these factions. Factionalism still serves as the basis of LDP organizational activity, as the party is still the political headquarters of the Japanese elite.

To regain its influence in parliament, the LDP has worked on the organizational reinforcement of the party and has made some efforts to revise the existing electoral system and replace it with a new and even more antidemocratic one. In connection with this, the conservatives are stubbornly advocating the creation of smaller electoral districts. The actual purpose of this plan is to redivide the existing medium-sized districts, each of which now elects three-five deputies, and create so many districts that each will only send one deputy to parliament. In view of the fact that LDP candidates receive the most votes in the majority of electoral districts, the institution of this system would provide them with more convenient electoral conditions. This would guarantee the Liberal Democrats a majority in parliament even if they won less than half of all votes. Democratic forces in Japan have been successfully opposing these reactionary plans for many years.

In addition to the consolidation of their political party and their continuous attempts to revise the electoral system, Japanese ruling circles are searching for other, more realistic ways of preserving their political supremacy. The inevitability of the LDP's entry into a coalition with opposition "middle-of-the-road" parties, which, despite their stated desire for socialism, actually do not object to the existing capitalist order and, in the final analysis, support capitalism, is being discussed more and more seriously. Another new idea concerns the need to create another conservative political party to vie for power against the LDP--that is, the institution of a two-party system of government like the American one in Japan.

The development of domestic politics testifies that the Japanese ruling clique is not discounting either method of retaining political control. Today, however, the most convenient method would be the creation of an LDP coalition with "middle-of-the-road" parties, particularly the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and the Clean Government Party (Komeito).

Taking the reformist character and anticommunist essence of these parties into account, Japanese ruling circles are doing everything within their power to alienate them from the democratic camp and win them over to their own side. For this purpose, they are resorting primarily to their old favorite method of operation--intimidating statements about the "communist threat." The mass propaganda media, which are controlled by monopolistic capital, are simultaneously publicizing the need to unite "middle-of-the-road" forces on an anticommunist basis.

Unfortunately, these reactionary maneuvers are producing results. In the beginning of the 1970's, both the DSP and Komeito advocated cooperation with the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), although with various provisos, and opposing the LDP. The latter's deep curtsies to these parties and their leaders' hope of acquiring ministerial positions in the conservative government have turned their political course completely upside-down. In the beginning of 1978, both parties refused to cooperate with the JSP and other democratic forces and supported cooperation with the LDP. Resolutions to this effect were passed at the 15th Komeito Congress in January 1978 and the 23d DSP Congress in April 1978. In this way, these parties not only openly demonstrated the anticommunist and antisocialist essence of their policies, but also voiced their support for the dangerous plans of Japanese reactionary forces to break up the democratic movement in the nation.

The DSP and Komeito took the next step in their departure from their previous position in the beginning of 1979. In the local government elections of April they joined the LDP in a united front against the communist and socialist parties. For the Liberal Democrats, who were striving to wake up democratic forces, this alliance was truly "manna from heaven." It brought them the propaganda success which they needed so much now that their political influence was declining, and which would have been unthinkable without the support of the DSP and Komeito and without the creation of a centrist-conservative coalition aimed against leftist opposition parties and groups. For the Liberal Democrats, the victories of their proteges in the gubernatorial elections in Tokyo and Osaka--the nation's largest industrial and cultural centers, which had been governed jointly by representatives of democratic forces for many years--had special propaganda value.

The last elections, which somewhat strengthened the LDP's position in local government, did not make any considerable changes in the balance of domestic political power in the LDP's favor. They did demonstrate, however, the need for stronger united action by all democratic forces, particularly the political parties of the leftist opposition--the JCP and JSP. Another valuable lesson taught by the elections was the self-exposure of the "middle-of-the-road" parties--the DSP and Komeito--which went over to the side of the conservatives, reflecting monopoly interests and defending the foundations of the capitalist order. Only time will tell how solid this alliance will be. It is completely obvious, however, that the support of the LDP by these parties, signifying a definite shift to the right in the domestic political struggle, will seriously complicate demonstrations by progressive forces in the nation for peace, democracy and social progres.

3. Energization of Foreign Policy

One of the basic foreign policy principles officially declared by Japan is the so-called "doctrine of multilateral diplomacy," envisaging the support and development of normal interrelations with all countries in the world. In reality, however, Japanese foreign policy is based on extensive and close cooperation with the United States on the basis of the Japanese-American "security agreement," which was concluded in January 1960 and automatically renewed in June 1970.

This military and political alliance between the United States and Japan, which, according to present terms, will remain in force until such time as one side denounces it, is in the class interests of the Japanese and American monopolies. Its main purpose is to ensure the stability of imperialist domination in Asia and the capitalist order in Japan under the conditions of the changing global balance of power in favor of peace and socialism. Its spearhead, therefore, is aimed primarily at the national liberation movement on the Asian continent and the constantly growing strength of Japanese democratic forces. It also represents a serious threat to the security of Japan's neighboring states. According to the Japanese-American "security agreement," more than 100 American military bases are located on the Japanese Islands, creating hotbeds of tension in this already explosive part of the world.

The past decade, which was marked by the growth of Japanese economic power and its advancement to the position of one of the three major centers of inter-imperialist rivalry, was distinguished by considerable advances within the framework of the Japanese-American alliance and a change in the relative strength of each partner. Japan is now playing a noticeable more important role in this alliance than in the past. The "junior partner" has become an equal partner, no longer simply following in the wake of U.S. Asian policy, but pursuing its own goals as well, with a view to the interests of Japanese monopolistic capital.

Japan's more important role in the military and political alliance with the United States naturally exacerbated Japanese-American conflicts. They became particularly acute in the area of trade and economic relations, which occupy an important place in the total system of interrelations between the two countries.

In recent years, many Japanese commodities (textiles, various types of electronics, bicycles, motorcycles, motor vehicles and so forth) have flooded the American market to such an extent that they have dealt a serious blow to the profits of American monopolies. The resulting permanent and substantial positive balance of trade in Japan's favor became the "apple of discord" in the relations between the two countries. Under these conditions, U.S. ruling circles are resorting to various restrictive actions in an attempt to force Japan to sharply reduce the flow of its commodities to the American market and open the Japanese market as much as possible to American monopolies. In many cases, these conflicts have become so acute that they have ultimately evolved into fierce "trade wars."

This decade was also distinguished by the further involvement of Japan in American global strategy and started a new stage in the development of Japanese-American military cooperation. In recent years, Japan has been pressured by the United States to take on several specific commitments regarding the expansion of co-called "Japanese participation in Asian affairs." In particular, it committed itself to a sharp increase in military appropriations, the strengthening and qualitative improvement of the "self-defense troops" created in violation of the Japanese Constitution, the payment of part of the cost of mantaining U.S. military bases in Japan, and more intensive participation in military and political alliance with the United States with a view to working out a system of operational interaction by U.S. armed forces and the virtually reborn Japanese army. It also promised to take on some of the functions of American troops in antisubmarine and antiair defense operations, to buy new American military equipment and so forth.

It is completely obvious that these qualitatively new and far-reaching commitments taken on by Japan will naturally lead to its further all-round remilitarization. All peaceful forces have been particularly alarmed by the intention of Japanese ruling circles to acquire their own thermonuclear weapon. Despite Japan's official declaration of three policy principles in the field of nuclear arms--its stated intention not to produce, acquire or import these weapons, which is in line with the peaceful nature of the Japanese Constitution--representatives of the government and monopolies have recently been persistently advocating the "acquisition of nuclear weapons" for the purpose of "exerting pressure on other countries." This has been motivated by the need to bring Japan's "negligible political influence" in the international arena in line with its economic strength.

Japanese ruling circles attach exceptional great significance to Japan's increasing economic expansion in Southeast Asia, which the Japanese monopolies regard as their traditional zone of influence. They view this region primarily as a vast and extremely promising sales market for Japanese commodities.

They are also attracted by Southeast Asia's abundant natural resources, which, under the conditions of the energy and raw material crisis in the capitalist world, are of particular value to Japan, which does not have its own raw materials. Great hopes are also connected with the abundance of cheap manpower in these countries. In connection with the sharp rise in real estate prices and the exacerbation of environmental pollution problems in Japan, this region is constantly gaining importance as a zone for the investment of Japanese capital and the construction of enterprises with the most labor-intensive and polluting processes.

Finally, Southeast Asia is exceptionally important to Japan from the strategic standpoint. It is here that most of Japan's vital supply lines are concentrated, and it is through this region that the main shipping lanes for the provision of Japan with all necessary raw materials pass. In the final analysis, the uninterrupted economic life of the Japanese nation depends on the state of affairs in this region.

It is indicative that Japanese ruling circles are camouflaging their expansionist plans regarding the Southeast Asian countries with intensive propaganda concerning the need for stronger friendship and cooperation with these countries. The main purpose of this propaganda campaign is to use diplomatic means to guarantee the Japanese monopolies the most favorable conditions for exploiting the riches of this part of the world.

Monopolistic capital is focusing its attention, in accordance with the Japanese Government's line of "a selective attitude toward Southeast Asian countries," on the development of relations with Asian states belonging to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)--the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. It is these nations that are of particular interest to Japan from the commercial and the strategic standpoints. It is these nations that receive the most generous economic and technical assistance from Japanese monopolies. In spite of Japan's flirtations, however, these nations are not forgetting the lessons of the past, particularly the way in which Japanese militarism lorded it over them prior to its defeat in World War II, and are displaying a definitely cautious attitude toward the U.S.-inspired "expansion of Japanese participation in Asian affairs." Profound concern for the fate of their own economies, which are being subjected to pressure by Japanese monopolistic capital, is keeping anti-Japanese feeling alive in these nations.

The Japanese ruling elite is also placing special hopes on the development of relations with China. The PRC occupied one of the most prominent positions in Japanese foreign policy theories of the 1970's. This is not only due to the geographic proximity of the two countries and their traditional historical ties, but also an entire complex of economic, political and strategic problems, the resolution of which will depend to one degree or another on China.

The past decade was marked by the restoration of Japanese-Chinese ties and the relatively rapid rate of their development. The normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and the PRC in September 1972 opened the way to intergovernmental relations in various fields. In a comparatively short period of time, the two countries had concluded several agreements and bargains, including agreements on trade (January 1974), air communications (April 1974), shipping (November 1974) and fishing (August 1975), a long-term trade agreement for 1978-1985 (February 1978) and, finally, a "treaty on peace and friendship," signed in Beijing on 12 August 1978 and put into effect after the exchange of ratification documents on 23 October the same year.

The comparatively quick rapprochement of Japan and China in 1972-1978 during the period of the so-called "China boom" was primarily the result of several temporary factors, as well as the traditional mutually supplementary nature of their economic structures. For highly developed Japan, China with its population of almost a billion represents a virtually unlimited sales market for finished products and an important source of extremely necessary raw materials, particularly energy sources--oil and coal. For China, Japan is unparalleled, from the standpoint of its export capabilities, as a supplier of the latest equipment and technology, as well as virtually all industrial commodities, which the Chinese side urgently needs.

In reality, however, the hopes of Japanese ruling circles for the rapid and unimpeded development of trade and economic ties with the PRC and the resolution of several important intergovernmental problems have recently turned into illusions.

First of all, it turned out that China was not as appealing and reliable a trade partner as it seemed to Japanese business circles during the period of the "China boom." Its available foreign currency reserves are far from sufficient for broad-scale trade. Its oil--the only Chinese export item essential to Japan at this point--turned out to be of extremely poor quality. Besides this, China's export potential in this field of such great importance to Japan is extremely limited. Moreover, considering the domestic political instability in China, Japanese business circles are quite justifiably worried that deliveries of Chinese oil to Japan could be cut off at any time for "political reasons." China has already displayed this kind of behavior. In the beginning of 1979, the Chinese side went against the elementary norms and ethics of international trade by unilaterally and suddenly putting a moratorium on existing contracts for several billion dollars, thereby inflicting serious losses on its Japanese partner. Japanese-Chinese negotiations on the joint development of oil deposits in the Pohai Gulf were cut off just as suddenly.

Many political problems will be equally difficult to solve. In particular, the Taiwan question is still a serious source of friction in relations between the two countries. Formally acknowledging that Taiwan is an "integral part of the PRC," Japan is actually doing everything within its power to prevent the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China. This is the consequence of the considerable economic interests of Japanese monopolies in Taiwan and its key strategic position: It is located on shipping routes of vital importance to Japan. Despite the restoration of diplomatic relations and the signing of the "treaty on peace and friendship," the territorial dispute with the PRC regarding Japan's ownership of the Senkaku Islands, the shelf of which is rich in oil deposits, has not been settled either. Finally, profound conflicts are becoming increasingly apparent in the mounting struggle for supremacy in Asia, which both countries regard as their natural zone of influence. The combination of all this is forcing Japan to take more sober stock of the possibilities for developing its relations with China.

The 1970's were also distinguished by the further increase of Japanese economic and political activity in the Western European countries, primarily the intensive penetration of these markets by Japanese goods. In connection with this, Japanese diplomacy assigns primary significance to the annual summit-level conferences of the leaders of the major capitalist powers. It is using them to reach agreements on the most pressing trade and economic problems. During this process, Japan is skillfully taking advantage of the conflicts between the Western European countries and the United States in an attempt to prevent the creation of a united front against the trade and economic expansion of Japanese monopolies. At the London meeting (May 1977), Japanese diplomacy gained, in particular, the confirmation of the principle of "free trade" by conference participants. The recognition of Japan's special role, along with the United States and the FRG, in the overall "improvement of world economics" was of equal importance to Japan. This meant that Japan had to take several measures to relax import restrictions for the purpose of making its market more accessible to American and Western European goods. At the same time, this allowed Japanese monopolistic capital to insist on the satifaction of its own demands on the pretext that the stable economic development of capitalism as a whole would depend on the stability and prosperity of the Japanese economy in its capacity as one of the "three motors" of the capitalist world.

Representing two powerful centers of imperialism, Japan and Western Europe have many common goals and interests of an economic and political nature. However, this does not exclude the possiblity of serious conflicts between them, and these must be taken into account by Japanese diplomacy in its global strategy.

The changes in the global balance of political power in favor of the camp of peace and socialism, the relaxation of international tension and the exacerbation of inter-imperialist conflicts are forcing Japan to adhere more vigorously to the line of "multilateral diplomacy," envisaging the development of contact with the socialist countries as well as the capitalist world. Japanese ruling circles attach particular significance to the all-round development of relations with the Soviet Union. This is being promoted to a significant extent not only by the geographic proximity of the two countries, but also by the increasing economic and military strength of the USSR and the elevation of its international prestige as a nation marching in the forward ranks of the struggle for peace and security. Particularly vivid confirmation of this can be seen in the signing of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons (SALT II).

The joint Soviet-Japanese declaration on the cessation of the state of war between the two countries and the restoration of diplomatic and consular relations, which was signed in Moscow in October 1956, laid the basis for the extensive, comprehensive development of Japanese-Soviet ties in the postwar period. This was followed by the conclusion of the first trade agreement in the history of Japanese-Soviet relations. The agreement was concluded in December 1957 and granted each side most-favored-nation terms. In 1966 a consular convention was signed, and it was on this basis that the first postwar consulate generals were opened--a Japanese one in Nakhodka and a Soviet one in Sapporo. Later (1970), another two consulates were opened, a Soviet one in Osaka and a Japanese one in Leningrad. Direct air communications between Moscow and Tokyo were established in 1967, and in 1969 an agreement was concluded on the commencement of regular flights from Japan to Europe over the Soviet Union.

In the 1970's, Japanese-Soviet relations, with mutually beneficial foreign economic ties constituting their basis, underwent further positive development. In particular, the volume of Japanese-Soviet trade grew noticeably: From 822 million dollars in 1970 to 3.4 billion in 1978--that is, it quadrupled. In accordance with the third 5-year trade agreement now in force (1976-1980), total commodity turnover will be 1.6 times as great as in the preceding 5 years. Long-term large-scale economic cooperation on a compensatory basis is acquiring more and more significance. The USSR buys Japanese machines and equipment on credit to work the natural resources of Siberia and the Far East and repays these loans by providing Japanese industry with the raw materials and fuel it needs. Several mutually beneficial long-range cooperative projects had been successfully completed by 1978, including the working of Far Eastern timber resources, the construction of Vostochnyy Port in the Bay of Wrangel and the processing of industrial chip. The Japanese side has also expressed great interest in other possible joint projects. American companies are expected to take part in a number of these--for example, the working of Yakut natural gas. Scientific and technical cooperation was also developed successfully. An important step in this field was the agreement concluded in 1977 between the State Committee of the USSR on Atomic Energy and the Japanese nuclear forum on cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy.

Economic ties are serving as the basis for the continuous development of cultural and political relations. It is indicative that during the fairly frequent meetings between foreign ministers, as well as the summit-level negotiations held in Moscow in October 1973, the Japanese side has always agreed that the reinforcement of friendly relations between the USSR and Japan on the basis of the principles of nonintervention in domestic affairs, mutual advantage and equality will not only be in the interests of both countries, but will also make a tremendous contribution to the cause of peace and the stabilization of the international situation in the Far East and the rest of the world.

The decade of the 1970's was also a time of certain negative phenomena in the development of Japanese-Soviet relations. In particular, the constant attempts of revanchist Japanese circles to exaggerate the spurious question of the so-called "northern territories," reflected in illegitimate bids for the Soviet islands of Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan and Khabomai, constituted a serious obstacle to the further improvement of friendly relations between the USSR and Japan. Japan's "treaty on peace and friendship" with the PRC, with the aid of which Beijing hopes to entangle this nation in its anti-Soviet strategy, also inflicted serious injuries on the developing friendly relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. Finally, an obviously negative role in the development of normal relations between the two countries is being played by the recently intensified anti-Soviet campaign in Japan with respect to the imaginary "Soviet military threat" and the "intensification of Soviet military preparations in regions adjacent to Japan." Inspired by the awakening monster of militarism for the purpose of substantiating the need for the intensive militarization of Japan, this tendentious campaign will certainly cast a pall over Japanese-Soviet relations.

The further reinforcement of friendly ties between the USSR and Japan will necessitate the elimination of artificial obstacles and a joint search for mutually acceptable solutions to new problems on the basis of the unconditional observance of the principles of mutual advantage and nonintervention in one another's domestic affairs. One clear example of the Soviet Union's willingness to take this course, the only reasonable one, was the draft treaty on friendship and cooperation between the USSR and Japan, which was submitted to the Japanese side in January 1978. This treaty would consolidate the positive advances that have already been made in Japanese-Soviet relations and would create a solid legal basis for the future development of these relations.

4. Unity of Democratic Forces--Basis for Success in the Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Social Progress

The LDP's declining influence in national politics created a new domestic political situation in Japan. In contrast to past years, when the party of monopolistic capital had a firm grasp on the reins of power, an objectively favorable atmosphere has come into being for an extensive and intensive assault by democratic forces on the excesses of the monopolies. The question of the possible replacement of the Liberal Democrats' one-party government with a coalition of opposition forces now sounds more pausible. Now that the LDP is on the defensive, however, it has made a maximum effort to hold on to its position at the top. As a result, it has been able to win the "middle-of-the-road" parties over to its own side and severed their connections with the democratic camp. The leftist opposition parties and all democratic forces in the nation have had to confront a conservative-centrist alliance made up of the LDP, the DSP and Komeito.

Under these conditions, there is a particularly urgent need to unite all progressive forces in the nation and, above all, to ensure solid concerted action by the parties of the leftist parliamentary opposition--the JCP and JSP.

The JCP has been the most energetic promoter of concerted action by all democratic forces for the accomplishment of fundamental social reforms. As early as 1970, Japanese communists were already calling upon all progressive organizations to strive for a democratic coalition government capable of replacing the LDP Government.

In 1971 the JCP set forth the three major objectives of democratic reform: the liquidation of the Japanese-American military and political alliance and the establishment of Japan's absolute neutrality; the replacement of politics in the monopoly interest with politics in defense of human lives and rights; the prevention of the revival and consolidation of militarism, the protection of democracy and the democratization of parliamentary activity. At the 12th JCP Congress (November 1973), the party proposed a concrete program for action, based on these objectives, by the coalition democratic government. The 13th special congress of the party (July 1976) again called upon all segments of the Japanese democratic public to unite. The ideas of creating a democratic coalition government and accomplishing democratic reforms were further amplified and clarified in the resolutions of the 14th JCP Congress in October 1977.

During the course of the daily struggle for united action, all antimonopoly forces in the JCP are organizing various campaigns for dialog with a broad variety of democratic organizations. Primary consideration is being given to the achievement of trade-union solidarity on a class basis. The creation of a united labor front is regarded as the basis for the unification of all democratic forces in the nation.

The programs worked out in recent years by the JCP and JSP for Japan's economic development are intensifying the struggle for peace, democracy and social progress.

The JCP was the pioneer in working out the economic fundamentals for a democratic alternative to monopoly domination. As early as November 1976, it had already published the "Five-Year Plan for the Reorganization of the Japanese Economy. An Alternative to the Previous Course, Which Has Pushed the Nation Into Economic Crisis." Following this, in June 1977, the JCP Central Committee published an all-encompassing document in the form of a special edition, "Proposals on the Japanese Economy. The Plan for Reorganization for Crisis Relief." This was an annotated description of the plan.

Accusing the LDP of serving big business, the JCP stresses that its plan for the reorganization of the Japanese economy will not eradicate the basic contradictions of capitalism, but is aimed at the accomplishment of realistic reforms on the basis of democratic political authority, "at the redirection of Japanese capitalism into a new and democratic channel in the public interest." Proceeding from the urgent need to improve the life of the working masses, the plan envisages, in particular, a new industrial policy which will shift the emphasis from augmentation of GNP volume in the monopoly interest to the reorganization of the industrial structure in accordance with the need for a higher public standard of living; the reconstruction of agriculture for the purpose of democratization; the resolution of energy problems in the national interest, particularly the nationalization of the basic subbranches of power engineering; the reform of the system for designating national territory usage in the public interest, and several other cardinal reforms.

A similar program for Japanese economic development has been drawn up by the JSP. It was discussed and adopted at the 43d Party Congress in January 1979.

The preamble to this program stresses that Japan has been undergoing serious economic difficulties in recent years. In order to overcome these difficulties, it will be necessary to concentrate on qualitative, and not quantitative, factors of economic growth, as it is precisely the race for superlative growth rates that has led to the present recession. In connection with this, the program envisages replacement of the "economic structure emphasizing industrial development by means of high economic growth rates" with an "economic system emphasizing public well-being within the framework of the existing capitalist system of economic management."

The JSP program envisages several measures aimed at the reconstruction of the Japanese economy to enhance public well-being. The most important of these include the stabilization of public life; the intelligent use of national territory and natural resources; the achievement of proportional domestic economic development and foreign economic relations; the modification of the industrial structure in favor of "branches satisfying domestic demand" and "medium-scale production," as branches ensuring the enhancement of the "quality of life" for workers; the institution of planning in the field of power engineering, including the nationalization of the coal industry and the creation of a so-called collective oil corporation; the democratic reorganization of the central and local financial systems, including the repeal of tax laws discriminating against the working masses.

The similar programs set forth by the JCP and JSP for fundamental socioeconomic reforms, their common desire for constant and strong united action in defense of the real interests of the Japanese people, their stubborn daily struggle to unite various segments of the Japanese democratic public for the purpose of creating a united antimonopoly front--all of this testifies, now that the LDP's political influence is declining, that favorable objective conditions exist for an even stronger nationwide struggle against monopoly domination and for peace, democracy and social progress. This is also attested to by the latest serious defeats suffered by the LDP in the general elections for the lower house of parliament in October 1979. It hoped to win a stable majority of 271 seats, but was only able to receive 248 mandates--1 mandate less than in the preceding elections. This only represents 48.5 percent of all deputies.

The noticeable successs of the JCP in these elections is of great significance. It won 38 mandates in place of its previous 17 seats. This brings its total vote in the lower house up to 41, counting the 2 victorious democratic candidates supported by the JCP.

Despite the serious difficulties and obstacles encountered by the progressive camp in Japan, its struggle, which is an integral part of the implacable worldwide revolutionary process, is constantly growing. Victory, however, will be unthinkable without strong and constant united action by all democratic forces in Japan.

The decade of the 1970's marked the beginning, therefore, of serious socioeconomic and political changes in contemporary Japanese life. The dramatic deceleration of growth rates, the deterioration of economic conditions and the attempts made by ruling circles to escape the increasingly acute difficulties by means of intensive exploitation of the working public; the declining political influence of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and its efforts to retain its position in power at any price, right up to the creation of a permanent conservative-centrist coalition with the "middle-of-the-road" parties; and, finally, the augmentation of the monopolies' expansionist aims and the intention of reactionary circles to make national foreign policy more aggressive, on the one hand, and the noticeably increased desire of the Japanese democratic public to accomplish socioeconomic and political reforms, on the other--this is what Japan looks like on the threshold of the 1980's.

In the coming decade, the "land of the rising sun" will certainly have to deal with the further intensification of all of the contradictions of capitalist society, particularly the basic contradiction of capitalism--between labor and capital, between the broad working masses and a handful of monopolies. This will unavoidably create more friction in the unabating class struggle and will intensify confrontations between forces for peace, democracy and social progress and forces for reaction and war. The success of the nation's democratic camp in this historic confrontation will depend primarily on the solidarity, cohesiveness and united action of all Japanese democratic forces.

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THE KIND OF DICTATORSHIP THEY ARE 'DEFENDING' IN BEIJING (APROPOS OF AN ARTICLE IN 'RENMIN RIBAO')

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1979 pp 52-65

[Article by F. F. Lappo]

[Text] The central organ of the CCP, the RENMIN RIBAO newspaper, has printed two articles by Li Honglin from a projected series on the theory of socialism ("The Kind of Socialism We Support"--9 May; "The Kind of Proletarian Dictatorship We Are Defending"--22 June).

Both RENMIN RIBAO articles were published in the PRC--a country whose ideological life has been alienated from the development of contemporary Marxist thinking for many years and has been subordinated to the ideology of Maoism and high-flown political campaigns accompanied by "Sinized" slogans. But now these articles have appeared (this applies to the first article in particular), which represent an obvious attempt at a Marxist analysis of the subject matter, an analysis devoid (or almost devoid) of Maoist terminology and the formulas of "Sinized" Marxism, devoid even of the very mention of the name and "Thought" of Mao Zedong. These two articles by Li Honglin are distinguished to varying degrees by the extent of their approximation of events in China today, but it is noteworthy that they contain no hostile attacks on "contemporary revisionism" or "social imperialism" and none of the prescribed appeals, "instructions" and "new ideas" that have been typical of contemporary official PRC propaganda.

This naturally raises questions about the purpose and significance of this kind of publication. Is it possible that this is evidence of a new and positive tendency in Chinese ideological life, taking its place among the rightist-opportunist "neo-Maoism" and the "leftist"-nationalist "orthodox Maoism" whose conflicts in 1979 were noted by all specialists? On the other hand, this might not in any sense be a confirmation of interests in Marxist-Leninist theory and its application to China, but a new propaganda line intended to provide the Beijing leaders with a Marxist "screen" for their further departure from socialism and from the theory of scientific communism.

This is not the first time that contemporary Marxist thinking has had the task (along with the investigation, elaboration and popularization of the theory and practice of socialism) of verifying the accuracy and sincerity with which the concepts and principles of scientific communism are implemented. This verification function is necessary both for the purpose of exposing unscrupulous falsifications and arbitrary revisionism and for the purpose of overcoming the narrowmindedness and innocent mistakes that are unavoidable when socialist ideas are extremely widespread in various social milieus. This work is particularly important with respect to problems connected with China, where a distorted understanding of Marxism-Leninism was cultivated for decades and where this doctrine was presented in a Maoist "translation."

The Soviet people's deep concern for the fate of the Chinese people is widely known and completely understandable. During all these years, the Soviet people have not abandoned their hope of a socialist escape from the severe historical crisis into which China was plunged by the Maoists; they are convinced that this is the only escape that will be in the interests of the PRC working public.

The article entitled "The Kind of Proletarian Dictatorship We Are Defending" is interesting for several reasons. Above all, it is closer to the political realities of the PRC, while the first article is more abstract, both in term of genre and in terms of content, and the subject matter is quite familiar to us. In the second place, the very formulation of the matter is interesting, stating the need for a proletarian dictatorship in China, as well as the need to "defend" it. The way in which the Chinese author now defines the term "proletarian dictatorship," the degree to which he applies this term to different stages in the development of the PRC, the way in which he interprets and employs the concept of "democracy," what it means to "defend proletarian dictatorship" in China today, and--above all--against whom must it be defended--all of these questions are certainly of interest to the Chinese reader, and not only the Chinese reader. We feel that the significance of Li Honglin's article lies primarily in the fact that he raises this question, the question of proletarian dictatorship in today's China, causing the reader to give some thought to this matter. The way in which he answers the question is another matter.

"In less than 30 years the Chinese people have already experienced two types of proletarian dictatorship," the author of the RENMIN RIBAO article remarks, and then goes on to write that a "democratic people's dictatorship" existed in the PRC during its first 17 years. This "was a proletarian dictatorship," although an imperfect one. For this reason, "errors were committed," the main one being "a shortage of democracy," as a result of which the "proletarian dictatorship" was replaced by the "feudal-fascist dictatorship"* of Lin Biao and the "gang of four"--"a handful of opportunists, hooligans and clowns." In October 1976 the "gang of four" was defeated and its "feudal-fascist dictatorship" was destroyed. "This was a great revolutionary act," an act "in defense of proletarian dictatorship."

This description alone gives rise to a multitude of questions. It is not clear which "two types" of proletarian dictatorship the author has in mind: Prior to 1966 and after 1976, or in 1966-1976 and 1976-1979. If the "feudal-fascist dicatorship," and one that "came into being under the conditions of proletarian dictatorship" because "socialist democracy and the legal system were undermined," represents, in the author's opinion, a type of proletarian dictatorship, then the year of 1966 cannot be the dividing line between these two types, and the "feudal-fascist dictatorship" can therefore be viewed as the logical result of the undermining of "democracy and the legal system." Consequently, whatever existed prior to 1966 cannot be called proletarian dictatorship either. If, on the other hand, he is referring to two types of proletarian dictatorship prior to 1966 and after 1976, what is the real meaning of the "great revolutionary act" of October 1976? Moreover, this gives rise to a question about the sociopolitical similarities and differences of the three stages (as delineated by Li Honglin); how do the "proletarian dictatorships" of 1949-1966 and 1976-1979 differ? What was the nature of the political systems in China in these years? The RENMIN RIBAO article does not answer these questions. And it could not possibly have answered them.

The fact is that there is absolutely no basis for describing the events of 1976 in China as a "revolutionary act" (naturally, if the term is not interpreted so broadly that even a funeral can be called a "revolution").

The Chinese author, basing his discussion on the premises and terminology of the Third Plenum of the CCP Central Committee (December 1978), writes that the "revolutionary act," the act "in defense of proletarian dictatorship" and "in defense of democracy" in today's China consisted of "six great deeds," which supposedly can be used as a description of the nature of the present regime in the PRC. In brief, they were essentially the following: 1. Provisions for an "organized purge" of the proletarian dictatorship, the discovery and expulsion of "factionists"--supporters of the "gang of four"--from the government structure; 2. The rehabilitation of innocent people who were victimized during the "Cultural Revolution"; 3. "The correction of errors committed prior to the Cultural Revolution and the resolution of questions inherited from the past"; 4. "The removal of labels from re-educated representatives of the exploitative classes," since the "final goal of the [proletarian] dictatorship is the self-destruction of classes"; 5. "The correction of extreme leftist policies in the economic sphere"; 6. The line of "Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools contend" in the sphere of culture, education, science and art, with the proletariat overseeing all ideological work."

It is true that much in the PRC has changed in the last 3 years and this is natural, but these changes can only be assessed correctly after all of their complexities and their essence as a whole have been revealed. Sufficient data are already available for this purpose. There can be no doubt that the need for a scientific, Marxist-Leninist assessment of these changes is being felt inside China as well as in other countries and that this assessment should not only concern itself with the past.

The question is essentially the following: In terms of its class essence, does the political line of the new Beijing leadership differ from the line of the past; do both of them represent varieties of proletarian dictatorship; and if not, then what is the actual nature of the regime in China?

We agree with the RENMIN RIBAO author that a "feudal-fascist dictatorship" cannot be a proletarian dictatorship. It cannot be a variety of this either, even a distorted variety "under the conditions," as Li Honglin puts it, of proletarian dictatorship. Perhaps the author believes that there was a proletarian dictatorship in the PRC at that time but the political regime was a "feudal-fascist dictatorship." If this is the case, how do Mao, Zhou Enlai and other persons, including ones who are still alive and healthy, fit into this landscape? The author's position on this matter is, to put it mildly, unclear.

If the political lines of these two regimes in the PRC differ in essence, they cannot have the sociopolitical basis of proletarian dictatorship in common. If, on the other hand, the differences between them are negligible and they have the same class nature, they cannot both be forms of proletarian dictatorship, despite all the external appeal of the "six great deeds" of the present regime, as described by Li Honglin. The Chinese author omitted much for reasons of his own, but much depends on these omissions: Among other considerations, the answer to the question of whether he is advocating proletarian dictatorship in China, advising its consolidation, or simply using the term to signify something completely different--something which can simultaneously represent "feudal-fascist dictatorship" and "proletarian dictatorship" in the Maoist interpretation.

Something else is completely obvious. "Barracks communism" as a social ideal and a principle governing the organization of economic development for militaristic purposes, on the one hand, and the "four modernizations" in combination with "economic democracy," which is being used to conceal the descent into capitalism, the tolerance of private capital and uncontrolled market fluctuations, and "militarized socialism" as the goal of economic strategy, on the other, are equally removed from socialism and will equally undermine the potential of the national economy and the society for socialist development.

In the sociopolitical sphere, political terror, contempt for the interests of the working public, the declaration of war against the "new bourgeoisie" and the goading of various social strata to fight an artificial "class battle," on the one hand, and the "socialism" of the petty shopkeeper, social manipulation, and the preaching of class "convergence," which essentially means alliance with the bourgeoisie, "foreign and domestic" (the national bourgeoisie has suddenly been credited with performing "services" for the revolution and the people, thereby becoming part of the masses), on the other, are equally removed from socialism, will equally threaten the construction of socialism with catastrophe and equally reflect class uncertainty.

As we know, the external and internal functions of the proletarian dictatorship are facets of a single entity. This is apparently why RENMIN RIBAO decided not to make its task difficult by discussing the foreign policy aspects of Beijing's line. But it is here that extremely noticeable coincidences are found. Everyone knows that there is no fundamental difference between the intrigues that went on during the Vietnam war of the 1960's, involving a conspiracy with the United States behind the Vietnamese people's back for the purpose of setting the "superpowers" against one another, the "Shanghai Communique" and Beijing's present line of alliance with the West. There is also no fundamental difference between the bloody provocations of the 1960's on the Sino-Soviet border and the recent piratical aggression against the SRV, or between the PRC's subversive activity in the revolutionary and communist movement then and now.

Both the past and the present PRC regimes have certain general, fundamental and essential features in common: Rabid nationalism, great-power hegemonism, anti-Sovietism, plans for the militarization of the country, contempt for the masses and so forth.

In addition, both political regimes are based on the same ideology of Maoism. It is not even a matter of opposing cliques using different quotations from Mao. Maoism is an eclectic ideology, and just like any other ideology of spontaneity it contains a multitude of variations and all extremes. Just as any other unscientific ideology, it evalutes the same phenomena in various pragmatic ways "convenient" for the particular moment. Both Maoist extremes, "leftist" and "rigthist," discredit Marxism-Leninism and introduce chaos into the spiritual life of society. Maoism is a social phenomenon, with Mao or without him, for him or against him, it can change its shape whenever necessary. But it cannot offer anything in exchange. Maoism can be praised for the "Thought of the Great Helmsman" and the campaign for "practice as a criterion of truth" or the "liberation of consciousness," because both currents are aimed against Marxist-Leninist theory, against scientific and socialist solutions to problems in China's development, because many individuals in the PRC who are now calling for "freedom from dogma," whether on the pretext of revising the "Thought of Mao" or "developing the Thought of Mao as an extension of Marxism-Leninism," are primarily attacking Marxism-Leninism and eroding socialist values and ideals. Maoism is a petty bourgeois "Sinized" variety of anti-Marxism and its extreme forms invariably have the same features in common: nationalism, anti-Sovietism, militarism and the betrayal of the interests of the people, socialism and peace.

When the author of the RENMIN RIBAO article describes the change of regimes in Beijing as a "revolutionary act," he is either confusing his own hopes with reality or unscrupulously concealing the actual truth about events in the PRC in the last 3 years. We could wonder which regime is "further" from socialism, from proletarian dictatorship and from Marxism-Leninism, but this would be an unnecessary abstraction.

The essence of these changes, on the other hand, is indisputable--there was a change of regimes of one type, Maoism rushed from one extreme to the other, from a regime of extreme "leftist" terror, petty bourgeois egalitarianism and "revolutionary" phraseology to rightist, opportunist, supraclass, philistine indiscrimination and unscrupulous methods, to antisocialist pragmatism. The foundation blocks of Maoism were retained in their entirety: nationalism, militarism and anti-Sovietism. This was not a revolution, but a stage in the political evolution of Maoism, having only a hostile relationship to proletarian dictatorship. There was a change of methods, means and forms but the previous system of objectives and the previous strategy were retained.

The doctrine concerning proletarian dictatorship occupies a central place in the theory of scientific communism, and the significance of this doctrine is so great that ideologists of anticommunism focus their efforts primarily against this part of Marxism-Leninism, correctly viewing proletarian dictatorship as the chief implement and guiding principle for the construction of a new world.

Bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideoligists are intensely exploiting and propagating the old confusion created by the formal similarity of the terms "proletarian dictatorship" and "total dictatorship." In essence, however, they are incomparable because they are phenomena of different species. "Proletarian dictatorship" is a concept reflecting the class essence of a historical type of political organization in a society building socialism. "Democracy" is a term used to express the form or state which can be taken by a political organization of any class and in any society (feudal, bourgeois and so forth).

The word "dictatorship" in the term "proletarian dictatorship" means nothing more than the refusal to give power to the bourgeoisie. It is the opposite of bourgeois dictatorship, but it is not the opposite of democracy. It is quite another matter when a dictatorship is a terrorist, repressive form of political regime in the exploitative society. It has nothing in common with proletarian dictatorship.

The author of the RENMIN RIBAO article has also confused these concepts, along with a flock of others, declaring that proletarian dictatorship is a "democratic dictatorship of the people" and equating it with mature socialism. In his article, he examines proletarian dictatorship and democracy not through the prism of class analysis, but only through administrative relationships--the relations between "cadres" and "the people"--and declares that these relations are in the nature of a gentleman's agreement, forgetting to note that proletarian dictatorship and democracy have one thing in common--this is a process of social organization supervised by the working class, superior in terms of this indicator to non-proletarian strata. Li Honglin feels that democracy in China and in the CCP is only being threatened by extreme "leftists" and dismisses the rightist threat with an extremely careless statement that bourgeois democracy did not exist in China and, for this reason, there is supposedly no reason to fear it because only feudal and fascist absolutism did exist. Besides this, the word "people" is used in a variety of ways in the article, and the social role of the proletariat is only mentioned once. Moreover, it is no secret that the rightist opportunist interpretation of the term "people" takes in the bourgeoisie, including the "huaqiao." If the author of this article is referring to the "people" in this sense, the concept of "proletarian dictatorship" turns out to be meaningless and only camouflages a rightist elevation of the bourgeois class in China to the level of government authority.

Finally, Li Honglin does not mention another extremely important aspect of proletarian dictatorship--its relationship with the petty bourgeoisie--as if the petty bourgeois phenomenon never existed in China. To whose advantage is this kind of "forgetfulness"? After all, the very reason that proletarian dictatorship, or proletarian government, embarks upon the path toward socialism is that no one else but the proletariat is capable of organizing the advancement toward socialism or capable of attracting non-proletarian strata by virtue of its own example of organization and knowledge of its importance. The numerous repetions of the word "people" cannot substantiate the reality of proletarian democracy in China, but they can conceal the political return of the bourgeoisie under the wing of petty bourgeois rulers.

No one objects to Chinese reminiscences about proletarian dictatorship, but the meaning of this is another matter. It is understandable that the RENMIN RIBAO author is angry about the fact that in the recent past in the PRC, "beating, breaking, confiscating, searching and apprehending were all called revolutionary actions." Li Honglin states that "these fundamental questions must be thoroughly analyzed." But does he analyze them? Does he thoroughly examine the relationship between dictatorship and democracy, and is this the essence of the matter or is it, rather, that both proletarian dictatorship and proletarian democracy exist for the sake of socialist construction? Can the mere "reeducation of the last emperor and the Guomindang war criminals" signal the triumph of proletarian dictatorship, as Li Honglin writes? Can the mere "reeducation of exploiters into laborers" bring about "sociopolitical unity" (which is typical of mature socialism but has already been proclaimed in China), as the Chinese newspapers report?

According to Marxism-Leninism, a scientific approach to the subject of proletarian dictatorship presupposes, above all, proof of its historical necessity and, in the broader context, of the worldwide historic mission of the working class. No other class but the proletariat has as clearly defined an incentive to eliminate exploitation and oppression and to accomplish the social organization of labor. Its interests and needs are the direct personification of the social nature of productive forces created by capitalism and inevitably require the appropriate societal relations and social organization. V. I. Lenin provided the classic definition of these qualities of the proletariat, "which has been trained, united, indoctrinated and tempered by decades of strikes and political struggle against capital,...which has assimilated all urban, industrial and large-scale capitalist culture, has the determination and ability to defend it, to preserve and further develop all its gains and to make them accessible to all the people, all the workers,...in which the best people are filled with hatred and contempt for everything that is Philistine and petty bourgeois,...which has 'created a tempering school of labor' and is able to instill respect for industriousness in each worker, in each person with integrity."[1]

Since the new society derived directly from the chaos of the old one and represented its negation, it could not be accomplished without a new political organization, as exemplified by proletarian dictatorship. Society could develop spontaneously only up to a certain level of complexity, which then requires scientifically informed management of its development and functioning. Only the working class, as the force displaying the highest level of social organization, is capable of this kind of management. "Proletarian dictatorship," V. I. Lenin wrote, "actually means that only a specific class, namely the urban industrial workers and, in general, all factory and plant workers, are capable of leading all the laboring and exploited masses in a struggle to throw off the yoke of capital, in the overthrow of capital, in the struggle to defend and consolidate victory, in the creation of a new, socialist social order and in the entire struggle for the complete elimination of classes."[2]

The essence of proletarian dictatorship does not consist so much in the violent treatment of overthrown classes and counterrevolutionary and antisocial elements, and not primarily in violence, as V. I. Lenin pointed out, but in creation, because the proletariat takes power nor for the sake of personal grandeur, but for the purpose of building a society expressing the interests of all workers. This is why the proletarian dictatorship strives to attain the entire group of social objectives. Firstly, in addition to stifling the resistance of overthrown classes, it defends the socialist society and revolutionary gains, strengthens the system of international ties with the proletariat and progressive and revolutionary forces in other countries, organizes support for the revolutionary and liberation movements, establishes a new type of international relations, strives for peace and international cooperation and guarantees favorable international conditions for the construction of a new society. Secondly, the proletarian dictatorship gives non-proletarian masses political guidance, releases them from the chains of economic and political dependence and spiritual slavery imposed by exploiters and involves them in the construction of socialism. Thirdly, the proletarian dictatorship carries out socialist reforms in the economic, social, political and cultural spheres, aimed at and resulting in the enhancement of the workers' material welfare, their social development and their spiritual enrichment.

The proletariat performs its guidance (and this is why proletarian dictatorship is not dictatorship in the fullest sense of the term) by means of an alliance with the broad working masses and the organization of a system of political institutions encompassing these masses. "Proletarian dictatorshp," V. I. Lenin wrote, "is a unique form of class alliance between the proletariat, the vanguard of the laborers, and many non-proletarian working strata (the petty bourgeoisie, small proprietors, the peasantry, the intelligentsia and so forth), or the majority of them, an alliance against capitalism,...an alliance aimed at the thorough construction and consolidation of socialism."[3] Without democracy there could be no proletarian dictatorship, which represents the highest form of democracy in the class sense because the construction of socialism--the first process of planned and deliberate societal creation in history--is based on broad participation by the masses in the development of production, social relations and culture, in the management of the society and in a dictatorship against exploitative and parasitical groups in society.

Proletarian democracy, just as socialist democracy in general, is a system for the organization of human activity in society which is based on past social experience and guarantees the adoption and implementation of decisions of vital importance to society, as well as the development of separate groups and individuals by communicating this experience to them. It is not the "babbling of an idle mind" or the mirages and myths born of a sheltered existence.

Without proletarian democracy there could be no collective labor. Without it there could not have been the unprecedented grand-scale upsurge of creative energy, labor and patriotic enthusiasm without which we cannot imagine our past.

Proletarian dictatorship has a profoundly humanistic nature, it guarantees the working class and all laborers freedom and equality, paves the way to the achievement of their social ideals, enriches their life with new human qualities, helps them to overcome the remaining traces of the "old division of labor" on the way to a society of complete social equality and all-round development of the individual, "the return of man to his basic nature" as a social being. Under the conditions of proletarian dictatorship, the working class is given an opportunity to fully reveal its societal nature, overcome the results of oppression and exploitation, learn to manage society and teach this to others, and assimilate the cultures of civilian, truly and totally human, activity.

Lenin's works, particularly those written around the end of the civil war and later, and literally all of his works pertaining to the objectives of building a new world and addressed to the most diverse strata of the laboring public, are filled with the basic theme of his appeal to the masses to master the achievements of human culture, science, experience, knowledge, assimilate everything, all culture, all science, "so that science will truly be part of your flesh and blood, be a part of daily life, completely and absolutely."[4] Proletarian dictatorship is a system for the organization of society which allows the laboring public to put an end to the monopolization of spiritual values by exploitative classes, make these values accessible to society and thereby create a higher type of social organization with culture as its substantial foundation.

The construction of socialism is a turning point in social development with no parallels in history, neither in terms of scale nor in terms of character and degree of complexity. The vastly rich content of this type of human activity is reflected in the specific functions of proletarian dictatorship, internal and external: the suppression of the resistance of overthrown classes and all inherently antisocialist and antisocial forces, which inevitably sprang up in the old society; the administrative or organizational function, including the organization, planning and management of economics, technical progress, culture and education, the management of the system of spiritual institutions and direct management of the socialist cultural revolution; several other social functions--the supervision of degrees of labor and consumption, the protection of socialist property, the elaboration and enforcement of socialist standards of communal living and the enhancement of the workers' well-being; national defense, the defense of state (including collective) interests, the safeguarding of state security, the establishment of foreign political conditions favoring socialism--peace and public security, peaceful coexistence and international cooperation, struggle against imperialist aggression and against the arbitrary rule of monopolistic associations, the organization of cooperation and mutual assistance in the socialist community, the assistance of developing countries, the support of liberation movements and so forth.

The list of these functions is ample proof in itself of the huge differences between Maoism and socialism, the artificial and parasitical nature of the strategic goals of Beijing leaders, and the huge differences between proletarian dictatorships and the regime which has been imposed on the people and is being "defended" against Marxism by the Maoists, including the "neo-Maoists," "post-Maoists" and so forth. K. Marx liked to say that an end justifying unfair means was an unjust end.

One carefully preserved Maoist postulate is the thesis regarding national uniqueness and the need to observe it. The Marxists became convinced long ago that it is precisely this desire to exaggerate national uniqueness that is the focal point of Beijing policy and ideology.

It is a known fact that K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin, and later, the fraternal communist parties of the socialist countries, paid a great deal of attention to the specific forms and unique methods of socialist construction. They have always believed in the creative nature of the science of communism and have recognized the historically necessary variety of these forms and methods. The Paris commune, the soviets, the popular democratic states in a number of European and Southeast Asian countries, and revolutionary governments are all forms of proletarian dictatorship. The Maoist regime does not belong in this category.

The type of government, the political organization of the class society and its sociopolitical essence depend on the particular class which stands at the center of this organization, controlling the society by means of a system of norms and institutions by virtue of its dominant position, defining the goal of society as its own class goal and determining the nature of relations with other classes and strata in the society (allies, reserves, exploited, oppressed and so forth). This indicator coincides largely with the framework of socioeconomic structures.

The form of political organization is determined by objective historical conditions and reflected in the specific structure of political institutions, traditions and norms, in the variety of historical roles played by social groups and their movements, as well as historical situations.

The concept of the political regime is much more specific and superficial, and it sometimes even seems that it depends purely on subjective factors. Within the framework of a particular type or form of political organization, the regime reflects the nature and scales of ties, direct and indirect, between the subject and object of social control in general. The subject of control is more noticeable due to the distinctive features of its methods, means, style and the very nature of the subject, right down to the personal makeup of executors. But it does not take shape spontaneously. The nature of the decisions that are made and the methods of their execution and supervision also depend on external conditions ("besieged fortress" or "community"), as well as internal conditions (the form of political organization, the social authority of the regime, the sociopolitical experience of the masses and even the nature, structure and level of coulture). In other words, not every regime is compatible with a particular level of social development or type and form of political organization, although the latter can replace several different types of regimes.

One thing is certain--the type, the form and the regime have a historic, but not ethnic, a social, but not national, basis. A regime can be imposed upon a society, it can come into being as a historical accident, but it will not reflect the national mentality and will not characterize a particular nationality, like the type and form of political organization.

For this reason, the distinctive features of the political organization, its nature and its peculiarities are historical rather than national in this respect. Those who emphasize national peculiarities should remember that, in the first place, national historical peculiarities cannot be used as a basis for a scientific view of society, since the particular cannot serve as the foundation of theory, and this can only drag science through "national quarters" and turn it into speculation. Maoism provides an extremely graphic and convincing example of this kind of over-exposure:

Instead of combining Marxism-Leninism with the labor and revolutionary movement--that is, combining theory with practice, which would have resulted in successful revolutionary action--Maoism was manipulatively dragged into the revolutionary movement under the guise of Marxism-Leninism and this resulted in the failure of socialist construction in China. Finally, lengthy experience in social development has proved that "peculiarities" are sometimes an obstacle to progress and must be overcome. The same experience proves that petty bourgeois adventurism and nationalism are most likely to clothe themselves in these "peculiarities." Marxism-Leninism, as a creative doctrine, presupposes consideration for peculiarities, but not obsession with them, since they cannot be related to the goals of the working class' political struggle. Peculiarities are less the subject of theory than of concrete policy; for this reason, all talk about "models" and special "courses" is aimed only at concealing the main thing--the construction of a new society primarily requires profound and systematic knowledge, it requires Marxist-Leninist science, without which peculiarities cannot be taken into account productively, policy cannot be effective, victory is not possible, and "peculiarities" cannot be overcome as the result of something spontaneous, specific or unexpected in the developmental process; otherwise, unscrupulous manipulators will confuse the masses and bring about the unproductive use of social strength.

Taking peculiarities into account rather than being dominated by them, and searching for national historic forms in the interests of a general movement for the success of the socialist cause--this means the construction of socialism, and not a "peculiarity" like the Maoist dictatorship, and the use of theory to energize practice, and not to muffle it by denying theory. The overemphasis of peculiarities often conceals regressive tendencies. Theory exists precisely for the purpose of examining the vast amount of social experience for the purpose of singling out and assessing all elements that are spontaneous, accidental and natural. Science makes a social movement coherent and purposeful, whereas speculation fails. It would be impossible, after all, to call the present regime of the Beijing rulers the "successful result" of the implementation of Maoism or proof of its "scientific" nature and accuracy.

Reactionary and anticommunist notions often build themselves a nest at the juncture of the general and particular. This is how bourgeois propaganda, extolling the achievements of European capitalism, conceals from the public the fact that this is not the absolute result of capitalism, but of the fact that this capitalism developed under the conditions of European civilization and, with only a few exceptions, could not have flourished to this degree anyplace else and, judging by all indications, cannot do this now.

The constant "surplus" of hungry people, which excluded the possibility of using machines and kept social relations on the most primitive level, the "vegetating way of life," the multitude of conquests (including some "in reverse"), the underestimation of the individual and the tradition of despotism--no one under these conditions could rise above the status of a "bud," a "sprout" or a "spec of matter" in the fixed and unchanging entity with no possibility of choice or escape. The stagnation of ideas and the blind alley in history and culture--do these really constitute "peculiarities" or the drama of an entire race? Is it really possible to propel this kind of society into a historical movement with the aid of maniacal nationalism, making it a "historic bomb" threatening to blow up civilization?

History is full of peculiarities. What made K. Marx great was his ability to find general laws in history and force them to serve the people and their future. Mao Zedong "specialized" Marxism and the result is apparent--the impoverishment of a great and talented race, endowed with great wealth by history but defrauded by its "leaders."

The present regime in the PRC, just as the previous one, which is now called the regime of Lin Biao and the "gang of four," does not have the characteristics of proletarian dictatorship and, therefore, does not "fit into" the framework of the forms of this dictatorship and is not a variety of political regime under the conditions of proletarian dictatorship. It is something else, something radically different.

"The parcel peasants," "K. Marx wrote, "constitute a huge group, the members of which live in similar conditions but do not enter into various types of relations with one another. Their method of production isolates them from one another instead of giving rise to mutual communications.... Their field of production...does not allow for any kind of division of labor in its processing or any kind of scientific application, and therefore does not allow for any kind of diversity of development, diversity of talent or variety of social relations.... This huge group...is the mere sum of similar quantities, just as potatoes in a sack constitute a sack of potatoes. To the degree that millions of families live in economic conditions which distinguish and antagonistically oppose their way of life, interests and education to the way of life, interests and education of other classes, they constitute a class. Since the parcel peasants have only local ties and their similar interests do not give rise to any kind of community, national ties or political organization, they do not constitute a class. For this reason, they are incapable of defending their class interests on their own behalf. They cannot represent themselves and must be represented by others. Their representative must also be their overlord, an authority standing above them, an unlimited government power protecting them from other classes and sending down the rain and sunshine that they need. The political influence of the parcel peasantry is therefore ultimately reflected in executive authority's jurisdiction over society."[5]

V. I. Lenin, in turn, described the characteristics of the conservative segment of the peasantry--its "isolation," "alienation," habit of "working separately" and "inability to work together." These are nothing other than the characteristic features of the petty bourgeoisie: similarity of appearance (including ethnic similarity), local ties, isolation, a "dog-eat-dog" way of life, a lack of structure, limited experience, obsolete traditions and so forth. These are characteristics of the petty bourgeois way of life, not only in rural areas, but even in the cities, common to physical and mental fields of labor, both in production and in distribution. "By virtue" of these characteristics, the petty bourgeoisie is distinguished by instability, vacillation and a tendency toward extremes. It is not merely chaotic and amorphous, it is polarized and prone to disorder, it cannot come to any decision on a multitude of aims and it is nothing in itself. It can give the world individuals who are strong personalities, heroes or geniuses, but it can also tear them away from the world and bury them in the mire. Having no connection with historical experience, it is prone to various types of prejudices and obsessions and is incapable of cultural elevation. It reveals its tendency toward extremes either in adventuristic politicians, who have an unparalleled talent for intrigue and opportunism, to whom it blindly and servilely prostrates itself when they are successful, or in the lumpenproletariat, social "outcasts" and the dregs of society, which it delightedly scorns. The petty bourgeoisie's fondest dream is to achieve grandeur, and its failure to achieve this results in boundless bitterness. It supports equality, but only because "no one else should have it better." It cannot become anything impressive, but takes every opportunity to pass itself off as something impressive. Strictly speaking, this is a "pre-class" in terms of its internal organization, and this is the reason for its "inferiority complex" and extremism. This also explains why it is equally likely to display passivity, unscrupulousness and a passion for tyranny when it enters the sphere of politics. Its political ideal is the "master," a despot with the manner and outlook of the head of a patriarchal family, but endowed with mystical features. It cannot create its own social organization and method of production because it is amorphous in itself, but it is precisely for this reason that it believes in this kind of miracle. This is the milieu that gives birth to Napoleons and Cavaignacs, as V. I. Lenin wrote.

Capitalism not only arises from this milieu, but also gives rise to it upon demand--whenever it needs the old division of labor or alienation in social relations. On the one hand, it creates something like a worldwide economic system, but it also separates people and races and afflicts society with social deformities which are psychologically reflected in individualism. The petty bourgeoisie is both the product of this corruption and its suffering victim, a victim exploited and tortured by big capital.

"Proletarian dictatorship is needed," V. I. Lenin wrote, "representing the authority of a single class, the strength of its organization and discipline, its centralized power based on all the cultural, scientific and technical achievements of capitalism, its proletarian proximity to the mentality of the entire laboring public, its prestige in comparison to the fragmented, less developed and less politically aware laborer from a rural location or from small-scale production, so that the proletariat can lead the peasantry and all petty bourgeois strata in general. Here all of the talk about 'democracy' in general, about 'unity,'...to which the Philistine social chauvinists and Kautskians are so prone...cannot help, here all that is 'Philistine and narrow-minded' cannot help, here everything that flourishes so 'in the petty bourgeoisie, among petty employees and in the intelligentsia' cannot help."[6] "The success of socialism would be unthinkable without the triumph of proletarian mental discipline over the spontaneity of petty bourgeois anarchy, this genuine guarantee of the possible return of the Kerensky and Kornilov types of authority."[7]

The eradication of petty bourgeois elements in the mentality and behavior of individuals and social groups, which are the result of "isolation" and "alienation," takes years and years of scientifically tested forms of labor and struggle, organized by the proletariat, such as the "neutralization" of the petty bourgeoisie and the main thing--and the most difficult--the "inculcation of new labor disciplines" and standards of communal living, with which the petty bourgeoisie has essentially had no experience. This process of overcoming instability, fragmentation and the behavioral traits of a "piggish individual" is not simply a matter of eradication, but a lengthy process by which petty bourgeois traits become obsolete, giving free rein to the human--that is, social--traits in the individual, society and environment--that is, the actual enrichment of the individual with a variety of human talents.

But let us consider another situation, in which a sudden turn of events causes the petty bourgeoisie to represent itself, borne on the crest of a wave, for instance, when for some reason or another a revolutionary coup is not followed by the establishment or development of a proletarian dictatorship but the bourgeois dictatorship has already been overthrown. Or let us consider a more plausible situation: Under the present conditions of confrontation between two worldwide systems, socialism and capitalism, in an atmosphere of, let us assume, relative equilibrium and absolute friction between two class organized forces in a particular developed country, a situation could arise in which the petty bourgeoisie, which would be in a state of "independent" balance, might refuse to be "represented by others" and might acquire illusions about its ability for independent social organization and "its own" course of historical development.

In this case, as we can see from events in the PRC, it may not be a petty bourgeois or transitional structure that arises, it may not be a petty bourgeois dictatorship, although its extreme regimes--"barracks" and Philistine "socialism," with their one and only "social" connection--nationalism--and with their delirious ideas about hegemonism in the world are quite possible. Under these conditions, there may be an attempt at petty bourgeois political organization on undeveloped and deformed (and sometimes formal) social bases, an organization with the appearance of a deformed type of petty bourgeois dictatorship. The consequences of this are not difficult to imagine, but the essential fact is that this phenomenon cannot exist for long on its own.

Maoism took two extreme political forms in the 1960's and 1970's as a result of the specific historical conditions, international position and geographic location of the PRC. These two regimes created the semblance of petty bourgeois dictatorship which underwent all stages in a revolution and has finally reached the stage of ideological crisis, confusion and, possibly, even collapse. The social strata on which it rested and from which it emerged still exist. The emotional memory of the "Great Helmsman" is still alive in the Chinese people. Elements of fatigue and confusion have arisen in the society, and Maoism can feed parasitically on all of this for years, or even decades, with the assistance of the West--it can feed on misunderstandings about revolutionary authority, on the similarity between its problems and those of some liberated countries and on elements of socialism, with the aid of camouflaging "communist" phrases.

The present regime in the PRC is just as objectively heterogeneous as in Mao Zedong's lifetime, or even more so. Will the "orthodox Maoists" be able to stop rightist opportunist groups from slipping into capitalism without employing the methods of the "Cultural Revolution," methods which have become outdated? Will the rightist Maoists, in turn, carry their line to its logical conclusion without arousing serious social protest? Only the Chinese people can answer these questions. The answers will depend on the degree of their fatigue and demoralization as a result of the disintegration and vacillation their lives have been subjected to by both regimes, taking advantage of their sufferings in "great China" on the "Chinese road to socialism."

Something else can be assessed more definitely. No matter how long the present situation of mutual attacks and compromises, or "criticism-unity-criticism," should last in the present Chinese leadership, the Beijing regime will have to make a choice between regression to capitalism or progression to socialism. It is only when this choice has been made that the historical place of the present stage in Chinese social life and the nature of authority in the PRC in the 1960's and 1970's can be judged. Either this was a zigzag on the way to socialism, arising from the weakness of proletarian leadership and the unique external and internal factors of the history of this nation so close to us, a zigzag representing an attempt to impose a "particular" petty bourgeois society based on rabid nationalism, or it was petty bourgeois counterrevolution, camouflaged once again by a semblance of socialism.

Something else is also evident. Neither the declasse mob's outbursts of nationalistic hysteria nor the Machiavellian intrigues of obvious merchants of anti-Sovietism who secretely hunger after Philistine capitalism--both of them parasites feeding equally on the shortage of social experience in the Chinese society--can find a way for China to escape its serious historical impasse; they can only complicate this situation. After all, there is only one solution to the problem--proletarian dictatorship--and many in the PRC know this.

As for Maoism, the time has come to sum up its meaning with Engels' words: "Invariability as a result of megalomania."[8]

FOOTNOTES

* We would have no chance to conduct a terminological analysis here, but it is necessary to note that not all regressive or terrorist actions in politics can be called fascism, a phenomenon connected with the policy of monpolistic capitalism, although it has its own social base of "petty bourgeois fanatics." On the other hand, even now, the petty bourgeoisie, just as in the past, has some feudal or, more precisely, pre-bourgeois traits.

1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 38, pp 387-388.

2. Ibid., vol 39, p 14.

3. Ibid., vol 38, p 377.

4. Ibid., vol 38, p 55; vol 45, p 391.

5. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 8, pp 207-208. Marx ascribed these characteristics to the conservative, "purely" petty bourgeois segment of the peasantry, which wants to establish the way of life described above, but there is also another segment, which "strives to break out of the social conditions of its existence, urbanize itself and overthrow the old order by itself" (pp 208-209), in contrast to those who "stupidly lock themselves up in this old order and expect the ghost of the empire to save them and their parcel and give them privileged status" (p 209). This statement, incidentally, corroborates the assumption that there are some differences between the historical category of "peasantry" and the sociological category of "petty bourgeoisie."

6. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 38, pp 386-388.

7. Ibid., vol 36, p 189.

8. K. Marx and F. Engels, Op. cit., vol 20, p 338.

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BEIJING'S CURRENT LEGISLATIVE POLICY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1979 pp 66-73

[Article by L. M. Gudoshnikov, doctor of theoretical sciences, and V. P. Slabnov]

[Text] After an interval of many years, new normative legal acts were published in the PRC in 1979, the first of which were the "Statute on Compensation for Inventions" (adopted by the PRC State Council on 28 December 1978)[1] and the "Statute of the PRC on Arrests and Detention" (adopted by the NPC [National People's Congress] Standing Committee on 23 February 1979)[2] along with the last document, the NPC Standing Committee approved, for experimental implementation, the "Law of the PRC on Forestry (Experimental)," which was not the first published act pertaining to forestry (the "Instructions of the PRC State Council on Forest Conservation and the Cessation of Indiscriminate and Excessive Felling," which had established some legal standards, was published earlier).[3] Finally, several major legislative documents, including two codes, were adopted at the second session of the Fifth NPC (June-July 1979). The publication of these documents was preceded by a lengthy campaign (which did not end with their adoption) in the press for the "establishment of legality" and the "improvement of legislation" within the framework of propaganda of the general line of "struggle to establish order throughout the nation." During the course of this campaign, criticism was leveled at arbitrary and unlawful actions dating back to the 1950's and particularly characteristic of the period of "Cultural Revolution." Contrary to historical fact, these phenomena are associated by PRC propaganda exclusively with the activities of Lin Biao and the "gang of four." Mao Zedong is assigned the role of an enthusiastic supporter of legality and initiator of better legislation in the PRC and better law codes. For example, the following words, supposedly dating back to 1962, have been put in the mouth of the late "Helmsman": "It is not only a criminal code that is needed, but also a civil code, because lawlessness reigns in our country now."[4] In 1965 Mao Zedong, according to current reports in the Chinese press, supposedly "made concerned inquiries" regarding the compilation of these codes.[5]

In the past, it was not known that Mao Zedong had made these statements. During the "Cultural Revolution," the Red Guard press cited such remarks by Liu Shaoqi, calling them "evil material." In 1962, he said the following: "A criminal code must be drafted as quickly as possible so that it can be submitted to the NPC Standing Committee for thorough investigation. A civil code must also be drawn up."[6] As for the views of "Chairman Mao," they were reflected in the following "frank statement" in the same Red Guard leaflet: "At any time, we must rely only on the enthusiasm of the popular masses, we must rely on mass revolutionary campaigns, and legislation can only be an auxiliary means." If we look at the experience of the "Cultural Revolution," however, we can see that the laws were not even assigned an auxiliary role at this time. Moreover, the Maoist storm troops--"revolutionary students"--were absolved in advance in an official document of the Chinese Government of all criminal responsibility for crimes committed "during the course of the movement."[7]

It is also known that the "Cultural Revolution" was preceded by a campaign in the press (particularly in publications dealing exclusively with political law), which can be described as the laying of a foundation for arbitrary and unlawful acts. For example, in 1965 the journal ZHENGFA YANJIU ("Political-Legal Studies") set forth the following "recommendations" for PRC judicial bodies: "All purely judicial precautions and unnecessary ceremonies which bind the masses and are not in line with revolutionary struggle must be discarded without the slightest regret. It must be clearly established that all necessary normative standards and procedures are intended to combat enemies and not to bind us. We must approach the class struggle from a revolutionary standpoint and not take a metaphysical view of various legal directives."[8]

The Maoists demanded that personnel of political-legal bodies act according to the formula--"I will do whatever Chairman Mao says."[9] It was at that time--during the period preceding the "Cultural Revolution," that "trial by quotations"--that is, direct references to quotations from Mao Zedong in trial verdicts rather than to the appropriate articles of law--became part of the practice of judicial bodies.[10] This is now being criticized. The Chinese press now writes--naturally, connecting these methods with Lin Biao and the "gang of four"--that "they tried to give Mao's remarks the force of law, thereby creating the method of 'trial by quotations,' similar to the medieval religious course. Just a few distorted or falsified remarks were enough to sentence a person to death."[11]

In essence, we must agree with this criticism, but we cannot agree that the "gang of four" and Lin Biao invented "trial by quotations" because it already existed by the time the "gang of four" rose to the top of the power structure. As for Lin Biao, his views on court trials were never made public and nothing is known about his activities in the area of judicial control. Any distortion in the area of legislative policy and the practice of political-legal work indisputably came directly from Mao Zedong. In this area, just as in all other spheres of life, the "gang of four" and Lin Biao were only the "Helmsman's" assistants. Without an admission of this irrefutable fact, criticism of lawlessness and other negative phenomena in Chinese life is aimless and, therefore, cannot be regarded as an attempt to correct the situation.

Besides this, in today's China, criticizing remarks in the press regarding certain shortcomings or errors do not signify a desire to put an end to them. This can be illustrated by the example of the criticism in the Chinese press of so-called local legislation in comparison to the actual state of affairs in the nation. The Chinese press uses the term "local legislation" to refer to the mandatory instructions issued by local authorities, including those which restrict civil rights. This generally involves the imposition of fines or other types of penalties not specified in national laws or, in some cases, the provision of incentives. In spite of the criticism of "local legislation," however, the Chinese press is still reporting the collection of fines for the failure to attend meetings and even for criticism, cases involving corporal punishment and so forth.[12] At the same time, positive reports are printed regarding such local measures to encourage birth control as, for example, the creation of systems of benefits and stipends for families with one child, including tax exemptions for childcare and education, free medical treatment for children up to the age of 8, exemption from work in remote rural and mountain locations and so forth.[13] All of this also constitutes an example of "local legislation." Naturally, this does not mean that the Chinese leadership limits legislative policy to propaganda maneuvers. The objective needs of economic management and the development of foreign economic relations calls for the use of legal leverage. This is also necessitated by the policy of stronger law enforcement, which was shaken to its foundations by the "Cultural Revolution" and other Maoist experiments. In 1978 a special party organ responsible for legislative policy-making resumed its activity. It is now called the political-legal group of the CCP Central Committee. The group seems to be performing the same functions as the legal commission of the CCP Central Committee, headed by Wang Ming, which existed at the end of the 1940's. Now the group is headed by Ji Dengkui, member of the CCP Central Committee Politburo and vice premier of the State Council. The members of the group include PRC Minister of Public Security Zhao Cangbi, Vice Premier of the State Council Ji Pengfei (then the chief of the NPC Standing Committee Secretariat), Chairman of the Supreme People's Court Jiang Hua and others. The group has drawn up a plan for immediate legislative measures, which was set forth in Zhao Cangbi's report at an October 1978 conference on questions of legislative construction.[14]

The report indicates that the present Chinese leadership has resolved to rely on legal norms primarily in the areas of economic management, administration and ship building, thereby placing law at the service of the "four modernizations." This is why the first laws to be passed will be revised or new laws and other normative acts in the area of administrative law and the improvement of government, which is now bearing most of the burden of managing the "modernizations." In particular, these acts include laws on the organization and activity of various components of the state structure (primarily local administrative and government agencies, the courts and public prosecutor's offices), a statute on rural people's communes, a statute on compensation for inventions and technical innovations, decrees on safety equipment in industrial enterprises, a temporary statute on bonuses and penalties for state administrative personnel and so forth.

Particular attention has been paid to legislation on forest conservation, which was also earmarked for immediate enactment. As Zhao Cangbi explained in his report, the indiscriminate felling of trees, particularly those in the southern part of the Great Hinggang, has a negative effect on climatic conditions and agricultural production. Later, in March of this year, the Chinese press recalled that a UN agency had listed Beijing, as early as 1977, among cities "seriously threatened by sand." Quicksand, GUANGMING RIBAO reported on 2 March 1978, is approaching the Chinese capital, and this will be directly connected with excessive forest losses. These losses, just as all negative events in national life under Mao Zedong, are being blamed on Lin Biao and the "gang of four." They are also being blamed for the barbarous actions, mentioned by Zhao Cangbi, which destroyed the steppes and turned them into a desert as a result of improper plowing practices. In his report, Zhao Cangbi also cited instances of the squandering and arbitrary seizure of commune plowland by government institutions.

In connection with this, the institution of land legislation is planned, including laws on steppe conservation and on the procedure for the appropriation of land for the needs of state construction. This kind of legislation is actually nonexistent in China.

In his speech at the close of the second session of the Fifth NPC, Chairman Ye Jianying of the NPC Standing Committee named the following as laws to be worked out in the near future--civil and civil trial codes, laws on marriage, on family planning, on industrial enterprises, on labor, on contracts (namely economic contracts--Author), on energy resources and on environmental protection.[15]

The establishment of special "judicial bodies to settle various conflicts and cases in economic work" was also promised. Therefore, the question of organizing economic courts in China, which have never existed there before, has been raised. These will not be the same, however, as state arbitration agencies because, judging from several publications, the parties involved in the proceedings of these courts can also be physical persons.[16] The possibility of the investigation of cases involving economic crimes in these courts is not excluded either.

In his report, Zhao Cangbi did not mention legal regulation of foreign economic ties (including questions connected with the attraction of foreign capital). This has been discussed, however, in other Chinese press publications and Chinese attorneys have expressed their views on this matter quite frankly in conversations with foreign journalists. In a conversation with a NEW YORK TIMES correspondent, for example, Wang Jiafu, assistant division head in the Law Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,[17] said that a statute is being drawn up in China to protect foreign capital investments in China, enterprises jointly owned by foreign capital and the patent rights of foreigners.[18] During the same conversation, neutral arbitration was promised in the event of conflicts between foreign firms and Chinese state corporations, demonstrating how far the Chinese are prepared to go in making concessions to foreign capital. These conflicts, in all probability, will not be under the jurisdiction of Chinese economic courts. A commercial code is to be compiled and enforced for the regulation of foreign economic relations and private enterprise within the nation.[19]

The steps taken by the Chinese leadership in the field of legislation are not limited to the sphere of legal economic regulation, but this is indisputably regarded as one of the more important and primary fields for the enactment of normative standards.

The "Statue of the PRC on Arrests and Detention," adopted 23 February 1979 by the NPC Standing Committee, has already been mentioned above. Criminal and criminal trial codes were adopted at the second session of the Fifth NPC. Prior to the session, several articles were printed in the Chinese press in regard to the need for the immediate enactment of criminal and criminal trial laws, and the question of compiling a civil code has also been raised in general terms.[20] These articles stated that a criminal code was drafted in the PRC in 1962-1963. This has never been mentioned in the Chinese press before, although a draft compiled in the 1950's was mentioned. At that time, it was reported that the draft contained 261 articles and consisted of two parts (probably general and particular).[21] Besides this Shi Liang, who was then PRC minister of justice, wrote in 1979 that a criminal code would soon be instituted and that active work was going on in connection with the drafting of civil and trial codes.[22] Evidently, the work on the draft criminal code, which was interrupted by the "Great Leap Forward," was continued in the early 1960's--that is, during the period of "regulation."

According to current reports, the draft was sent to "a number of provinces, cities of central jurisdiction and autonomous regions for opinions and suggestions."[23] Nothing was ever said about its subsequent fate. Reference has been made to the fact that a criminal trial code was also being drafted in those years.[24] The cessation of this work is now naturally being connected with the "subversive activities of Lin Biao and the 'gang of four.'"

Legislative measures are dictated by the abovementioned objective need and by political propaganda considerations. The present Chinese leaders, in all probability, are fully aware of the importance of legal methods of economic regulation. They are apparently making an effort to institute the appropriate laws and codes and establish the machinery for legal regulation, particularly in the area of foreign economic relations, where this kind of work was being performed earlier as well. The process of instituting the legal regulation of internal economic problems will certainly be difficult and lengthy, both as a result of the Chinese leaders' actual lack of tradition and experience in economic administration with the aid of legal means and as a result of the shortage of personnel capable of carrying out this process. Similar difficulties have also been encountered in the enactment of criminal and criminal trial legislation.

Quick and effective measures will most certainly be taken to establish legal conditions for the attraction of foreign capital, technology and so forth to China, and this is attested to by the passage of a law by the second session of the Fifth NPC on the operation of enterprises controlled jointly by Chinese and foreign capital. This law, which was published in RENMIN RIBAO on 9 July 1979, permits foreign companies, other foreign economic organizations and individuals to establish joint enterprises in the PRC in conjunction with Chinese economic organizations. The protection of the "rights and interests of foreign partners" is one of the objectives of the legal regulation of joint enterprises. In particular, according to this law, joint enterprises can be partially or completely exempted from taxation for the first 2 or 3 years of profitable operations. If the profits are reinvested in China, the foreign partner can even apply for a refund of taxes that have already been paid. In accordance with this law, the foreign partner has the right to take profits out of the country and, in the event that the joint enterprise should cease operations, to take invested capital out of the country as well. Besides this, joint enterprises have the right to sell their products in China and abroad. They are permitted to open overseas branches for this purpose. In this way, extremely beneficial conditions have been created for foreign capital investments in the PRC.

In general, the Chinese leaders want foreign partners to view their nation as a "law-abiding state" and a reliable contracting partner. China's capitalist partners--and they are not the only ones--are not averse to exaggerating the positive aspects of the neo-Maoist regime and applauding all of its intrigues to create the semblance of "democratization and legality" in the nation.

Naturally, the law on joint Chinese-foreign enterprises aroused the greatest favorable response in the bourgeois press.[25] In addition, other laws adopted at the second NPC session were also found "worthy" of a positive evaluation, although with some provisos, including voting laws, laws on the organization of trials and public prosecutor's offices and others. Particular notice was taken of the election law regarding the plurality of candidates, within certain proportions, in local NPC elections and the self-nomination of candidates. Naturally, these measures cannot threaten the ruling clique in the PRC at all, but they are obviously expected not only to create a "new image" for China abroad (which is one of the Chinese leaders' major concerns), but also to reduce the existing social friction in the nation. There is no question that the number of candidates and the nomination of contenders in election will be "regulated" by the authorities. It is no coincidence that the new legislation still associates elections with "democratic consultations"--a term which, in the PRC political lexicon, has always signified the multileveled selection of members of various administrative and representative agencies.

It was not unnoticed abroad that the new law on the courts restored certain principles of judicial proceedings, present in the 1954 law on the organization of PRC people's courts, as the right of various nationalities to use their own spoken and written languages in court, the collective investigation of cases and so forth. This type of new tendency in Chinese legislation actually reflects the policy of the ruling clique in the PRC, which is striving, by means of rigidly controlled and strictly dispensed "democracy," to stimulate the public enthusiasm needed by the regime, enhance the effectiveness of government activity and acquire sympathy for the regime abroad.

Some of the Chinese leadership's legislative measures with a definite propagandistic purpose simultaneously reflect public demands. These include, for example, measures to stop the abuse of power, particularly the "Statue of the PRC on Arrests and Detention" issued by the NPC Standing Committee. If this act is compared to its predecessor--the statute of the same name of 20 December 1954--democratizing elements will not be seen; on the contrary, the new statute stipulates that the authorities can detain individuals for a much longer period of time without pressing charges. But the new act appears to restore certain rights that were swept away by the "Cultural Revolution" in provisions pertaining to agencies with the power to arrest or detain and norms concerning various guaranteed civil rights in this connection.

The number of people who suffered as a result of arbitrary arrests during the "Cultural Revolution" and afterwards is great. They include officials who were prominent in the past and have now returned to leading positions. They naturally want guaranteed safeguards against this kind of arbitrary action, at least one that would affect them personally. The popular masses suffered from this also, as arbitrary arrests were made in various strata of the Chinese society--not only among cadres and intellectuals, but also among the millions of other laboring people. This is why the adoption of the "Statute of the PRC on Arrests and Detention" corresponds to a certain degree to the wishes of the public. The enforcement of this statue, however, will be another matter, particularly on the local level.

The principles lying at the basis of the statute stem from the PRC Constitution of 1978, and some data on the implementation of the constitution during the time since its adoption are disturbing. For example, a dazibao which appeared in the city of Taiyuan on 16 March 1978 told of how constitutional provisions were interpreted on the local level: "Security agencies in the city of Taiyuan, just as in the past, apprehend anyone without evidence or the preliminary consent of judicial bodies. The day before yesterday, for example, security personnel apprehended three young workers on suspicion of a crime. The men who were arrested demanded a warrant and received the following reply: 'You are suspected of committing a crime as class enemies, and no sanctions are therefore required. The constitution guarantees the rights of citizens, but it does not protect the rights of class enemies.'"[26]

This announcement requires no commentary, but it should be added that all criminals in China are actually categorized as class enemies, according to official decisions by the Chinese leadership.[27]

No matter what direction law enforcement should take, however, state judicial norms are expected to multiply quickly in the PRC, and legislative regulation will most likely take in many fields of law in the future. At the sixth meeting of the Fifth NPC Standing Committee on 23 February 1979, a judicial commission was formed for the purpose of "aiding the NPC Standing Committee in intensive legislative work." The recently rehabilitated Peng Zhen was appointed chairman of the commission. Prior to the "Cultural Revolution," he headed the NPC Secretariat for three convocations and simultaneously served as deputy chairman of the NPC Standing Committee and occupied other government and party offices. Several prominent activists, including jurists, were appointed deputy chairmen and members of the commission. The latter include former Minister of Justice Shi Liang, former Supreme Court officials Yang Xiufeng and Gao Keling, and former State Council and NPC Standing Committee officials Wang Zhixiang, Zhang Su, Wu Kejiang and others. The new deputy chairmen of the commission are prominent individuals--Hu Qiaomu, Wang Shoudao and An Ziwen. The second session of the Fifth NPC formed a legislative proposal commission.

Measures were taken somewhat earlier to revive the science of law. As we have already mentioned, the academic Law Institute, as well as law schools and departments, have resumed their activity in China. The first issue of a theoretical judicial journal--FAXIUE YANJIU ("The Study of the Law")--came out in April 1979. On 6 April 1979 the NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY reported that an all-China conference, convened by the Law Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, was held from 22 through 31 March this year to plan scientific work in the field of jurisprudence. The "basic provisions of the plan for the development of scientific work in the field of law in the PRC in 1978-1985" were adopted at this conference.

Articles on legal matters have appeared constantly in Chinese newspapers and magazines for the general reading public since 1977. The criticism in some of them is reminiscent of articles printed in the spring of 1957, during the "Let a hundred schools contend" period, which was later christened a "rabid rightist attack."

Naturally, in China this kind of campaign could lead to the repetition of provocations with respect to the "contending of a hundred schools," but it is now much more probable that the Chinese leadership will utilize various legal institutions in the interests of the "four modernizations."

FOOTNOTES

1. RENMIN RIBAO, 17 January 1979.

2. Ibid., 25 February 1979.

3. Ibid., 3 February 1979.

4. GUANGMING RIBAO, 2 November 1978.

5. RENMIN RIBAO, 24 November 1978.

6. Quoted in the editorial entitled "The Complete Exposure of the Counterrevolutionary Revisionist Crimes of Liu Shaoqi in the Area of Political-Legal Work" (ZHENGFA GONGSHE, 16 April 1967).

7. This refers to the "Decision on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," adopted by the 11th Plenum of the Eighth CCP Central Committee, which took place on 1-12 August 1966.

8. ZHENGFA YANJIU, 1965, No 1, p 19.

9. Ibid., 1966, No 1, p 18.

10. During the "Cultural Revolution," the place of constitutional legal bodies was taken by military-controlled punitive agencies and the unauthorized trials of the "revolutionary masses"--that is, the Re Guards and Zaofan.

11. GUANGMING RIBAO, 26 October 1978.

12. See ZHONGGUO QINGNIANBAO, 4 January 1979 (selected letters from readers on p 3). The same newspaper printed an article on 31 March 1979 which criticized the official practice in some schools to impose fines on the parents of students who violate regulations.

13. ZHONGGUO QINGNIANBAO, 21 January 1979.

14. RENMIN RIBAO, 29 October 1979.

15. An even longer list of laws to be enacted was presented in an article by Wang Jiafu and Cheng Mingxia on economic legislation and administrative justice (RENMIN RIBAO, 6 December 1978). They also discussed the need to pass laws on air and railway transportation and trade, land and mining codes.

16. See, for example, the article by Hu Qiaomu, "The Observance of Economic Laws and the Accelerated Accomplishment of the Four Modernizations" (RENMIN RIBAO, 6 October 1978).

17. The activities of the academic Law Institute were resumed in 1977 and it is now part of the Academy of Social Sciences (it was previously part of the Chinese Academy of Sciences).

18. NEW YORK TIMES, 15 January 1979.

19. Ibid.

20. See, for example, the articles of the Law Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, "The Compilation of Criminal and Criminal Trial Codes Must Be Started in Earnest" (GUANMING RIBAO, 2 November 1978), and Zhang Zhonglin, "There Is an Urgent Need for Criminal and Criminal Trial Codes" (RENMIN RIBAO, 24 November 1978).

21. See, for example, GUANMING RIBAO, 24 November 1956. There are 192 articles in the Criminal Code of the PRC adopted by the NPC on 1 July 1979 (GUANMING RIBAO, 7 July 1979).

22. PEOPLE'S CHINA, 1957, No 6.

23. RENMIN RIBAO, 2 November 1978.

24. Ibid.

25. See, for example, "Beijing Passes a Law to Attract Investors" in the NEW YORK TIMES, 9 August 1979.

26. ZHONGGUO DALU, 1978, No 130.

27. For example, the decisions of the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee, held in December 1978, state: "Under no circumstances should the class struggle against the handful of counterrevolutionaries and criminals be abandoned" (RENMIN RIBAO, 24 December 1978).

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REASSESSMENT OF TIANANMEN EVENTS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1979 pp 74-84

[Article by R. M. Neronov, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] The rivaling cliques in the Chinese leadership take different approaches to the "correction" of the chief tendencies in the development of Chinese society and the assessment of political events in China. The assessment of Mao Zedong as an individual and his "Cultural Revolution," measures to mobilize "mass enthusiasm," the problem of rehabilitating people condemned in the last 20 years, and questions of socioeconomic policy are all giving rise to new conflicts within the Beijing leadership. The Chinese leaders are making every effort to keep these conflicts from becoming public. Nonetheless, some documents and articles published in China indicate that this struggle has been exceptionally tense at times.

One indication of the struggle between the two cliques is the changed approach to the assessment of the "April events" in Tiananmen Square in 1976.

The Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee, which came to an end on 22 December 1978, issued a special decree on the vindication of the April events of 1976 in Tiananmen Square. A plenum communique states that "the Tiananmen events of 5 April 1976 were totally and completely a revolutionary demonstration; they represented the central event of a great revolutionary mass movement, during the course of which the entire multimillion-strong population of the country honored the memory of Comrade Zhou Enlai with deep regret and angrily condemned the 'gang of four.'" The plenum resolved to annul all erroneous documents distributed by the Central Committee regarding the "movement to protest the right-wing whirlwind of revisions of correct conclusions" and the Tiananmen events.

The Tiananmen events were called "a great service to the socialist cause," the "pride of the Chinese race," the "popular movement of 5 April," which "represented a battle not for life, but to the death, over the future of China," and a struggle between "scientific socialism and feudal socialism."

The two RENMIN RIBAO issues of 21 and 22 November 1978 contained a lengthy article entitled "The Truth About the Events in Tiananmen," and subtitled "Let Us Upright the Upside-Down History of These Events, Which Was Invented by the 'Gang of Four,' Taking Advantage of RENMIN RIBAO."

In this way, the events underwent a complete political reassessment. It is no secret that the organ of the CCP Central Committee, the RENMIN RIBAO newspaper, long and stubbornly asserted, from April 1976 on, that the events in Tiananmen Square were a "counterrevolutionary political incident" and that the written and oral statements made in the square were directed "against the CCP Central Committee and Chairman Mao Zedong personally."[1]

When the April events of 1976 and the resulting struggle in the Chinese leadership are evaluated, questions like the following must first be answered:

1. Were the Tiananmen events a purely "popular movement" led by the workers, as the Chinese press now asserts?

2. Which particular political forces were behind these events?

3. Did this movement have the anti-Maoist features that are now being denied in China?

At the time, the press in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries contained a principled assessment of the events of 5 April, describing them in general as the first open and mass-scale demonstration by the Chinese workers against the Maoist regime.[2]

Soviet Sinologists correctly pointed out the following distinctive features of the April events of 1976, which reflected the attitudes of the most aware segment of Chinese society, openly expressing its dissatisfaction with Maoism and the Maoist order: their anti-Maoist nature; the fact that the masses joined the struggle; the element of provocation of a particular type--the Gaponov type; the creation of the necessary conditions, as part of the correction of the present policy line, for the appearance of healthy forces in the Chinese political arena.

Since the beginning of 1978, new articles have been published in China which shed light on the details and essence of the events in Tiananmen Square. The bloody revenge taken against hundreds of thousands of demonstrators, including the dozens who were killed, the many hundreds of wounded and the tens of thousands who were arrested,[3] constituted more proof of the mounting crisis in the Mao Zedong regime and an indicator that public dissatisfaction could lead to social outbursts endangering the regime. What frightened the Maoists, as the Czechoslovakian RUDE PRAVO correctly noted at the time, was precisely the fact that the masses had joined the struggle

The attitude of the Chinese leadership toward the "incident of 5 April" is extremely indicative. A meeting of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee on 7 April, immediately after the events, categorized them as a "counterrevolutionary incident." Deputy Chairman of the CCP Central Committee and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping was divested of his titles, and Hua Guofeng was appointed first deputy chairman of the Central Committee and premier of the PRC State Council.

The question arises: Is it true that the masses in Beijing and other cities of China suddenly decided unanimously at the beginning of April 1976 to honor the memory of "esteemed Premier Zhou" and, after preparing hundreds of costly wreaths and portraits and writing huge quantities of verses condemning current rulers of the PRC, including Mao Zedong himself, went to the square? Or is it more likely, as Chinese propaganda put it in Mao's lifetime, that this "political incident was completely prearranged and conducted in a planned and orderly manner"?

Facts have now come to light which testify that the payment of homage to Zhou Enlai was only the pretext for a mass demonstration, and that the events in Tiananmen Square and in other Chinese cities were a reflection of the sharply intensified struggle between the two main cliques within the CCP leadership--the leftist Maoists followers of Mao and the old cadres headed by Deng Xiaoping. The masses had lost faith in Mao Zedong's policies and regarded the line connected with Zhou Enlai's name with an alternative, however minor, to the criminal political line and consequently eagerly agreed to pay homage to the late premier and protest the Jiang Qing clique's bids for power.

Now the Chinese press is describing the events in the following manner: "This was a unique type of war, a war in which wreaths and verses were used as weapons to fire quickly upon the "gang of four," sitting aloft in usurped seats."[4]

Reports in the Chinese press seem to indicate that the demonstration was not spontaneous: The wreaths from enterprises and organizations were prepared in advance on a mass scale, just as the verses and the text of leaflets. Later reports stated that the party committees of the production and administrative units concerned knew of this in advance. The Beijing city committee distributed a telegram: "Memorial day is a throwback to ancestor worship, it is among the four 'old' habits. Pilgrimages to monuments are unnecessary." Nonetheless, many low-level party committees went against these instructions. They apparently received instructions through other channels. Several officials personally led mourning columns and recited eulogies to Zhou Enlai's memory.

The political import of the verses and slogans aimed against Mao Zedong and his followers testifies that this was not in any sense a mere "wake for the premier," but the beginning of an overt struggle against Mao's closest associates. The demonstrations were joined by industrial enterprises and, in particular, the workers and employees of Beijing radio plants and Plant 109 of the PRC Academy of Sciences, servicemen, and research associates from the Institute of Automatic Equipment and other organizations.[5] The participation of servicemen naturally must have been sanctioned by commanders. The individuals representing organizations certainly might have been joined by spontaneous elements, but it was not these that made up the majority of participants.

It is now being said that the demonstration was sparked by veiled attacks on late Premier Zhou Enlai in Shanghai's WENHUEI BAO newspaper in March 1976. The editorial in the 5 March 1976 issue first omitted a quotation from Zhou Enlai--words addressed to the "rust-proof screw--Comrade Lei Feng"--who was supposedly totally devoted to Mao Zedong. This editorial "license" was interpreted as an attempt to separate Zhou Enlai from Mao and from the army. Later, an editorial in the 25 March 1976 issue of the paper stated: "These capitalist roaders within the party want to give authority to a deposed, but still inveterate capitalist roader." They are now saying that the population "immediately realized" that "these two poisonous arrows fired at Premier Zhou were a danger signal attesting to a conspiracy by the 'gang of four' to seize power in the party."[6] This supposedly lit the fuse for the Tiananmen explosion.

Every effort is now being made to broadcast the "universal love" for "Premier Zhou" which almost led to revolution. It must be said that the popularity of Zhou Enlai among the masses at the time of the incredibly exaggerated personality cult of Mao Zedong, who was still alive at that time, is highly exaggerated. This is particularly true since Zhou was "attacked" during the campaign for "criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius," during the struggle against the "right-wing whirlwind of revisions of the correct conclusions of the Cultural Revolution" and so forth.

We know, for example, the reaction that followed the news of Zhou Enlai's death in Shanghai. Many party cadres objected to the funeral ceremonies. When some individuals cried, they were asked: "Why are you crying? Even when your father dies you are supposed to cry at home!" In another place, a leading party official ironically remarked: "You are grieving so much that it would be better for you to join Premier Zhou!" At one Shanghai enterprise, they were even asking: "Is it worth it to mourn the death of an American spy?"[7]

There is no question that most of the population, particularly the young, had the proper negative feelings about Zhou Enlai. Incidentally, it must be said that no "line of Premier Zhou" ever existed in China. Zhou Enlai himself implemented Mao Zedong's instructions, making only tactical corrections in the Maoist line, alleviating some of the harshness and smoothing out sharp corners.

It is therefore not surprising that the popular uprising began not in Shanghai or Beijing, but in Nanjing, where the influence of the "pragmatists" was stronger. Placards with the following messages were put up in the streets of Nanjing on 29 March 1979 [as published]: "The antiparty article in WENHUEI BAO is a signal flare for the seizure of power in the party" and "we will not rest until the dark cellar of WENHUEI BAO is seized!"[8] A rostrum decorated with lilies was prepared, and it was here that funeral wreaths were placed in honor of the late Zhou Enlai. Leaflets were also pasted on the walls of trains headed for Beijing and were read out loud throughout the journey. In this way, a method of disseminating information about the Nanjing events was found.

It is interesting that people in Beijing knew about the attacks on Zhou Enlai even before the Nanjing events. "The people of Beijing were already angry about the counterrevolutionary actions of WENHUEI BAO," news reports of those days state. "Heated debates were going on everywhere--at enterprises, in academic institutions, in establishments and in military units."[9]

Proof that the mass demonstration in Tiananmen Square was prearranged can be found in the almost simultaneous incidents of a similar nature in several other large, medium-sized and small cities in the PRC, and some of them took place even after the adoption of the "two resolutions" of the CCP Central Committee on 7 April 1976. All of this testifies that the demonstrations were far from spontaneous.

The question now is who could have incited the masses to demonstrate in this manner.

Subsequent events proved that the "four" did not need this at all: They occupied a sufficient high and firm position in the party leadership in Mao's lifetime. An analysis of the appeals, slogans, verses and other materials distributed at the time of the events in Tiananmen Square in Beijing and in other cities shows that the overwhelming majority of them were directed against Mao and the "gang of four," particularly Jiang Qing, and contained direct or indirect appeals like "overthrow the dowager empress Ci Xi," "down with Wu Zetian, the instigator of chaos," "down with people like Lu Hou,"[10] "strangle Jiang Qing" and "mash the dog's head of Jiang Qing."

There can be no doubt that all of these demonstrations were prearranged and were inspired by the followers of Deng Xiaoping, who was actually isolated from public affairs as a result of the intrigues of those closest to Mao. Rumors about his fall spread quickly and the press provided indirect confirmation of this.

In this situation, Deng Xiaoping's supporters had to take steps to preserve their own position in the leadership.

Conveniently enough, memorial day was coming. The very personality of the late Zhou Enlai and feelings about him became a unique line of demarcation between the two main cliques. Deng Xiaoping's clique knew from the increase of attacks in the press on "capitalist roaders," "democrats" and "restorers" that it had been put in a difficult position by Deng Xiaoping's dismissal. We can even assume that this clique realized that the "Great Helmsman" would die soon and resolved to launch a warning assault on the "four," if not bringing about their downfall then at least compromising them in the eyes of the public by means of mass demonstrations on memorial day and thereby, using the Maoist term, "preparing public opinion" for their downfall.

Why was it so easy to quickly stifle the demonstration in April? In the first place, the army command was apparently divided into factions and did not want to oppose Mao Zedong's favorites while he was still alive. In the second place, the Jiang Qing faction, sensing that the struggle would revolve immediately around her and that her position was in danger, used Mao Zedong's authority, informing him about events in ways convenient for her. It was with his consent that armed forces, the public security system and the militia were used to stifle the mounting rebellion. In the third place, the "four's" relative freedom of action was predetermined by the presence of such individuals in the leadership as Hua Guofeng, Wu De, Chen Xilian, Wang Dongxing and Ji Dengkui, who had been associated with the "ultra-leftists" since the beginning of the "Cultural Revolution" and rose to power during the course of this revolution. As we know, Hua Guofeng rose to second place in the PRC power hierarchy after this "counterrevolutionary political incident."

The leftist Maoist clique skillfully made use of the events in Tiananmen Square to temporarily strengthen its own position: Deng Xiaoping was removed from all of his offices, and Wang Li, Zhang Jingfu, Zhou Rongxing, Lu Bing, Hu Yaobang, Hu Qiaomu and other of his followers disappeared from the political horizon. A series of articles was published under the pseudonym Liang Xiao. They contained the following remarks in particular: "It is apparent that all of the scum that gathered in Tiananmen Square to create a scandal was dancing to the tune of Deng Xiaoping. The incident in Tiananmen Square was a criminal offshoot of the right-wing whirlwind stirred up by Deng Xiaoping for the revision of the correct conclusions of the Cultural Revolution.... The counterrevolutionary incident in Tiananmen Square proved that representatives of the bourgeoisie and their leaders are present within the party."[11]

This description of the "bloody Monday" of 5 April 1976 benefited the leftist extremist wing, giving it an opportunity to intensify their struggle against "democrats who are capitalist roaders" and isolate their opponents in the fight for the further "usurpation of authority in the party." However, subsequent events--the death of Mao Zedong and the arrest of Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan on 6 October 1976--steered political events in another direction.

The arrest of the "gang of four" and the defeat of their supporters were described in the Soviet and foreign press as a top-echelon coup. In China, the incident in Tiananmen Square was simply ignored or given the traditional interpretation for a long time after the defeat of the "four." The words of Vice Chairman Deng Yingchao of the NPC [National People's Congress] Standing Committee, Zhou Enlai's widow, who said in a talk with Yugoslavian journalists in 1977 that the "question of the Tiananmen incident has been essentially settled" was practically the only sign, and an unofficial one at that, of a new approach to the "April events." She repeated a statement once made by Hua Guofeng--that "thorough investigation had established that Deng Xiaoping was not implicated in the April incident."

After the fall of the "gang of four," Deng Xiaoping's supporters began to insist on his rehabilitation. The Third Plenum of the Tenth CCP Central Committee, held in July 1977, reinstated Deng Xiaoping in all of his former offices, removed the members of the "gang of four" from all of their public offices and "expelled them from the party forever." Deng Xiaoping's return to politics was accompanied by the intensive rehabilitation of cadres who had been repressed prior to and during the "Cultural Revolution." According to some Chinese observers, conflicts between Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng arose at the very moment when Deng returned to politics and these conflicts centered around the questions of rehabilitation and the "Cultural Revolution." Apparently the question of rehabilitating participants in the April events of 1976 was never even raised. This was not so simple a matter: The forces involved in suppressing the demonstration included Beijing Government officials (Wu De was the secretary of the city committee and the representative revolutionary committee), the army (Ye Jianying was defense minister at that time and Chen Xilian commanded the Beijing military division), public security agencies (Hua Guofeng was the minister of public security), the "palace guard"--military unit 8341 (under the jurisdiction of Wang Dongxing, head of the CCP Central Committee Office) and the Beijing militia (commanded by Ni Zhifu).

In this situation, it was quite understandable that some leaders tried to hush up or ignore the events of 5 April, which had stigmatized the Maoist regime. The attitude of the Beijing leadership toward the events of 5 April and their desire to "save Mao's face" provide eloquent testimony that the present process of adjustment in Maoist policy is having little effect on the essence of Maoism and its established regime.

This is also corroborated by the content of the majority of dazibao which appeared in China for 2 years in a row--on the first and second anniversaries of the April events. For example, a poster entitled "Public Opinion" which appeared in April 1977 asks: Why were cadres and rank-and-file workers who were dismissed from their duties prior to the fall of the "gang of four" not rehabilitated in Beijing or in other cities? The authors of another dazibao stated: "Have the people really won? The 'four' have fallen, but the real state of events indicates that many people are still being persecuted, the new-born forces of revolution have been annihilated, and all of the old aims of the 'four' still exist in the political and economic spheres and have even been developed further."

The dazibao declared that "the revolution has failed" and that "the present government is not a proletarian government."

Dazibao attacking top-level officials also appeared on the pedestal of the monument to the fallen heroes of the revolution in Tiananmen Square on the second anniversary of the events of 5 April. The dazibao demanded a "thorough investigation of the underlying motives for the events of 5 April 1976 and the publication of the results in the press." A few days before the second anniversary of the events in Tiananmen Square, mass demonstrations took place in Beijing and Nanjing, led by people who had suffered 2 years before. The demonstrators distributed leaflets, pasted dazibao on walls and recited slogans. They demanded that the "villans" who had treated the people in Tiananmen Square so brutally be severely punished, particularly Wu De and Chen Xilian. The police were ordered to stifle the demonstration and this resulted in skirmishes and bloody battles. People died in Beijing and in Nanjing, but the number of dead is still unknown.

One dazibao frankly inquired about the responsibility of those who then headed the "party central committee and organs of the dictatorship in our nation." Everyone knew that this applied primarily to Mao Zedong, Hua Guofeng, Chen Xilian, Wu De and Ni Zhifu. This time, in April 1978, in addition to these individuals, officials on a lower level were criticized--for example, Ding Guoyu, secretary of the Beijing CCP City Committee, "for betraying Zhou Enlai, under whom he once worked in the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs." Attacks were made on Xie Jingyi, former member of the CCP Central Committee and MPC Standing Committee, head of the Preparatory Group for the Tenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth League and member of the "Liang Xiao" writers' group, and Li Suwen--member of the Central Committee and deputy chairman of the MPC Standing Committee.

Many of the dazibao which appeared between 4 and 8 April 1978 contained several new facts and demands. For example, they reported the suicide of Liu Chuanxin, former chief of the Beijing Public Security Administration, who had been personally involved in planning the bloody incidents connected with the suppression of the popular demonstration of 5 April 1976.[12] The torture and harassment to which the "heroes of 5 April" were subjected in prison were described in detail. Many of these individuals, according to what is written, died. The authors of the dazibao demanded the punishment of several leaders of the Beijing City Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League, the women's federation, the capital's militia headquarters and Beijing VUZ's, as well as the institution of criminal proceedings against members of the writers' group of the Beijing CCP City Committee, known under the pseudonym of "Tang Guangsi."

An analysis of these dazibao points up some of the peculiarities of the campaign to justify the events of 5 April immediately before their vindication.

In the first place, not one of them mentioned Mao Zedong and none of the attacks named Hua Guofeng. The latter testifies to the institution of tougher policy restrictions (it is known that some dazibao were immediately torn down) and the enforcement of earlier (1977) special Central Committee decisions on the cessation of attacks on Mao, Zhou and Hua Guofeng. The tendency to attack Kang Sheng was still present.

In the second place, there were fewer attacks on Chen Xilian and there was no mention of the military leaders who suppressed the demonstration. Reports were heard that dazibao criticizing Chen Xilian were put up in Shenyang, meaning that the criticism moved from the capital to the province where Chen Xilian once worked.

In the third place, recently coined terms began to prevail in the dazibao--the "third battle" against the "four." This testifies that the dazibao were inspired by the political group that had launched the campaign against the "four"--Deng Xiaoping's people.

More vigorous activity by Deng Xiaoping and his supporters was attested to by the repeated repressive actions taken against former Red Guard leaders--Kuai Dafu, Nie Yuanzi, Tan Houlan and others, who had been condemned by participants in "hate meetings" since 19 April.

The reassessment of the "incident in Tiananmen Square" in the Chinese press in October-December 1978 should also be regarded as a result of this latest stage in the intra-party struggle.

Official reports concerning the "complete rehabilitation of comrades who were persecuted for demonstrating against the 'gang of four'" and the restoration of their good reputations by the Beijing CCP City Committee were published 16 November 1978, but articles mentioning the rehabilitation of participants in this incident began to appear as early as August. It is indicative that some of them contained quite uncomplimentary references to the public security personnel who were hampering the rehabilitation.

There is reason to believe that the actual reassessment of the Tiananmen events took place in June-August 1978. For example, in August the press contained mention of one of the "heroes" of the Tiananmen events, bulldozer operator Han Zhixiong,[13] and a meeting of Beijing youths demanding the review of all of the "cases" involving participants in the April events of 1976.[14] We know that a document entitled "Party Central Committee Instructions Concerning the Correction and Review of Cases Involving Innocent Victims and Erroneous Cases," which mention the need to rehabilitate individuals who suffered at the time of the April events of 1976, was being studied in PRC party organizations in June 1978.[15] Moreover, this did not apply exclusively to inhabitants of Beijing, since reports of rehabilitation were received from the city of Guiyang and other places.

A distinctive feature of the October articles in the Chinese press was the new version of the April events of 1976 which was set forth in detail for the first time. It attested to the increasing strength of Den Xiaoping's faction after 2 years of persistent struggle to erase the brand of a "counterrevolutionary political incident."

Chronologically, the first report came from the city of Xian and described a seminar of cadres in the province of Shenxi, at which, as the newspaper stated, "persons (31 of them) mistakenly condemned as counterrevolutionary participants in the April events of 1976 in Xian, during the course of which the masses honored the memory of Premier Zhou and spoke out against the 'gang of four,' were completely rehabilitated." The actions of these people in 1976 were described in the report as "revolutionary."16

On 18 October, RENMIN RIBAO printed an article entitled "Into the Storm," in which the events of April 1976 in Beijing were called a "revolutionary struggle" and their participants were called "revolutionary heroes." The article contained a detailed description of the part played by Han Zhixiong, worker in the Beijing repair and construction administration, in the events in Tiananmen Square and his arrest. The facts printed in the newspaper refute the previous version of the events and illustrate how the previous assessment of the events was fabricated. The article contains vivid descriptions of the illegal arrests that were made, the inhuman tastes of the investigators and the workings of the public security machinery in Maoist China.

The 20 October issue of GONGREN RIBAO contained an essay on Cao Zhijie, a delegate to the ninth trade union congress and one of the 29 authors of the first slogan which appeared in Tiananmen Square on 30 March 1976. The essay described the factors which motivated Cao Zhijie, who was then deputy chief of the theoretical group of the Beijing federation of trade unions, to write the appeal: "Honor the memory of Premier Zhou and finish the bloody battle against the bourgeoisie!" It also described the repressive actions to which Cao, his father and his father-in-law were subjected and the circumstances of his arrest and interrogation, at which time investigators tried to acquire testimony regarding Deng Xiaoping's connections with the participants in the events in Tiananmen Square.

Finally, the 24 October issue of GUANMING RIBAO contained an essay on Lin Dezhong, Xiamen University instructor, who was another victim of these events. He is depicted as a person who was defending Deng Xiaoping. Lin Dezhong has now resumed his work in the university.

An analysis of the articles printed in October indicates a general tendency which can probably be summed up in four particulars.

Firstly, the articles primarily concern those who defended Deng Xiaoping, stressing that "95 percent of the population opposed the dismissal of Deputy Chairman Deng." Deng Xiaoping is depicted as a man who "cares about the masses and acts in their interest." In particular, it has been noted that in his time, "the production of cast iron and steel grew, the trains ran on schedule, the revival of education began and the living conditions of the people became an important issue."

Secondly, the articles conceal the actual role played by Hua Guofeng in the April events of 1976, when he was carrying out the orders of Mao and the "gang of four." Now, on the contrary, Hua Guofeng is being praised for "defeating the 'gang of four' with one blow" and "saving" those who had been arrested. Moreover, "expressions of public gratitude" have been organized in Beijing in connection with a collection of essays, describing the events of 5 April 1976 in Tiananmen Square, which are supposed to have been written by Chairman Hua.[17] Hua Guofeng's guilt as former minister of public security has been transferred to the "black general" of the Beijing public security administration, Liu Chuanxin.

Thirdly, the blame for the bloody slaughter and arrests has been transferred completely to public security agencies and the militia, even though the demonstration was also suppressed by army divisions commanded by Chen Xilian and Zhong Nanhai Guard troops under the jurisdiction of Wang Dongxing. It is assumed that this tendency is not a coincidence and that this issue was the focal point of the struggle over the vindication of Chen Xilian and Wang Dongxing.

Fourthly, everything possible is being done to preserve the prestige of Mao Zedong, about whom it is being said that he would have restored justice long ago "if he had been well." Nonetheless, the tendency to "save Mao's face" and to deny the anti-Maoist feelings of the Chinese masses in Tiananmen Square in April 1976 has a quite contradictory appearance in current press articles. On the one hand, it has been stated that the "people were defending Marxism-Leninism and the revolutionary line of Mao," but phrases and verses discrediting Mao can often be found in the same article.[18] It appears that the conflict between various political groups over this issue is being reflected in the press.

Chronologically, later events took the following sequence. In the middle of November 1978 a frontal assault was organized by Deng Xiaoping's supporters in Beijing: 1) the appointment of Lin Hujia--Deng's comrade-in-arms--as chairman of the Beijing revolutionary committee was announced (15 November); 2) RENMIN RIBAO published an article entitled "Taking a Realistic Approach and, if Errors Are Found, Correcting Them," which stated that the documents of superior agencies, statements of top-level officials and various resolutions would have to be corrected if they were wrong (15 November); 3) the premier performance of a play was held--"In Silence"--in which the events in Tiananmen Square were vindicated (16 November); 4) a decree of the Beijing city committee bureau was published, stating that the events in Tiananmen Square were totally "revolutionary acts" (16 November).

On 16 November 1978 reports were also heard about the publication of a collection of poems which had appeared at the time of the events in Tiananmen Square. It was stressed that Hua Guofeng himself had penned the title. It was reported that more than 2 million copies had been sold. The group of authors took the pseudonym "Zhou's mourners."

The same day a campaign was launched on a broad scale, consisting of dazibao and mass demonstrations. The main purpose of the campaign was to support the vindication of the Tiananmen events. It was accompanied by the appearance of slogans demanding democratic freedoms and the observance of legality and human rights.

The 20 November issue of RENMIN RIBAO contained an article called "Historical Support for the Revision of Unjust Accusations," which indicated that the review of unjust trials should not take too much time or consideration. The next day an article entitled "The Real Nature of the Tiananmen Events" appeared, and this one attacked both the "gang of four" and Mao Zedong, absolving Deng Xiaoping of all guilt.

There is no question that this entire chain of events was part of a carefully worked out plan to exert pressure on officials supporting Hua Guofeng. The process by which the "events in Tiananmen Square" were vindicated testifies that Hua Guofeng's prestige was extremely shaky.

All of this indicates that even before the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee, the vindication of the Tiananmen events was accomplished in an atmosphere of the fiercest struggle and compromise. The plenum simply had to officially confirm the new version of the events.

After this, Chinese propaganda began to associate the 5 April movement with other major mass movements, and even to find genealogical relationships between them. "The tremendous movement of 5 April 1976," ZHONGGUO QINGNIANBAO wrote, "represented the broad-scale development of the traditions and spirit of the 9 December 1935 movement."[19] Moreover, the April mass demonstration began to be described the strongest movement with an "antifeudal (?!) purpose." For example, the journal ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN noted: "This movement sounded a louder funeral bell for feudal absolutism than the 'May 4th movement' and the Xinhai Revolution." The slogan "The feudal regime of Qin Shihuang is gone forever" was called more consistent and firm than the appeals of the "May 4th movement" ("Down with the Confucius gang!") and the Xinhai Revolution.[20]

The metamorhposis undergone by the assessment of the Tiananmen events proves that certain events are not evaluated, interpreted and utilized in China objectively, but in line with the goals and interests of ruling cliques.

A study of the texts of dazibao and the Chinese press in 1978 provides grounds for a number of conclusions.

The Tiananmen events were not a purely popular demonstration led by the workers, as they are now saying in Beijing. The initial laying of wreaths in honor of Zhou Enlai's memory in Beijing and another six cities, as well as several districts, was organized by a group of pragmatic officials following the line of Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, who were supported by their followers on the local level.

The popular masses joined in the events on the qingming holiday after they had lost faith in Mao Zedong's policies and were afraid that ultra-leftists from Mao's clan would take power after his death. The most active participants in the events of 5 April 1976 were intellectuals and students--the substratum that was most severely wounded in Mao's lifetime--as well as employees. The atmosphere of police and political terror were clearly demonstrated by the very dispersal of the demonstration in Tiananmen Square and by the officially organized demonstrations in support of the "two Central Committee decisions" (on the dismissal of Deng Xiaoping and the appointment of Hua Guofeng premier and first deputy chairman of the CCP Central Committee).

The provocative actions and the branding of Zhou's supporters with negative political labels were undertaken by ultra-leftists from the Qinghua Polytechnical Institute, after which confrontations and mob rule began in the square on 5 April. The situation was complicated by provocative escapades during which the wreaths were destroyed and the monument was cordoned off. This was done, as the press now maintains, on the orders of Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan with the aid of the personnel of the Beijing public security administration.

The suppression of the popular masses was accomplished jointly by worker-militia members (Ni Zhifu was the chief of the city militia headquarters), public security personnel (Liu Chuanxin was the chief of the city public security administration), a PLA division (Chen Xilian was the chief of the Beijing military headquarters) and part of the Zhong Nanhai Guard (Wang Dongxing was the chief). There is documented proof that the suppression of the demonstrators was sanctioned by Mao Zedong and was accomplished with the knowledge of Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Jiang Qing, Hua Guofeng and many other members of the Politburo. Hua Guofeng's role is not exactly clear because only one reference to this was made in Jiang Qing's speech at a banquet on 26 April 1976: "Premier Hua's approach to the suppression of the disorder in Tiananmen Square and his views on this coincide completely with the opinion of Chairman Mao."

The present reassessment of the Tiananmen events was not carried out in the interests of historical truth, but as a factor in the domestic political struggle. This is why the significance of the April events has been somewhat exaggreated, substantial cuts and changes of emphasis have been made and the anti-Maoist essence of the events is being hushed up. Mao Zedong is once again being led out of firing range, and all the blame is being assigned to the "gang of four." It is being said, for example, that the gang "published the 'Collected Essays on Current Events,' in which the events in the square were depicted as if they were being reflected in a crooked mirror, exclusively for the purpose of misinforming the party and government." In the first place, the assignment of exaggerating significance to the events has been done in the interest of the Deng Xiaoping clique; in the second place, their reassessment makes it appear as though acute sociopolitical problems are being solved (questions of democracy, legality, the eradication of the cult of personality, the observance of public rights and so forth), although these only have an artificial connection with the Tiananmen events. The events in Tiananmen Square are sometimes depicted as leverage in the "struggle against revisionism and for its prevention" within the CCP Central Committee.[21]

Now that the Tiananmen events have been reassessed, the thorough disclosure of all the facts and documents of 1976 is being impeded by the need to use Mao's legacy (the "Thougth of Mao Zedong")--a need which is felt both by the Hua Guofeng clique and by the clique of officials supporting Deng Xiaoping. Therefore, the reassessment of the Tiananmen events is one of the points in the temporary compromise between the Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng cliques.

These are only the main motives for the publication of a new version of the April events of 1976. They testify that the reassessment of the Tiananmen events is only one link in the domestic political struggle that is still going on in the Beijing leadership.

FOOTNOTES

1. RENMIN RIBAO, 27 April 1976.

2. See, for example, A. M. Mikhaylov, "An Enquiry Into the Events of 5 April in Beijing," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1976, No 3, pp 36-42.

3. According to Chinese data, more than 40,000 people in Beijing and more than 3,000 in Shanghai were repressed in 1976.

4. RENMIN RIBAO, 21 November 1978.

5. Ibid., 4 December 1978.

6. Ibid., 21 November 1978.

7. ZHANWANG, 1 February 1976, p 11.

8. RENMIN RIBAO, 21 November 1978.

9. Ibid.

10. The images of these Chinese empresses were once used to praise Jiang Qing.

11. RENMIN RIBAO, 22 October 1976.

12. It was this man that the Chinese press called the "black general" of the Beijing public security administration.

13. In October 1978 at the Tenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth League, he was elected a member of the Central Committee.

14. RENMIN RIBAO, 3 August 1978.

15. Ibid., 18 October 1978.

16. Ibid., 8 October 1978.

17. Ibid., 22 November 1978.

18. Ibid., 21 and 22 November 1978.

19. ZHONGGUO QINGNIANBAO, 9 December 1978.

20. ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN, 1979, No 1.

21. RENMIN RIBAO, 22 November 1978.

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CHINESE COMMUNITY IN MAURITIUS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1979 pp 85-91

[Article by N. V. Krivtsov]

[Text] Beijing's recent noticeably more active work among Chinese living abroad in an attempt to use them as the instrument of its chauvinistic and expansionist policies and the growing economic significance of Chinese communities abroad, which represent an important source of China's foreign currency receipts, have aroused increased interest in numerous Chinese communities in various countries.

Many works have been written about the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, the United States, Canada and Western Europe; there are works about Chinese emigrants in Latin America, Australia and Oceania. Works dealing exclusively with the status of Chinese communities in the African countries, however, are extremely rare as yet. The only work of a general nature is Xiao Cuyi's study "The Chinese Emigrant Economy in Africa."[1] A book about French policy toward the Chinese in Madagascar could also be mentioned in this connection.[2] Most of the other studies are short articles which do not even pretend to provide a complete and thorough analysis. Only one article about the Chinese communities in the African countries has been printed in the Russian language--"The Chinese on Reunion," the translation of a chapter from G. Defau du Reau's book "Reunion Island."[3]

The Chinese communities in the African countries make up a negligible percentage of the population but play a perceptible role in the economic life of these countries. Historical circumstances brought about a situation in which Chinese emigrants in Africa have settled mainly in regions of great strategic importance (the southern tip of Africa, the islands located on shipping routes, and coastal regions). The overwhelming majority of Chinese permanently residing in Africa live in the Indian Ocean zone--either on its islands or in countries immediately adjacent to it.

The largest Chinese community in Africa (30,000 people, 3 percent of the population) is the Chinese community of Mauritius. Other, smaller Chinese communities in Africa are located on Reunion Island (12,000-15,000), in Madagascar (9,000-17,000), South Africa (8,000), Mozambique (3,000), Tanzania (over 1,000), on the Seychelles Islands, in Angola, Kenya, Uganda and several other countries (the islands of Sao Tome and Principe, Zambia, Rhodesia, the island of St. Helena, Egypt and Zaire). Precise data on the number of Chinese in the overwhelming majority of the African countries are not available. According to our estimates, the total number of Chinese permanently residing in Africa is approximately 70,000-80,000, which is approximately in line with the data in a Taipei almanac.[4]

The Chinese community in Mauritius is of considerable interest to the researcher because it is the strongest and most organized Chinese community in Africa, and it is here that the distinctive features of the Chinese community's relations with other ethnic groups are quite vividly reflected.

The beginning of the mass Chinese migration to Mauritius was connected with the abolition of slavery there and the need to find new manpower to replace slave labor on the plantations. The first organized group of Chinese emigrants was brought to Mauritius for this purpose in 1829. These were contracted workers for sugar plantations. The group of 300 arrived on the island in August, but after encountering exceedingly difficult working and living conditions, they refused to work in the plantations and demanded the cancellation of their contracts. In October of the same year, most of them left the island. The first attempt at the mass resettlement of Chinese was therefore unsuccessful.

Another attempt was made to bring Chinese workers to Mauritius in 1841: 515 people from China came to the island. By 1843 the number of Chinese in Mauritius had reached 1,500. The next year, however, the Chinese population in Mauritius decreased again, and by 1850 there were only 1,178 Chinese living here.

The first groups of Chinese came to Mauritius from Guangzhou. Later, most of them came from Hong Kong, and these emigrants from Hong Kong and their descendants are now predominant on the island.

There were several reasons for the uneven growth of the Chinese population in Mauritius. In the second half of the 19th century, Mauritius became something of a transfer point for Chinese emigrants: Many who came here moved on to Madagascar or Reunion. The Chinese who came to work on plantations were followed to Mauritius by Chinese merchants. At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, however, when merchants in Mauritius were already facing competition, many of the Chinese who arrived on the island found it more promising to start a new business on the neighboring island of Madagascar, where the colonization process was just beginning.

The migration of part of the Chinese community from Mauritius to neighboring countries was also due to the prevalence of emigrants from Hong Hong; emigrants from Guangzhou, who had always been the former's enemies, preferred to settle in Madagascar and Reunion. It is for this reason in particular that the Chinese community on these islands is made up primarily of emigrants from Guangzhou.

Members of the Mauritian Chinese community have recently been turning away from their traditional religions of Buddhism and Confucianism and leaning more toward Catholicism. Whereas 26 percent of the Chinese were Christian in 1944, the figure was already approaching 50 percent by 1952. In 1962, 68 percent of the Chinese called themselves Christians. The process of the christianization of Mauritian Chinese has naturally been influenced by the Catholic Church: In the past, for example, missionaries who spoke Chinese were specially sent to Mauritius. At the same time, there are more atheists in the Chinese community of Mauritius than in any other community: In 1962, 699 of the 890 atheists were Chinese. The traditional Chinese religions, according to data for 1952 were professed by the following percentages: 42.9 percent for Buddhism and 4.1 percent for Confucianism. In 1940 the Chinese community in Mauritius celebrated the hundredth anniversary of the first Chinese pagoda on the island. In 1956 there were 11 Buddhist temples and monasteries on the island, 2 of which were family and clan shrines.

The Chinese community on the island includes many families in which different members have different religious beliefs. There have been cases in which a Chinese father has had one son baptized a Roman Catholic and has raised the other in the religion of his ancestors. Many of the Chinese in Mauritius are now giving their children European names.

Despite its relatively small size, the Chinese community in Mauritius has also preserved its native language. Two Chinese dialects are spoken on the island--Youe (Guangdong) and Hakka (Hong Kong)--but the latter is much more prevalent. For a long time, attempts were made in the community to choose one common dialect, but all of these attempts failed. The decision to conduct education in the Beijing dialect, which is now used in the Higher Chinese School in Port Louis, was made just recently.

Creole has become the native language of some Chinese (mainly offspring of mixed marriages). In 1962, for example, Chinese represented slightly over 3 percent of the population, but Chinese was the native language of only 2.8 percent. Moreover, the gradual adoption of creole or European languages (English and French) by the Chinese is a continuing process. The following statistics attest to the spread of the creole language among Mauritian Chinese: In 1952, 18 percent of the Chinese called creole their native language, for 26 percent it was their conversational medium, and 67 percent used this language from time to time.

Only slightly more than half of the Chinese in Mauritius can read and write Chinese: In 1952, when Chinese made up 3 percent of the population, 2.9 percent of the population indicated an ability to speak Chinese, but only 1.8 percent could read and write. At present, however, few young Chinese can write more than 100 of the most commonly used characters.

Therefore, the Europeanization of the Chinese community can be seen in religion and in language. In spite of this, however, the Chinese language still occupies a fairly strong position and is used in the Mauritian press and on the radio.

The Chinese community in Mauritius has had its own press since the end of the last century. Its first newspaper was issued on 21 December 1895 and was called the MAURITIUS CHINESE GAZETTE. Not one copy of this paper has been preserved, but we can assume that it was not printed in Chinese. The first Chinese-language newspaper in Mauritius was ZHONGHUA RIBAO--Chinese Daily News. The first issue came out on 11 August 1932. The newspaper is still being published.

Today the Chinese community in Mauritius, in contrast to Chinese communities in other African countries, has, due to its relatively large size and strong position in the nation, a fairly developed press, represented by four Chinese-language newspapers. The total distribution figure of Chinese newspapers in Mauritius exceeds 5,000 copies. The two major, most influential papers are dailies--the CHINESE DAILY NEWS (2,000 copies) and the CHINA TIMES (2,000 copies), published since 1953, and the NEW CHINESE COMMERCIAL PAPER is also a daily (1,000 copies, published since 1956).

The Chinese read more than any other ethnic group in Mauritius: Representing 3.2 percent of the total population, they make up 4.5 percent of all readers of Mauritian papers.

The Chinese language is used in special radio broadcasts in Mauritius. In 1971, Chinese-language programs were on for 3.5 hours a week. Chinese-language films are not shown in Mauritian theaters, but they can sometimes be seen at private screenings organized by members of the Chinese community.

Mauritius is a multinational state. In 1967 it was inhabited by, in addition to the Chinese, Hindu Indians (403,551, or 51.6 percent of the population), Moslem Indians (128,779, or 16.5 percent of the population), creoles and French Mauritians (224,692 combined, or 28.7 percent of the population). Each of these national communities has retained its own distinctive features, but the Chinese community is the most integral, compact and isolated group, with the possible exception of the French Mauritians. This is reflected in relations with other communities and in the social status of the Chinese.

A well-arranged system of mutual assistance exists in the Mauritian Chinese community, and special unions and clubs have been organized to protect the commercial and personal interests of the Chinese in Mauritius. The Chinese community has its own athletic teams and the young have a Chinese scout organization.

The members of the Chinese community are distinguished by a developed sense of national awareness; they strive to remain apart from other ethnic groups.

The community's traditional ties to China were particularly strong before World War II. In the 1940's these ties were severed when Japan occupied Hong Kong and Guangzhou. This was the time of a brisk upsurge of Chinese patriotism, and the Chinese community demonstrated, as never before, its sympathy for China, which was being victimized by Japanese militarism. After the war, the old ties were partially restored, but these were mainly contacts with Hong Kong and Taiwan. Many Mauritian Chinese still travel to these places to visit relatives and correspond with them.

As we have already mentioned, with the exception of the first Chinese merchants who settled in Mauritius on their own at the end of the 18th century and those who emigrated to Mauritius at the end of the 19th century and in the 20th, all of the Chinese who arrived on the island were contracted agricultural workers. At present, however, not one Chinese is employed in Mauritian agriculture. The word "Chinese" on the island is associated only with the word "trade." By the middle of our century, almost the entire Chinese population of the island had entered retail trade and the service sphere (the restaurant business). This was greatly promoted by the developed system of family and clan mutual assistance, characteristic of the Chinese community. Since 1908 Mauritius has had a Chinese chamber of commerce--the only exclusively national organization of its kind, the purpose of which is to protect the commercial interests of Chinese entrepreneurs and the interests of the Chinese community as a whole.

According to a 1952 population census, 81.7 percent of all shop clerks and 60.8 percent of all owners of shops and stores in Mauritius were Chinese. The Chinese community now has almost an exclusively monopoly in Mauritian retail trade, and their only competitors here are Moslem Indians.

The annual increase in the number of foreign tourists who come to Mauritius has motivated rich Chinese to invest their capital in tourism, and not only in the construction of Chinese restaurants, which has been just as characteristically their field as trade, but also in the establishment of hotels and inns. Chinese businessmen now own several hotels in Mauritius. For example, businessman Wang Ying, whose family has owned a store in Port Louis since 1904, opened a hotel a few years ago on the west coast of the island, and just the equipment for it cost him 150,000 pounds sterling.[5]

Since the beginning of the 1970's, when "free industrial zones" were created in Mauritius and the processing industry developed in these zones (home electronics, clothing, haberdashery, toys and precious stones), the richest Chinese entrepreneurs have been investing their capital in industry, a new sphere for them.

Therefore, while retaining its monopoly in traditional spheres (stores, shops and restaurants), the Chinese community in Mauritius has also branched out into the tourist industry and partially into industry.

Moreover, the percentage accounted for by small-scale trade is decreasing and, conversely, the number of medium-sized and large Chinese enterprises is increasing. All of this attests to the stronger economic position of the island's Chinese community and its stronger influence.

At present, some Mauritian Chinese are also employed in the civil service and in English and French commercial firms. The Chinese are supplementing the ranks of the so-called "white-collar workers" and the Europeanized intelligentsia. Members of the Chinese community include prominent physicians, attorneys and engineers. For example, the works of Madeleine Lee Tiofang, a Mauritian scholar of Chinese origin, on the history of the plantations are published in Europe as well as Mauritius. In recent years, members of the Chinese community have been distinguished by a desire to give their children a good education, and many young Chinese from Mauritius study abroad. It has also been said in reference to the Mauritian Chinese that their grandfathers valued the family, their fathers valued money and the children value education.

As we can see, the Chinese community is the most wealthy ethnic group, with the exception of the French Mauritians, who have always held the top positions in the island economy, and it is the most integral community in terms of social composition (it does not have the extremes of poverty and wealth that are characteristic, for example, of the Mauritian Indians).

The Chinese mix socially with the upper strata of Mauritian society--that is, the French Mauritians, the more wealthy creoles and some up-and-coming Mauritian Indian merchants, and they also interact with them in the political arena. In contrast to other ethnic communities in Mauritius, almost each of which has its own party (or even several, as in the case of the Mauritian Indians) to express its interests, the Chinese community does not have its own party.

The wealthiest members of the Chinese community support the rightist Mauritian Social Democratic Party, while most of the other members support the Labor Party. It is true that the popularity of the Mauritian Social Democratic Party has been declining noticeably in recent years, throughout the country and not just in the Chinese community.

In general, the Chinese community takes virtually no part in island politics. The Chinese feel that participation in the political struggle, which often takes the form of rivalry between ethnic groups, could harm trade.

Despite the Chinese community's political passivity, a seat on the cabinet has traditionally been given to a Chinese national. Paul Chong Leung, the current representative of the Chinese community, is the Mauritian minister of justice. The Chinese also hold 2 of the 70 seats in the Legislative Assembly (parliament).

During campaigns, however, leaders of political parties try to win the sympathy and support of the Chinese community by appealing to national feelings. Prior to the last Mauritian election at the end of December 1976, for example, A. R. Muhammad, leader of the Moslem community and the Muslim Action Committee, pleaded with the Chinese not to give their vote to the strongest and most radical opposition party, the Mauritian Militant Movement, as it was supposedly a "dangerous pro-Russian communist organization" and, consequently, an enemy of Maoist China.[6] This also indicates that a considerable segment of the Chinese community sympathizes with Beijing.

The national feelings of the Chinese community in Mauritius and existing ties with the PRC also color the foreign political sympathies of the Chinese community to a certain extent.

After World War II, which temporarily but completely severed the ties between the Mauritian Chinese community and China, the island community separated into two groups of approximately the same size: pro-Beijing and pro-Taipei. Moreover, this division did not depend on social or property differences and sometimes occurred even within a family. This situation still exists, although foreign political sympathies do not affect interrelations between Chinese within the community at all. Conflicts between them generally take the form of disputes over which flag--PRC or Taiwan--should be flown on Chinese holidays and which holidays--PRC or Taiwan--should be celebrated by the community. One of the two leading Chinese newspapers on the island is pro-Beijing and the other is pro-Taipei, but most of the Chinese read both papers. When representatives of mainland China or Taiwan arrive on the island, they are greeted at the airport by representatives of the corresponding group, either pro-Beijing or pro-Taipei.

It is indicative that although Mauritius voted in favor of the PRC's admission to the United Nations, it also maintains relations with Taiwan. Mauritius and Taiwan have traditional economic ties, and the Mauritian Chinese naturally had a hand in establishing them. Influential groups in the Chinese community are extremely interested in keeping up ties with the PRC and with Hong Kong and Taiwan: Some still have relatives there and others have traditional economic interests to protect.

The status of the Chinese community in Mauritius and the social processes occurring within the community are characteristic in general of Chinese communities in other African countries. The Chinese community in Mauritius is, however, stronger, more cohesive and more organized, which is due to the nature of Chinese emigration to Mauritius, the considerable size of the community, the absence of racial discrimination in the country and the extensive opportunities for private enterprise. The Chinese in Mauritius have not been affected by the assimilation policy of France, which had a considerable influence on Reunion's Chinese.

In recent decades, substantial changes have taken place in the Mauritian Chinese community; the size and influence of the bourgeois substratum have grown considerably. Naturally, the Chinese communities of Mauritius and other African countries are much weaker than the Chinese communities in the Southeast Asian countries, where Chinese businessmen largely control the economy and finance, although it can certainly be assumed that they are also being assigned a place of some importance in Beijing's present policy line.

As early as the beginning of the 1960's, in Tanganyika, the first East African country in which a PRC embassy was opened, embassy personnel began to establish solid contacts with the local Chinese community, and P. Tsiranana, then president of the Malagassy Republic, even threatened the Chinese community of his nation with deportation from Madagascar if its members should engage in subversive activity. The Chinese community in Mauritius, on the other hand, has a virtual monopoly in retail trade, is capable of paralyzing all trade on the island at any time and represents a force whose interests must be taken into account.

The increasingly active economic ties between the PRC and Mauritius (for example, the extension of loans and economic assistance for the construction of a new airport), the reinforcement of political contacts, particularly the opening of a PRC embassy in Mauritius, and the exchange of various delegations are aimed at strengthening the PRC's influence in the country and at developing ties with representatives of the island's Chinese community.

FOOTNOTES

1. Xiao Cuyi, "The Chinese Emigrant Economy in Africa" (in Chinese), Taipei, 1956.

2. L. M. S. Slawecki, "French Policy Towards the Chinese in Madagascar," Hamden, 1971.

3. AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA, 1978, No 10, pp 38-39.

4. "China Yearbook, 1976," Taipei, 1976, p 383.

5. THE TIMES, 5 March 1973.

6. STAR (Port Louis), 20 December 1976.

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MAOIST CONCEPT OF 'NEW DEMOCRACY'--RIGHTIST REVISIONIST VERSION OF 'NATIONAL' SOCIALISM

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1979 pp 92-105

[Article by D. A. Smirnov]

[Text] The aggressive policy of the present Beijing authorities, who launched the predatory war against socialist Vietnam, clearly revealed the antisocialist, great-power, hegemonistic essence of Maoism and proved the complete groundlessness of the fanciful imperialist propaganda regarding the process of "de-Maoization" that is supposedly going on in China. Beijing's present revision of some Maoist economic and political directives that had been most discredited and the use of some reasonable methods in various spheres of national administration do not actually signify a departure from Maoism, but merely a pragmatic approach to the selection of means for the establishment of domestic and foreign political conditions and military-economic potential which could ensure China's domination of the world.

The attainment of this goal was the final purpose of all of Mao Zedong's political and theoretical activity, and this was the reason for the strictly pragmatic nature of his theoretical search for a special, "third" course of development for China, aimed at the ultimate establishment of conditions for the quickest possible "self-reinforcement" of the nation. Depending on the political situation in China and in the world in general and on the strength of his own political position, Mao Zedong proposed different methods of "self-reinforcement" at different times--ranging from the rightist revisionist concept of 'new democracy' to the leftist adventuristic course of the "Great Leap Forward" and "people's communes." This is why the content of Mao Zedong's theoretical "legacy" is so contradictory, which allows the present leaders to discard some Maoist methods of attaining great-power objectives that have proved useless and adopt other methods that are the direct opposite. This is attested to by China's recent policy of establishing a political and economic alliance with the bourgeoisie, both the international monopolistic bourgeoisie and the Chinese national and emigrant bourgeoisie, whose support is expected to ensure the success of the program of "four modernizations."

Beijing's unconcealed alliance with the most reactionary forces in the international bourgeoisie and reliance on the bourgeoisie within China--its move from ultra-leftist to ultra-rightist positions--is the natural result of Mao Zedong's entire anti-Soviet, antisocialist policy line. It was Mao who actually began this process and, in particular, suggested theoretical grounds for the policy of reliance on the bourgeoisie for the purpose of creating a "strong" China within the context of the concept of "new democracy" he had already elaborated in the late 1930's and early 1940's.

In connection with this, the question of the political content of the concept of "new democracy" and, in particular, of Mao Zedong's interpretation of the role and place of the bourgeoisie in the "new democratic" state, acquires topical significance--it is important in the study of the ideological roots of the contemporary Chinese leadership's policy line.

Class Content and Political Form of 'New Democracy'

The concept of "new democracy" was Mao Zedong's first comprehensive statement in regard to fundamental questions connected with the theory and practice of the Chinese revolution, which was preceded by a period of more than 20 years during which his ideological and political views took shape. A distinctive feature of this period was Mao Zedong's attempts to find the particular social force in China which could lead the struggle for national liberation and the eradication of the remaining traces of feudalism that were hampering national development. This was to be followed by the restoration of China's past grandeur.

Whereas Mao Zedong assigned this task to the entire Chinese nationality as a whole in his first published article entitled "An Enquiry Into the Issue of Physical Education" (April 1917), in later statements, according to his system for the class differentiation of Chinese society, this task was assigned to the "common people," who were being opposed by the "aristocrats" and "capitalists" (in the article "Broad Public Alliance," July-August 1919), then to the national bourgeoisie (in the article "The Beijing Coup and the Merchants," July 1923), industrial workers and coolies (in the article "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society," February 1926) and, finally, the peasantry (in the "Report on the Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan Province," March 1927). The peasants were called upon by Mao Zedong to carry out their "historic mission," consisting in the "establishment of unlimited power for the peasants."[1]

Advancing the thesis regarding peasant hegemony in the Chinese revolution and basing all of his subsequent views on the contents of the revolutionary process in China, Mao Zedong began to work on his own theory of revolution. The new objective conditions for the development of the Chinese revolution, which resulted from the failure of the national revolution of 1925-1927 and the forced migration of main CCP forces from the cities to rural locations, when revolutionary war against the Guomindang became the principal means of revolutionary struggle and the army became the basic weapon in this struggle, were interpreted by Mao Zedong as something absolutely necessary for the entire process of revolutionary development in China and, therefore, something constituting one of its permanent national features. Referring to the need to take the national features of the Chinese revolution into account, Mao Zedong raised the question of its "correct theoretical basis,"[2] in accordance with which the peasants represented the main strategic force, and revolutionary war represented the main tactical means of revolution.[3] It was on this "theoretical basis" that Mao pretended to give Marxism "national form" and set forth a petty bourgeois nationalist theoretical platform that was incompatible with Marxism. These theories took final form as the concept of "new democracy."

Mao Zedong began to work out some of the premises of this concept in 1935-1938,[4] and set forth all or part of its content in the works entitled "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party" (1939) and "On the New Democracy" (1940), and in the report "On Coalition Government" (1945), after he had already suggested at the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth CCP Central Committee (1938) the "Sinization" of Marxism and during the period when he was reinforcing his own position in the CCP leadership at the time of the "zhengfeng" campaign.

In his analysis of the nature of the Chinese revolution in these works, Mao Zedong divided it into two stages--"new democratic" and socialist. He declared that the main objective of the "new democratic" stage of revolution was the liberation of China from imperialist domination and the force of feudal traditions. For this reason, when he defined the character of "new democratic" revolution, Mao Zedong stressed that this revolution was "essentially still bourgeois democratic in terms of its social character."[5] Proceeding from this objective and the nature of "new democratic" revolution, Mao Zedong included among its driving forces the proletariat, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie and all other social strata in Chinese society that had some interest in national liberation and the attainment of bourgeois democratic revolutionary objectives.

Mao Zedong's ideas about class hegemony in the "new democratic" revolution were extremely contradictory. On the one hand, he declared that the government in the "new democratic republic" should "not be taken over by a single party, single group or single class," but should represent a "dictatorship by several parties" in the anti-Japanese national united front.[6] On the other hand, he assigned the peasants the main role in carrying out and leading the "new democratic" revolution. His absolutized thesis regarding the peasantry as the main strategic force of revolution and regarding revolutionary war as the main tactical means of this revolution was worked out by him in 1927 and was given final form in the concept of "new democracy." "Every schoolchild knows," Mao Zedong wrote, "that peasants make up 80 percent of the population of China.... This is why the peasant question has become the main question of the Chinese revolution, and why the strength of the peasantry is the chief strength of the Chinese revolution." It is for this reason that the "Chinese revolution is essentially a peasant revolution." From this, he concluded that the "political order of new democracy essentially represents the endowment of the peasantry with authority."[7] Moreover, whereas Mao Zedong stipulated in the work "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party" that he was using the term peasantry primarily to signify poor peasants and peasants of average means and was not including rich peasants in the revolutionary camp,[8] in the work "On the New Democracy," which was a more complete discussion of the "new democracy" concept, he did not even mention the different segments of the Chinese peasantry in his resolution of the main issue of revolution--the issue of power--in favor of the peasantry, implying that power should be given to the peasantry as a whole, including the rich peasants.

When we analyze Mao Zedong's policy toward the peasantry (in the period in question), we must remember that, according to V. I. Lenin's definition, "the peasantry includes laboring peasants and petty bourgeois peasants, who live like petty landowners at the expense of others. The peasant laborers, on the other hand, are exploited by others but do not wish to support themselves."[9]

In this connection, the following fact is striking: In 1939-1940, when the abovementioned work on the "new democracy" was written, the election of rural representative assemblies and district and village national-political councils in liberated zones resulted in the assumption of the principal leading positions by representatives of the petty bourgeois and bourgeois rural strata. For example, peasants of average means, rich peasants and merchants represented 60.4 percent of all chairmen and secretaries of district councils and 85.7 percent in the case of village councils. Rich peasants and peasants of average means represented more than 60 percent of all district chiefs and more than 85 percent of all village chiefs. Slightly less than half of all district chiefs in the liberated zones were rich peasants (42.8 percent).[10] This clearly signifies the actual meaning of the "endowment of the peasantry with authority." It appears that by setting forth the slogan of endowing the peasantry with political power under the particular conditions in liberated zones, Mao was playing up to the wealthy substratum in rural China, which, in the final analysis, would benefit more than all other rural strata from the "new democratic" agrarian reforms which envisage private ownership of the land by peasants and the inviolability of the rich peasants.[11] Moreover, it was on this substratum, particularly the rich peasants, who had the most sizable reserves of commercial agricultural products, that the state of the sales market for industrial commodities in rural areas would depend, and it was the expansion of this market that Mao Zedong regarded as one of the essential conditions for the successful industrialization of the "new democratic" China.[12]

Mao Zedong's equation of the "political order of new democracy" with the "endowment of the peasantry with authority" essentially signified a petty bourgeois dictatorship in the "new democratic" state. The consistency with which he developed his thesis regarding the peasantry's leading role in the revolution testifies that Mao regarded the establishment of peasant political authority as a strategic objective of the Chinese revolution, and the determining factor in the class content of the "new democratic" state. By separating the peasants from their allies--the proletariat--and thereby depriving the "new democracy" of a socialist future,[13] Mao Zedong was acting in the interests of the wealthy peasantry, and not the laboring peasants.

By describing the "new democratic" state as a "people's state," Mao Zedong tried to substantiate the tactic of uniting, around the CCP, various sociopolitical forces with an interest in the objectives of bourgeois democratic revolution and the construction of a "new democratic" state, which would represent a "unified dictatorship" by several classes in the anti-Japanese united national front, and would take the form of a coalition government made up of representatives of these classes.

The Role and Place of the National Bourgeoisie in the 'New Democratic' Revolution and the 'New Democratic' State

Mao Zedong assigned the national bourgeoisie an important role in the establishment of the "new democratic" state. The policy of reliance on the national bourgeoisie pursued two goals: a political goal--guaranteed political support by the national bourgeoisie for the "new democratic" program--and an economic goal--the use of the national bourgeoisie's capital, experience and international connections in the construction of a "rich and powerful" "new democratic" China by means of industrialization and agricultural modernization.[14]

For this purpose, Mao Zedong declared that the objective of the "new democratic" state was to "create the necessary conditions for the free development of private capital,"[15] with the exception of capitalist enterprises of dimensions allowing them to "control public life"--that is, with the exception of monopolies. This economic program, which was obviously convenient for the national bourgeoisie, was supposed to stimulate the rapid growth of private capitalist enterprise.

Mao's policy toward working class economic demands was also engineered in the interest of the bourgeoisie. Calling these demands "nearsighted and lopsided insistence on so-called worker welfare,"[16] he demanded that private owners be guarded against this kind of "insistence." Mao Zedong made absolutely no mention of the struggle for working class economic demands when he listed the objectives of the working class in the "new democratic" revolution. For this reason, his works on "new democracy" mention the need to observe some elementary rights of the workers but do not contain any kind of comprehensive program of struggle for a higher standard of living for the working class in the "new democratic" state.

With respect to relations between the proletariat and bourgeoisie, Mao Zedong pursued only the goal of "creating the necessary conditions so that both sides--labor and capital--will work toward the development of industrial production." In essence, he hoped to attain this goal by means of a policy of class peace, setting forth the principles of "the regulation of relations between labor and capital" by guaranteeing the bourgeoisie a "suitable profit margin."[17]

Proof that the Marxist-Leninist assessment of the national bourgeoisie has been ignored and that Mao's own interpretation of the place and role of the peasantry is contradictory can be found in Mao Zedong's descriptions of the national bourgeoisie's role in the "new democratic" revolution and the "new democratic" state. The underestimation of the reactionary aspect and overestimation of the revolutionary potential of the bourgeoisie are already apparent even in his early statements. In this connection, it is wise to remember that Mao Zedong was already calling the bourgeoisie a leading force and was raising the question of its class hegemony in national revolution as early as 1923, in an article entitled "The Beijing Coup and the Merchants."[18] In 1937 Mao Zedong (see the report entitled "The Struggle to Involve the Multimillion-Strong Masses in the Anti-Japanese United National Front"), discussing the period of struggle for hegemony between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, asserted the presence of "bourgeois superiority" in a "new democratic" revolution.[19] In the work "On the New Democracy," Mao Zedong expressed a lack of faith in the strength of the working class and declared that the bourgeoisie could lead the "new democratic" revolution if it could urge "the people to overthrow imperialism and feudal forces...and...display the ability... to institute a democratic system of government."[20] During the period of the war against Japan (1937-1945) and afterward (1946-1949), Mao Zedong played up to the national bourgeoisie less in the interests of a united front of struggle against external enemies by all patriotic forces in the nation than in the interests of struggle to establish his own personal power in postwar China, including the establishment of this power by means of reliance on the national bourgeoisie and its separation from the Guomindang. Mao Zedong simultaneously assigned the national bourgeoisie the task of industrializing the nation, which would be necessary for the creation of a "strong" China. Under these conditions, the working class was supposed to give up its own interests, according to Mao Zedong, for the sake of providing the bourgeoisie with an economic incentive to establish powerful industrial potential in the nation. It is true that this was camouflaged by Mao's demagogic declarations that he regarded the proletariat as the chief ally of the peasantry, but he was actually denigrating the role of the working class.

'New Democracy'--Rightist Revisionist Version of 'National' Socialism

How did Mao Zedong himself view the prospects for the development of the "new democratic republic"?

He took an extremely ambiguous stand on this matter, stating that although it could take the capitalist course in the future, there was also the possibility of transfer to the course of non-capitalist development.[21] Mao's extremely contradictory views on this matter testify that he had doubts about the Chinese proletariat's ability to lead the revolution and triumph over the bourgeoisie and, in general, doubted that socialism could be constructed in China. This is corroborated by the concept of "new democracy."

In reference to the relationship between the "new democratic" and socialist stages of revolution, Mao Zedong said that the "new democratic" stage paved the way for the socialist stage, and that these stages "should merge, with no place left between them for a stage of bourgeois dictatorship." It was only through "new democratic" revolution that China would be able to "progress toward socialist revolution."[22] Using the excuse that the proper conditions did not exist in China, however, Mao Zedong failed to set forth any concrete objectives connected with preparations for the transition from the "new democratic" to the socialist stage of revolution, particularly with respect to guaranteed political leadership by the proletariat during the "new democratic" revolution's evolution into a socialist one. Moreover, he stressed that "during the entire period of new democracy in China, dictatorship by one class or a monopoly by one party in government will be impossible and therefore should not exist." This "new democratic program," he added, "will not be subject to change for decades."[23] This clearly indicates that Mao Zedong had no plans to construct socialism even in the distant future.

In spite of these views, Mao Zedong began to raise the question of struggle for socialism more and more persistently under the influence of the defeat of Hitler's Germany and Japanese militarism in World War II, the approaching triumph of popular revolution in China, the upsurge in the Chinese people's liberation struggle and the increasing assistance rendered by the Soviet Union.

Having no wish to abandon his theory of "new democracy," Mao Zedong tried to make it "compatible" with socialism by introducing a few corrections. In particular, he announced the need for a transitional stage between "new democracy" and socialism. The responsibility for accomplishing all the tasks of this period was assigned by him to the so-called "democratic popular dictatorship," the grounds for which were set forth in his article "On the Democratic Popular Dictatorship" (30 June 1949).[24]

As we know, one of the main objectives of the state during the period of transition to socialism is the eradication of man's exploitation by other men and, consequently, the eradication of the exploitative classes. But Mao Zedong essentially never admitted the need to eradicate the bourgeois class during the transition to socialism, mentioning only the need to "restrict" the bourgeoisie. In order to resolve the conflict between the anti-exploitative essence of socialism and the permitted existence of the bourgeois class in the socialist society, Mao Zedong set forth some ideas in 1957 about the nature of contradictions in the socialist society in a report entitled "An Enquiry Into the Correct Resolution of Conflicts Within the People," which was supposed to provide theoretical grounds for his earlier declared policy of "regulating" relations between labor and capital through the classification of the working class and bourgeoisie as components of the "people" and contrasting "people" to the "enemies of the people," signifying those who objected to Mao Zedong's line. According to the Maoist idea, there were two kinds of conflicts in the socialist society: "Between us and our enemies and conflicts within the population."[25] Conflicts between the "people" and "enemies of the people" ("between us and our enemies") were labeled antagonistic. As for the conflicts "within the population," Mao Zedong replaced the question of the character of conflicts between the proletariat and bourgeoisie with the question of the method of resolving them and declared that "if antagonistic conflicts between these two classes are regulated in the proper manner, they can turn into non-antagonistic conflicts and can be resolved by peaceful means."[26] But "regulation" cannot change the internal irreconcilability of these conflicts. They can only be resolved through social revolution aimed at the eradication of the bourgeoisie as a class (either through violent expropriation or through the peaceful purchase of the means of production belonging to the bourgeoisie). Mao Zedong, however, asserted that the bourgeoisie supposedly "wants to accept socialist reforms" at a time of socialist revolution.[27] Due to its economic and political weakness, the Chinese national bourgeoisie was incapable of seriously resisting socialist reforms. At the same time, however, it was unable to "voluntarily" participate in these reforms if their content truly corresponded to their title--that is, if they signified the ultimate eradication of the bourgeois class. It turned out that Mao Zedong's concept of "socialism" did not call for the eradication of the bourgeois class.

What role did Mao Zedong assign the national bourgeoisie in the state of "democratic popular dictatorship"? Primarily an economic one: "For a fairly long period of time after the triumph of the revolution, it will still be necessary to use private economic capitalist activity as much as possible in urban and rural locations in the interests of national economic development."[28] In itself, this idea was understandable given the conditions of chaos and general economic underdevelopment in China. This was confirmed by the experience of other countries which had begun to build socialism. But the temporary use of small- and medium-scale capitalism for the purpose of economic development during the transition to socialism does not in any sense change the political essence of this period, at which time the state "cannot be anything other than a revolutionary proletarian dictatorship"[29] in one for or another. In any case, the possibility of the temporary existence of private capitalism in the economy does not signify any kind of political participation by the bourgeoisie in the accomplishment of socialist reforms. By including the national bourgeoisie among the "people" who were supposed to establish a dictatorship over socialism's enemies, Mao Zedong transformed the bourgeoisie from the target of socialist reforms into a fully fledged participant in these reforms and thereby acknowledge the possibility of bourgeois participation in the resolution of political problems during the period of transition to socialism. Moreover, in accordance with his line of "lengthy coexistence and mutual control," the CCP was not only given the responsibility of supervising "democratic" parties representing the national bourgeoisie, but the latter had the right to "supervise the communist party."[30]

Therefore, the "democratic popular dictatorship," the goal of which was declared by Mao to be transition to socialism, was actually aimed against the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship, which he diluted and made part of the "popular" dictatorship, against the eradication of capitalist exploitation and its executors--the bourgeois class--and, consequently, against the creation of a socialist society. The denial of the leading role of the proletariat and the policy of reliance on the bourgeoisie were the fundamental principles of the "new democracy." Mao Zedong's elaboration of his own interpretation, based on these principles, of the period of transition to socialism in the form of the concept of "democratic popular dictatorship" testifies that he was modifying the concept of "new democracy" to adapt it to new historical conditions. By diluting the proletarian dictatorship in the "popular dictatorship," Mao Zedong reserved an important role in the performance of the political functions of the "democratic popular dictatorship" for the peasantry: "All people endowed with civil rights, united by the working class, primarily the peasants, will establish a dictatorship over reactionary classes, reactionaries and elements opposing socialist reforms."[31] As we know, the peasantry as a whole, along with the national bourgeoisie, is only a temporary ally of the proletariat until bourgeois democratic revolution evolves into socialist revolution. As the objectives of the bourgeois democratic revolution are attained, conflicts inevitably arise between antagonistic classes within the revolutionary democratic camp: The elements remaining within this camp, in addition to the proletariat, consist only of the poorest peasants, and not all of them, with peasants of average means undergoing a process of neutralization in rural areas, as well as the urban petty bourgeoisie. "Beyond the bounds of democratism," V. I. Lenin wrote, "there can be no community of desires between the proletariat and the peasant bourgeoisie. Class struggle between them is unavoidable, but in a democratic republic this struggle would take the form of the most profound and most extensive popular struggle for socialism."[32] Mao Zedong, however, did not admit this prospect because he was attempting to artificially preserve the social makeup of the "new democratic dictatorship" ("democratic popular dictatorship") for a long period of time after the triumph of the popular revolution by employing the Bonapartist tactic of equalizing various classes and social substrata with the aid of the so-called "regulation" of class conflicts.

Mao Zedong's ideas, as set forth in this report, about "democratic popular dictatorship" and the nature of contradictions in the socialist society reveal the actual purpose of the "regulation" of class conflicts which lay at the basis of his social policy of "new democracy." Mao Zedong's refusal to struggle for proletarian hegemony in the "new democratic" revolution and to set forth specific objectives in the subsequent stage of revolution regarding the transformation of the "new democratic united dictatorship by several classes" or "democratic popular dictatorship" into a proletarian dictatorship essentially concealed a refusal to build socialism in China.

What then did socialism mean to Mao Zedong?

An answer to this question can be found in his idealistic ideas about the nature of classes and class struggle. These ideas give priority to subjective factors over objective considerations, and to ideology and politics over economics. Mao's beliefs also colored his approach to the problem of class conflicts. Stressing that the capitalism developing in China was foreign instead of Chinese,[33] and referring to the unique "patriotism" of the Chinese bourgeoisie, Mao Zedong denied that the conflicts between the proletariat and national bourgeoisie in China were antagonistic, thereby actually denying the exploitative nature of the Chinese national bourgeoisie. This led to Mao Zedong's conclusion that it was possible to include the bourgeoisie in the political system of the socialist society. This indicates that Mao regarded socialism from a supra-class standpoint and explains his attempts to equate "new democracy" with socialism.

The basic premises of the concept of "new democracy," which primarily included the denial of the proletariat's leading role in the revolution and the need to establish proletarian dictatorship in one form or another, the actual refusal to build socialism on the basis of the Marxist-Leninist theory of socialism and the plan to establish a "popular dictatorship," which he interpreted from a supra-class standpoint, all testify that the Maoist concept of "new democracy" can be viewed as a rightist revisionist variety of petty bourgeois theories of "national" socialism.

Mao Zedong set forth his idea of "new democracy" as a model of a special, "third" course of development for China and all colonial and dependent countries as a counterbalance to Lenin's theory of non-capitalist development. Corroboration of this can be found in Mao Zedong's work "On the New Democracy," in which he said that it was "already too late" to create capitalist republics with the old European-American type of bourgeois dictatorship, and too early to create "socialist republics with the latest Soviet type of proletarian dictatorship," and declared that, for these reasons, "the only possible form of government for all revolutionary colonies and semicolonies at a particular point in time is a third form--the so-called republic of new democracy," which he also called the "Chinese type of democracy."[34]

An analysis of the political, economic and social programs of "new democracy" indicates that its accomplishment would have benefited primarily the national bourgeoisie and the rich peasants. In the political context, the "endowment" of the peasantry with authority actually signified the establishment of a petty bourgeois dictatorship based on a political and economic alliance with the national bourgeoisie. This kind of dictatorship would objectively open the door to capitalism. As for Mao's subjective views on this matter, he essentially did not conceal his belief that the principal, if not the only, means of industrialization would be the all-round development of private capitalism in the economy. A characteristic exposition of these views can be found in his report "On the Coalition Government" (1945), in which he declared that the goal of the "new democratic" state is to "transform China from an agrarian nation into an industrial one"[35] but does not associate this goal with the establishment of a material and technical basis for socialism, announcing the need for socialist reform in the economy and policies of the "new democratic" state, but also stressing the need for favorable conditions for the free development of private capital.

The overtly capitalist aims of the domestic political content of "new democracy" also colored its foreign political aims. With respect to the sources of capital investments in the economy of the "new democratic" state, Mao Zedong attached special significance to the attraction of foreign capital investments, the volume of which, in his words, would be "extraordinarily great."[36] Although political considerations kept him from openly pointing out possible sources of foreign capital investments, close contacts between the CCP leadership and the American representatives in China in the mid-1940's indicated that Mao Zedong hoped for American assistance.[37] His hopes were not limited to the economic sphere, but pursued far-reaching political goals as well. "In exchange for weapons and an alliance with the United States," P. P. Vladimirov remarked, "Mao Zedong promised to renounce 'ties to Moscow.'"[38]

The evolution of the concept of "new democracy" illustrates Mao's gradual progression toward unconcealed revision of the fundamental teachings of Marxism-Leninism on the worldwide historic role of the working class and Lenin's theory of non-capitalist development, which was based on the demand for "unconditional preservation of the independence of the proletarian movement even in its earliest form."[39] The path traveled by the concept of "new democracy" in its development moved from the elaboration of a peculiar "theoretical basis" for the Chinese revolution to the "Sinization" of Marxism, and then to the refusal to fight for socialism and the plan to thoroughly develop capitalism for the purpose of creating powerful economic potential.

Mao Zedong's hegemonistic aims, which were reflected in his announcement that the concept of "new democracy"--the "Chinese type of democracy"--was the only acceptable type for all colonial and dependent countries, his attempts to establish a close economic and political alliance with

American imperialism and his plan to subordinate the economic interests of the working class to the needs of capitalist industrialization all indicated quite clearly that he was pursuing the goal of creating a "powerful and strong" "new democratic" China. This policy, which had nothing in common with socialism, was fundamentally inconsistent with the interests of the proletariat and all laboring people in the Chinese revolution.

The content of the Maoist concept of "new democracy" demonstrates that the pragmatic policy of the present Chinese leadership, aimed at the establishment of political and economic alliance with the national and emigrant bourgeoisie, as well as the international imperialist bourgeoisie, represents the materialization of the more reactionary facets of Maoism.

What elements of the Maoist concept of "new democracy" have been adapted by the present Chinese leaders, who came to power after Mao Zedong's death?

Above all, they have adopted the course of reliance on the bourgeoisie and the theoretical grounds for this course, as set forth by Mao Zedong in the report "An Enquiry Into the Correct Resolution of Conflicts Within the People" in the form of the theory of the two types of conflicts in the socialist society. The new Chinese leaders have had to use this theory to give the semblance of theoretical substantiation, sanctified by Mao Zedong's own prestige, to their policy of reliance on the bourgeoisie in the implementation of their ambitious and hegemonistic program of "four modernizations" and to justify their political repressive actions against opponents of the Maoist regime during the course of the policy of so-called "continued revolution under proletarian dictatorship." This position was reflected as early as 1977, in Hua Guofeng's report to the 11th CCP Congress, and was then amplified in Ye Jianying's report at the first session of the Fifth NPC in 1978. "Workers, peasants, the urban petty bourgeoisie, the patriotic intelligentsia, patriotic capitalists and other democratic patriots...under our democratic people's dictatorship...are part of the people," Ye Jianying said in this report. "Chairman Mao Zedong's...class analysis of the various social forces on which the proletarian dictatorship in our nation must rely and with which it must ally itself represents...the strategic ideal we must uphold in the struggle to attain our latest general objective."[40]

Therefore, it turns out that proletarian dictatorship should rely...on the "patriotic" bourgeoisie, as part of the "people" and this principle is advanced as the central sociopolitical principle during the attainment of the "general objective" of national development. This interpretation of proletarian dictatorship essentially signifies its denial, since the basic social objective of proletarian dictatorship is the eradication of man's exploitation by other men and, consequently, the eradication of the bourgeoisie as a class.

The policy of reliance on the national and emigrant bourgeoisie was legislatively reinforced in the new Constitution of the PRC in 1978. To the accompaniment of the slogan "Unite all forces that can be united,"[41] which was widely propagandized by the Chinese mass media, a statement was added to the constitution regarding a "revolutionary united front," in which the national bourgeoisie and representatives of the emigrant bourgeoisie were to be included, among other classes and social groups, as well as a statement about the "international united front," which is supposed to unite all anti-Soviet forces in the world arena.

Measures were simultaneously taken to implement this policy: The activity of the CPPCC [Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference] was revived on a Maoist basis (the bourgeoisie is represented in its administrative organs);[42] on the pretext of restoring "democratic" parties, political activity by the bourgeoisie was legalized; laws were passed which established beneficial conditions for Chinese and foreign private capital in various branches of the Chinese economy with the simultaneous rejection of economic cooperation with the international socialist camp; the bank deposits and confiscated property of the national bourgeoisie are being returned, and other steps are being taken to convince the bourgeoisie to work with the Chinese authorities in the creation of economic and political conditions which will allow them to fully realize their hegemonistic aims. It is indicative that the course of reliance on the bourgeoisie has been accompanied by the implementation of a more aggressive foreign policy by the Beijing leadership.

An explanation of the policy of reliance on the bourgeoisie was presented in an article, printed in RENMIN RIBAO on 15 February 1979 and compiled by the United Front Work Department of the CCP Central Committee, "The Proper Comprehension and Suitable Implementation of Party Policy Toward the National Bourgeoisie," which discusses the "need to reeducate the broad masses of cadres, workers and employees in the spirit of the united front policy," so that "party policy toward the national bourgeoisie can be further implemented." For this purpose, the article contains a detailed description of the CCP leadership's views regarding the national bourgeoisie in light of the tenet of the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee (December 1978) that "all patriotic Chinese are the members of one big family."

Mao Zedong's theory about the two types of conflicts in the socialist society, which denies the antagonistic nature of conflicts between the proletarian and bourgeoisie "given the correct approach," is being used as theoretical grounds for this political reliance on the bourgeoisie. His formula regarding the social makeup of the "people," which includes the national bourgeoisie, is being reiterated. On this basis, the following conclusion has been drawn: "During the historic stage of socialism, we must unite all forces that can be united, including members of the national bourgeoisie, to encourage them to take part in the struggle against internal and external enemies."

The question arises: What is the ultimate goal of this kind of "socialism," if the specific objective of eradicating capitalist exploitation is not set and the bourgeoisie is being encouraged to perform political functions in the socialist state in connection with the suppression of the socialist order's opponents, the most prominent of which is the bourgeoisie because of the objective opposite class interest of the proletariat and bourgeoisie?

This policy of encouraging the bourgeoisie to cooperate in the accomplishment of "socialist modernization," which has been declared the principal goal of national development, was reaffirmed at sessions of the NPC and CPPCC this June. Hua Guofeng said in his report at the NPC session[43] that the socialist order had been "completely and firmly established" in China, but simultaneously called for the continuation of "constant class struggle." But not between the working class and bourgeoisie, which, in his words, has been completely "reeducated" and "constitutes part of the people of the People's Republic of China," but, rather, "between us and our enemies"--that is, between the "people," including the bourgeoisie as one of its components, and "various class enemies," mainly opponents of the Maoist regime. Therefore, in spite of Hua Guofeng's announcement that a proletarian dictatorship exists in China, this dictatorship has actually been diluted into a "popular" dictatorship. This was also made quite clear in Deng Xiaoping's report at the CPPCC session,[44] when he said that "democratic" parties connected with "patriotic individuals" (that is, bourgeois elements) "represent a political force which serves socialism."

In the absence of true leadership by the working class under the conditions of the military bureaucratic dictatorship set up by the Maoist regime (the new Chinese leaders are trying to conceal this by restoring state and public institutions that were destroyed during the "Cultural Revolution"), at a time when power is controlled by a party whose leadership rests on the petty bourgeois nationalist platform of Maoism, this kind of policy, stimulating economic and political activity by the bourgeoisie, with the support of the international imperialist bourgeoisie, will certainly result in the restoration of capitalism (which is precisely what the Chinese authorities are doing by returning confiscated property to the bourgeoisie and thereby resurrecting the class of capitalists, who had "ceased to exist as a class," in Hua Guofeng's words).

The Chinese leadership's current policy of reliance on the bourgeoisie can be regarded as a modern modification of the Maoist concept of "new democracy," made up of elements from this concept pertaining to policy toward the bourgeoisie. The very fact that the Chinese leaders have returned to a theory based on the policy of reliance on the bourgeoisie for the purpose of creating, with its help, powerful military and economic potential for the sake of hegemonistic goals at a time when, according to the Chinese leaders, "socialism is completely established" in China, clearly illustrates the antisocialist nature of Maoism and its unprincipled chauvinistic essence.

FOOTNOTES

1. See XIN QINGNIAN, vol 3, No 2, 1 April 1917, pp 1-11; XIANGJIANG PINGLUN, 1919, No 2-4; XIANGDAO, No 31-32, 11 July 1923, pp 233-234; ZHONGGUO NONGMIN, 1926, No 2, p 12; Mao Zedong, "Selected Works" (in Chinese), Harbin, 1948, pp 22, 24.

2. For a discussion of Mao Zedong's elaboration of "theoretical grounds" for the Chinese revolution, see Ye. F. Kovalev, "From the History of the Development of Maoist Views," VOPROSY ISTORII, 1972, No 4, pp 63-76.

3. See "Strategic Questions of Revolutionary War in China" (1936), "The Strategy of Partisan Warfare Against the Japanese Invaders" (1938), "On Prolonged Warfare" (1938), report and concluding speech at the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth CCP Central Committee (1938)--Mao Zedong, Op. cit., pp 585-646, 647, 677-743, 913-930; Mao Zedong, "Selected Works," vol 1, Moscow, 1952, pp 314-317, 329-339.

4. "On the Tactic of Struggle Against Japanese Imperialism" (1935), "The Objectives of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of War Against Japan" (1937). In this report, Mao Zedong first used the term "new democracy" to signify the current stage of the Chinese revolution; "Trends in the Development of the Youth Movement" (1939), and others--Mao Zedong, "Selected Works," vol 1, Moscow, 1953, pp 285-288; vol 3, Moscow, 1953, pp 17-18.

5. Mao Zedong, "Selected Works," Harbin, p 238.

6. Ibid., pp 277, 229.

7. Ibid., pp 258-259.

8. Ibid., p 225.

9. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 36, p 274.

10. "Noveyshaya istoriya Kitaya" [Contemporary Chinese History], Moscow, 1972, p 190.

11. Mao Zedong, "Selected Works," Harbin, pp 247, 330.

12. Ibid., p 330.

13. Pointing out the exceedingly important role of the peasantry in the Chinese revolution, the Comintern noted the need for the working class to lead the peasant struggle. "The main question of the Chinese national liberation movement," the decisions of the Sixth Plenum of

the Comintern Executive Committee (March 1926) state, "is the peasant question. The degree to which China's 400 million peasants will become involved in a decisive revolutionary struggle along with the Chinese workers and under their leadership will determine the results of the revolutionary democratic tendency of the Chinese national liberation movement"--"Strategiya i taktika Kominterna v natsional'no-kolonial'noy revolyutsii na primere Kitaya" [Comintern Strategy and Tactics in National Colonial Revolution as Exemplified by the Chinese Experience], Moscow, 1934, p 114.

14. Mao Zedong, "Selected Works," Harbin, pp 335, 336.

15. Ibid., p 314.

16. Mao Zedong, "Selected Works," vol IV, Beijing, 1964, p 204.

17. Mao Zedong, "Selected Works," Harbin, p 336.

18. XIANGDAO, 11 July 1923, No 31-32, pp 233-234.

19. Mao Zedong, "Selected Works," vol 1, Moscow, 1952, p 495.

20. Mao Zedong, "Selected Works," Harbin, p 244.

21. Mao Zedong, "Selected Works," vol 1, pp 467-469.

22. Mao Zedong, "Selected Works," Harbin, pp 253, 229.

23. Ibid., pp 317, 319.

24. Mao Zedong, "Selected Works," vol IV, Beijing, 1964, pp 501-517.

25. Mao Zedong, "An Enquiry Into the Correct Resolution of Conflicts Within the People," Moscow, 1957, p 4.

26. Ibid., p 7.

27. Ibid., p 5.

28. Mao Zedong, "Selected Works," vol IV, Beijing, 1964, p 448.

29. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 19, p 27.

30. Mao Zedong, "An Enquiry Into the Correct Resolution of Conflicts Within the People," p 40.

31. Ibid., pp 9-10.

32. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 11, pp 73-74.

33. Mao Zedong, "Selected Works," Harbin, p 248.

34. Ibid., pp 244, 236.

35. Ibid., p 335.

36. Ibid., p 336.

37. According to the records of American diplomat John S. Service, Mao Zedong told him the following in an interview on 23 August 1944: "China must carry out industrialization. This can only be done in China by means of free enterprise and with the assistance of foreign capital. Chinese and American interests are interconnected and close to one another. They coincide in the economic and political respects. We can and must work together." ("Lost Chance in China. The World War II Dispatches of John S. Service," New York, 1974, p 307.)

38. P. P. Vladimirov, "Osobyy rayon Kitaya" [The Special Region of China], Moscow, 1973, p 505.

39. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 41, p 167.

40. "First Session of the Fifth All-China National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China (Documents)," Beijing, 1978, pp 198 pp 198-199.

41. Ibid., p 112.

42. The bourgeoisie is also widely represented in the NPC, in which so-called "patriotic individuals" and "countrymen who have returned from abroad" represent almost 10 percent of all deputies.

43. RENMIN RIBAO, 26 June 1979.

44. Ibid., 16 June 1979.

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PATRIOTIC STRUGGLE OF CHINESE WORKERS AGAINST JAPANESE AGGRESSION, 1931-1937

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1979 pp 106-118

[Article by T. N. Akatova, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] The extremely inadequate investigation of the history of the workers movement during the period of Guomindang rule, which began after the revolution of 1925-1927, has given rise (with some help from Maoist theory) to the belief that the urban working class as a whole had lost its revolutionary significance during these years in connection with the sharp decline in the sociopolitical activity of the proletariat and that precisely this factor was the main reason for the isolation of the CCP from the working class.

Historical facts testify, however, that in 1928, in an atmosphere of rabid Guomindang terror, the working class of major industrial centers was already initiating vigorous opposition to the mounting aggression of Japan, and that the patriotic activity of Chinese workers after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 reflected the major tendency in the revolutionary process, contributing in particular to the creation of a united national anti-Japanese front. The events of this period vividly illustrate the degree to which the Chinese workers were enraged by foreign imperialist oppression. The elucidation of these events will refute the antiproletarian ideas of Maoism and the antihistorical nature of its official description of certain periods and episodes in the Chinese revolution. At the same time, this material will reaffirm the fact that the CCP Maoist leadership's loss of ideological and political contact with the working class--the most selfless and staunch force for national liberation--has played, and is still playing, an extremely pernicious role in the development of the revolutionary process in China.

Only one aspect of the multifaceted and complex problem of creating a united national anti-Japanese front in China will be examined in this article--namely, the historic significance of the anti-Japanese struggle launched at that time by workers in industrial centers. In recent years, K. V. Kukushkin, V. N. Nikiforov, A. S. Titov, R. A. Mirovitskaya and other Soviet historian-Sinologists have examined the problem as a whole, but the aspect of worker demonstrations has not been comprehensively elucidated as yet.

When we look at the history of the workers movement in 1917-1949, the decisive significance of its anti-imperialist aims is quite apparent. Indignation with foreign capitalist oppression was the prevalent motive for the militant demonstrations of the Chinese proletariat. The characteristic development of the Chinese workers' anti-imperialist struggle and of the entire national liberation movement fully reflected the unique semicolonial status of the country. In each individual historical period, the spearhead of the struggle was pointed precisely at the particular imperialist power which was conducting the most aggressive policy toward China at that time.

It is no coincidence that the young Chinese working class made its first political appearance during the course of the patriotic "May 4th" movement of 1919, which was a response to increased Japanese expansion against China and a consequence of socioeconomic changes in China itself and changes in the entire international situation after the war and after the October Revolution. From that time on, the national liberation struggle in China was accompanied by constantly increasing sociopolitical activity on the part of the Chinese proletariat and was indissolubly connected with the worldwide revolutionary process and with international proletarian solidarity.

For many years, the expansion of Japanese imperialism was a permanent factor in the political anti-imperialist struggle in China. In the revolution of 1925-1927, forces for national liberation directed their main strikes against Japan and England. From the time the Guomindang regime was established in 1927 to the end of World War II in 1945, Japanese imperialism was the chief aggressor acting against China. In the last stage of the national revolutionary struggle, after the main forces of Japanese militarism had been defeated in China by the Soviet Union, the monopolist in the enslavement of China was the United States.

The national aspect--the indignation felt by Chinese workers at foreign capitalist oppression--colored the workers' movement in the nation right up to 1949. The national oppression from which the entire Chinese population was suffering was felt particularly acutely and directly by the working class, which was concentrated in large industrial centers. In general, the exploitative essence of the foreign oppressors and their domination of all spheres of economic and sociopolitical life were most clearly and vividly demonstrated in the cities. It was precisely the presence of the class, or social, aspects of the anti-imperialist struggle of the workers that made it so clear-cut, selfless and uncompromising.

Despite the relatively small number of workers on the national scale, they represented an extremely impressive political force, particularly in China's vitally important economic, political and cultural centers.

In oppressed China, the proletariat's general social advantage of geographic and production concentration took on particular significance precisely in the anti-imperialist struggle, since other patriotic forces were also concentrated in the cities: the progressive intelligentsia, the many strata of petty bourgeois and laboring urbanites, and the national bourgeoisie. This gave rise to the necessary conditions for the unification of the working class with other patriotic forces and the implementation in China of Lenin's strategy of the united national anti-imperialist front. Workers in foreign enterprises were not only the pioneers in the anti-imperialist struggle, but also introduced their own proletarian forms of struggle and organization into this fight. Labor strikes, which were materially and emotionally supported by broad segments of the urban population, became a tried and tested element of the national revolutionary movement.

The experience of the 1925-1927 revolution quite clearly demonstrated the tremendous revolutionary potential of the Chinese proletariat in the anti-imperialist struggle and proved that its sociopolitical role, which was unaccountable due to its relatively small size on the scale of the entire nation, was a result of its position as the most resolute, consistent and selfless fighter against national oppression.

After the revolution of 1925-1927, the first revival of political activity by the Chinese proletariat took place in connection with the "Jingan events" of 3 May 1928.[1] Shanghai, Jingan, Qingdao, Tianjin, Guangzhou and other cities were enveloped in anti-Japanese strikes and demonstrations.[2] In the atmosphere of depression following the revolution, the strength of the indignation at this new act of Japanese aggression again demonstrated the mobilizing power of the national factor in the Chinese workers' movement. The chain of anti-Japanese demonstrations by workers in the nation's largest centers in 1928-1930 became the prologue for active demonstrations by the working masses against the overt Japanese aggression which began in 1931. In connection with the general strike at Japanese enterprises in Hankou in 1929, the central committees of the Japan Communist Party and CCP jointly appealed to the workers, peasants and oppressed people in both countries, pleading with them to unite in the struggle against Japanese imperialism.[3] The scales of anti-Japanese strikes in the largest industrial center of Shandong Province, the city of Qingdao, in 1929-1930 were so great that the Chiang Kai-shek Government, dreading a conflict with Japan, prohibited the activities of even the legal Guomindang trade unions here.[4]

Afte the beginning of Japan's overt aggression against China, when Manchuria was invaded in the fall of 1931, the threat to the very existence of the Chinese State became the main factor in national politics. Without exaggeration, we can say that the need to repulse the Japanese invaders became the chief motive for political activity by the Chinese workers at that time.

When the social forces for national resistance were divided by the treacherous policies of Chiang Kai-shek's Guomindang in an attempt to destroy the CCP at any cost, the patriotic struggle of the working class acquired particular political importance. It aided in the attainment of the main historic objective of this period--the creation of a united national anti-imperialist front in China--by reinforcing the general political positions of the CCP and urging the two opposing sides to unite.

What specific forms did the actions of the workers' movement take in establishing the prerequisites for the creation of a united anti-Japanese front? The forms of patriotic struggle by the workers in these crucial days for the nation were extremely varied. The main method of proletarian struggle was naturally the strike. After Japan invaded Manchuria, workers at Japanese enterprises went on strike throughout the nation. These anti-Japanese strikes reflected the spirit of the times and the national mood, and the urban population sympathized with them and gave them extensive support. Strikes also occurred at foreign enterprises serving Japanese firms and at Chinese enterprises whose owners were hampering the anti-Japanese demonstrations of their workers. The working masses also took an active part in a broad-scale anti-Japanese boycott.[5] The anti-foreign boycott, which reflected the spontaneous creation of a united front of the most diverse social forces in elementary form, was a traditional method of patriotic struggle. The union workers who organized and supervised the anti-Japanese boycott were not only guaranteeing its mass scale and, consequently, its effectiveness, but were also acting as a unifying force for broad segments of the population. It was these workers who exposed conspirators and punished violators of the boycott, subjecting them to public condemnation. In Shanghai, for example, picketing workers inspected warehouses and stores, destroyed establishments trading in Japanese goods, and exposed speculators who were violating the boycott to shame by beating them up and parading them through the streets. In Tangshang a workers' committee for the routing of Japan and the liberation of China organized thorough inspections of all stores and warehouses, publicly accused the chairman of the local chamber of commerce, who had secretly purchased Japanese wool, of criminal speculation, and organized an anti-Japanese demonstration in the city with 50,000 participants, during the course of which the stores and shops of boycott violators were demolished.[6]

Among the numerous committees for the repulsion of Japan and the liberation of China which were formed throughout the nation by various social strata, the committees of union workers became a serious political force in the cities at that time. It was no coincidence that the Japanese organized provocation primarily against anti-Japanese labor organizations.[7]

The anti-Japanese struggle of the working class reached its peak at the time of the notorious Shanghai defense (January-March 1932). Here it took on the form of head-on armed battles with the invaders.

The heroic defense of Shanghai, which decided the fate of China's main economic center, was a historic feat for the Chinese working class. Moreover, it was during the course of this defense that the broad urban masses first expressed a clear desire to create a united front of struggle against the invaders (the militant association of workers and students, joined by the 19th Army and given material support by the national bourgeoisie).[8]

The revival of sociopolitical activity in the Chinese working class, which had initiated the decisive resistance of Japanese aggression, played a substantial part in the creation of the united national anti-Japanese front. As official Guomindang representatives admitted, workers in all of the nation's cities without exception took every opportunity to express indignant protests from the very first days of the Japanese aggression and formed patriotic associations on their own initiative--anti-Japanese societies and committees with the motto "Repulse Japan and save China."[9]

Before we begin our discussion of the anti-Japanese struggle of the Chinese workers in 1935-1937, a period which has gone down in history as the stage of immediate preparations for the united front, such major issues as the positions of the CCP and Guomindang in the leadership of the workers' movement and the significance of the patriotic actions of the working class for each of these opposing sides must be examined.

The distinctive features of the revolutionary process in China after the disintegration of the united front in 1927 were dramatic changes in the relative positions of the working class and peasantry in the group of active revolutionaries led by the CCP. All industrial centers in China were under Guomindang rule. The CCP was driven underground and could not establish its influence among the working masses, despite the unparalleled courage and remarkable selflessness of communist cadres working in the cities. Leftist adventuristic aims, which reached their peak with Li Lisan-ism, which began in 1930, not long after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, were also exceptionally injurious to this cause. Underground Red trade unions led by communists were almost totally annihilated during Li Lisan's time.

During the course of the anti-Japanese struggle which began after the invasion of Manchuria, the communist party was able to establish somewhat stronger contacts with the masses. But the sectarian attempts to oppose Red trade unions with the legal Guomindang labor movement affected the situation until the Seventh Comintern Congress and hampered the establishment of working class unity. By 1934 most of the CCP cadres working in the cities had been executed. This was a colossal and irreparable loss for the CCP.

The inordinate difficulties encountered by the CCP in its struggle with the Guomindang for leadership of the working class were complicated even further by the fact that the Guomindang attached tremendous significance to its own unlimited control over the labor movement. The working class became the object of extremely vigorous and purposeful Guomindang policy. It was based on an objective assessment of the social significance and great revolutionary importance of the proletariat in the liberation struggle. The desire to eradicate CCP influence in the central spheres of its activity also played an important part. In an attempt to completely exclude the possibility of class struggle against Chinese employers, the Guomindang appealed to the national feelings of the workers. Taking advantage of their indignation at foreign capitalist oppression, the Guomindang tried to use its past prestige as a fighter for national liberation to redirect the labor movement exclusively into the channel of anti-foreign struggle which was to be completely governed by the interests of Guomindang policy. In other words, the Guomindang hoped to make the working class its obedient tool and to direct and control the political activity of this class in its own interest. In addition to nationalism, the Guomindang's known concern for the vital needs of the workers played an important part in subordinating the labor movement to Guomindang leadership. Striving for class peace, the Guomindang also forced Chinese employers to make certain concessions to avoid "worker extremism."[10]

It would seem that the anti-Japanese struggle of the Chinese workers should have been totally supported by the Guomindang. It was here, however, that the basic contradiction of the entire Guomindang regime became apparent: It proclaimed the great goals of national liberation and revival but simultaneously dreaded the possibility of revolutionary initiative by its own people. The Guomindang Government constantly impeded not only the economic struggle of the workers, but also their anti-Japanese struggle, because this would naturally have caused them to go beyond authorized limits. Moreover, in the hope of "pacifying the aggressor" by essentially adhering to a policy of capitulation, the Nanjing Government often took repressive actions against the workers at the insistence of Japanese residents. This applies, for example, to the measures taken by the authorities against striking workers in Japanese factories in Qingdao in 1930,[11] the suppression of anti-Japanese worker organizations by Shanghai Mayor Wu Tiecheng after the Japanese issued an ultimatum on the eve of the Shanghai invasion, and many others.[12]

From the very first days of the Japanese aggression, the patriotic struggle of the workers was organically connected with the condemnation of the government's tendency to capitulate. The main political slogans of all worker demonstrations of this time were the demands that the Guomindang organize the immediate repulsion of the aggressors, that all land occupied by the enemy be returned and that the workers of volunteer brigades be armed. These slogans were totally supported by radical students. It was precisely the workers and students who resolutely opposed the Guomindang in those days, even going so far as to engage in bloody skirmishes with the police, assault government buildings and beat up officials. In response, the Nanjing Government did not even balk at shooting the demonstrators.[13] The worker and student demonstrations exposed the Guomindang regime's most vulnerable spot--its inconsistent and contradictory policy in regard to the most important and most pressing issue in the life of the Chinese public. For the Guomindang, which put such a high value on its prestige as a fighter for national freedom and which had made nationalism the trump card of its entire sociopolitical program, these demonstrations in the nation's largest economic, political and cultural centers meant a great deal.

At that time, however, these demonstrations did not touch upon the essence of the Guomindang regime as a whole. In the eyes of the general public, the Guomindang was still a force capable of saving the nation and organizing nationwide resistance. This capability, in fact, became the basis for the united efforts of the Guomindang and CCP in the struggle against the aggressor.

From the very beginning of Japan's aggression against China, therefore, demonstrations by the working class were having a direct effect on the Guomidang, urging it to resolutely repulse the invaders. It was this that became the main condition for the subsequent CCP-Guomindang alliance.

It is indicative that the working class, as always, introduced social-democratic content into the struggle for national liberation. The appeals addressed by trade union workers to the Nanjing Government combined demands for the organization of the immediate routing of the Japanese and arming of the working class with demands for the general democratization of the labor movement, the repeal of the restrictive 1929 law on trade unions, the granting of strike freedom and the institution of measures to improve living conditions for the workers and protect their jobs.[14]

The working class' recognition of the need to unite ranks in the struggle against Japanese aggression was of particularly great significance. The Guomindang had to make serious concessions to the workers--it authorized the creation of a Shanghai general trade union council and several nationwide sectorial trade unions and the establishment of a Chinese labor association in 1935.

In order to fully assess the significance of the anti-Japanese struggle of the working class, we must consider the full extent of its influence on public opinion and on Guomindang policy. After the Guomindang had seized power, as we have already mentioned, the labor movement became one of its most serious problems. The Guomindang had to spend much time and effort on the regulation of conflicts between labor and capital, on the organization of the legal trade union movement, which was constantly disobeying the regime and never became a basis of support for the regime, on measures in the area of labor legislation and so forth. The outbreak of the anti-Japanese strike struggle intensified friction in the cities; it also caused the workers to fight more vigorously for their own vested interests.[15] In this way, the patriotic struggle of the workers objectively aided in reinforcing the general political positions of the CCP and in weakening the forces sent out by the Guomindang to fight against the Soviet regions. The working class gained significance as a force compelling the Guomindang Government and party power structure to spend time and effort on the "pacification" of the cities, thereby objectively supporting the communists' armed struggle in rural regions.

As we know, bitterness towards the Guomindang within the CCP itself represented a serious obstacle in the way of the creation of a united anti-Japanese front. The brutal terror launched by the Guomindang against the CCP after the disintegration of the united front had taken the lives of thousands of revolutionary fighters. The Guomindang regarded the annihilation of communism in China as a goal indissolubly connected with the repulsion of the Japanese. Right up to the Seventh Comintern Congress, the CCP, in turn, advocated the overthrow of the Guomindang regime as the main condition for the organized repulsion of the aggressor.

In this atmosphere, the very experience accumulated by the working class in anti-Japanese struggle was an important factor which aided the CCP in overcoming its sectarian errors and correctly accepting the recommendations of the Seventh Comintern Congress on the need to create a united anti-Japanese front with the Guomindang.

The CCP's unsuccessful attempts to lead the anti-Japanese struggle of the workers by relying exclusively on the Red trade unions and to combine this struggle with a struggle to overthrow the Guomindang isolated the party from the working masses, which had been drawn into the legal labor movement. In the days of the Shanghai defense, when the members of legal and Red trade unions fought side by side and died for a common cause, the communists erroneously advocated the overthrow of Guomindang rule in the city and the creation of a worker government as the sole leader of the resistance. Along with the objective of driving out the Japanese troops, another demand was announced, which was too extreme and unrealistic at that time: the cancellation of the privileges of all imperialist powers. The economic demands made on all employers (and not only the Japanese) were just as unrealistic.

This confusion of distant revolutionary prospects with the most urgent objective of the moment impeded the spread of CCP influence among the working masses and contradicted the very logic of the resistance. Among the members of the Red trade unions there was a widespread desire for unity with the majority of workers, who were united in the legal trade unions.

Under the influence of these events in the workers' struggle, Chinese communists also acquired an increasing desire to establish a broad united anti-Japanese front, which would include even the national bourgeoisie, as it had given material support to the striking employees of Japanese factories.

In this way, the reality of the anti-Japanese workers' movement in 1931-1935 brought the CCP and the Guomindang to the realization that a united front was necessary. The spontaneous creation of a united workers' front from below, the close alliance of the workers and the revolutionary students and the support of anti-Japanese strikers by the Chinese bourgeoisie all testify that the idea of unity was becoming quite appealing to the masses.

The Japanese assault against China was engulfing more and more new territories in the nation. It was becoming increasingly obvious that the aggressor would not be satisfied with the seizure of isolated regions. The Chinese people were faced by a dilemma: They would either have to resist Japanese aggression or not resist. It was a matter of life or death for the entire race and the entire state.

The decisions of the Seventh Comintern Congress (July-August 1935), which put an end to leftist sectarian errors in the international workers and communist movement, were of tremendous value in working out the only correct CCP policy under those conditions, a policy dictated by reality itself. Lenin's strategy of a united anti-imperialist front was resurrected. The congress recommended that Red and legal trade unions unite. "The creation of a united labor front appears to be the most important and most immediate objective of the international workers movement at this time," the congress resolution stated.[16] The united labor front in China was to serve as the basis for a broad united national anti-Japanese front. The policy of the CCP underwent a sharp reversal. In connection with this, the erroneous and anti-historical beliefs of Mao Zedong regarding ways of overcoming dissent within the working class are of interest.

The CCP Maoist leadership's first steps in organizing the united anti-Japanese front and, in particular, in uniting the labor movement were complicated by its inconsistent and contradictory tactics. Until May 1936, the CCP leadership (headed by Mao Zedong since January 1935) assumed that the spearhead of the united front should be aimed simultaneously at the Japanese and at Chiang Kai-shek as a national traitor. In December 1935, at a conference in Wayaobao, Mao Zedong recommended that working class efforts be focused "on the struggle against imperialism and its stooges--national traitors."[17] This prolonged adherence to the sectarian aim of struggle against the official Guomindang Government would have made it absolutely impossible for the working class to establish unity, not only with broad patriotic segments of the population, but even within the working class itself. Neither the bourgeois strata nor the working masses belonging to legal trade unions could have been drawn into a fight against the government at that time. It is also indicative that in the speech mentioned above, Mao described the working class as the "vanguard of national revolution," but did not set forth any specific recommendations regarding CCP leadership of the workers' struggle and did not even mention the need for this.[18] By this time, party forces in the cities were almost nonexistent. In 1935 the CCP was no longer setting up local organizations in the cities. There were only isolated communists, acting at their own risk and having no contact with the Mao Zedong leadership. Each day the proletarian bases of the CCP diminished catastrophically. It was these communist heroes who carried out the Comintern policy of struggle for a united national anti-Japanese front and energized the patriotic movement of the workers and students.[19]

The combination of all these circumstances--the tremendous difficulties of underground existence, the death of cadres connected with the workers' movement and the specific makeup of the CCP leadership--led to a situation in which the CCP Maoist leadership refused to work in the cities after 1935, focusing all of its effort on the consolidation of its army after recognizing the actual monopoly of the Guomindang in the area of working class leadership. The subsequent anti-Japanese struggle of the workers developed either spontaneously or under the supervision of Guomindang trade unions.

The rejection of attempts to revive party contacts with the working masses and the total absence of concrete plans for this gave rise to a formula that was characteristic of the entire period of Mao Zedong's leadership: The very fact that Mao Zedong was heading the CCP leadership was supposedly tantamount to the achievement of proletarian hegemony.

However (and this was one of the peculiarities of the revolutionary process in China), the working class, by its high level of political activity in 1935-1937, effectively supported the CCP policy of creating a united anti-Japanese front, despite the weaknesses of the party leadership. The anti-Japanese struggle of the proletariat became the deciding factor in the nationwide outburst of patriotism which forced the Guomindang to confront the desire of the masses to create a united front "from below." The events of the anti-Japanese struggle of the workers in 1935-1937 deserve more detailed discussion.

In the beginning of 1935, despite the occupation regime, miners in Manchuria rose up in struggle.[20] Isolated anti-Japanese strikes and demonstrations constantly flared up in Shanghai, Guangzhou, Tianjin and other cities. The revolutionary students, including communists, played an extremely important role in the patriotic struggle of this period. Just as in the years of the revolution, the students and workers formed a united front. The notorious patriotic movement of 9 December 1935, which was begun by the students, was supported by the workers and had considerable influence on the masses of workers, who began to persistently request the Guomindang to create a united front. Following the student uprisings and in direct connection with them, major anti-Japanese strikes began in early 1936 in Shanghai and Qingdao--the largest centers of Japanese industry in China.

On 6 February 1935, a general strike erupted in Shanghai. The strike involved 8,000 employees of the Japanese Dakan textile factory who were enraged by the Japanese overseer's punishment of Mei Shijun, a patriotic worker who had participated in the Shanghai defense.[21] The strike was brutally stifled, but the unrest spread to other Japanese factories, engulfing one after another throughout February and March 1935. All of the strikes were spontaneous but they were distinguished by their exceptionally militant nature. The workers stormed the factories, destroyed products and fought battles with the Japanese police and troops. Many of them were fired and arrested.[22]

In spite of the repressive actions of their Japanese bosses, the workers went back on strike in November. This time they were angry about the new spread of Japanese invading forces in Suiyuan Province. More than 45,000 employees of Japanese textile factories in Shanghai announced a general strike and made extremely radical demands for better conditions.[23] The Japanese threw all of their forces based in Shanghai into the fight to stifle the workers: police and troops, armed with machine guns, tanks and armored cars. The soldiers beat the strikers mercilessly, tied them up and returned them by force to the factories, where they threatened to shoot them if they did not begin working. Nonetheless, the workers stood firm. The strike lasted from 8 through 26 November and inflicted perceptible losses on the Japanese textile enterprises. Conditions improved, on the other hand, for the national textile industry. The population of Shanghai and other cities heartily supported the strikers. Broad segments of the public, united in the societies for the salvation of China, collected money and food for them. Mass anti-Japanese meetings were held, at which strikers spoke and the demand to create a united front was unanimously voiced. In the Chinese bourgeois press of that time, the struggle of the workers against Japanese domination was highly commended, and appeals were constantly made for the unification of all forces in the nation. The authorities, however, were still trying to restrict the dimensions of the workers' struggle and their unification with other strata of the population. The Guomindang archives contain documents from 1936 on the secret surveillance of student groups and other democratic organizations in various cities which were collecting contributions and organizing trips to Shanghai to aid the strikers.[24] In an attempt to imply that the strike was an ordinary economic struggle, Shanghai Mayor Wu Tiecheng persuaded the workers to go back to their jobs and wait quietly until the Japanese employers satisfied their economic demands with Guomindang mediation.[25] The firm resolve of the strikers and the support of the strikes by the broadest segments of the public forced the Japanese to make serious economic concessions and reinstate all of the strikers in their previous jobs. Under these conditions, the concessions were a substantial victory for the workers and were viewed by the public as an achievement of the general struggle against the Japanese. This provided substantial experience in the organization of worker demonstrations and their coordination with the general patriotic struggle. It is indicative that the workers regarded this struggle as a political one in spite of the resulting economic gains and became sharply aware of the need for unity to resist the Japanese imperialists. After this strike, they requested the Shanghai general trade union council to form a committee uniting all textile workers in the city for further struggle against the Japanese.[26] This demand, however, was not satisfied at that time.

The general strike in Japanese textile factories in Qingdao flared up under the direct influence of the anti-Japanese struggle in Shanghai. Qingdao was second only to Shanghai as a center of Japanese industry in China. Since the same Japanese firms were operating in Shanghai and Qingdao, the economic impact of these strikes was particularly great. The total number of strikers in both cities exceeded 100,000. But the political significance of the anti-Japanese struggle was even greater. In Shanghai and Qingdao, the strikers had the sympathy and support of the broad popular masses. The All-China Association for National Salvation actively organized support for the strikers.[27] In order to stifle the strikes, which were becoming the most significant aspect of the broad anti-Japanese struggle, the Japanese took extreme measures--they sent nine warships to the port of Qingdao. On 3 December a landing force of 2,000, armed with machine guns, came ashore. The Japanese soldiers not only occupied all the Japanese factory buildings, but also blockaded the major government and public organizations, including the Guomindang city committee, printing presses, publishing firms and so forth.

These excesses aroused such a storm of protest throughout the nation, howe-ever, that the Japanese had to retreat. Just as in Shanghai, the Japanese employers agreed to considerable economic concessions to stop the strikes. On 15 December the Japanese troops were withdrawn from Qingdao. This was an extremely serious victory and it was the result of the spontaneous creation of a united front. The Guomindang Government was still trying to narrow the bounds of the struggle, which was developing beyond its control. Guomindang archives contain, in addition to detailed descriptions of these events, confidential materials on the secret surveillance of patriotic workers, attempts to sever ties between workers and students and repressive actions taken against various anti-Japanese committees.[28]

It is indicative that these actions by the Guomindang were being condemned more and more by the broadest segments of the public. It would be difficult to overestimate the significance of the anti-Japanese strikes of 1935-1937 in the establishment of the prerequisites for a united front. The workers represented the vanguard of the resistance. Their determination, their selflessness and their desire to close their own ranks and unite with all patriotic forces in the nation evoked the greatest sympathy in these chaotic days. It was in connection with this worker struggle that the slogans of the united anti-Japanese front were quite precisely formulated. At the time of the strikes, the bourgeois newspaper ZHONGHUA RIBAO reported: "The great significance of the anti-Japanese strikes consists in the sympathy they are evoking in all strata of the national population. Finally, the Chinese workers and the Chinese bourgeoisie are uniting their efforts in an attempt to save the nation. All of our countrymen must fully support the strikes. Our government must commend the selfless struggle of the workers to resist the aggressors and assist them in their organization and struggle."[29]

There is no question that at the deciding moment, when the CCP, with the aid of the Comintern, focused all of its efforts on the creation of a united anti-Japanese front, the patriotic struggle of the workers in the nation's leading industrial centers was an important factor in the nationwide outburst of enthusiasm which promoted the Guomindang's transition from civil war to an alliance with the CCP. Wang Ming says that Liu Shaoqi, who then headed the CCP Central Committee Bureau of North China, stressed the following in a letter to Mao Zedong in reference to the difficulties of the soviet movement and militant CCP forces: In the work of creating a united front, it was "not the countryside that saved the cities, but the cities that saved the countryside." Wang Ming explains: "In other words, the success of the policy of the anti-Japanese national united front in urban areas saved rural China."[30]

But one of the peculiarities of the development of the revolutionary process in China was the fact that the creation of the united front in 1937, in spite of its colossal significance for the future of the nation, the revolution and the CCP itself, was not followed by the reinforcement of the proletarian basis of the CCP. A proletarian nucleus did not take shape within the CCP. The instructions of the Seventh Comintern Congress regarding the unification of all patriotic forces in China in a single national anti-Japanese front envisaged consolidation of the alliance of workers in industrial centers with the revolutionary peasants in soviet regions and the coordination of their struggle under CCP leadership. At the time when the united front was taking shape, it was assumed that the revival of the CCP-Guomindang alliance would give communists an opportunity to strengthen their ties with the working class, and that this, in turn, would promote the Bolshevization of the CCP itself.

Wang Ming, the representative of the CCP in the Comintern, wrote the following at that time: "Most of the present CCP cadres were trained and tempered in the civil war. Many of them come from peasant families. They have experience in armed struggle against the Guomindang and its armies, but many have absolutely no experience in struggle for the masses in the absence of Soviet rule and a Red Army, and they do not even have any conception of the labor movement in the large cities. This is why it is not that easy to train old party cadres the new conditions and methods of work. It is just as important to train and promote new cadres, particularly those with a working class background. Many activists and leaders of the mass anti-Japanese movement and strike struggle have grown up in recent years. The communist party should take fresh forces and new reserves from this group to acquire new cadres who are able to fight, have direct contact with the broad masses and have experience in the new methods of struggle and work."[31]

But these plans were not supported by Mao Zedong, who had established his own leadership in the party, and did not result in any real action. Moreover, in time the absence of a proletarian basis began to be viewed as something just short of an advantage by the CCP Maoist leadership. What should have been seen as a misfortune and a party weakness, according to Lenin's teachings and the actual experience of struggle (it was impossible to rely on the working class, which had proved to be an effective revolutionary vanguard in the liberation struggle, armed struggle was the only element in the entire variety of forms of revolutionary activity that could be developed, and so forth), was assessed by the Maoist leadership as the greatest positive experience. This onesided and meager experience was then raised to the status of an absolute and began to be seen as a revolutionary path which was supposedly compulsory for all oppressed countries.

As later events showed, the contemptuous attitude toward the historic role of the working class proper was organically connected at first with a purely utilitarian approach to the problems of international proletarian solidarity and has now resulted in the overt betrayal of its principles and an alliance with the most reactionary forces of the present day.

All of the experience of the development of the Chinese workers' movement confirms that the main area of worker activity, in which the sociopolitical significance and best fighting qualities of the Chinese proletariat were revealed to the maximum, was the struggle against imperialist oppression. It was precisely this aspect of worker activity that was historically necessary at that time in the face of the Japanese aggression, a deadly threat to the very existence of China. The CCP, which had consistently taken an anti-imperialist stand, therefore had a proven way of winning the trust of the working class and establishing its leadership of the patriotic struggle. Proof of this can also be seen in the fact that the working class, to its credit, did not support the Guomindang Regime in spite of all the latter's efforts. The impracticability of Guomindang plans for a "class peace" in China, the Guomindang's inconsistency in the movement for national liberation and its fear that the workers would take the initiative in the patriotic struggle ultimately had their effect.

The alienation of the Maoist CCP leadership from the working class had the most severe consequences for the fate of the CCP itself, the development of the revolutionary process and the fate of the working class and its struggle.

All of the complexity of revolutionary developments in China and the specific features of the working class in the oppressed country did not in themselves predetermine the fatal inevitability of the CCP's estrangement from the proletariat which has played and is still playing such a negative historic role. A subjective factor--the antiproletarian nationalist aims of Mao Zedong and his supporters--played a substantial part in this.

FOOTNOTES

1. On 3 May 1928, Japanese troops invaded the city of Jinan. the capital of Shandong Province, in an attempt to establish their own influence

here and to block the path of Chiang Kai-shek's troops, who were successfully advancing on the positions of Zhang Zuolin, Japan's protege, in Manchuria. Several thousand civilians died in Jinan at this time.

2. See SHANGHAI GONGREN, 1928, No 17; "The History of the Workers Movement in China," vol 3, Taipei, 1959 (in Chinese), pp 795-800.

3. See BUERSAIWEIKE, 1929, vol 2, No 5, pp 1-8.

4. See "Collected Documents on Modern Chinese Political History. Materials of the Guomindang Archives in Nanjing," No 2, vol 43 (place of publication unknown), 1958, docs 5406, 5489.

5. The program of action for the entire population, which was adopted on 2 October 1931 at a general meeting of the workers of Nanjing--the nation's capital--included the following forms of anti-Japanese boycott at that time: the refusal to work for Japanese or buy Japanese goods, the removal of all Japanese-produced items from circulation and the trade network, and the refusal to wear clothes made in Japan--see "The History of the Workers Movement in China," vol 3, p 1046.

6. Ibid., pp 1049-1050.

7. In Tianjin, for example, the Japanese organized an attempt on the life of union activist Chen Wenpen, a leader of the patriotic struggle in the city (Ibid., p 1050); countless provocations against the workers preceded the Japanese attack on Shanghai in the beginning of 1932.

8. For more detail, see T. N. Akatova, "The Chinese Proletariat in the Struggle Against Japanese Aggression," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1977, No 1, pp 114-127.

9. "The History of the Workers Movement in China," vol 3, p 1045.

10. For more detail, see T. N. Akatova, "Basic Trends in Guomindang Government Policy on the Labor Question," in the book "Obshchestvo i gosudarstvo v Kitaye" [Society and the State in China], Moscow, 1973, pp 294-313.

11. "Collected Documents on Modern Chinese Political History," No 2, vol 43, docs 5406, 5489.

12. See "Materials on the History of the 19th Army's Anti-Japanese Struggle," Shanghai, 1933, pp 60-64; "The Struggle of the Popular Masses in Shanghai at the Time of the 'January 28th Defense,'" Shanghai, 1958, pp 13-14.

13. The public was particularly enraged by the shots fired on 17 December 1931 at a student demonstration. Students from all cities in the

nation had gathered in Nanjing to demand that the government immediately organize the repulsion of the Japanese. This was followed by "coffin demonstrations," in which workers and students walked through the cities, carrying the bodies of those who had been shot by the Guomindang police and denouncing the cowardly government. See "The Struggle of the Popular Masses in Shanghai at the Time of the 'January 28th Defense,'" p 11.

14. This applies, for example, to the contents of the message sent to the Fourth Guomindang Congress by 70 trade unions in Shanghai, uniting 800,000 workers. For the complete text of this document, see "The History of the Workers Movement in China," vol 3, p 1056.

15. According to official Guomindang statistics, approximately half of all conflicts in industrial centers in 1935-1937 grew into strikes. In previous years, the Guomindang had been able to settle the overwhelming majority of conflicts by means of mandatory arbitration and to prevent strikes from flaring up in this way.

16. "Rezolyutsii VII Vsemirnogo kongressa Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala" [Resolutions of the Seventh World Congress of the Communist Internationale], Moscow, 1935, p 28.

17. See Mao Zedong, "On the Tactics of Struggle Against Japanese Imperialism"--"Selected Works," vol 1, Moscow, 1952, p 286.

18. Ibid., p 287.

19. For a discussion of the student movement of these years, see A. S. Titov, "The '9 December Movement' of 1935," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1976, No 3, pp 103-116.

20. See SHENBAO, 27 January 1935.

21. In those days, the Chinese press printed a detailed description of the brutal murder of Mei Shijun by Japanese overseers who had searched him and found a carefully preserved photograph of him dressed in the uniform of a volunteer in the Shanghai Defense--see GUOJI LAOGONG TONGXUN, 1936, No 3, p 112.

22. For more about these strikes, see "Collected Documents on Modern Chinese Political History," No 2, vol 43, docs 5500-1, 5500-11; DAGONGBAO, 13 March 1936, 15 March 1936.

23. See "Collected Documents on Modern Chinese Political History," No 2, vol 46, docs 5500-1, 5500-11. As a rule, economic demands were voiced during the course of anti-imperialist political strikes. Moreover, the level of these demands paralleled the level of strike intensity.

24. Ibid., doc 4228.

25. Ibid., docs 5500-1, 5500-11.

26. "Industry and Trade Unions in Shanghai" (in Chinese), Xianggang, 1939, pp 110-113.

27. Founded in May 1936 with the participation of Chinese communists.

28. See "Collected Documents on Modern Chinese Political History," No 1, vol 46, doc 4228.

29. ZHONGHUA RIBAO, 21 November 1936.

30. Wang Ming, "Half a Century of the CCP and the Treachery of Mao Zedong," Moscow, 1975, p 35. A. S. Titov correctly quotes this statement in his description of the significance of the anti-Japanese student movement of 9 December 1935 in the cities of China (PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1976, No 3, p 114). It also applies completely to the patriotic proletarian demonstrations in industrial centers.

31. Wang Ming, "A New Stage in Japanese Imperialist Aggression and a New Phase of the Chinese People's Struggle," KOMMUNISTICHESKIY INTERNATSIONAL, 1937, No 8, p 57.

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CSO: 1805

GUOMINDANG ABUSES (FROM THE MEMOIRS OF A SOVIET DIPLOMAT)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1979 pp 119-126

[Article by I. N. Nikitin]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SAKHALIN: PAST AND PRESENT

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1979 pp 127-137

[Article by K. Ye. Cherevko, candidate of philological sciences]

[Text] Hunting in remote regions was always part of the economy of Rus'. As early as 1114, a chronicle notes that Ladoga Governor Pavel spoke of the "men of old" marching "beyond Yugra and beyond Samoyad'"[1]--that is, into the trans-Urals and East Siberia.

The first Russian plans to develop the natural resources of the Far East were reported at the beginning of the 16th century. The possibility of sailing along the northern waterway to regions adjacent to Japan and China, "hugging the right shore" of the Asian continent, was discussed in 1525 by a Russian diplomat in Rome, Dmitriy Gerasimov, ambassador to Pope Clement VII.[2]

After Ivan the Terrible "punished" Novgorod in 1571 for its dealings with Lithuania, some of its inhabitants, escaping the "head tax" (poll-tax), traveled paths long known to them to the basin of the Lena and Indigirka, where their descendants still live, while some of the Russians set off for Kamchatka across the Anadyr' River. "One ship was wrecked here and its passengers went ashore; they began to live here, built a church, the floor of which is still sound, and built what is now the city of Anadyrsk, while the other vessels sailed out to sea, five of them putting in at Izhiga, Yakum and Tansk, and the sixth disappearing without a trace. They think that this boat must have come to America." This is what German, head of the Russian ecclesiastical mission in Alaska, later wrote about them, citing the testimony of old inhabitants.

In the first half of the 17th century, Russian explorers from the detachment of Tomsk Cossack Ivan Moskvitin reached the banks of the Sea of Okhotsk near the islands of the "Gilyak Horde" (1640),[3] and Yuriy Seliverstov from the detachment of Mikhail Stadukhin heard the first reports of the Kuril Islands (1649), which began to be depicted on Russian maps in 1667.

In 1697 V. Atlasov, who went to Kamchatka and the Kurils after A. Kamchatyy, wrote a picturesque description of the region. As a result of expeditions to the Kuril Islands in 1711 and 1713, I. Kozyrevskiy gathered data on the mineral wealth of this territory (Raykoke Island). Peter I sent land-surveyors I. Yevreynov and F. Luzhin to this island in search of silver. In 1739 minerologist Gardebol and a group of Russian sailors conducted work on Shikotan Island "to look for metals and minerals on the island."[4] Gardebol was a member of the detachment of M. Shpanberg, whose name was given to this island of the Lesser Kurils on many nautical maps. This detachment made up part of V. Bering's expedition. According to Peter I's instructions to V. Bering, the Russian border was to be established along the strait between Asia and America, which, according to the geographic beliefs of that time, originating with the Japanese, was on the shore of Edzonis (Ezo) or Borealis (Gama).[5]

These discoveries were a great contribution to the science of geography. For example, Japanese researcher T. Akizuki wrote the following about I. Kozyrevskiy's expedition: "At that time almost nothing was known in Japan about the Kurils. Moreover, until Japan was able to describe each of these islands, I. Kozyrevskiy's report on them was of truly tremendous value."[6]

In 1714, in a memo pertaining to the discovery of promising territories, Russian diplomat F. S. Saltykov suggested to Peter I that the coastline of Siberia be mapped "down to the last river mouth convenient to the Amur River, along the mouth of the Amur and the length of the distance between Japan and China,"[7] and that a stronghold be built on the island of Sakhalin for the initiation of trade relations with Japan and China and the exploitation of natural resources, particularly timber.

In 1763 M. V. Lomonosov, the great Russian scientist and founder of Moscow University, wrote that, "having possession of the entire coastline and both ends of the Siberian Ocean...so that this discovery does not fall into the hands of others...Kamchatka, or a spot near the estuaries of Uda River, or the Kuril Islands, where the climate is the same as in France, should become the site of a settlement and a good fleet with a sizeable group of military men, Russians and Pagan Siberian subjects, against whose strength other European powers will not be able to mount troops from the North or the South."[8]

In the 18th and 19th centuries, the study of the coastal waters, topography and minerals of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands and the initial exploitation of natural resources, particularly the hunting of marine mammals and fishing, were part of programs worked out by top-level government agencies, the Russian Academy of Sciences, Siberian authorities and naval officials. Trips were made to Sakhalin by I. Shestakov (1729), I. Skurikhin (1730), A. Ye. Shel'ting, V. Rtishchev and M. S. Gvozdev (1742), a group of Russians who settled in Patience Bay (1780), A. Terent'yev (1789-1790), I. V. Kruzenshtern (1805), N. A. Khvostov and

G. I. Davydov (1806-1807) and G. I. Nevel'skoy (1849-1854). In 1808 the government authorized a Russian-American company to "found its settlements"[9] on the island of Sakhalin. An associate of G. I. Nevel'skoy, N. K. Boshnyak, discovered coal deposits on this island. His work was continued by mining engineer I. A. Lopatin in 1867-1868. By 1880, geologist L. F. Bartsevich had begun to investigate the island's oil deposits. In 1881, A. M. Nikol'skiy and I. S. Polyakov began a thorough study of the flora and fauna of Sakhalin, and P. Yu. Shmidt and V. P. Brazhnikov researched fishing resources. In 1908-1910 the expedition of N. N. Tikhonovich and P. I. Polevoy discovered several dozen deposits of minerals in the northern part of the island.

As for the Kuril Islands, Urup was visited by N. Treska (before 1727) and Kunashir was visited by N. Storozhev, who accepted the local Ainu inhabitants as Russian subjects (1755), A. Tolstykh (1765), I. Chernyy (he wrote a detailed description of the natural features of the archipelago and accepted the inhabitants of Simushir, Urup and Iturup as subjects, 1766-1768), I. Nikonov (to the islands of Urup and Iturup, where he hunted sea mammals, 1770-1773), A. Sapozhnikov (to Simushir and Urup, 1771-1772), F. Putintsev and I. Antipin (to Urup, 1775-1776), M. Petushkov (to Urup, 1777), and D. Shabalin (to Urup, Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Atkis, or Hokkaido, where he also accepted the local inhabitants as subjects, 1778).[10]

In 1785-1786 a group of Russian sailors (S. Yezhov and others) spent the winter on the island of Iturup. They passed on the information they had gathered on natural conditions on the islands north of Iturup to M. Tokunai, who was a member of the first official Japanese expedition to the Kuril Islands in 1786.[11]

At the end of the same year, A. R. Vorontsov, president of the Russian Board of Commerce, and State Secretary A. A. Bezborodko informed Yekaterina II of the need to officially annex the Kuril Islands, as well as Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, to protect Russia's "trade and hunting rights in the Oriental Sea."[12] The provisions of this document were put in effect by an ukase of the Admiralty Board on 22 December 1786, signed by Yekaterina II.[13]

The purpose of the Russian expeditions to this region was, as the instructions issued, for example, by Kamchatka Chief Commander K. Bem to I. Antipin ordered, "to find possible sites for at least small plants or small smelting ovens; to search for iron and copper ore, other metals and minerals and, in particular, native compounds and various dyes, curious and interesting objects, such as fossilized animals and plants, and any kind of rocks and shells with large, medium-sized and small Oriental pearls in them." In addition, the instructions ordered "seeing and meeting the Japanese and initiating trade with them."[14] But when the Japanese met Antipin in 1779, they would only agree to conduct trade through the Ainus (inhabitants of the Kurils).

Russian explorers also learned that there was land suitable for agriculture on the Kurils. In the second half of the 18th century, the settlement of Kurilorossiya was founded on the island of Urup, where Russians grew grain and vegetables.

In 1798 a Japanese detachment led by M. Kondo knocked down all of the Russian crosses in the southern part of the Kurils on the grounds that they were symbols of Russian ownership and set up pillars everywhere, including the island of Urup, with the inscription that this region was part of the Japanese Empire.[15] Nonetheless, in an attempt to defend Russian trade and the fur, fishing and whaling industries against foreigners, in 1821 when the privileges of the Russian-American Company were renewed--the company was authorized from this year on to also settle lands discovered by the Russians in the Kurils south of 45°50' north latitude--Alexander I issued an ukase on Russia's economic sovereignty in its possessions in the northwestern Pacific, from the coast of Alaska to a line 100 nautical miles (185.2 kilometers) from the Russian coastline, south of the island of Urup, running across the southern part of Iturup.[16]

In 1854, when Ye. V. Putyatin, head of the Russian mission in Japan, was concluding the first Russo-Japanese trade treaty, he defended Russia's right to the southern part of the Kurils, but had to concede the region to Japan de facto in 1855 due to the Crimean War, which posed the constant threat of attack by English and French naval ships. In 1905 Japan seized the southern half of Sakhalin as a result of the Russo-Japanese War, although it had renounced its claim in 1875.

A new stage in the life of Sakhalin began after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. At the beginning of 1918 the Sakhalinskaya Oblast Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies proclaimed Soviet rule. But the struggle against Kolchakov's forces delayed the establishment of the new regime until the beginning of 1920.

After the establishment of Soviet rule, labor communes began to be founded in the northern part of the island. Local ethnic groups began to receive the goods they needed--medicine, hunting equipment, fishing gear and so forth.

From April 1920 through May 1925 North Sakhalin was occupied by Japanese troops, which had invaded the Soviet Far East in 1918.

In 1925 a Soviet-Japanese convention was signed on the basic principles of interrelations between the two countries, in accordance with which the USSR regained complete sovereignty in North Sakhalin. When the agreement was being concluded, the Soviet side published a declaration that the government of the USSR would not share the former tsarist government's political responsibility for the signing of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty with Japan in 1905,[17] in line with which Japan had forced Russia to cede the southern part of this island.

On 13 November 1922, the popular assembly of the Far Eastern Republic announced the annexation of the Soviet Far East to the RSFSR after its liberation from interventionists. On 15 November 1922, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR declared that the Far Eastern Republic, including the zone occupied by the Japanese, was part of the Russian Federation.[18] The territory of the Far Eastern Republic included "all of the territory of the former tsarist government east of Selenga River and Lake Baykal to the Pacific Ocean," including the West and East Trans-Baykal and Amurskaya, Primorskaya, Sakhalinskaya and Kamchatskaya oblasts (the last two provinces of the Russian Empire had included the southern half of Sakhalin from 1875 to 1905 and the Kuril Islands from 1849 to 1866).[19]

During the years of Soviet rule, the inhabitants of North Sakhalin were extremely successful in the economic development of this region. They established a power engineering base which served this island as well as the entire Soviet Far East. The production output here in 1932 was 201,000 tons of oil (in comparison to 16,370 tons in 1928-1929) and 160,000 tons of coal (4.5 times as much as in 1928-1929). The fishing and lumber industries developed quickly. The first canneries and fish farms were opened, and a wharf and logging combine began operating. A great deal of attention was devoted to the enhancement of public well-being and the satisfaction of the spiritual needs of local inhabitants, the number of which had risen 6.5-fold during the years of the five-year plans, reaching 110,000 in 1940. Particular efforts were taken on behalf of the small ethnic groups--Nivkhy, Oroki, Evenki, Yakuts and others--for whom boarding schools, red nomad camps and cultural centers were founded.[20]

After the publication of the abovementioned declaration of 1925, the Soviet Government raised the question of the return of South Sakhalin and the Kurils several times.[21] For example, on 18 November 1940, when a Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact was being negotiated, the restoration of our nation's sovereignty over the Kuril Islands was proposed. In April 1941, V. M. Molotov requested Foreign Minister Y. Matsuoka to consider the revision of some articles of the unfair Portsmouth Treaty of 1905 in connection with the conclusion of a Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact. This pact stated that "in the event that one of the sides becomes the object of hostilities on the part of one or several other powers, the other side will remain neutral throughout the conflict."

As we know, Japan's sudden attack on the United States and Great Britain at the end of 1941 made it an aggressor, and not the object of aggression. One of the goals of the Japanese militarists was the seizure of not only North Sakhalin, but also the entire Soviet Far East and Siberia. This is why the question of changing the status of South Sakhalin and the Kurils was also discussed at the Teheran Conference of the heads of government of the great powers in November 1943. This is why a memorandum sent by U.S. President F. Roosevelt to the participants of a Pacific Council session on 12 January 1944 stated: "J. Stalin has expressed the hope that all of Sakhalin will be returned to Russia and that the Kuril Islands will be turned over to Russia."[22] Later, in February 1945, at the final plenary session of the Yalta Conference, where the decision was made to restore Soviet rights to this territory, F. Roosevelt said that "the Russians only want the return of something that has been taken away from them."[23]

In May 1945, immediately after the defeat of fascist Germany, Japan expressed its willingness, based on a decision of the Supreme Military Council, to return the southern half of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands (with the exception of their southern half) to the USSR if the Soviet Government would mediate the negotiation of a peace treaty with the Western countries and renew the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. But the Soviet Union did not agree to these separate actions, which would have been contrary to the joint decisions of the allies in regard to Japan.[24]

As a result of the collapse of Japanese militarism in 1945, the sovereignty of our country over the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kurils was restored in accordance with international agreements (the Cairo, Yalta and Potsdam declarations) aimed at putting an end to Japan's aggression and its plans to partition the USSR and to guard against any repetition of this aggression with the aid of convenient lines of assault.

A new stage began in the study and development of the natural resources of the pearl of the Soviet Far East.

The waters of Sakhalin, the islands adjacent to it and the islands of the Kuril Archipelago--our nation's most valuable fishing zone--are inhabited by herring, humpback salmon, Siberian salmon, flounder, mintai, mackerel, halibut, cod and other species of fish, crab, squid, mussels, scallops, kelp, ahnfeltia and other types of seaweed, seals, sea lions, whales of various types, sea otters and other marine mammals. Muskrats, which were brought to the island of Sakhalin in 1952, have adapted well to the region. On Shikotan Island, sea otters are being bred successfully. The territory is famous for its mink.

Fishing and the fish industry are the leading branches of the economy of Sakhalinskaya Oblast. Fresh-frozen and canned fish and items made of mollusks and seaweed are valued highly in the USSR domestic market and abroad. Salmon reproduction has been active. The young Siberian, humpback, king, silver, sima and red salmon produced each year by 20 fish farms exceed the number of fry produced by all fish farms in Japan.[25]

A letter from the workers of Yuzhnokuril'skiy Rayon in Sakhalinskaya Oblast to Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, published in SOVETSKIY SAKHALIN, stressed: "These successes were made possible by the all-round assistance and concern of the party and your personal effort to develop industrial production on the Kuril Islands."[26]

The Japanese press has pointed out the fact that the decision to accelerate the development of Sakhalin and the Kurils was made in 1964 at a joint meeting of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers, chaired by L. I. Brezhnev.[27]

The greatest variety of minerals can be found on the islands in the Sea of Okhotsk. Deposits of petroleum and natural gas are being exploited here, and this petroleum is light in gravity and color, with a low content of sulfur and paraffin. The oil and gas are in direct proximity to deposits of high-calorie lignite and hard coal, with a low and medium ash content, low in sulfur but high in phosphorus. Lignite, long-flame and gas coals contain a high percentage of tar. Sakhalin coal is easily concentrated and is used not only as a high-quality source of energy, but also as a raw material for metallurgical coke and petrochemicals. This is why it is also in great demand outside the oblast, and even abroad. The coal is located at depths of up to 300 meters, which allows for open-pit mining. In 1980 the coal output is expected to reach 5.5-6 million tons.

Recently the Yubileynaya deposit was discovered in northeast Sakhalin, which corroborates the promising nature of the reserves of these valuable types of fuel. The Dagi-Pogibi Pipeline is being constructed, and another pipeline will soon stretch to the mainland, which will be an important supplement to the Okha-Komsomol'sk Pipeline built in 1976. Work has been completed on the 40-kilometer second section of the Dagi-Noglinki line. Geophysical research and seismological studies are conducted with the aid of the latest methods and modern computers.

Sakhalin and the Kurils are also famous for their peat deposits. Known reserves exceed 4 billion cubic meters. According to the estimates of geologists, they could be several times greater. The ash content of the peat is low and the technical conditions for its processing are excellent. It is mainly located in the depths of the Tym'-Poronyanskaya, Susunayskaya and North Sakhalin lowlands.

These abundant fuel resources will increase power output in the 10th Five-Year Plan, which will create future opportunities for the production of electric power at oblast TETs's and its export to Japan.

On the island of Iturup (in the southern part of the Kurils), deposits of titanomagnetite gravel have been discovered. It is used in aircraft engineering and shipbuilding and at enterprises of the chemical industry in Khabarovsk and Komsomol'sk-on-Amur. Gravel containing many minerals is also valuable from the industrial standpoint. The joint exploitation of these deposits is being considered by the Soviet-Japanese and Japanese-Soviet committees on economic cooperation.

There are known deposits of complex ores on Kunashir and Urup. Nonferrous and rare metals also decorate the Kuril necklace. There are suspected deposits of various ores and metals on Sakhalin, in the East Sakhalin mountains and the Tonino-Anivskiy Peninsula. Many metallic and mineral ores have also been found in the Kuril Islands.

Vast native sulfur deposits were found in the Kurils long ago. The deposits on the islands of Iturup and Paramushir are of the greatest industrial value. Just as the sulfur of Kunashir, the sulfur from these deposits will be used in the pulp and paper industry of Sakhalin.

Marble and jasper have been discovered in the East Sakhalin mountains, in the Susnaysk Range and the Tonino-Anivskiy Peninsula on Sakhalin. In addition to the Gomonsk limestone deposit with an output of 50 million tons, other deposits have been found in the East Sakhalin mountains. Gravel is being mined in the large Okha deposit.

The timber resources of the territory are immeasurable. There are up to 200 known types of trees, shrubs and vines. Sakhalin's timber resources have been valued at up to 650 million rubles a meter. The spruce, fir, larch and birch are of the greatest economic value. The forests of the Kuril Archipelago are also quite valuable, particularly the Sitka spruce and fir on Kunashir. The planting of forests on the islands of Simushir and Kharimkotan has transformed the landscape in the central Kurils. The exploitation of overmature Sakhalin forests north of 50° north latitude will provide considerable opportunities for the export of timber.

Sakhalin's timber resources serve as the basis for the operations of seven pulp and paper combines, a cardboard factory and a production combine in South Sakhalin. The output of pulp reached 350,000 tons in the Ninth Five-Year Plan and paper production exceeded 300,000 tons. In the 10th Five-Year Plan, these indicators will rise 11.4 percent and 12.1 percent respectively.

At the seventh conference of the Soviet-Japanese and Japanese-Soviet committees on economic cooperation in September 1977, an agreement was concluded on the technical re-equipping of pulp and paper enterprises in this region in connection with the conclusion of the third general lumber agreement in the near future.[28] The Japanese side's interest in this project is largely due to its tradition of importing newsprint from Sakhalin.

Agricultural workers in this area have been remarkably successful. A congratulatory message from Comrade L. I. Brezhnev to the workers of Sakhalin and the Kurils said: "I am happy to say that agricultural workers have achieved good and stable indicators in the sale of potatoes and vegetables to the state each year in recent years under the difficult climatic conditions of Sakhalinskaya Oblast."[29]

By the beginning of 1978, the first section of the Pervomayskaya Poultry Factory for the production of 1 million broilers a year began operating, and in 1979 the construction of the second section will begin, which will increase the broiler output to 6 million a year. The construction of animal husbandry complexes for the production of milk, beef and pork is being conducted intensively.

After the war, much was done to establish efficient transportation in Sakhalinskaya Oblast--railway, motor vehicle, air and sea transport. The railroad lines encircling Sakhalin underwent complete technical remodeling. In 1973 work was completed on the Vanino-Kholmsk railroad ferry crossing, which connects the oblast with the mainland.

The expansion of the railway network in the Far East is increasing Soviet orders for Japanese means of transport. For example, in 1976 the Soviet Union was the third largest importer of Japanese rolling stock, and it was used on Sakhalin Island.[30]

The resort industry is also being developed intensively in Sakhalinskaya Oblast. Several dozen medicinal springs have been discovered and thoroughly researched on Sakhalin and the Kurils. There are around 100 mineral springs, separate and in groups, in the oblast. The Sinegorsk carbonated, boric and chloride-hydrocarbon-sodium waters are particularly valuable. These are unique in composition and have excellent medicinal properties. Other springs of exceptional value are the Lopatinskiye Springs, containing chlorine, sodium, potassium, alkali and so forth (Sakhalin Island), thermal carbonated, chloride-hydrocarbon springs (Dachnyye and Goryachiye springs on the island of Iturup), hydrogen sulfide carbonated sulfate waters (Aleksinskiye Springs on the island of Kunashir), nitrogen carbonated, hydrogen sulfide and sodium chloride (Goryachiy Beach on the island of Kunashir) and others.

Methane carbonate mud has been discovered on Sakhalin (Pugachevskiye and South Sakhalin baths), as well as hydrosulfide mineral valley mud (the Starodubskiye and Daginskiye baths), and on the Kuril Islands--the mud of mineral springs (Kunashirskiye).[31]

In terms of medicinal properties, these mineral waters and therapeutic mud baths are not surpassed by those in the south of our nation and are quite promising for continued use in balneology.

The Sakhalin Sanatorium operates on the grounds of the Sinegorskiye Springs, and therapeutic water and mud treatment centers, seven sanatoriums and rest homes, many tourist centers and fishing and hunting lodges are located on the grounds of the Daginskiye, Kuril'skiye and South Kuril'skiye springs. Tens of thousands of workers and employees, including people who come here from other oblasts, annually vacation here for rest and treatment.

Great significance is attached in the region to the development of culture and sports. Work has been completed on seven stadiums, around 200 sports auditoriums, dozens of ski lodges and hundreds of volleyball, tennis and other athletic courts. Tens of thousands of inhabitants of Sakhalin and the Kurils engage in physical culture and sports.

Oblast inhabitants take an active part in cultural construction. Schools began to be built here for local inhabitants soon after the arrival of the first explorers, and in 1970 the children here were already attending 378 schools. The academic buildings of a pedagogical institute, music and pedagogical schools and a timber industry tekhnikum have been built. The construction of an academic center for several dozen students is planned in South Sakhalinsk.

Since the war, the oblast Dramatic Theater imeni A. P. Chekhov has been opened, folk theaters have been established in Aleksandrovsk, Okha, Makarovo and Tomar', and there is a Nivkhy national dance troupe, a symphony orchestra and the South Sakhalin Russian Folk Choir. In the 1960's a writers' organization with a broad variety of literary members took shape.

A comprehensive scientific research institute of the Far East Scientific Center of the USSR Academy of Sciences, a branch of the Pacific Scientific Research Institute of Fish Farming and Oceanography, and agricultural and forestry experimental stations have been established on Sakhalin Island.

They are headed by experienced scientists. Sakhalin scientists are conducting oceanographic and geological research in this region and are working on better methods of oil and gas prospecting. The Sakhalin branch of the Pacific Institute of Fish Farming has worked out the biological bases for the technical and economic development of salmon-breeding in the waters off Sakhalin and the Kurils.

During the years of Soviet rule, the Russian people's dream of acquiring the riches of the legendary Land of White Waters has become a reality. This was the fairyland of the islands of the Oriental Ocean, to which, according to tradition, those who had fought in the peasant war under S. T. Razin's command went "on ships through the Arctic Sea," escaping oppression after the last seat of resistance was crushed in 1676 on the Solovetsk Islands in the White Sea.[32]

The workers of Sakhalin and the Kurils greeted the year of 1978 with new achievements, fulfilling the plan for the first 2 years of the 10th Five-Year Plan by 7 December 1977. Industrial growth in 1978 was 5.7 percent, instead of the 3.9 percent called for in the plan, and labor productivity rose 7.3 percent in comparison to 1975, instead of the planned 4.9 percent. "A great deal has been done to develop power engineering, communications systems, material and technical supply operations, highways, the lumber industry and public utilities and to improve trade and consumer services," reported SOVETSKIY SAKHALIN on 21 February 1978. In 1978 many enterprises in Sakhalinskaya Oblast were remodeled and technically re-equipped, automatic and mechanized flowlines were installed, technological processes were automated and more productive equipment was put in operation. Large above-plan quantities of oil, coal, commercial lumber, paper, cardboard, cellulose, fish products and canned goods were produced, and an excellent harvest of vegetables and potatoes was gathered.

Oblast inhabitants responded with enthusiasm to a telegram sent to them by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev during his trip through Siberia and the Far East.

On 7 December 1978, South Sakhalin workers fulfilled the industrial product sales plan for the first 3 years of the five-year plan in advance, with a growth rate almost double the planned figure (12.7 percent). Whereas plan fulfillment in the first 3 years of the previous five-year plan had been 80-percent due to increased labor productivity, the figure was 100 percent in the current five-year plan. An extensive capital construction program has been carried out in the oblast center, 202,000 square meters of living area has been built, including 17,000 square meters over and above the plan. The plans for freight shipments, commodity turnover and consumer services have been overfulfilled.[33]

On 13 December 1978, all of Sakhalinskaya Oblast had fulfilled the sales volume plan for the major types of industrial products. The plan for the sale of milk to the state was fulfilled ahead of schedule at the same time, and by 25 December it had already been overfulfilled by 8 percent in comparison to 1977. The average daily milk yield in 1978 rose to 400-500 grams per cow.[34]

By the end of 1978, the plans for industrial production and retail trade turnover in the cooperative network had also been overfulfilled (by 4.4 percent), as well as the plans for consumer services (by 7.1 percent) and the production of industrial and food products (by 7.1 million rubles). The plan for the sale of agricultural products to the state was overfulfilled by the following amounts--potatoes (1,900 tons), vegetables (1,300 tons), livestock and poultry (1,200 tons), eggs (2 million) and fur (2.7 million rubles).

In all, oblast kolkhozes and sovkhozes sold the state 86,000 tons of milk, 19,000 tons of meat and 132 million eggs in 1978. In terms of agricultural production indicators, the leading rayons are Yuzhno-Kuril'skiy, Severo-Kuril'skiy, Yuzhno-Sakhalinskiy, Anivskiy, Okhinskiy and Makarovskiy.[35]

The average monthly wages of workers and employees are 7.5 percent higher than in 1975, and allocations for public health, social security and culture are 9.3 percent higher. During the first 3 years of the five-year plan, around 1 million square meters of living area became available and 75,000 people moved to homes equipped with all modern conveniences.[36]

In general, the island economy is productive and stable, and the people employed in this economy are maintaining the rates specified in plans for the accelerated development of these parts of the Soviet Far East.

On 23 December 1978 a plenum of the Sakhalinskaya CPSU Obkom was held to discuss organizational matters. Due to the fact that First Secretary P. A. Leonov of the party obkom had been elected first secretary of the Kalininskaya CPSU Obkom, P. I. Tret'yakov was elected first secretary of the Sakhalinskaya party obkom, A. T. Kuzin was elected obkom secretary and P. V. Savin was elected chief of the section for organizational party work. The plenum was attended by Deputy Chief Ye. Z. Razumov of the Section for Organizational Party Work of the CPSU Central Committee.[37]

The plan for 1979 envisages the growth of industrial production by 12.5 percent in comparison to 1975. In comparison to 1978, the plan calls for an increase of 13.7 percent in oil production, of 7.2 percent in gas production, of 1.2 percent in the production of pulp, paper and cardboard, of 2,000 tons in cement production, of 5,000 tons in the output of powdered limestone and of 3,000 tons in the output of construction limestone. Besides this, an increase of 1.2 percent in the output of meat and milk and of 8 percent in pastries and pasta is planned for the year. The oblast budget for the year will be more than 8 million rubles higher and will total 291,832,000 rubles.

Japan purchases oil, coal, lumber, paper, fish and other goods from Sakhalinskaya Oblast and exports consumer goods, means of transport, equipment for the timber and woodworking industry and other types of equipment to this region, including exports sent through coastal trade channels, represented by the Dal'intorg office on the Soviet side. The fact that Sakhalin and the Kurils are so close to Japan and the concrete plans for the Soviet exploitation of natural resources in this zone make Soviet-Japanese trade and mutually beneficial economic cooperation in accordance with international financing practices extremely promising.

After Sakhalinskaya Oblast had been reunited with the Soviet Union, the efforts of its workers turned it into an economically developed part of our nation, an important link in an integral national economic chain, the eastern regions of which, because they are rich in sources of energy, are receiving priority development. This program is being carried out in accordance with the 10th Five-Year Plan for the purpose of establishing new territorial proportions based on the specific distribution of productive forces within the nation and on international division of labor.

Whereas this region was once a raw material annex of the central regions of Russia, and then of Japan, this territory of legendary wealth is now exporting primary products as well as various types of industrial commodities to many foreign countries.

Under the conditions of postwar peaceful construction, the specific geographic position of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands in relation to developed capitalist countries (Japan, the United States, Canada and Australia) and to socialist countries (the PRC, MPR, DPRK and SRV) and their status as outlying districts of the Soviet Far East have ceased to be a negative factor and, on the contrary, are becoming a serious advantage.

History ultimately made this region an integral part of our nation. This is why the attempts of some groups in Japan to revise the international agreements of wartime and the postwar period, and their campaigns for the return of the so-called northern territories, which are unrealistic and futile, are escalating tension and mutual distrust between the people of the Soviet Union and Japan. It is much more important to take a practical approach to the problem of the more expedient use of the natural resources of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands with a view to the economic and political interests of the Soviet and Japanese people and on the basis of the principles of cooperation and friendship. These goals could be attained, for example, by the conclusion of an agreement on the principles of economic cooperation by the two countries over the long range, similar to the agreements concluded by the Soviet Union with France, England, Italy, Canada and other states.

A peace treaty recognizing present realities, or a treaty on cooperation and friendship, a draft of which has been published in our press, could improve the political climate in relations between the USSR and Japan and thereby establish more favorable conditions for Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation, including the joint development of the natural resources of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. It is in this way that progress can be made in the more efficient exploitation of the vast resources of this region on the basis of the existing system of international division of labor in the Far East.

FOOTNOTES

1. See "Povest' vremennykh let" [Chronicle of Bygone Years], pt 1, Moscow-Leningrad, 1950, p 197.

2. See P. I. Novakomskiy, "Kniga o Moskovitskom posol'stve" [Book About the Muscovy Embassy], St. Petersburg, 1908, p 262.

3. See B. P. Polevoy, "Did Ivan Moskvitin Reach the Mouth of the Amur?"--MATERIALY PO ISTORII GEOGRAFICHESKIKH ZNANIY, No 1, Leningrad, 1962, p 68; B. P. Polevoy, "An Inquiry Into the Exact Date of the Initial Russian Discovery of the Pacific Ocean," STRANY I NARODY VOSTOKA, No XX, bk 4, Moscow, 1979, p 94.

4. See L. S. Berg, "The Discovery of Kamchatka and the Bering Expedition," Moscow-Leningrad, 1946, p 178.

5. See B. P. Polevoy, "Peter I, Nikolay Vitsen and the Question of 'America's Meeting with Asia,'" STRANY I NARODY VOSTOKA, No XVII, Moscow, 1975, p 29.

6. T. Akizuki, "The Research of I. Kozyrevskiy and the Map of the Kuril Islands," HOPPO BUNKA KENKYU, 1968, No 3, p 157.

7. Quoted by L. S. Berg, "Izbrannyye trudy" [Selected Works], vol 1, Moscow, 1955, p 162.

8. M. V. Lomonosov, "Pol. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Moscow-Leningrad, 1952, p 498.

9. See "Polnoye sovraniye zakonov Rossiyskoy imperii" [Complete Collected Laws of the Russian Empire], vol 40, "General Supplements," Ukase No 23207-a, St. Petersburg, 1830, p 55.

10. See R. V. Makarova, "Russkiye na Tikhom okeane vo vtoroy polovine XVIII v." [The Russians in the Pacific in the Second Half of the 18th Century], Moscow, 1968, pp 89-93, 188.

11. See S. Takakura, "Essay on the History of the Kuril Islands," Tokyo, 1961, p 42.

12. Central State Archives of the Navy, USSR, File on Count I. G. Chernyshev, case 408, pt II, sheets 793-796.

13. Central State Archives of Ancient Documents, USSR, series VII, case 2539, sheets 107-108, 148.

14. Ibid.

15. See E. Ya. Faynberg, "Russko-yaponskiye otnosheniya v 1767-1875 g." [Russo-Japanese Relations in 1767-1875], Moscow, 1960, pp 41, 69-70.

16. See P. Tikhmenev, "Istoricheskoye obozreniye obrazovaniya Rossiysko-Amerikanskoy kompanii i deystviy yeye do nastoyashchego vremeni" [Historical Survey of the Origins of the Russian-American Company and Its Operations to the Present Day], pt 1, St. Petersburg, 1861, pp 27, 41.

17. See "Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR" [Foreign Policy Documents of the USSR], vol VIII, Moscow, 1963, p 77.

18. SOVRANIYE UZAKONENIY I RASPORYAZHENIY RABOCHEGO I KREST'YANSKOGO PRAVITEL'STVA, People's Commissariat of Justice, 25 January 1923, No 1, sec 1, p 3.

19. See S. Grigortsevich, "Amerikanskaya i yaponskaya interventsiya na Sovetskom Dal'nem Vostoke i yeye razgrom (1918-1922)" [American and Japanese Intervention in the Soviet Far East and Its Defeat (1918-1922)], Moscow, 1957, p 91.

20. See P. A. Leonov, I. V. Pan'kin and I. Ye. Belousov, "Oblast' na ostrovakh" [The Oblast on Islands], Moscow, 1974, p 61.

21. See N. Kutakov, "Japanese Foreign Policy on the Eve of Pacific War; A Soviet View," Tallahassee, 1972, p 185.

22. D. Leahy, "I Was There," London, 1947, p 364.

23. FRUS, Diplomatic Papers, "The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943," Washington, 1961, p 869.

24. See G. Lensen, "The Strange Neutrality," Tallahassee, 1972, pp 134-135.

25. See P. A. Leonov, "The Pearl of the Soviet Far East," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1977, No 4, p 31.

26. SOVETSKIY SAKHALIN, 1 January 1978.

27. MAINICHI SHIMBUN, 21 January 1978.

28. See V. B. Spandar'yan, "Important Stage in the Development of Soviet-Japanese Trade," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1978, No 1, p 108.

29. SOVETSKIY SAKHALIN, 10 January 1978.

30. V. B. Spandar'yan, Op. cit., p 103.

31. See A. F. Yefremenkov, D. P. Zhizhin, A. Ya. Taboyakov, B. D. Shirokov and M. A. Shpetalenko, "Minerals," in the book "Atlas Sakhalinskoy oblasti" [An Atlas of Sakhalinskaya Oblast], Moscow, 1967, p 40.

32. See K. V. Chistov, "Russkiye narodnyye sotsial'no-utopicheskiye legendy XVIII-XIX vv." [Russian Folk Social-Utopian Legends of the 18th and 19th Centuries], Moscow, 1967; K. V. Chistov, "Legend of the Land of White Waters," TRUDY KAREL'SKOGO FILIALA AN SSSR, 1962, vol 35, pp 116-181.

33. SOVETSKIY SAKHALIN, 21 December 1978.

34. Ibid., 26 and 29 December 1978.

35. Ibid., 27 December 1978.

36. Ibid., 29 December 1978.

37. Ibid., 24 December 1978.

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SU ZHAOZHEN--TALENTED LEADER OF THE CHINESE WORKERS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1979 pp 138-142

[Article by A. S. Titov]

[Text] The young Chinese working class, which made its first appearance in the arena of political struggle under the influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia, began to advance its own talented leaders and guides from the worker milieu even before the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. One of these leaders and guides of the Chinese workers was Su Zhaozhen, a prominent figure in the Chinese and international workers' movement who died 50 years ago last February.

Su Zhaozhen (1895-1929) had a short but eventful and heroic life. The greatest purpose of his life was tireless struggle for the interests of the working class and laboring people of China, for their national and social liberation. He was fated to play an important role in the history of the Chinese workers' movement; he was always in the forward ranks of the fighting Chinese proletariat, led the workers into battle several times and successfully guided them in economic and political struggle. Su Zhaozhen inspired the workers and the poorest peasants, who had been subjected to merciless exploitation by landowners, merchants and usurers, to rise up in struggle. He left the city many times to go back to the countryside and conduct agitation among the peasants, organizing them to fight against their oppressors, for which he was once arrested and spent more than a year in prison. His closeness to the working class and laboring people, his profound understanding of their interests and his tireless struggle won Su Zhaozhen the sincere respect and deep affection of all workers in China.

Su Zhaozhen was born into a poor peasant family in the Xiangshan district of Guangdong province. Necessity forced him to begin serving on an ocean liner when he was still a boy. For more than 20 years he worked as a common sailor on English and other foreign ships, sailed around the world and visited many countries in Europe, Asia, Africa and America. There is no question that this helped to broaden his outlook and brought about his recognition of the need for struggle against national and social oppression. He himself experienced the oppression, brutality and humiliation to which Chinese sailors were subjected by foreign and Chinese shipowners and their administrations of contractor-middlemen. To get a job, the Chinese sailor had to pay the contractor bribes of up to 100 dollars and, after getting the job, he had to give him more than 10 percent of his monthly wage. This extortion was impossible to escape--without the assistance of a middleman, the Chinese sailor could not get work, as the shipowners concluded hiring agreements only with these contractors. The wages of the Chinese sailor were pitifully small and provided him with hardly enough to feed himself. Besides this, the Chinese sailor was subjected to racial and national discrimination: He received one-fifth as much as a white performing the same work; whereas white sailors were lodged in single or double cabins, the Chinese slept six or seven to each cabin, in the worst part of the ship, sometimes without light or ventilation. There were also other kinds of discrimination. The wages and working conditions were no better on Chinese-owned ships.

Su Zhaozhen was one of the ones who could not, and had no wish to, accept this kind of scandalous injustice; it aroused his class and revolutionary consciousness. He burned with the desire to start fighting for the improvement of his colleagues' status. The first attempt to somehow alleviate conditions was the creation of a sailors' friendship association by Su Zhaozhen and a group of his comrades. The basic principles of the association were mutual assistance and mutual support.

When he visited various port cities, Su Zhaozhen took an interest in the living conditions of workers and their struggle for their own interests in other countries. He was particularly impressed by the news of the October Socialist Revolution in Russia, where the working class had taken power into its own hands. He began to display more and more interest in the workers' and trade-union movement.

In 1920, along with Lin Weilin[1] and others, Su Zhaozhen organized the Chinese Sailors' Union, and in March 1921, the Union of Associated Chinese Sailors, with its headquarters in the British colony of Hongkong. This organization united the Chinese sailors, dockworkers and stevedores. Soon after the union was founded, demands for better conditions for Chinese seamen and dockworkers were submitted to shipowners--namely, higher wages and the right of the union to take part in the job placement of sailors and the conclusion of agreements between sailors and employers. English shipowners refused these demands three times. After this, on 13 January 1922, the union declared a general strike, which was joined by 100,000 workers by February. Hongkong was paralyzed. The British governor of Hongkong declared the union an illegal organization, as a result of which the strike headquarters had to move to Canton (Guangzhou).

Although the chairman of the union was Chen Bingshen,[2] the central figure in the organization and the leader of the strike was Su Zhaozhen. He was elected chairman of the strike committee and actually performed all of the work involved in supervising the strike and negotiating with employers and Hongkong authorities. He resolutely repulsed all attempts by Hongkong authorities and the Chinese shipowners who served as their middlemen to stop the strike and intimidate the strikers. In response to a representative of the Hongkong government, Su Zhaozhen declared: "We have already submitted our demands three times. We informed the government of this in advance. Why was nothing said at that time? Now we have gone on strike and will not return to work until all of the demands have been satisfied. Whether we starve or not is our own affair and is not the concern of the government."[3]

Su Zhaozhen adhered to this firm line throughout the strike, and this was of extremely great significance because some representatives of the union were prepared to compromise and go back to work. They were particularly affected by the admonitions of Chinese shipowners who addressed the strikers with the following words: "All of us are Chinese and we naturally sympathize with your strike. Perhaps we can find a way out of the dilemma. First you must return to the Chinese ships. After the foreign shipowners have satisfied your demands, we will naturally follow their example."[4] This appeal to national feelings did not affect Su Zhaozhen. With the frankness and dignity of a worker, he replied: "Of course we are all Chinese. This is why we asked the Chinese capitalists to help us when the strike began. If, as you say, you sympathize with your countrymen, why did you not answer our request? Why did you not issue a protest on our behalf to the Hongkong government? Now you are seeking special treatment on the grounds that we are of the same nationality, but this is contrary to the interests of the strike and we cannot agree to this. It seems to me that it would be best for you to help us force the Hongkong government to satisfy our demands as quickly as possible."[5]

The strike lasted 55 days and ended on 8 March in a victory for the workers. Shipowners and the British authorities in Hongkong had to accept the demands of the sailors' union. The governor of Hongkong countermanded the order that had declared the union illegal.

This was the Chinese workers' first major victory. The strike of the Hongkong sailors and dockworkers demonstrated the strength and potential of organized workers and revealed a concrete way of fighting for better conditions. It greatly influenced the development of the workers' movement throughout China.

During the strike, Su Zhaozhen devoted a great deal of attention to international contacts as well as contacts within China. Although he was not a communist as yet, he believed in the solidarity and assistance of the world proletariat. While he was in Guangzhou, he went each day to the news agency of the Nation of Soviets and asked that the news of the strike be broadcasted throughout the world and that the workers of the entire world be called upon to assist their brothers--the Chinese workers. He made the same request in the editorial offices of the French communist newspaper L'HUMANITE.[6]

This resulted in a campaign of solidarity with the Hongkong workers on the railroads of North China, in Shanghai and Guangzhou, where Sun Yat-sen's government gave material and political assistance and support to the strikers, as well as in Singapore and other foreign ports.

Su Zhaozhen also tried to make contact with the Chinese Communist Party at that time, but, in his words, he "raced through the entire city (Guangzhou) in a futile search for the communist party."[7]

In 1924 Su Zhaozhen attended a conference of transport workers in the Pacific countries, convened on the initiative of Profintern. After the conference he maintained close contact with labor movement leaders in several Pacific countries. He supported and defended the need for labor unity in the Pacific countries. He took a special interest in the successes of the labor and national revolutionary movements in India and other countries and was delighted with the increasing unity of the workers of China and the Philippines.[8]

In 1924 Su Zhaozhen joined the Chinese Communist Party and began to participate energetically in its work. He began to study Marxism-Leninism at the same time and remained loyal to this doctrine until his death. In 1925 Su Zhaozhen assisted in the organization and work of the Second All-China Labor Congress, which was supervised by communists. The congress played an important part in the unification of the Chinese working class. A resolution was passed at the congress regarding the establishment of an all-China labor confederation and its affiliation with Profintern. Su Zhaozhen was elected a member of the executive committee of the new confederation.

After the congress, Su Zhaozhen was sent by the party to Hongkong to organize the famous 16-month anti-imperialist strike of workers in Hongkong and Guangzhou, which played an important role in the development of the Chinese revolution of 1925-1927. Using his influence with the masses, which he had acquired after the Hongkong sailors' strike in 1922, Su Zhaozhen convinced even the leaders of "yellow" trade unions in Hongkong to take part in the anti-imperialist strike as a sign of solidarity with the striking Shanghai workers. The first to strike were 100,000 Hongkong workers who supported the demands of Shanghai workers and voiced additional demands to restrict discriminatory practices against the Chinese population of Hongkong and improve labor conditions. Two days later, a strike broke out on the territory of the Anglo-French concession in Guangzhou--Shamiang. Then the Guangzhou workers joined the strike.

During the strike, Su Zhaozhen was elected chairman of the strike committee in Guangzhou and chairman of the finance commission. The strike committee actually turned into a second government (this is what it was ironically called by imperialists) in Guangzhou. The committee had a squad of around 3,000 picketers who essentially kept Hongkong in a blockade, courts, a legislative bureau, places of detention, public dining rooms and dormitories, schools, a bureau for the confiscation of goods from merchants who violated the boycott and traded in foreign goods, a bureau for the sale of confiscated goods and a bureau for the issuance of permits to ships entering and leaving the port of Guangzhou (all ships entering the port had to register with the strike committee). Special striker brigades were formed to keep an eye on ships to prevent them from sailing to Hongkong.

For 16 months, Su Zhaozhen skillfully managed this entire complex mechanism. In this strike, he displayed his political abilities and his talent for organization. Despite his duties as head of the strike committee, Su Zhaozhen found time to take part in the work of unions as well. He helped to convene the first all-China congress of Chinese sailors, where he was elected chairman of the executive committee of the sailors' union.

In 1926 Su Zhaozhen took part in the preparations for the Third Congress of the Chinese Trade Union Federation and in the proceedings of this congress. He was elected congress chairman. From that time on, Su Zhaozhen was the recognized leader of the Chinese proletariat. The same year, he became a member of the Guangdong Provincial CCP Committee.

In 1927 Su Zhaozhen worked with Profintern leaders to convene a Pacific trade union conference. At the conference, he advocated unity and concerted action by workers in the Pacific countries, appealed for a broader liberation movement by the oppressed people of the Orient as one of the most important facets of the world proletarian revolution and condemned the leaders of reformist trade unions and the heads of the Amsterdam Trade Union Internationale for betraying the workers' interests. At this conference, Su Zhaozhen was elected chairman of the Pacific Secretariat of Trade Unions, which then had its headquarters in Shanghai.

Later, in his capacity as chairman of the Pacific Secretariat of Trade Unions, Su Zhaozhen warned the workers of the Asian countries against the attempts of Albert Thomas from the International Labor Bureau to undermine the increasing influence of the Pacific Secretariat by convening an Asian workers' conference in India. He said that the leader of the Japanese labor federation, Bunji Suzuki, an agent of Baron Tanaka, had treacherously supported this attempt to break up the Pacific trade unions and isolate the Oriental workers from their class brothers in other countries. He called for energetic struggle against these treacherous attempts.[9]

At the Fifth CCP Congress in 1927, Su Zhaozhen was elected a member of the Central Committee, and then an alternate member of the CCP Central Committee Politburo. In the spring of the same year, he represented the CCP in the Wuhan Government, where he took the office of minister of labor. This was the first time in China's history that a common worker had become a minister. This promotion reflected the power of the CCP-led worker and peasant movement of that time. Although the Wuhan Government soon betrayed the revolutionary cause, Su Zhaozhen continued to fight for the interests of the working class. There were two communist ministers in the Wuhan Government: the worker Su Zhaozhen and the intellectual Tan Pingshan. At the most crucial moment, just before the communists withdrew from the government, Tan Pingshan displayed a tendency to capitulate and the symptoms of cowardice (he was expelled from the party soon afterward), while Su Zhaozhen was planning to submit a labor bill, drawn up under his direct supervision, to the government for discussion in order to expose the Wuhan Government leaders as renegades to the broad masses of workers and laborers in China. He resolutely supported the Comintern's opinion that the communists should openly withdraw from the Wuhan Government in connection with the plans of its leaders to betray the revolution. When he was leaving the government, Su Zhaozhen ordered that 100,000 yuan in cash in the Ministry of Labor's treasury be distributed among the unemployed.

After he left the government, Su Zhaozhen was sent by the CCP leadership to Jiujiang to prepare for the Nanchang armed rebellion. Soon afterward, however, he was recalled to Wuhan to attend a special CCP Central Committee convention on 7 August 1927. The convention criticized the errors of the CCP leadership headed by Chen Duxiu and dismissed Chen Duxiu and his followers from leadership positions. A new policy line was adopted for resolute agrarian revolution and the organization of armed repulsion of reaction. Su Zhaozhen was elected a member of the CCP Central Committee Politburo at this convention.

According to one prominent CCP activist, Deng Zhongxia, "the party leaders then believed that workers were not intellectually prepared for responsible work on the central level." This is why Su Zhaozhen's services were not enlisted for party administrative work. The situation changed after the special convention of the CCP Central Committee on 7 August 1927. Despite the fact that Su Zhaozhen had never even completed elementary school, he became a journalist. His articles were read with great interest. He drafted the resolution on the labor movement that was adopted at the special conference on 7 August.[10]

After the failure of the revolution in 1927, Su Zhaozhen was ordered by the party leadership to continue illegal work in Wuhan. He worked toward the consolidation and Bolshevization of the party and resolutely fought against all kinds of opportunism within party ranks. The agents of internal and external reaction hunted for Su Zhaozhen and there was a sizeable bounty on his head. But the many workers who knew where he was did not betray their leader, even under torture.

While he was in Wuhan, Su Zhaozhen took part in the discussion and compilation of the plans for the revolutionary armed uprising in Guangzhou. He was not able to go to Guangzhou to take part in the uprising, however, which began on 11 December 1927. During the Guangzhou rebellion, a Chinese soviet government was proclaimed and Su Zhaozhen was elected chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, even though he was not present, because his name was the most popular among the Chinese workers and the broad laboring masses.

In February 1928 Su Zhaozhen held an extended meeting of the executive committee of the Chinese Trade Union Federation (illegally) to discuss new forms of union activity under changed circumstances. The same month, he was sent by the party leadership to Moscow to represent the CCP in the Comintern and to attend the Fourth Profintern Congress. Immediately upon his arrival in Moscow in March 1928, Su Zhaozhen requested the Comintern leadership for assistance in the political and organizational preparations for a special CCP congress in the near future. At the Fourth Profintern Congress in April 1928, Su Zhaozhen was elected a member of the congress presidium, and then a member of the Profintern Executive Committee.

While he was in Moscow, Su Zhaozhen took an active part in the preparations for the Sixth CCP Congress, which was held in Moscow in June-July 1928. At the congress, he welcomed participants on behalf of the Chinese Trade Union Federation and joined in the discussion of reports. In his speech on the accountability report of the CCP Central Committee, he criticized the congress participants who were trying to lay the blame for opportunism within the CCP on the representative of the Comintern Executive Committee in China. He said this was absolutely incorrect because the party leadership itself was guilty of opportunism and had committed several major opportunistic errors, particularly during the Wuhan period. He criticized the CCP leadership for not trusting the working class, not telling it the truth and not working with this class enough. Propaganda operations among the workers, he went on, had been quite poorly organized. Articles published in worker newspapers were mostly incomprehensible to the workers, and this was why the newspaper of the Shanghai General Trade Union Council was not read by workers.

Su Zhaozhen also criticized the party's incorrect work in trade unions, stating that communist factions in the trade unions existed only formally, since there was no difference between party and union administrative bodies, the officials were the same, there was not a single non-communist in the union administrative bodies, and so forth.

In his speech at the congress, Su Zhaozhen said that there was a tendency in the party to give preference to work in rural areas. "The central party motto," he said, "should be to seize and conquer the masses and to conduct work in the cities and trade unions."11

At the sixth party congress, Su Zhaozhen was again elected a member of the Central Committee and of the Central Committee Politburo. After the Sixth CCP Congress had ended, Su Zhaozhen represented the CCP at the Sixth Comintern Congress, at which time he was elected a member of the Comintern Executive Committee. His election to the administrative organs of the Comintern and Profintern attested to his recognition as an energetic proletarian fighter on the international level.

Su Zhaozhen was a sincere friend of the Soviet Union. He counseled people to study the experience of the Soviet Union, learn from it and follow its example. While he was in the Soviet Union, Su Zhaozhen appeared several times before the laboring public of Moscow and Leningrad. He was greeted everywhere with the greatest enthusiasm. According to witnesses, Su Zhaozhen, who was by nature a quiet and calm man, underwent a complete metamorphosis when he appeared in public, speaking with genuine revolutionary zeal. He spoke in Chinese, but even without a translation into Russian it was understandable that Su Zhaozhen had been "able to inspire his own Chinese comrades--the workers in Guangzhou and other places where he worked and fought."[12]

His uninterrupted difficult and intense work in responsible positions on behalf of the workers' cause, on behalf of the revolution, his habit of working too hard and, sometimes, of eating too little, undermined Su Zhaozhen's health. Physicians who saw him during his stay in the Soviet Union prescribed a long rest and treatment in a Crimean sanatorium. After the rest and treatment in the Crimea, he went to China in January 1929. Soon after his arrival in Shanghai, Su Zhaozhen fell gravely ill and in February 1929 he died. Before his death, he told all of those who were present to call on his comrades to "use every ounce of strength to win a victory."[13]

The sad news of Su Zhaozhen's untimely death shocked the entire Chinese working class and aroused the sympathies of workers throughout the world. The Chinese and international communist movement had lost a talented leader and fighter for the worker cause.

The Soviet people were deeply saddened by the news that Su Zhaozhen, the sincere friend of the Soviet Union, had died. The grief of the Soviet people was masterfully expressed in a letter by sculptor Grigoriy Kozlov. On 9 March 1929 he wrote: "I must express my deep sorrow at Comrade Su Zhaozhen's untimely death to the Chinese section and the entire Comintern. When I attended the Sixth Comintern Congress in my capacity as a sculptor and simultaneously observed the congress at work, I was amazed by the wholehearted devotion to the Chinese and world revolution expressed by the Chinese comrades in their speeches. This makes the loss of such revolutionary fighters as Comrade Su Zhaozhen all the more painful. It is a pity that the illegal status of all of the Chinese comrades made it impossible for me to make rough sculptures of at least a few of them. Now it is particularly regretful that I did not have the opportunity to sculpt a likeness of Comrade Su Zhaozhen, as well as the delegate from the Japan Communist Party whose life was recently taken by the hirelings of the Japanese bourgeoisie. The memory of these revolutionaries should live on, both in hearts of millions of workers and peasants and in works of art. Long live the memory of Comrade Su Zhaozhen and others like him."

The French communist organ DRAPEAU ROUGE printed the following eulogy to Su Zhaozhen: "Looking back at the work performed by Comrade Su Zhaozhen, we can see that he was not only a leader of the Chinese proletariat, but also of the Chinese Communist Party and the world communist revolution.

The death of Comrade Su Zhaozhen is not only an immeasurable loss for the Chinese proletariat and party, but also a loss for the world revolution."[14]

After Su Zhaozhen's death, his wife, son and daughter remained in China. To avoid being suppressed by the Chinese reactionary authorities, they emigrated illegally to the Soviet Union. Su Zhaozhen's children received a higher education in the Soviet Union and returned to China in the 1940's. They were persecuted during Mao Zedong's notorious "Cultural Revolution."

FOOTNOTES

1. Lin Weilin was the first chairman of the Chinese Trade Union Federation. He died in 1927.

2. Chen Bingshen soon betrayed the interests of the workers and was driven out of the Chinese sailors' union.

3. Quoted by Deng Zhongxia, "A Short Biography of Su Zhaozhen," in the book "Su Chzhaochzhen'--vozhd' kitayskikh rabochikh" [Su Zhaozhen--Leader of the Chinese Workers], Moscow, 1929, p 13.

4. Deng Zhongxia, Op. cit., p 14.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., p 17.

8. Ibid., p 42.

9. Ibid., pp 42-43.

10. Ibid., pp 29, 36.

11. "Transcript of the Proceedings of the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party," bk 3, Moscow, 1930, pp 17-18.

12. Deng Zhongxia, Op. cit., p 55.

13. DRAPEAU ROUGE, 13 March 1929.

14. Ibid.

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FIRST SINOLOGICAL CENTER IN THE FAR EAST AND ITS GRADUATES IN THE TWENTIES

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1979 pp 143-152

[Article by M. I. Sladkovskiy, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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PREDECESSORS AND CONTEMPORARIES OF QU QIUBO'S LINGUISTIC WORKS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1979 pp 153-157

[Article by M. V. Sofronov, doctor of philological sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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QU QIUBO AND THE CHINESE WRITTEN ALPHABET

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1979 pp 158-164

[Article by A. G. Shprintsin]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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OUTSTANDING INTERNATIONALIST REVOLUTIONARY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1979 pp 165-167

[Review by V. A. Arkhipov of the book "Kho Shi min" (Ho Chi Minh) by Yevgeniy Kobelev, Moscow, Molodaya gvardiya, 1979, 366 pages, illustrated]

[Text] The personality of outstanding internationalist revolutionary, founder of the independent socialist Vietnam, Comrade Ho Chi Minh, has naturally always intrigued Soviet researchers and journalists. His political career is the subject of this book by Y. Kobelev--a journalist and expert on international affairs who specializes in elucidating current events in Indochina. The author has set himself a difficult but rewarding task: To trace the path followed in life by Comrade Ho Chi Minh, discuss the basic stages in his ideological and political evolution as a proletarian internationalist revolutionary and to describe Ho Chi Minh's activities as the first president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

The biography of Ho Chi Minh, just as that of any professional revolutionary, is complex and noble. The son of a Vietnamese patriot and intellectual, he quite early became fully aware of the inferior status of his country as an overseas colony of France. Ho Chi Minh's youth coincided with the period defined by V. I. Lenin as the "beginning of Asia's awakening."[1] At the beginning of the century, under the influence of the Russian revolution of 1905, many people in the Orient, including the Vietnamese, began to stir. In Vietnam, however, the scope of the patriotic struggle was initially limited by the illusions of some national patriotic leaders, particularly the idea that Vietnam's sociopolitical problems could be solved with the aid of the French colonizers or the idea that it would be necessary to unite with capitalist Japan as a state of the "yellow" race in the struggle against the "white" oppressors from the West. This naturally chained the Vietnamese liberation movement with political and ideological "fetters," introduced confusion into patriotic ranks and aroused dissatisfaction in the movement's participants. In 1911 Ho Chi Minh left his homeland in an attempt to determine and plan ways of saving it from the oppression of colonizers.

His long years of wondering across countries and continents and his participation in the democratic movement, and later the labor movement, in France, "compounded" by the beneficial influence of the ideals of Great October, marked an important turning point in the development of the Vietnamese patriot's ideological and political views. At the end of 1918, an important change occurred in his life: He became the first Vietnamese member of the Socialist Party of France. This event marked the beginning of Ho Chi Minh's professional revolutionary activity (p 43).

In 1919 and 1920, after the Third Communist Internationale had been founded on the initiative of V. I. Lenin, a struggle was launched by the genuine revolutionary forces in the labor movement of the capitalist countries against the reformist leaders with social-democratic leanings for the creation of parties of a new type, which would be expected to lead the broad working masses and take their place at the head of the revolutionary movement. At that time, Ho Chi Minh was working vigorously in the left wing of the socialist party, on the basis of which the French Communist Party was formed at the end of 1920. By joining the FCP, he became the first Vietnamese communist. His conscious choice of the Comintern and Leninism was made in the summer of 1920, after he had read his first work by V. I. Lenin--theses on the national and colonial questions. Lenin's ideas about the need for close concerted effort by the revolutionary movements of mother countries and colonies and about the peculiarities of the liberation movement in the colonial and dependent countries made an indelible impression on the Vietnamese revolutionary, as the author of this book conclusively demonstrates. It was in Leninism and in the truly revolutionary, multileveled and universal nature of Lenin's teachings, the basic principles of which were equally applicable to developed capitalist countries and to backward dependent countries in the Orient, that Nguyen Ai Quok (Nguyen Patriot--this was Ho Chi Minh's party pseudonym at that time) found a guide for action. Many years later, when he was already the president of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh recalled: "In these theses I encountered political terms which were extremely difficult for me to understand. After reading and rereading them many times, however, I grasped their meaning. How this excited, enraged, enlightened and amazed me!" (p 61).

When he began his activity as a patriot fighting for the liberation of his native land from the oppression of colonizers, Ho Chi Minh made a conscious choice in favor of Lenin's teachings, in favor of the ideals of socialism and communism. Just as many other progressive figures in the liberation movement in Vietnam and in the Orient in general, he arrived at Marxism-Leninism through vigorous revolutionary activity under the national democratic slogans of the anti-imperialist and anticolonial struggle. Later, Ho Chi Minh said: "It was my patriotism, and not communism, that first attracted me to Lenin and the Communist Internationale. It was only gradually, during the course of subsequent struggle, that I realized that only socialism, only communism, could liberate the oppressed people and the workers of the entire world from slavery. I realized that there was an indissoluble connection between patriotism and proletarian internationalism" (p 69). This admission is the best possible proof of the accuracy of V. I. Lenin's scientific prediction that "in future decisive battles of the world revolutionary movement, the majority of the earth's population, after aiming first at national liberation, will turn against capitalism and imperialism."[2]

The 20's and 30's of Ho Chi Minh's life were filled to the maximum with revolutionary and party work. During this period, he worked vigorously within the ranks of the FCP and was later sent by the party to Moscow, where he worked in the eastern division of the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI) and attended the Communist University of Workers of the East. In 1924 Ho Chi Minh represented Indochina at the Fifth World Comintern Congress in Moscow, and spent the next 3 years in South China as a represantative of the eastern division of the ECCI, working with revolutionary emigrants from Vietnam and other Asian countries. His work in the Comintern and his contacts with outstanding figures in the international labor movement indisputably taught Ho Chi Minh a great deal about revolutionary struggle.

At that time, the ECCI was directing the attention of Indochinese communists to the urgent need to create a revolutionary proletarian party--a mass communist party. On 3-5 February 1930, a secret unifying conference of Vietnamese communists took place in Hong Kong under the chairmanship of Ho Chi Minh. It was here that the Vietnam Communist Party was founded. Conference participants approved the brief thesis of the party program and its charter, drawn up by Ho Chi Minh. The adoption of these documents was of historic significance, as they defined the basic aim of the Vietnamese revolution. The thesis stated that Vietnam, as a colony and a semifeudal state in terms of its socioeconomic structure, was standing on the threshold of a bourgeois democratic revolution of a new type. This revolution, the thesis noted, should be carried out under the guidance of the working class and should become a way station on the way to socialist revolution. Its objective would be the overthrow of colonial and feudal authority, the achievement of national independence, the transfer of land to the peasants, the creation of a worker, peasant and soldier government, the endownment of the people with democratic freedom and so forth. Documents adopted at the conference stressed that the VCP was the vanguard of the Vietnamese working class, leading the broad working masses. The party announced its intention to adhere to the line of uniting the Vietnamese people with all oppressed people in the world and maintaining close contacts with the international working class. The creation of the VCP was a turning point in Vietnam's history. The party's heroic actions (in October 1930 it was renamed the Communist Party of Indochina) in leading popular demonstrations against colonial oppression and social inequality gave Ho Chi Minh grounds for later saying that, "from the moment of its birth, the Communist Party of Indochina proved on the whole to be a party of a new type, a Leninist party, a militant party of the young Vietnamese proletariat, capable of uniting the broad masses of the peasantry and working population under its banner" (p 146).

From 1934 through 1938, Ho Chi Minh was in Moscow, where he attended the International Leninist School and worked in the Scientific Research Institute of National and Colonial Problems. In 1935 Ho Chi Minh attended the Seventh World Conference of the Comintern, at which time the decision of the ECCI to admit the Communist Party of Indochina to the Comintern was approved. For Ho Chi Minh, these were years of persistent personal study and work with young Vietnamese revolutionaries, who learned the fundamentals of revolutionary science under his guidance. Ho Chi Minh always spoke with great warmth of the years he spent in the Soviet Union. In 1938 Ho Chi Minh went to China, where he took part in the Chinese people's national liberation struggle.

At the beginning of 1941, Ho Chi Minh returned to his homeland illegally after 30 years of emigration and began to lead the growing national liberation movement of the Vietnamese people. His revolutionary conviction that his cause was right, his great prestige among Vietnamese communists and his inexhaustible personal energy helped Ho Chi Minh to energize the Communist Party of Indochina. As early as May 1941, a decision was made on his initiative to create the Vietnam League of Independence (Vietminh), which marked the beginning of the strategy of a broad national front in the struggle for a free Vietnam, and preparations were made for a nationwide armed uprising to overthrow the French colonial authorities. Under the most difficult conditions, Ho Chi Minh personally supervised the direct preparations for the nationwide armed uprising. On 16 August 1945, a congress of people's representatives in Tanchao, the work of which was overseeing by Ho Chi Minh, adopted the decision to begin the armed uprising. Half a month later, on 2 September 1945, it was Ho Chi Minh who recited the Declaration of Independence on behalf of the Provisional Government of the DRV, announcing the birth of the first state of workers and peasants in Southeast Asia.

The young independent state was being subjected to pressure from all sides at that time. Chiang Kai-shek's forces led an army of 200,000 into North Vietnam in an attempt to carry out the old great-power plans of Han hegemonists. The imperialist power intended to commit aggressive acts against Vietnam. Under these conditions, the government of the DRV, headed by Ho Chi Minh, required exceptional endurance. It was not until all means of political struggle had been exhausted, winning the nation the peaceful respite of almost a year and a half that it so needed, that President Ho Chi Minh called upon his countrymen to fight a war of resistance against the French colonizers, who were trying by false alarms to regain their lost control over Vietnam. In the war of resistance, the Vietnamese people defeated the French colonizers and defended their independence.

The new set of historical circumstances faced the Vietnamese communists with new tasks. The third congress of Vietnamese communists in 1960 defined the two strategic objectives of the Vietnamese revolution in its new stage: the construction of socialism in the North and the liberation of the South from the imperialists and the peaceful unification of the homeland. A prominent role in the attainment of these objectives was played by Ho Chi Minh, president of the DRV and chairman of the party of Vietnamese communists. Comrade Ho Chi Minh also played an outstanding role in organizing the resistance of American imperialist aggression against the DRV.

As a political spokesman, the author notes, Ho Chi Minh always remained loyal to the principles of proletarian internationalism, demonstrating with all of his revolutionary, party and government activity the indissoluble dialectical interconnection between national and international factors (p 349). As the president of his nation and the leader of his party, Ho Chi Minh contributed tremendously to the development of relations of fraternal cooperation between Vietnam and the socialist countries, the international communist movement and the national liberation forces of the present day. He always saw the Soviet Union as a friend and comrade-in-arms of fighting Vietnam and justifiably regarded it as a reliable basis of support for the Vietnamese people in their struggle for freedom and independence. On 28 October 1967, in a PRAVDA article entitled "Great October Showed People the Road to Liberation," Ho Chi Minh wrote: "By traveling the road pointed out by the great Lenin, the road of the October Revolution, the Vietnamese people have won tremendous victories. It is for this reason that they have such deep feelings of gratitude and respect for the glorious October Revolution, the great Lenin and the Soviet people."

"The great revolutionary leaders," said General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev, "laid the foundations of our states, decisively promoted their development and charted our course--Vladimir Il'ich Lenin in Soviet Russia and Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam. We can proudly say that we are faithfully following this course."[3]

An outstanding internationalist revolutionary and activist in the international communist and national liberation movement, a staunch Marxist-Leninist, a consistent fighter for peace and socialism and a true friend of the Soviet people--this is how the Soviet people describe Ho Chi Minh, this is how he is depicted in books.

Kobelev's book, which is filled with profound respect for Ho Chi Minh and the entire Vietnamese population, and which has been written with scientific precision and is simultaneously vivid and entertaining, will indisputably arouse great interest in the Soviet reading public.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 4, p 381.

2. Ibid., vol 44, p 38.

3. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom" [Following the Leninist Course], vol 7, Moscow, 1979, p 503.

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'CULTURAL REVOLUTION': EYE-WITNESS ACCOUNT

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1979 pp 167-169

[Review by O. V. Tolstykh of the book "Chetyre goda v khaose. O tak nazyvayemoy 'kul'turnoy revolyutsii' v Sin'tzyane" (Four Years of Chaos. The So-Called "Cultural Revolution" in Xinjiang) by A. Bazil'bayev, Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan, 1978, 144 pages]

[Text] This book by A. Bazil'bayev is a description of the so-called "Cultural Revolution" in the Xinjiang-Uigur Autonomous Region of China (XUAR). It is based on abundant factual material and the personal observations of the author, a native of Xinjiang and a witness of the events he describes. In his book, A. Bazil'bayev presents a detailed analysis of the peculiarities of this campaign, which became a vivid sign of great-Han chauvinism in the XUAR.

The first chapter of the book describes the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in Xinjiang. The author notes that this campaign was somewhat "delayed" in the XUAR in comparison to China's central provinces. It was conducted, one could say, on the basis of accumulated "experience" and according to plans drawn up in advance. The first blow was directed against the intelligentsia and progressive workers, which was in line with the Maoist precept: "Hit the head and the rest will fall apart by itself." The author describes the activities of a so-called "task force," consisting mainly of Han students from Xinjiang University in Urumqi. It was this force that initiated the movement to expose "class enemies" and the struggle against "black lines" and "poisonous weeds." The "poisonous weeds" included, for example, the best examples of folk art (particularly the crowning glory of Uigur folk music, the "12 Mukams") and works by famous Uigur novelists and poets (including the verses of popular folk poet L. Mutallip).

The formation of Red Guard detachments in Xinjiang, the author notes, took place later than in China's central regions, and exclusively under the leadership of Han Red Guards. Bazil'bayev stresses that the 400 Red Guards who came to Xinjiang from Beijing at the beginning of September 1966 were ordered to "fire on headquarters"--that is, on the XUAR Party Committee.

The rude behavior of the Beijing "envoys" aroused pointed dissatisfaction in the Xinjiang population (p 35).

In the second chapter, Bazil'bayev presents a detailed examination of the procedure and results of the campaign to "establish revolutionary ties" in Xinjiang, which was launched at Zhou Enlai's order. During the course of this campaign, Red Guards traveled throughout the nation, meeting with CCP leaders and "exchanging experience" in "firing on headquarters." As a member of one of these delegations, Bazil'bayev passed through many Chinese cities. On the basis of his own impressions, he paints a depressing picture of the ruins, difficulties and poverty in which the population of this enormous nation lived. The author writes that during this entire long journey, he encounter only dejected people who had lost all hope and all faith in their future (p 49).

But the author never saw anything to equal what the Maoists were doing in the national regions. In Xinjiang he saw a huge quantity of trains carrying Chinese immigrants to "strengthen the borders." On their way back, these trains carried away grain, meat and dairy products, wool, leather, fruit and other agricultural products, as well as industrial raw materials: petroleum, precious and nonferrous metals, wood and so forth (p 51). The author notes that the campaign to "establish revolutionary ties" brought the Xinjiang economy to the verge of chaos. Since transportation was controlled by the Red Guards, shipments of raw material were intermittent and factories and plants ceased operations.

During the "Cultural Revolution" more and more new "leftist groups" came into being and fought one another uncompromisingly for influence. In the third chapter, the author presents a thorough analysis of the forces participating in the "Cultural Revolution" in the XUAR. The center of the Red Guard movement was Xinjiang University, and its students headed the first "mass organizations" in Xinjiang. This is how the "First Headquarters of Xinjiang Red Guards" ("First Red Headquarters") and "Second Rebel Headquarters of Xinjiang Red Guards" ("Second Red Headquarters") were organized. Fierce competition broke out between these organizations. At first it took the form of conflicts between individual groups of Red Guards. In time, these "headquarters" sowed the seeds of dissent and disagreement among the workers and peasants who were under the control of the opposing headquarters."

Bazil'bayev stresses that all of these organizations were founded by Han Red Guards. Only one group--the "Three Red Banners"--was organized by non-Hans, but it was immediately labeled the "local nationalist group" (p 77). Bazil'bayev notes that members of the "Three Red Banners" group made an energetic attempt to expose great-Han chauvinism. They used concrete examples to illustrate that the people of Xinjiang would ultimately suffer the most from the "Cultural Revolution." They called upon the youth of the non-Han ethnic groups in Xinjiang to withdraw from the "Red Headquarters" organizations. It was this group's data that proved that 90 percent of the non-Han cadres, who were already a rarity in the system of public administration, were categorized as "scum" and "black gang members" during this campaign (p 82).

By the end of 1966 the conflicts between groups of Red Guards in Xinjiang had become particularly fierce. The "ideological" conflicts between the two "Red Headquarters" began to evolve into bloody battles. The author described this in the chapter entitled "The 'January Revolution' and the Eruption of Armed Struggle." The author stresses that even the intervention of units of the Xinjiang Military District and production and construction corps could not stabilize the situation in Xinjiang, where a broad-scale campaign had already been launched in February 1967 for the "seizure of power" in enterprise and establishment party committees. At this time, the Red Guards made extensive use of guns in their personal squabbles.

Bazil'bayev describes the bloody events in the medical institutes at the end of July 1967. With the aid of mortar, representatives of the "First Red Headquarters" completely destroyed one of its buildings, killing many people (p 107). The author describes how the Red Guards indulged in unbridled robbery and vandalism in these days. More than 300 motor vehicles, requisitioned for the "needs of the Cultural Revolution," accumulated at Xinjiang University. Not to be outdone, detachments of the "Second Red Headquarters" once seized an entire flock of sheep numbering a thousand head (pp 109-110).

Under these conditions of chaos and mass confusion, production came to a complete halt. Life became unbearably difficult for the population. The author stresses that these conditions "eroded the foundations of the cult of Mao Zedong"; the non-Han people of Xinjiang resisted great-Han chauvinist policy and ideology with renewed vigor (p 110).

The author concludes his book with a chapter entitled "The Exposure of Great-Han Chauvinism." Bazil'bayev presents numerous examples to illustrate the effects of Maoist chauvinist polices on the native inhabitants of Xinjiang. He concludes that all of the political campaigns which swept through Xinjiang since the first days of the PRC's existence, despite their dissimilar titles, essentially had one thing in common: They were all ultimately to the detriment of the non-Han ethnic groups. The author directs the reader's attention to several distinctive features of these campaigns. A tremendous number of Xinjiang cadres were repressed during the struggle against "rightist leanings" of 1957 and 1958. These included a few Hans, but they were soon vindicated and set free, while tens of thousands of non-Han workers never lost the label of "local nationalists."

Bazil'bayev proves that the Maoists have always instilled the younger generation of Hans in the XUAR with the spirit of great-Han chauvinism. This is why, as the author notes, the activities of the "Three Red Banners" group to expose great-Han chauvinism were of great significance during the period of "Cultural Revolution," and this struggle won the respect and support of the native population of Xinjiang. The members of this group propagandized V. I. Lenin's works on the national question and, on the basis of these works, wrote many articles exposing the hypocrisy of the Maoists in national policy. The author stresses that this group was not alone. By the end of 1967 it was already supported by more than 60 "mass organizations" (p 124).

The author devotes a great deal of attention to the creation of the XUAR "revolutionary committee." He quite justifiably believes that the "revolutionary committee" was created without the knowledge of the native population of the autonomous region. The chairman of the Beijing-manufactured "revolutionary committee" of the XUAR was Long Shujin, who was completely unknown to the population. After the members of the "revolutionary committee" arrived in Xinjiang, the campaign of mass repression acquired unprecedented fury. Once again, tens of thousands of completely innocent people were incarcerated in jails and corrective labor camps.

In this book, Bazil'bayev describes the "Cultural Revolution" in Xinjiang as the most vivid manifestation of great-Han chauvinism.

This book will indisputably help the reader to gain a fuller and more accurate understanding of the inferior status of non-Han ethnic groups in the Xinjiang-Uigur Autonomous Region and of the true essence of the great-power national policy of the Maoists, both yesterday and today.

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PROBLEMS OF JAPANESE MONARCHY: HISTORY AND PROSPECTS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1979 pp 169-172

[Review by V. M. Gaydar of the book "A Study of the Monarchic Order" by F. Moriya, Tokyo, Aoki Shoten, 1979, 367 pages]

[Text] For more than a thousand years, from the time when the production relations of feudalism were established to the present day, the Japanese state structure has been monarchic. Naturally, over this long period of time, the actual meaning of the term "monarchy" has changed repeatedly in Japan under the influence of the irreversible processes of social development in the nation and the complex and sometimes quite dramatic conflicts that are so abundant in Japanese political history. Despite all the changes in the meaning of this term, however, Japan has always been a monarchy, and the long existence of this order and its variety of political roles in different periods of the nation's historical development have made the Japanese monarchy the object of unremitting attention for Japanese and foreign historians, sociologists and philosophers, who have attempted to determine the actual significance of the monarchic order in the nation's past and its possible effect on Japan's future.

A monograph by one of Japan's oldest Marxist scholars, attorney and economist Fumio Moriya, is probably one of the most substantial works on this subject.[1] As the author writes in his concluding remarks, "the monarchic order has intrigued me for half a century. This book actually represents the result of my 50 years of research" (p 361).

Building his narrative on the methodological basis worked out by K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin, and making extensive use of their works, the author attempts a detailed analysis of the Japanese monarchic order as a political and social phenomenon, examines its history, displaying particular interest in periods of absolute monarchic rule in the nation, compares the Japanese monarchic order with forms of monarchy in other countries and explains the monarchy's attitude toward the landowning, bourgeois, proletarian and peasant classes. A considerable portion of the book is devoted to proof of the groundlessness of the view held by part of the Japanese population and scientific community regarding the "purely symbolic" nature of the Japanese monarchy today, which allegedly does not influence the nation's political development in any way.

The book is divided into three sections. In the first section, entitled "The Significance of Absolute Monarchy and Its Evolution," the author analyzes the interrelationship between absolutism as one form of monarchic order and the capitalist method of production. This is regarded as one of the most pressing problems of the present day by the Japanese scientific community. On the one hand, the incompatibility of absolutism, as a product of the feudal socioeconomic structure, and capitalist production relations seems self-evident to many. This is also the basis for the opinion that absolutism in Japan is past history and that the fear of the possible rebirth of absolutism in the nation is unfounded.

On the other hand, it was not so long ago, less than four decades, and in Japan that despotic monarchy, as a form of political organization of society, and capitalism in its most consumate monopolistic stage, as a socioeconomic basis of the state, not only coexisted, but even collaborated actively, essentially making up a single sociopolitical complex lying at the basis of the totalitarian state's existence. Several objective researchers have concluded from this that the highest level of capitalist development does not in itself exclude the possibility of the revival of absolutism in Japan under certain political circumstances.

The author of the book refutes the view that absolutism and monopolistic capitalism are incompatible as phenomena of different historical eras. Comparing the relationship between absolutism and capitalism in various countries, he concludes that the contradictions between capitalism and absolutism, which were once reflected in the overthrow of several absolutist regimes by the bourgeoisie, were not the rule. This is illustrated by the example of such countries as Germany and Russia in the 19th century. In these countries the new-born industrial capitalism was too weak to develop successfully on its own, and the absolutist regimes here necessitated the creation of strong industry, meeting the requirements of the age. In this way, industrial capitalism in Germany and Russia acquired a powerful patron in the absolute monarchy, and the states themselves evolved from feudal entities into bourgeois-landowning states. As the author points out, the development of relations between the absolute monarchy and industrial capitalism in Japan in the last decades of the 19th century took essentially the same course.

The birth and development of monopolistic capitalism in Japan led to changes in the political life of the country--a change in the relative proportions accounted for by the landowning and bourgeois classes in favor of the latter, but this did not change the relationship of "mutually beneficial partnership" between capitalism and the absolute monarchy. Monopolistic capitalism, on one side, and the complex of the absolute monarchy, the military establishment and the traditional source of personnel for them--the landowning class, on the other side, organically aided one another in the attainment of their common political and economic goals inside and outside the nation. For monopolistic capital, the absolute monarchy was a convenient tool for stifling the labor and socialist movement. Monopolistic capital's need for larger sales markets and new sources of raw materials was totally consistent with the increasing foreign policy ambitions of the absolute monarchic regime and with the aggressive aims of the military establishment. This mutual understanding brought about the merger of the political system of absolute monarchy with the economic system of monopolistic capital, representing the Japanese variety of the more general global process by which state-monopolistic capitalism was taking shape.

The second part of the book is entitled "Theoretical Problems of the Absolute Monarchy." Here the author focuses his attention on the relations between absolutism of the imperialist era and fascism and discusses the tendency toward the degeneration of the absolute monarchy into a monarchic-fascistic regime under the conditions of its functioning as a superstructure for the production relations of monopolistic capitalism.

Here Moriya lays special emphasis on the fact that the absolute monarchy in the imperialist era represented a ready-made mechanism for the institution of a fascist dictatorship. In the Italian constitutional monarchy and the Weimar Republic, fascism could not establish its own regime until it had destroyed the old state system, and the fascist coups in these countries, which were upper-echelon social changes in content, appeared to be "revolution from the bottom" in form. Ruling classes in Japan, on the other hand, essentially did not have to reorganize the state system when the need for a fascist dictatorship arose in this country. The establishment of a terroristic dictatorship of monopolistic capital and landowners in Japan was a top-level coup in form and in content.

The absolute monarchic regime, which is antidemocratic by its very nature, and its role as the mechanism of the fascist dictatorship in the Japan of the late 1930's and early 1940's have given advocates of democracy in the nation reason to thoroughly analyze the material, primarily economic, as well as social and ideological factors which constitute the basis or foundation of the monarchic order. Whereas the material basis for the establishment and initial functioning of the absolute monarchy in Japan, the author points out, was the ownership of the land by the gentry, while the gentry also represented the monarchic order's main base of social support, the financial capital fostered by the monarchy and the financial cliques, or zaibatsu, later served as this kind of basis along with the landowning class. The ideological basis of the monarchic order consisted of Shinto and other myths, which subsequently took the form of the Tennoi-ist ideology, and nationalism, camouflaged by the slogan of patriotism and the preaching of Japan's "special mission" in the world. The ideology of Tennoi-ism stressed the "sacred" nature of the ruling dynasty as the alleged direct descendants of the supreme goddess of the Shinto Pantheon, Amaterasu, and as the only country in the world governed by "gods in human form," Japan was therefore proclaimed an instrument of "the gods' will" in any foreign policy action.

According to Moriya, some of the factors making up the absolute monarchy's material, social and ideological basis of support, particularly ownership of the land by the gentry, either do not exist in Japan today or have lost their previous significance. It must be borne in mind, however, as the author warns, that other factors are still present and it would be a serious mistake to ignore them.

The third section of the book is entitled "The Postwar Monarchic Order." In this section, the author discusses the general and particular features of the present and pre-war forms of the Japanese monarchy. Many people in Japan today do not believe that these two phenomena have anything in common, with the exception of the very existence of the monarchy as a form of state structure before and after the war. It is true that whereas the pre-war Japanese monarchy represented the highest instance of state power, limiting and controlling all of the activities of parliament and the cabinet of ministers, the present constitution unequivocally states that the "emperor...has no powers connected with the exercise of government authority."[2] Only a few symbolic functions have been left to the emperor: He appoints the prime minister and the chief justices of the Supreme Court, he convenes parliament and performs some other functions, but only with the approval and by the grace of parliament and the cabinet of ministers. Under these conditions, it would seem difficult to find anything in common between the pre-war monarchy as a tool of the dictatorial regime and the present constitutional monarchy.

After a thorough and comprehensive study of Japanese realities, however, the author arrives at the opposite conclusion. He admits that the status of the monarchic order in Japan changed after 1945, but points that this change was mandatory rather than voluntary for ruling circles, necessitated by the defeat suffered by the monarchic fascist regime in World War II and the intensive struggle of democratic forces within the nation in an atmosphere of stronger democracy throughout the world. The increasingly active democratic movement is quite justifiably regarded by reactionary forces as a phenomenon which is undermining their own influence. Consequently, as long as these forces exist, there will be the possibility that attempts will be made at restoring the pre-war type of absolute monarchy as a mechanism which has already been tested in the role of an irreconcilable enemy of the democratic movement.

Of the forces making up the support basis of the pre-war monarchy, financial capital, which constitutes the basis of present-day Japanese state-monopolistic capitalism, has not only retained its power, but has even increased substantially. There are no more gentry land holdings, but the author conclusively proves that present-day large-scale private holdings, including real estate with rental units, are similar in essence to gentry holdings and, in this sense, will support the monarchy along with financial capital and strive for its reinforcement. In this nation with its relatively young democratic traditions, the author warns, there are still large segments of the population with a positive attitude toward the monarchic order, even in the form of absolute monarchy. Some of these people could be deceived by monarchic propaganda, which has recently been noticeably intensified, and serve as the instrument of forces with monarchic leanings.

It should be noted that Moriya's entire book is permeated with serious worries about the launching of a monarchic propaganda campaign in the nation, and the author is not alone in these feelings. The activization of monarchic propaganda, which took on the nature of an extensive ideological campaign in the mid-1960's, is the object of serious concern among Japanese democratic scholars. For example, Yoshishige Kozai, prominent Japanese Marxist philosopher, stresses in his work "Remarks on the 'Yamato Spirit'" that "it is no coincidence that there has been a resurgence of the idea of the 'Japanese spirit' on the model of the 'imperial line' which took the form of monarchic doctrine."[3] Given the current political situation in Japan, the propaganda of the monarchic ideology is nothing other than a method of consolidating the forces leading the irreconcilable struggle against democracy. This is why, Kozai points out, the monarchy's advocates "have turned the appeal for the 'democratization of Japan' into an appeal for the 'Japanization of democracy.'"[4] Koichi Mori, another famous Japanese Marxist philosopher, also wrote about this: "The people are told about the importance of patriotism and respect for the emperor: 'Japanese uniqueness' is crowned by the emperor as a symbol of the nation."[5]

In this political and ideological atmosphere, the publication of Moriya Fumio's book, containing a theoretical interpretation of the role of the monarchic order in contemporary Japanese social life, is quite timely. This book urges Japanese democratic organizations to be on the lookout for reactionary intrigues, to involve the broadest segments of the population in their activity and to explain the goals and objectives of the struggle for a democratic society to the masses.

FOOTNOTES

1. F. Moriya, "Tennosei kenkyu," Tokyo, 1979.

2. See "Sovremennaya Yaponiya" [Modern-Day Japan], Moscow, 1973, p 757.

3. Y. Kozai, "Contemporary Philosophy. Remarks on the 'Yamato Spirit,'" Moscow, 1974, p 127.

4. Ibid.

5. "Marukusushugi tetsugaku," vol 5, Tokyo, 1969, p 22.

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MARXIST STUDY OF THE ESSENCE OF THE STATE

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1979 pp 172-174

[Review by G. D. Spektorov of the book "Kokka to wa nani ka?" (What is the State?) by T. Kinugasa, Tokyo, Sukuramu bunko, 1977, 170 pages]

[Text] In-depth analysis of the theoretical legacy of scientific communism's founders would be impossible without a comprehensive analysis of one of its integral elements--teachings on the state. Under the conditions of increased ideological confrontation between the two opposing social systems, the study of the essence and role of the state at various levels of historical development from a truly Marxist vantage point is acquiring particular significance.

This was the intention of Tetsuo Kinugasa, chairman of the theoretical committee of the socialist society headed by Kaoru Ota. On the basis of extensive factual material, he investigates the history of the class antagonistic society and the principle of the inevitable alternation of socioeconomic structures. Classic works of Marxism-Leninism, primarily F. Engels' "Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State" and V. I. Lenin's "State and Revolution," served as the ideological and theoretical basis for the monograph.

In the introduction, the author says that he was motivated to study the origin and essence of the state by a phenomenon which rocked the entire nation in the late 1950's and the early 1960's: The struggle of workers and the entire democratic camp against the Japanese-American "security treaty" and the strengthening of "self-defense forces."

Proceeding from Marxist-Leninist teachings about socioeconomic structures, T. Kinugasa distinguishes between four types of states in the history of human society--slaveholding, feudal, capitalist and socialist. Analyzing the distinctive features of each structure, the writer stresses that in all of the stages of historic development preceding socialism--from the slaveholding society to capitalism--the state expresses the interest of exploiters and serves as a means of class oppression.

In his discussion of the birth and development of capitalist society, the author concentrates on criticism of the "theories" of sociologists who distort historical facts and hypocritically talk about the "democratism" of the bourgeois order. Exposing the lack of basis for these "theories," the writer notes that although specific human rights are proclaimed in the bourgeois state in accordance with the constitution (freedom of speech and assembly, the freedom to choose a profession, freedom of movement and so forth), under the conditions of capitalism democracy actually represents a political system which disregards the interests of the working masses (pp 71-72, 141).

Refuting the myth regarding the "prosperity" of present-day capitalist society, the author quite definitely stresses that the screen of the "prosperous state" is used to conceal the scrambling of monopolistic circles for maximum profits and that the thesis of "economic prosperity" is actually nothing other than verbal camouflage, which is resorted to by bourgeois ideologists to alleviate the friction of class conflicts in the capitalist nations (p 98).

A large part of the book is devoted to the study of issues pertaining to the theory and practice of socialist revolution and the creation of the new type of state. These issues are analyzed by the writer from the principled vantage point of a Marxist philosopher. Basing his discussion on Lenin's belief that socialist revolution can only be accomplished in close connection with certain objective conditions and subjective factors, the author objects to ultra-leftist slogans calling for the immediate overthrow of bourgeois society, completely ignoring the actual situation (p 150). In connection with this, the writer discusses the experience of the Soviet Union and says that the Bolsheviks, headed by V. I. Lenin, were able to win a victory in 1917 because all of the prerequisites for the seizure of political power by the proletariat were present in Russia by that time, while conflicts between monopolies and the working class, between imperialism and the oppressed nations and between the capitalist countries themselves had become acute on the global scale (pp 152-153).

After carrying out a socialist revolution, Kinugasa goes on, the proletariat must retain power and guard against internal and external counterrevolution. Citing the conclusions of K. Marx and V. I. Lenin, the author stresses that proletarian dictatorship represents a new form of class struggle and that socialism can be constructed merely by going through the period of revolutionary proletarian dictatorship (pp 157-158).

A large part of the work is devoted to the history of the Soviet State, the growth of its power and its increased influence on the world revolutionary process. The author places particular emphasis on the fact that the states making up the worldwide socialist system are not pursuing military confrontation with capitalism, but are striving to become superior to capitalism in areas of peaceful development (p 155).

Setting forth his belief in the peaceful nature of Soviet foreign policy, the writer argues with those of his countrymen who give lip service to the notorious thesis of socialism's "aggressive" nature, substantiating these statements by references to the USSR's supposed "violation" of the neutrality pact of April 1941 and its entry into the war against Japan. He calls this "argument" demagogic propaganda. Kinugasa stresses that the USSR denounced the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact on 9 August 1945 because it was necessary to put an end to the world war and defeat the Japanese militarists, who had allied themselves with German and Italian fascists and had committed aggressive actions against China and several other Asian countries. Criticizing representatives of the bourgeois press who called the Soviet assault on Japanese armed forces a "surprise attack," the author states that the USSR's entry into the war against Japan was not in any sense a surprise, since the Soviet Union had officially informed Japan of its intention to denounce the neutrality pact on 5 April 1945--that is, 4 months prior to the beginning of hostilities.

The author goes on to stress that although Japanese imperialism had concluded a neutrality pact with the USSR, it simultaneously made energetic preparations for war against the Soviet Union. In the hope that a favorable situation for Japan would take shape during the course of the German-Soviet war, ruling circles in the nation planned to initiate hostilities against the USSR and to use armed force to seize part of Soviet territory. The Japanese military establishment regularly conducted provocations in regions bordering on the USSR. For example, between August 1941 and the end of 1944, Japanese naval ships detained 178 Soviet vessels and sank 3. Consequently, Kinugasa concludes, "the neutrality pact was actually violated by Japanese imperialism, and not by the Soviet Union" (pp 113-114). The author also argues that the USSR's entry into the war saved the lives of millions of people in Japan. He recalls that the Japanese militarist clique ordered the population to conduct "decisive battles on the mainland" of the state in the last months of the war in the Pacific. According to the author, the USSR's entry into the war and the subsequent Japanese surrender thwarted the plans of the Japanese militarists--plans which would have inevitably led to incalculable losses and deprivations in densely populated parts of the nation (p 110).

In regard to the territorial claims on the USSR that are now being made by the government and the Liberal Democratic Party, the author remarks that Japan has no legal basis for this, since it accepted the decisions of the Postdam conference after its surrender and signed a peace treaty with the United States in San Francisco, according to which it gave up its right to the Kurile Islands (p 114).

One of the central chapters of the work deals with the widely debated problems of Japanese security. Kinugasa definitely opposes the "self-defense concept" propagandized by the government and the monopolies, as he believes that the implementation of this concept will go against the national interest, since it presupposes the conduct of a policy aimed at broader military cooperation with the United States within the framework of the "security treaty" and the buildup of Japan's military-economic potential (p 101).

The author presents a critical analysis of an idea fostered by the mass media--the belief that the "security treaty" has allegedly "kept Japan out of war." Exposing the falsity and biased nature of this kind of allegation, the writer notes that Japanese territory has repeatedly been used as a beachhead for aggressive actions against neighboring countries. As a direct result of the "security treaty," Japan was one of the participants in the war in Vietnam (p 105). In Kinugasa's opinion, the only reasonable alternative to the "self-defense concept," which endangers Japan's future, is the theory of "unarmed neutrality," advanced by the JSP [Japan Socialist Party] and envisaging a struggle against the remilitarization plans of ruling circles, and for the observance of the Ninth Article of the constitution, proclaiming Japan's refusal to use armed force as a means of settling international conflicts.

As a result of in-depth scientific analysis of the present international situation and the balance of class power within the nation, the author has found irrefutable proof that Japan's security can be safeguarded not through the revival of militarism and the continued reinforcement of the military-political alliance with the United States, but through adherence to a neutral foreign policy line and through the peaceful and democratic development of the Japanese State. This is one of the book's indisputable good points.

Nonetheless, it must be said that some important issues, particularly several connected with the worldwide communist movement, are not discussed with sufficient thoroughness or accuracy in the Japanese scholar's monograph. For example, the assessment of the present status of Soviet-Chinese relations in the concluding chapter of the book is not only extremely brief, but also somewhat distorted. Although he disagrees with those who allege that contradictions between the USSR and PRC "stem from the very nature of socialism," the author nonetheless regards the present situation in relations between the two countries merely as "different interpretations of the period of transition from capitalism to socialism" (p 166). In this case, the writer has lost sight of the main factors lying at the basis of acute Soviet-Chinese ideological disagreements: The CCP leadership's departure from the most important theoretical principles of Marxism-Leninism and the Maoist leaders' turnabout to an anti-Soviet, hegemonistic policy line in the international arena.

On the whole, however, the work is a serious scientific study and a major contribution to research into the state in general and the development of contemporary Japanese society in particular. One of the indisputable merits of the book is its political timeliness. The topical, multifaceted nature of the author's subject matter have aroused the interest of a broad group of readers: The work has gone through three editions since 1973. Although some of the statements the author makes seem debatable, there is no question that Kinugasa energetically propagandizes the Marxist-Leninist outlook in his book and advocates broader and stronger ties of friendship and neighborliness between the USSR and Japan.

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JAPANESE SCHOLAR DISCUSSES POLITICAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS IN CHINA TODAY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1979 pp 174-176

[Review by A. I. Sokolov of the book "Law and Politics in Modern-Day China, 1949-1975" by Inako Tsuneo, Moscow, Progress, 1978, 295 pages]

[Text] In the last 10-15 years, several studies of law and legal theory in modern-day China have been published in Japan. The interest of Soviet Sinologists, however, was rightfully aroused by the publication of a book in 1975 by a progressive scholar and renowned expert on government and law in the socialist countries, Nagoya State University Professor Tsuneo Inako. The book has now been translated into Russian.

The publication of works on political and legal problems in modern-day China is a quite rare event in Sinology, which is largely due to difficulties with reference sources, particularly Chinese reference materials. Inako's work is of interest not only because he elucidates his subject matter with the aid of Marxist-Leninist methodology, but also because the author examines the law in today's China in direct relationship to the political development of this country and analyzes the results of legal development as a consequence of the Maoist policy line.

The author of this monograph has employed numerous sources, including Soviet Sinological literature, and has made many little-known Chinese sources accessible to scholars, including some of Mao Zedong's remarks and "directives" that have never before been published in Russian.

The first chapter--"The Roots of the Law in Modern-Day China"--contains not only a study of the legal ideology and policy of popular government in the liberated regions (prior to 1949), but also a general description of the law in pre-revolutionary China. Pointing out the formal character of Guomindang legislation, which was actually not applied in rural locations, the author correctly underscores the prominence of local common law in much of the nation. Just as in imperial China, only the provisions of criminal and administrative law were of any real significance (pp 24-25).

The author returns several times to the question of the influence of old Chinese legal tradition on the law and legal ideology of the PRC. He expresses the convinction that "the law in today's China has still not cast off the burden of past legal tradition," illustrating this with the example of an article in the Chinese press in connection with the "criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius," when, according to a tradition "dating back to the ancient Legalist school," only the "repressive function with respect to an 'enemy'" was governable by law (p 279). The author's supposition seems correct if we consider that Legalism and Confucianism recognize the need for disciplinary criminal law for the common people (moral standards were enough, according to Confucius, for aristocrats).

The author examines political and legal problems connected with the formation of the PRC and the period of restoration. The author analyzes the state structure of the PRC during the restoration period and its first major legislative acts (laws on land reform and marriage), as well as the mass campaigns of those years: the campaigns for "patriotic duty" and "suppression of counterrevolution," the struggles against the "three evils" and the "five evils" and so forth. The laws and political measures of that time are positively assessed by the author, but he nonetheless, citing the words of Dong Biwu, correctly notes the vague nature of several legal standards which created opportunities for legal abuses (p 77). Analyzing legal questions in relationship to the general line of the CCP in 1953, the author states that Mao Zedong's subsequent actions and statements prove that he opposed this line (p 83). The author uses the example of the Gao Gang and Rao Shushi "affair" (1954) to illustrate the acute confrontations over the general line.

The author also examines the political and legal development of China in light of the struggle between two lines in the CCP leadership. For example, in his discussion of the PRC Constitution of 1954, Inako says that after the Maoists had discarded the general CCP line, formulated in 1953 on the basis of the experience of worldwide socialism, constitutional provisions were left hanging in mid-air (p 98). In connection with his discussion of the materials of the Eighth CCP Congress (1956), the author remarks that Mao Zedong was dissatisfied with the decisions of this congress, but had to profess agreement with them, including the provision concerning the strict observance of legality (p 118). As early as 1957, however, he was already attempting to gain revenge for his defeat at the congress. Inako believes that the deciding role in the revision of the Eighth CCP Congress' line regarding questions of legality and law was played by the decree of the PRC State Council on labor training of 1 August 1957, in accordance with which administrative agencies were authorized to confine any PRC citizens in "educational labor" camps without a trial or inquest. After this, the author notes, the Chinese leaders stopped insisting on the need to regulate and observe the law (p 126).

The author examines the political and legal aspects of the period of so-called regulation--that is, the time when several Chinese activists went against Maoist slogans and directives by mobilizing the people to eradicate the consequences of the "Great Leap Forward," employing methods of economic management that were similar to the practices of worldwide socialism.

The author conducts an interesting analysis of some of the legal drafts of that time, particularly the draft of the Statute on the Work of Industrial Raw Material Enterprises (1961), which was later, at the time of the "Cultural Revolution," attacked as "revisionist." In fact, this draft was intended to correct the disorganization of enterprise administrations during the period of the "Great Leap Forward." The author proves that theoretical work in the law was revived to some degree during the period of "regulation." Interesting data are presented in the book regarding the debates in the law school of Beijing University over the "nature and effect of socialist law in the PRC." The author analyzes two books--the latest publications on legal issues in the PRC: "Basic Information About the Constitution" by Wang Ming and Wang Shuwen (1962) and "Lectures on the Fundamentals of Law" by Zhang Royu (1963). The latest collection of laws and decrees of the PRC was published in 1963. After this, Chinese legislation was never made public.

The "Cultural Revolution" is the next historical period examined by the author. This campaign, particularly the actions of Red Guards and other student groups, proved that law did not exist in China in the full sense of the term. As for the various "directives" connected with the "Cultural Revolution," issued by its leaders and intended to keep the development of events under the control of the Maoist upper echelon, they, as the author correctly points out, provided scandalous evidence of the lawlessness which reigned in the nation (p 208).

The book contains a long annotated list of Maoist "directives" of the time of the "Cultural Revolution" (pp 201-206).

In his examination of the period following the "Cultural Revolution," Inako focuses the reader's attention on such matters as the preparation of the new constitution (an analysis of the constitutional draft of 1970), the Tenth CCP Congress, the campaign for "criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius" and the present state of affairs in the sphere of justice. He presents a striking and well-ordered account of the impressions gained by American and Japanese lawyers from conversations with Chinese court officials, as well as the impressions of Japanese lawyers who were present at assizes in a Beijing hospital. Summing up these impressions, the author writes: "When a case is tried in criminal courts in today's China, the judge conducts the trial on the assumption that the accused is guilty.... A great of significance is attached to the defendant's confession. Attention is focused on the social origins of the accused and on his ideology, and not on his motives or the social causes of the crime" (p 259). The absence of practicing attorneys in the PRC is noted (p 258). Chinese officials list family matters among the most prevalent civil trials (divorce trials, cases involving child support, interference in the marital and family relations of children and so forth); among criminal cases, the most prevalent are murders (including murders connected with the submission of divorce petitions), bodily injury, embezzlement and graft. There has been a tendency to depict general criminal cases as cases involving counter-revolutionary crimes (pp 256-257).

The Maoist Constitution of 1975 is thoroughly criticized by the author. The Japanese researcher associates the constitutional crisis with the mass campaign launched after its adoption "for the study of the theory of proletarian dictatorship," since an element of this campaign was the criticism of one of the basic principles formally recorded in the new constitution--the principle of distribution according to labor. The author exposes the Maoist falsification of Lenin's doctrine of proletarian dictatorship and points out the lack of unanimity on the issue of so-called "bourgeois law" in the previous Maoist ruling clique (he arrives at this conclusion by comparing statements printed in HONGQI magazine throughout 1975 by prominent Maoist ideologists--former members of the CCP Central Committee Politburo Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao). The campaign "For the study of the theory of proletarian dictatorship" itself, according to Inako, became a factor arousing the dissatisfaction of the masses. After July 1975, disturbances broke out everywhere in China, particularly in Hangzhou, where production was halted at plants and where troops were sent from other regions to establish "order" in line with the "special instructions of Mao Zedong and the CCP Central Committee 'regarding the activity in Zhejiang Province.'" Similar disturbances also broke out in Heilongjiang Province. Peasant uprisings began in Yunnan and Sichuan. Young urbanites who had been sent to rural areas took part in the peasant uprising in Yunnan Province. Public security units and troops were mobilized to stifle this peasant movement (p 277).

The author stresses that the situation in China remained unstable even after the adoption of the 1975 Constitution. It will be a long time, Inako concludes, before the real development of law in China begins (pp 278-279).

The author must be commended for his efforts to expose the defective theory and practice of Maoism, which has now turned into a variety of anticommunism. Inako has written an interesting and meaningful study which has aroused great interest in Soviet readers.

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PAGES FROM THE HEROIC HISTORY OF THE JCP

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[Review by V. A. Vasil'yev of the book "Ocherki istorii kommunisticheskogo dvizheniya v Yaponii do vtoroy mirovoy voyny" (Essays on the History of the Communist Movement in Japan Prior to World War II) by I. I. Kovalenko, Moscow, Nauka, Glavnaya Redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1979, 272 pages, with illustrations and an appendix]

[Text] A book recently published by the Nauka Publishing House in Moscow--"Ocherki istorii kommunisticheskogo dvizheniya v Yaponii do vtoroy mirovoy voyny" by Doctor of Historial Sciences I. I. Kovalenko--is the first work written in our nation on the pre-war history of the communist movement in Japan.

The subject matter of the worldwide communist movement, particularly its development in the capitalist countries, has always aroused the interest of Soviet researchers. And this is understandable: The Marxist-Leninist analysis of today's most progressive and revolutionary movement has always been of primary theoretical and practical significance.

In our day, now that the constant development of the worldwide revolutionary process is being accompanied by the further intensification of the ideological struggle, the study of this subject matter acquires even more topical importance.

Bourgeois apologists try to minimize the effects of the Great October Socialist Revolution on the worldwide revolutionary process, falsify its history and denigrate its consequences and results. Attacks on the Comintern, in particular, indicate a tendency to strike a blow at the unity of the international communist movement by criticizing this international organization, governed by the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and to promote the growth of nationalist, chauvinist and schismatic currents. The Comintern played an outstanding role in the birth and development of the international communist movement and the elaboration of its political line. The Comintern performed the historic service of uniting Marxism-Leninism with the labor movement on a global scale. The experience of October and the international communist movement is studied in depth and utilized creatively by Marxist-Leninist parties.

Kovalenko's new work on the birth and development of the communist movement in Japan is dedicated to the glorious memory of the Japanese communists who died heroically in the fight against Japanese reaction. Kovalenko, who is one of the Soviet Union's leading experts on Japan and the author of the first fundamental work in our scientific literature on collective security in Asia, deals with an important and complex subject in the work being reviewed, which is the first attempt in Soviet literature on Japan to present a comprehensive narrative of the history of the Japan Communist Party. Despite the fact that the monograph deals mainly with the period prior to the 1940's, the author has been able to give his narrative a contemporary tone. In his analysis of the difficult and glorious path traveled by the Japanese communist movement in the years before the war, the author leads the reader up to the present day and assists him in gaining a more thorough understanding of the problems now being faced by the JCP and all other democratic forces in Japan.

One of the chief merits of the monograph is the author's extensive use of quotations from the founders of Marxism-Leninism, many of the latest studies by Soviet and Japanese progressive scholars, materials of the JCP and statements by its leaders, as well as various periodicals. The birth and development of the communist movement in Japan in the pre-war period are examined against the background of the economic and political events of those years.

In this monograph, which covers a lengthy and important period in the history of the JCP, the scientific analysis of the subject matter is skillfully combined with brilliant descriptions of the selfless activity of famous Japanese revolutionaries--the initiators and organizers of the communist movement. Displaying an objective attitude toward historical fact and a tactical attitude toward printed materials, the ability to single out the principal and distinguishing features of communist activities, and abundant experience and knowledge in the field of Japanese area studies, the author skillfully intersperses his narrative with descriptive sketches of outstanding JCP activists who gave their lives to the working class cause.

Now that many years have gone by, the services performed by the communists who laid the foundations of the communist movement in Japan are more visible. When revolutionary activists are depicted, it is important to not only describe them from all aspects, but also to indicate the ideals which inspired them and the heights to which they aspired. The pages of the monograph which deal with this subject matter give it a particularly revolutionary tone.

The appendix contains the text of many important documents, including the "Thesis of the Executive Committee of the Communist Internationale on Japan of 15 July 1927," "On the State of Affairs in Japan and the Objectives of the Japan Communist Party. Thesis of the Western European

Bureau of the Communist Internationale" and "The Response of the Central Committee of the Japan Communist Party to the New Thesis of the Western European Bureau of the Communist Internationale on the Japanese Question."

An analysis of the pre-war history of the communist movement in Japan is indisputably of more than just informative significance. It provides a better understanding of the problems of the revolutionary movement and the struggle of all democratic forces in the nation at the present time. The problem of working class party policy (party organization, tactics, the acquisition of a mass base, the elaboration of policy-planning documents and so forth) is the focal point of the analysis in this monograph. "The most important prerequisite for a scientific approach to this matter," V. I. Lenin stressed, "is to not lose sight of the basic historical connection, to view each issue from the standpoint of the birth of the specific phenomenon in history, the principal stages undergone by this phenomenon in its development and the present status of the phenomenon in relation to its development."[1] Guided by this approach to the problems of the revolutionary movement in Japan, the author paints a picture of socioeconomic development in the nation and the ideological and political maturation of the working class and its evolution as the leading force in the revolutionary transformation of society.

Analyzing the peculiarities of the development of Japanese imperialism, the author directs the reader's attention to the particular socioeconomic and political processes which turned Japan into an imperialist state and left their imprint on the formation of the working class and the birth of the revolutionary movement in the nation. "The specific conditions of the development of Japanese capitalism," the author stresses, "gave rise to a multitude of difficult problems which impeded the development of the revolutionary process in the nation, complicated the struggle of the working class and set up additional obstacles in the way of the socialist and communist movement in Japan" (p 28).

The progression of Japanese capitalism to the monopolistic stage and the sharply intensified militarization of the country and the exploitation of the working class stimulated the labor movement. In the second half of the 1890's, demonstrations by the Japanese proletariat became more frequent, organized and militant. The first trade unions had already appeared in the nation by that time. At the same time, various political groups, clubs and organizations, demanding the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of a parliamentary republic, began to appear. All of this naturally frightened the ruling clique, which passed the first special law "On the preservation of order." With the aid of this law, demonstrations against the existing order were mercilessly crushed. In spite of these difficult conditions, however, socialist ideas spread throughout Japan.

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1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 39, p 67.

The monograph contains vivid descriptions of how the Japanese proletariat gradually gained strength, produced capable leaders and joined the vigorous fight against exploiters and for better living conditions, political rights and democratic freedoms.

In the second half of the 1890's, a new stage in the development of the Japanese labor and socialist movement began, connected primarily with the name of outstanding Japanese revolutionary Sen Katayama, who played a tremendous part in the spread of Marxism in Japan. The recognized leader of the Japanese proletariat and founder of the Japan Communist Party, he worked long and hard to combine the labor movement with the theory of scientific socialism. "He was," the author writes, "the exemplary Japanese revolutionary, who emerged from the depths of the masses and spent all of his waking hours in selfless struggle for grand communist ideals" (p 36). Sen Katayama's name is still a symbol of boundless loyalty to the masses, to the great cause of Marxism-Leninism and to proletarian internationalism.

The author underscores the tremendous influence of Lenin's ideas and the struggle of the Bolshevik Party in Russia on the development of the revolutionary movement in Japan. Internationalists enthusiastically applauded the October victory. "Japan absorbed the news from Russia just as greedily as arid desert soil absorbs water," Japanese journalist Ogura wrote.

The Great October Socialist Revolution provided the strongest impetus for the development of the worker and peasant movement and the intensification of political struggle in Japan. The triumph of this revolution motivated Japanese revolutionaries to study the works of the leader of the world proletariat, V. I. Lenin. Progressive forces in Japan began to seek answers in his works to the question of greatest concern to them. Japanese proressive publishing firms began to issue mass editions of Lenin's works.

"The entire galaxy of confirmed and staunch revolutionaries, the founders of the Japan Communist Party and leaders of the Japanese proletarian's revolutionary struggle, were nurtured on V. I. Lenin's works" (p 57). Certain works by V. I. Lenin became quite popular in Japan, such as "Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism," "The State and Revolution," "The Development of Capitalism in Russia," "The New Economic Policy," "Imperialism and the National Question," "War and Socialism," "Proletarian Revolution," "The Political Objectives of the Proletariat," "The Proletariat and Parliamentary Elections," "What is to Be Done?", "The Infantile Disease of 'Leftwing Communism'" and "Materialism and Empiriocriticism."

Under the direct influence of October, massive worker demonstrations flared up in Japan and were given the name of the "rice riots." Sen Katayama, founder of the Japan Communist Party, wrote: "The October Revolution was a signal for proletarian demonstrations in every corner of the land. Under the influence of the October Revolution, Japanese workers and peasants stirred up the famous rice riots of 1918. This movement, which became a point of departure for the present revolutionary movement in Japan, was born on the crest of the wave caused by October" (pp 58-59). To a considerable extent, this was promoted by the overproduction crisis following the end of World War I, during which Japanese monopolies had amassed huge quantities of capital. The crisis brought about the collapse of entire branches of industry, the bankruptcy of companies and banks, an increase in unemployment and the considerable deterioration of the already burdensome life of the working masses. This resulted in the sharp intensification of the strike struggle of the working class, on whose shoulders most of the burden of the crisis upheavals lay. This struggle became increasingly organized and purposeful.

The upsurge of the labor and democratic movement led to the revival of the activities of syndicalist elements taking a "leftist" stand and social democratic elements of rightist leanings. The continuous ideological struggle between these currents kept working class actions from being directed properly due to the absence of a Marxist political party.

Under these difficult socioeconomic and political conditions of Japan's development, "an item was added to the agenda regarding the need to establish a revolutionary political party of a new type, which, guided by the doctrine of scientific socialism, would arm the Japanese working class with a clear promise of advancement, unite the broadest segments of the working public around it and lead them in a struggle for peace, democracy and social progress, the collapse of capitalism and the construction of a socialist society" (p 68). On 15 July 1922, the Japan Communist Party was founded as a result of the efforts of Japanese professional communist revolutionaries supported by the international communist movement.

The author stresses that the establishment of the JCP was closely connected with the triumph of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia and with the political activities of the leader of the world proletariat, V. I. Lenin, and the Comintern. The author devotes serious attention in the monograph to the founding of the JCP and its first steps, discussing in detail the concrete assistance the Comintern, performing its international duty to the world proletariat, and V. I. Lenin gave to the Japanese communists in their creation and reinforcement of a working class vanguard.

The JCP experienced many difficulties in the first years of its existence. It was faced with a task of tremendous importance--the elaboration of correct tactics and strategies for struggle under the conditions of a rigid military-monarchic regime, the unification of the masses and their mobilization for a struggle against capitalist oppression, war and reaction and for the development of the nation in the direction of peace and social progress. Resolving to defend the class interests of the working public and embarking on the path of proletarian internationalism, it launched a struggle for the democratization of the nation, for the improvement of the Japanese people's living conditions and against the aggressive policy of Japanese imperialism. Less than a year after the founding of the JCP, reactionary forces launched an exceptionally harsh repressive campaign against the communists and the first mass arrests were made. Party activists were apprehended and convicted. They were subjected to incredible torture. But severe blows did not break the communist party. "Deep underground, the author writes, "the party continued its courageous struggle for the unfading communist ideals" (p 126).

All of the activity of the JCP before the war represents an example of the heroic and selfless way in which communists served the great cause of society's transformation in the interests of the working masses on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. Even in the most difficult moments of their struggle against the superior forces of reaction, the communists believed in the inevitable collapse of Japanese militarism and the liberation of the Japanese people from the cruel oppression of the military-fascist dictatorship. Chairman Keiji Miyamoto of the JCP Central Committee Presidium prophetically wrote in December 1944, in the jail where he was held for almost 12 years by the Japanese secret police, that "the court of history would soon pronounce its verdict" and that "thorough preparations must be made for the day when Japanese imperialism, hopefully in the coming year, will suffer defeat and democratic freedoms will be restored" (pp 223-224).

The defeat suffered by militarist Japan in World War II began a new page in the history of the labor and democratic movement and in the history of JCP activity.

This book by I. I. Kovalenko, which is permeated with the spirit of proletarian internationalism and class solidarity with the Japanese communists, will indisputably arouse great interest not only in Soviet readers, but also in the Japanese progressive public and all who are interested in the history of the communist movement in Japan.

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FUNDAMENTAL STUDY OF YUAN DRAMA

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1979 pp 179-182

[Review by B. L. Riftin. doctor of philological sciences, of the book "Kitayskaya klassicheskaya drama XIII-XIV vv. Genezis. Struktura. Obrazy. Syuzhety" (Chinese Classical Drama of the 13th and 14th Centuries. Genesis, Structure, Characters and Plots) by V. F. Sorokin, Nauka, Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1979]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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FOREIGN CONTACTS OF THE INSTITUTE OF THE FAR EAST

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1979 pp 183-185

[Article by L. S. Sukhanov, candidate of historical sciences and head of the Department of Foreign Contacts and International Scientific Cooperation of the Institute of the Far East]

> [Text] In view of the interest our readers have expressed in the IDV [Institute of the Far East] of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and in response to reader requests received by the editors, the editorial board of PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA is introducing a permanent subsection of the magazine section entitled "Scientific Life." This subsection will be called "In the Institute of the Far East" and will contain regular reports on the international scientific contacts of the institute, science forums held at the institute and attended by foreign scientists, the most interesting conversations and discussions with institute visitors from various countries and so forth.
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> The first article on this subject is printed below. It presents a general overview of the volume and nature of the institute's foreign contacts and has been written by Candidate of Historical Sciences L. S. Sukhanov, head of the Department of Foreign Contacts and International Scientific Cooperation of the IDV.

No one is likely to deny or dispute the statement that the foreign contacts of any scientific research center (laboratory, institute and so forth) are not only closely connected with its scientific significance, but are also directly proportionate to this significance, the final results of its research and the prestige and qualifications of its researchers. The higher these indicators are, the more interest and attention the scientific center will evoke in other scientists and experts in related organizations and establishments, both domestic and foreign. This applies completely not only to scientific centers working in the natural and exact sciences, but also centers specializing in the humanities and working in the social sciences or, according to Western terminology, the political sciences.

The second most important factor directly influencing the nature and volume of international scientific contacts is the political climate--that is, the international situation. It is completely understandable that international scientific contacts are negligible in times of war. These contacts are also minimal at a time of so-called "cold war." They are diminished or halted during periods of friction in international relations in crisis situations. Only the relaxation of international tension can establish favorable conditions for the development of broad and strong scientific contacts between states with differing sociopolitical systems.

International scientific contacts and international detente also have a reciprocal connection: Broader scientific exchange contributes to better mutual understanding between states, strengthens mutual trust and, consequently, promotes the further spread of detente in breadth and depth. This is why agreements on scientific exchange represent an important part of the international treaties concluded in recent years by states with differing social structures. It is for this reason that the question of the present status and future expansion of scientific exchange was among the main topics on the agenda of the international conference of heads of state and government on security and cooperation in Europe, which was held in Helsinki in 1975.

The establishment and development of the foreign contacts of the IDV of the USSR Academy of Sciences followed the establishment and development of the institute itself, which was expected to become the head scientific establishment in the study of international relations in the Far East and the present-day problems of states in this region, primarily China and Japan.

The IDV of the USSR Academy of Sciences was founded in 1966--that is, only 13 years ago. For a scientific establishment this is not a long time, but as we will see, the institute has acquired fame and prestige in various parts of our planet within this brief period. As the heirs to the best traditions of Russian and Soviet Sinology, the research associates at the institute who specialize in Sinology (and they constitute the majority of IDV researchers) have published dozens of substantial studies of the current problems of the region in a short time. Many of these works have been published in native-language editions in Eastern European countries, the United States, Japan and other nations. According to reviews of institute publications published abroad and statements by foreign specialists who visit the institute, the works of IDV researchers attract attention primarily because of their comprehensive approach to the subject matter and the profundity and scientific validity of the conclusions drawn in these works.

The institute journal, PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, is the object of increasing demand and circulation. It is published in English and

Japanese translated editions in addition to the Russian magazine (a Spanish edition is being prepared). The interest in this publication in the United States is particularly attested to by the fact that an American publishing firm has signed a contract for the translation, publication and circulation of 1,000 copies of the magazine in the United States so that it can reach the American reader--interested organizations and individuals--more quickly.

The energetic participation of IDV researchers in various international science forums held abroad--in the United States, Japan, Belgium, Italy and other countries--has contributed a great deal to the development of the institute's foreign contacts. Institute researchers have attended European Sinology congresses since 1967. Since that time, congresses have been held in Italy (twice), Great Britain, France (twice), Sweden and the Netherlands. In line with scientific exchange programs, IDV scientists have traveled to India, Singapore, Japan, the United States, the FRG, Great Britain, France and Italy to work on scientific projects, exchange views and present lectures.

The IDV of the USSR Academy of Sciences has established particularly strong and extensive scientific contacts with related scientific centers in the fraternal socialist countries of Europe, the Republic of Cuba and the Mongolian People's Republic. Friendly contacts with centers in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam are being developed successfully. Soviet scientists regularly travel to these countries to attend science forums, present lectures and exchange opinions. The scientific contacts of IDV sinologists with their colleagues from the nations mentioned above have reached their highest form--joint research projects. Joint scientific works have been compiled or are now being prepared for publication (in the appropriate national languages): "Maoism: Evolution, Ideology and Policy" (Bulgaria and the USSR), "Classes and the Class Structure in the PRC" (GDR and USSR) and "The National Question in the PRC" (MPR AND USSR). Work is being completed on a collective monograph entitled "Thirty Years of the People's Republic of China. 1949-1979," the contributing authors of which include, in addition to IDV scientists, scientists from Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, the Republic of Cuba, the MPR, Poland and the CSSR. The book will be published in all of these countries in their national languages.

The IDV of the USSR Academy of Sciences is assisting the fraternal nations in the training of young scientific personnel. Young people from Bulgaria, Hungary, the MPR, Poland and the CSSR have completed or are now engaged in post-graduate work at the institute. Researchers from these countries work on special assignments at the IDV of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Publications and scientific works are exchanged regularly.

The extensive development and intensification of the institute's international scientific contacts led to the founding of the Department of Foreign Contacts and International Scientific Cooperation in 1974.

The department is also responsible for the exchange of scientific publications between the IDV and foreign science centers.

The growing fame and prestige of the IDV as a scientific center was mentioned above. More and more foreigners are visiting the institute. The purposes of these visits vary: They come to work on scientific projects or special assignments, to attend science conferences and symposiums held by the institute, to present lectures or exchange views with leading IDV researchers on their particular areas of interest, to seek advice, to learn about the institute in general, and so forth. It is indicative that a great deal of interest in the institute and its projects has been displayed not only by experts on international affairs who are working in the same field of research, but also by journalists, the political commentators of various television and radio firms and press concerns, politicians and public spokesmen from various countries, and diplomats.

A few figures can be cited to illustrate this: In 1979 alone (from 1 January through 15 September), for example, the institute was visited by more than 260 foreign guests from 18 countries, including more than 150 scientists and scientific workers, around 80 political and public spokesmen, 20 journalists and the same number of diplomats. In terms of numbers, the leaders (70 people) were scientists from eight fraternal socialist countries: Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Cuba, Mongolia, Poland, the SRV and the CSSR. They took an active part in two science conferences organized by the IDV--"Objections to the Falsification of History by the Maoists" (March 1979, Moscow, see PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, No 2, 1979) and the annual IDV conference on contemporary Chinese history (April 1979, Moscow). They have included such prominent scientists as Academicians D. Kosev (Bulgaria), F. Tyokai (Hungary) and S. Bira (MPR), corresponding members of national academies B. Tugaadash (MPR) and J. Purs (CSSR), administrators of large scientific research institutes in their own countries D. Mitev (Bulgaria), B. Talas (Hungary), N. Isjamts (MPR), M. Matous, J. Cesar and V. Oplustil (CSSR), prominent scientists H. Peters and R. Felber (GDR), W. Nametkiewicz and R. Slawinski (Poland), Vo Hong Qiong and Dao Dhui Tung (SRV) and others.

During the same period, the institute was visited by many scientists from the Western countries. Professor L. Lanciotti, vice president of Rome's Institute of the Middle and Far East, who has trained an entire galaxy of Italian sinologists at the University of Venice, presented a lecture on "Confucianism and Legalism in China" at the institute and spoke with IDV administrators. Conversations and discussions with professors from various U.S. universities have taken place: W. Kintner, Guy Paucker, George Ginsburgs, Michael Kau, Thomas Robinson, Kim Yang and Wu Yuanli. The institute has been visited by Japanese scientists: Professors Sato Hiroshi, Isamu Fujita and M. Himeta. We have also been visited by Indian Professor Mucherdji, Professor Bertrand, director of the London Institute of Strategic Studies, and others.

Far from all of the discussions and conversations on international affairs have been calm and smooth: There have been heated debates, fierce arguments and so forth. This is completely understandable since the parties in these debates have represented diametrically opposed political views and opinions on world events. Nonetheless, it has been pointed out repeatedly that this frank exchange of opinions is of indisputable mutual interest, leads to a better understanding of the positions and arguments of the other side and--the main thing--reveals the common features that unite the two sides rather than dividing them, since common uniting features are found even in extreme points of view--above all, these include the desire for lasting and stable peace in the world, for stronger detente and for stronger friendship and cooperation between nations.

As for the assessment of events in the PRC, the domestic and foreign policy of the Beijing leadership and the role of the PRC in current international relations, these issues generally reveal that the views of sinologists from the socialist and capitalist countries are virtually identical. This is also completely understandable, since science, in the true and philosophical sense of the term--the investigation of objective truth--is an integral entity and is not dependent on the political views of scientists who seek this truth.

Meetings and talks of this kind with colleagues from other countries also help the participants perceptibly in their personal research by revealing the inadequacy of arguments on certain research topics, introducing new facts and statistics, revealing new sources of information and so forth. When Professor G. Ginsburgs (United States), for example, was writing a long and serious study of the history of the formation of China's borders and the origination of the PRC's territorial claims on its neighbors (the first part of this work was recently published in the United States), he talked at length on this topic with IDV sector head V. S. Myasnikov and other researchers. During the course of these talks, the first part (the published part) of the American scientist's work was analyzed in detail and its strong points were noted: the breadth of the investigation, the strict adherence to objectivity and so forth. At the same time, the Soviet scientists pointed out several serious defects and omissions which, in their opinion, diminished the value and significance of the work: the onesided use of sources, several inaccurate statements and so forth. Professor Ginsburgs sincerely thanked his Soviet colleagues for their friendly constructive criticism of his work and, in particular, for their concrete advice on the use of sources and facts unknown to him, which he will be able to take into account in his work on the second and final part of the study. V. S. Myasnikov noted that the discussions were also useful for the Soviet scientists.

The list of such examples could be continued. It should be noted that all talks and discussions, without exception, between institute scientists and their Western colleagues have taken place in an atmosphere of mutual respect despite some differences of opinion. The friendliness and cordiality of the Soviet scientists, just as of all other Soviet people, were mentioned in the press and in verbal statements by many institute guests from Western countries upon their return to these countries.

Politicians, statesmen and public spokesmen from various countries, mainly Western, make up a large group of visitors to the IDV of the USSR Academy of Sciences. They have included Professor Griffiths, an official research associate of the U.S. National Security Council, a delegation representing the Japan Socialist Party and headed by Comrade Takasawa Torao, deputy in the House of Representatives, a delegation of young Japan Socialist Party members headed by Comrade Fukoda, a member of the JSP Central Committee, and others.

The IDV has also been visited by Secretary-General Liman of the Janata Party (the ruling party in India), Comrade Phan Hien, SRV deputy minister of foreign affairs, SRV Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials Le Chan and Tang Phon, Comrade Rakowski, member of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party, and others. In August the institute was visited by a group of American congressmen (26 individuals) headed by Congressman Wolff.

The journalists who visited the IDV of the USSR Academy of Sciences this year included G. Brandon (WASHINGTON STAR), C. Piper (BALTIMORE SUN, United States), Kumar (UNI, India), A. Schuster ("Radio Prague," CSSR), S. Viola (REPUBLICA, Italy), Boogardh (NRK, Netherlands), John McCarthy (U.S. political correspondent), Guha Andreas (FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, FRG), prominent Dutch journalist Olsman and others.

The personnel of embassies accredited in Moscow--Japan, United States, Norway and other countries--visit the IDV quite often.

In 1979 IDV scientists took an active part in various international science forums abroad and in the USSR, particularly the world congress of political scientists (August, Moscow) and the 14th Pacific Science Congress (August-September, Khabarovsk). While the world political science congress was in session, more than 30 of its participants from various countries visited the IDV.

Institute researchers attended the scientific symposium on "Maoism and the National Question" (May, Ulaanbatar, MPR) and the conference on "China and Asia" (Berlin, GDR).

Most of the IDV researchers take an active part in institute foreign contacts (correspondence, conversations, debates and so forth). All of them approach this aspect of their work with a great sense of responsibility, in the same way that they approach their duties as scientists, citizens and individuals, and they are fully determined to contribute as much as possible to the common cause of broader and stronger detente, the cause of lasting and strong peace throughout the world.

In May of this year the IDV of the USSR Academy of Sciences moved to new quarters in a new and beautiful modern building. This building will also be the home of the main Soviet sinological library, one of the largest in the world.

The new address of the IDV of the USSR Academy of Sciences is: Moscow, 117218, Ulitsa Krasikova, 27.

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FOURTEENTH PACIFIC SCIENCE CONGRESS

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[Report by L. S. Leonidov, candidate of historical sciences, on the 14th Pacific Science Congress, held in Khabarovsk on 20 August-5 September 1979]

[Text] Around 2,000 delegates and guests from 46 countries gathered together on 20 August 1979 in Khabarovsk's Palace of Sports imeni V. I. Lenin for the opening ceremonies of the 14th Pacific Science Congress.

The presidium consisted of the president of the Pacific Science Association (PSA) and 14th Pacific Science Congress, Vice President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician A. V. Sidorenko, members of the PSA Executive Committee and the organizational committee of the congress, and honored congress guests representing international organizations: UNESCO, the World Health Organization (WHO), the UN Environmental Protection Program (UNEP) and the International Council of Learned Societies, as well as leaders of Khabarovskiy Kray, U.S. Supreme Soviet Deputies A. K. Chernyy and G. Ye. Podgayev, and Chairman P. L. Morozov of the executive committee of the Khabarovsk City Soviet of People's Deputies.

The general theme and motto of the congress, "Pacific natural resources--for the good of mankind," aroused exceptional interest in scholars from almost all fields of knowledge.

Calling the congress to order, Academician A. V. Sidorenko read a message of welcome from the USSR Council of Ministers.

"As a Pacific power, the Soviet Union," the message said, "wants to aid in the broader investigation of scientific problems in the Pacific Ocean and adjacent regions and promote the enhancement of public well-being.

"The Pacific region, where around half of the world's population lives, has an important role to play in the fate of our entire planet. It contains boundless mineral and biological resources, is an important zone of international shipping and fishing, and has a major effect on the climate of our planet and the state of man's environment. Its resources must fully serve all mankind and the goals of progress and construction. Naturally, these objectives can only be attained in an atmosphere of peace and international security."

In his opening speech, A. V. Sidorenko noted the positive effect of international detente on the development of mutually beneficial economic and cultural contacts between countries with different social structures.

Representatives of international organizations welcomed congress participants at the opening ceremonies.

Doctor Francesco Di Castri, UNESCO assistant director general, noted in his speech that the fact that this congress was being held in the USSR provided more evidence of the Soviet Union's interest in developing science and the exchange of scientific information.

The chief assistant to the secretary general of UNEP, S. Yevteyev, said that the vast dimensions of the Pacific basin and its coastal areas would require continuous and considerable cooperation between scientists in the region to maintain a constantly favorable environment for present and future generations in this region.

Welcoming the congress on behalf of the International Council of Learned Societies, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences A. S. Monin pointed out the need to make efficient use of both limited and renewable resources throughout the world as a whole.

A representative from the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, G. I. Sidorenko, stressed that Soviet scientists in the field of medicine have a great deal of experience in the preservation and improvement of public health and in environmental protection and that they are willing to share this experience with scientists from various countries.

On behalf of the inhabitants of Khabarovsk, a city with a population of more than half a million, P. L. Morozov wished congress participants success in their work and expressed the hope that their stay in Khabarovsk would be helpful, pleasant and memorable.

At the opening ceremonies, honorary certificates and medals were presented to several scientists for their contribution to Pacific research.

The plenary session on 21 August was called to order by PSA President, Academician A. V. Sidorenko, who presented a report on the general theme of the congress--"Pacific natural resources--for the good of mankind." General reports on this subject were also presented.

In his report, Academician A. V. Sidorenko said that world ocean studies have risen to the level of a state objective in our nation. He quoted from a speech made by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the

CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, at the 25th CPSU Congress: "Such global problems as the raw material and energy shortages and the need to combat the most dangerous and widespread diseases, to protect the environment, to explore space and to utilize world ocean resources efficiently are important and urgent enough even today. In the future, they will have an increasingly noticeable effect on life in each nation and on the entire system of international relations. Our nation, just as the other socialist countries, cannot remain uninvolved in the resolution of these problems that touch upon the interests of all mankind."

He expressed a belief which has become the conviction of an increasing number of scientists: that marine resources and nature can only be understood, studied and placed at the service of mankind through the concerted effort of scientists from various countries.

In his report on "Problems of Scientific Research in the Pacific Basin," Academician N. A. Shilo, chairman of the Soviet National Committee of the PSA and chairman of the DVNTs [Far Eastern Scientific Center] of the USSR Academy of Sciences, stressed the need for the collective investigation of such global problems as the legal aspects of the use of world ocean resources and the struggle for peace and security in the Pacific, the Far East and Southeast Asia.

Academician Ye. M. Primakov, director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, presented a report on "Basic Tendencies in the Development of the International Situation in Asia and the Pacific."

One of the principal features of the technological revolution of our day is its tremendous role in the further internationalization of production and the dramatic intensification of the interdependence of the natural and social spheres of human life. Therefore, the speaker said, it can be said that the term "environment" is taking on broader meaning, including the dynamics of international political and economic conditions.

"The Pacific region occupies a unique position in today's world, primarily from the standpoint of the main problem facing mankind--the problem of war and peace. The USSR, United States, Japan and the PRC are located in this region. The stabilization of relations between the leading Pacific powers could improve the entire international climate."

Academician I. P. Gerasimov, director of the Geography Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, reported on "The Geographic Problems of the Pacific Region."

The authors of the collective report on "Scientific Aspects of the Comprehensive Study of the Pacific Ocean for the Purpose of Preventing Its Pollution," Soviet scientists Yu. A. Izrael', A. I. Simonov and A. V. Tsyban', pointed out the fact that considerable human influence on the world ocean was changing several of its most important characteristics.

"The Medical Aspects of Environmental Protection in the Pacific Countries" was the title of a report by Academician G. A. Sidorenko of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences. The problem of environmental protection, the speaker said, has taken on global scales due to the possible spread of pollution hundreds of kilometers from the source both in the atmosphere and in bodies of water. This carries pollution across state boundaries. Besides this, in a number of cases, the resolution of the more difficult environmental problems is not within the capability of a single nation. International cooperation is a much wiser course of action in this field.

"Basic Problems of Pacific Hydrology" was the title of a report by Professors V. I. Nort (USSR) and K. Virtki (Harvard University, United States).

In a report on the "Biological Resources of the Pacific Ocean," Soviet Professor P. A. Moiseyev described how scientists could aid in the correct use of ocean resources. Their compilation of large-scale maps of ocean ecosystems could preserve fish numbers, regulate commercial fishing and double the size of the present catch. To attain these objectives, scientists must assess the food productivity of Pacific regions.

American scientist J. Bardach proposed the institution of standard regulations on energy expenditures in his report on "Energy Conservation in Aquaculture and Fishing." According to the speaker, these regulations would primarily benefit the Asian countries, which could then use fishing vessels more efficiently, locate schools of fish more quickly and employ economical equipment.

The day of 22 August was devoted completely to the work of the congress general symposium on the "Scientific Bases of the Efficient Use and Protection of the Environment in the Pacific Region."

University of Hawaii Professor A. Mueller-Dombois (United States) presented a report entitled "Monitoring Island Ecosystems--the Method of Their Conservation." Monitoring calls for the periodic observation of certain elements or phenomena in the natural environment. The environmental protection and conservation committee of the PSA, the speaker said, has worked out a program for monitoring the basic ecosystems, which is to be carried out as part of the UNESCO program "Man and the Biosphere."

In a report on "The Disintegration Speed of Nuclear Radioactive Deposits in the Northwestern Pacific," Doctor T. R. Folsom (United States) directed attention to the consequences of thermonuclear tests in this region and their effect on the natural environment. He cited dozens of examples which cogently testify that high-energy radiation lasts for a long time and injures the health of human beings and all other living creatures in the region. The disruption of the ecological balance by radioactive deposits can lead to irreparable consequences for present and future generations.

A report on "UNEP's Approach to Water Pollution Control in the Pacific Ocean" was presented by a representative of this organization, Doctor R. Helmer.

The speaker described the specific ways in which this special UN agency is giving scientific and material assistance to the national institutes of Pacific countries and territories.

The general symposium also heard reports by Soviet scientists M. P. Nesterova and A. I. Simonov on "The Scientific Aspects of Water Pollution Control in the Pacific Ocean," N. G. Vasil'yev, B. G. Stepanov and Ye. Ye. Syroyetskovskiy on "The Natural Preserves of the Soviet Far East and Their Role in Conservation" and P. P. Shirshov and R. V. Ozmidov on "Turbulent Processes in the Ocean."

The policy-planning committee of the organizational committee of the 14th Pacific Science Congress approved and recommended around 1,500 reports covering all fields of knowledge. The themes of these reports alone, which were published by the Soviet organizational committee of the congress prior to its commencement and were distributed to each delegate, constitute a voluminous multivolume science library.

From 23 August on, the work of the congress was continued in committees working on specific topics. There were 14 PSA committees of this type. These committees were then divided into sections, subsections and symposiums due to the large number and diverse subject matter of the reports submitted.

A group of scientists from the IDV [Institute of the Far East] of the USSR Academy of Sciences worked on the committee on "The Social Sciences and Humanities." Professor V. A. Krivtsov, assistant director of the IDV, supervised the first section of this committee--"The Social and Political Aspects of Research in Pacific Countries." This section carried on its work in two symposiums: "The Social and Political Aspects of Researching Pacific Natural Resources and Cooperation Between Pacific Countries" and the "Demographic Problems of the Pacific Region."

Soviet scientists presented reports on "Regional Cooperation and the Safeguarding of Security in Asia" and "Detente--the Most Important Prerequisite for Cooperation by the Pacific Countries and the Development of Pacific Resources," which noted that devastating wars and conflicts had raged through this region several times in the postwar period. Profound social and political changes have taken place in the Asian countries. The people of these countries have freed themselves from colonial oppression and are waging a courageous struggle for their independence, for fundamental social and economic reforms and for the guaranteed security of their states.

The attainment of these objectives will call for close unity in Asia, the constant development of regional cooperation by the Asian countries in trade, economics, culture, science and other spheres, concerted effort to eradicate present disputes and conflicts and prevent future ones, and deeper and broader international detente.

The policy aimed at guaranteed peace and security in this region, however, is still not being supported by several countries, and peace in the Pacific will depend to a definite extent on these countries. The political doctrine lying at the basis of U.S. Government policy in the Pacific emphasizes the need for military presence in this region and the modernization and buildup of armed forces. The cause of peaceful cooperation is being hampered by the existing system of military and political alliances. The foreign policy actions of the PRC leaders represent a serious threat to the cause of peace in this region. This applies above all to the actions taken by the Beijing leaders against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

Pham Ny Quong, member of the SRV Committee for the Social Sciences, noted in his speech that the situation which took shape as a result of the Indochinese people's victory over aggressors has consolidated peace in this region. Constant vigilance is needed, however, to guard against intrigues by imperialists and other aggressors.

The speech by Professor Guy Paucker (United States) aroused great interest. Admitting that he was once one of the cold war's most vigorous supporters, he said that the resolution of urgent problems in the Pacific region, just as in the rest of the world, will necessitate the relaxation of tension in international relations and the settlement of all disputes by means of peaceful negotiations.

An analysis of Japan's role in the system of economic relations in Asia and the Pacific was presented by Professor D. V. Petrov (IDV, USSR Academy of Sciences) in his report. "Problems in Socioeconomic Cooperation Between Small Developing Countries in the Pacific Region"--this was the subject of a report by N. B. Lebedeva. Interesting reports were also presented by scientists Sidney Chang (United States), V. P. Nikolayev (USSR), Yung-Huan Jo (United States) and others.

Various aspects of the complex demographic processes taking place in the Pacific countries were discussed at the second symposium of this section. Reports were presented by prominent demographers from the USSR, United States, India, Japan, Bangladesh, Fiji, New Zealand, Mexico and other countries.

The second section of the committee on the social sciences and humanities, "The Economic Problems of the Pacific Countries," held two symposiums in addition to plenary sessions. The symposiums were entitled "Natural Resources, Their Economic Management and Resource Policy" and "Problems in the International Law of the Sea."

Particular interest was aroused by a series of reports by Soviet scientists on the plans for developing the resources of East Siberia and the Far East in connection with the construction of the Baykal-Amur Mainline.

A large audience gathered in the section on "Ethnocultural Problems of Pacific Anthropological Studies," the work of which took place in seven symposiums. One of these--"The Fate of Small Ethnic Groups in the Pacific Region Under the Conditions of Present-Day Sociocultural and Political Changes"--aroused particular interest in congress participants by its topical subject matter.

Scientist and writer John Waiko (Papua New Guinea) spoke of the search for means of combating the spread of the decadent bourgeois ideology in the countries liberated from imperialist colonialism.

Interesting reports were presented at this symposium by J. L. Fischer (United States), V. Naidu (Fiji) and others.

The sessions of the section on "Pacific Languages" were well attended.

Participants in many congress symposiums and sections set forth specific proposals and recommendations on topics of discussion, which were turned over to the appropriate standing committees of the PSA.

Many foreign participants mentioned in their speeches and numerous interviews with newsmen that the preparations for the congress and the actual proceedings had been quite impressive and expressed their gratitude to the authorities and inhabitants of Khabarovsk for treating them with such cordiality and hospitality and for giving them the opportunity to visit various industrial and agricultural enterprises, schools, institutes, hospitals, clubs, museums and so forth.

While the congress was in session, an exhibit of the achievements of Soviet science in the Far East was shown in the Institute of Physical Culture. It was organized by the DVNTs of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Prior to the beginning of the congress and afterwards, foreign participants were offered an opportunity to visit various parts of Siberia and the Far East, including Sakhalin, Kamchatka and Lake Baykal, and learn about the work being performed in scientific centers and institutes. All congress participants had an opportunity to walk along the beautiful Amur.

On 1 September the final plenary session of the 14th Pacific Science Congress was held. A congratulatory telegram from the secretary-general of the United Nations was read to congress participants. The wire said that the study of the Pacific region on a scientific basis for the purpose of determining factors which can contribute to the present and future development of the countries concerned will be an important event in the attainment of the goals of peace and progress.

Many telegrams were sent to the congress by various scientific institutes, scientists and research vessels sailing in the world ocean.

Summing up the results of the intensive work at the congress, Academician A. V. Sidorenko said: "In terms of the breadth of the topics we have discussed and the coverage of many natural, ecological and socioeconomic sciences, the 14th Pacific Science Congress has been extremely impressive. This kind of comprehensive study of natural and social processes is the best indicator of natural unity on our planet and the close interaction and interdependence of man and nature in the age of technological revolution."

He went on to say that the work of all scientific committees had been productive. Urgent matters of concern to all scientists had been discussed and the further development of research in the Pacific region had been planned. The activity of the committees proved that real opportunities do exist for more thorough scientific research, not only within the framework of national programs, but in international projects as well.

The congress was held in an atmosphere of goodwill, businesslike cooperation and mutual understanding. The discussions represented a free and frank exchange of opinions. Under the conditions of the present international situation, the 14th World Pacific Congress reaffirmed the belief expressed by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev that "broad cooperation by scientists will be an important factor in solving the urgent global problems of the present day and strengthening trust between peoples."

The congress conclusively demonstrated that the resolution of the most difficult natural, ecological and socioeconomic problems in the Pacific region will only be possible under the conditions of broad-scale international cooperation and peaceful coexistence by the people of our planet.

Robert Follensby, president of the Canadian Academy of Sciences, read the text of a message to the Soviet Government from the participants in the 14th Pacific Science Congress, which was unanimously approved by all those present.

At the suggestion of Japanese scientist Arika Watanabe, the congress unanimously approved the text of a message of gratitude from participants in the 14th Pacific Science Congress to the Khabarovsk City Soviet of People's Deputies and the inhabitants of Khabarovsk.

Congress participants passed a resolution "For Cooperation in the Pacific Region in the Use of Natural Resources for the Good of Mankind," in which they declared that the 14th Pacific Science Congress was definitely in favor of the further normalization of international relations and the consolidation of peace and economic, scientific and cultural ties in the interests of peace and public well-being.

At the last meeting, congress participants also passed a resolution containing the recommendations worked out by the scientific committees of the 14th Pacific Science Congress during the course of the discussion of speeches and scientific reports presented by congress participants.

The PSA Scientific Council passed a resolution to hold the next Pacific science congress, the 15th, in New Zealand in 1983. Doctor John Miles, New Zealand scientist, will be the president of the PSA and the president of the 15th congress.

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SELECTIVE LIST OF JPRS SERIAL REPORTS

USSR SERIAL REPORTS (GENERAL)

USSR REPORT: Agriculture
USSR REPORT: Economic Affairs
USSR REPORT: Construction and Equipment
USSR REPORT: Military Affairs
USSR REPORT: Political and Sociological Affairs
USSR REPORT: Energy
USSR REPORT: International Economic Relations
USSR REPORT: Consumer Goods and Domestic Trade
USSR REPORT: Human Resources
USSR REPORT: Transportation
USSR REPORT: Translations from KOMMUNIST*
USSR REPORT: PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST*
USSR REPORT: SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES*
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19 June 1980

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SOME PROBLEMS IN BEIJING FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY

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[Round table discussion in editorial office of journal at the end of 1979]

> [Text] The latest discussion of the peculiarities of the Beijing leadership's current foreign and domestic policy and the antisocialist, anti-Soviet, great-power chauvinistic line of the Maoists in the international arena and within the nation was held in the editorial office of PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA at the end of 1979. During the course of the discussion, Sinologists and researchers from the Institute of the Far East of the USSR Academy of Sciences answered a number of questions of interest to our readers and pertaining to the present state of affairs in the PRC and the implications of certain political actions by the Beijing leadership.

Question: As we know, the Chinese leaders are guided by the official resolutions of the 11th CCP Congress and sessions of the NPC [National People's Congress], which still praise Mao and propagandize Maoism, although they are actually (particularly in certain publications) openly criticizing Mao and denying many of his basic tenets. What is the reason for this?

Answer: It is true that this contradictory phenomenon exists. Naturally, we must not judge CCP policy on the basis of isolated newspaper articles or speeches, but on the basis of fundamental official documents and the actions of the PRC leadership. When we evaluate the situation from these vantage points, we must say that the PRC leadership is still loyal to Mao Zedong and is carrying on his great-Han militaristic line. It is striving to keep national development within Maoist bounds. In this respect, we can definitely say that the "Thought of Mao" is still the basis of the current PRC leadership's strategy. At the same time, the present leaders of the CCP must recognize the fact that many of Mao's tenets have proved worthless, are obviously impeding national economic development and cannot guarantee the fulfillment of Maoist strategic plans. They must manipulate and modify the "Thought of Mao" and search through Mao's past statements for remarks which can be adapted to present conditions.

On the other hand, it is true that the Chinese press and statements by some Chinese scholars, writers and public spokesmen contain anti-Maoist appeals, condemn Mao's fundamental directives, make demands for the democratization of all public life in the nation and so forth. There is no question that many of these statements reflect the Chinese people's opposition to the Maoist line and confirm that the Chinese people view Maoism as a bankrupt ideology. These remarks and attitudes are still of an isolated and unorganized nature and cannot be used as a basis for assumptions regarding radical changes in CCP policy. We must also remember, as Deng Xiaoping frankly admitted, that many of the "democratic" steps taken by the Chinese leadership, like the establishment of the "wall of democracy," have been calculated to win the sympathy of the capitalist West.

Therefore, the contradictory phenomenon we are now observing in the PRC reflects the continuing state of political instability and unrest in the nation. The mass purges, reprisals and other forms of terrorism that are being employed now, just as they were during the years of the "Cultural Revolution," testify that the military-bureaucratic government of the PRC still has means of coercion that are strong enough to preserve its dominant position.

Question: New youth and children's organizations are now being founded in China. We know that the Komsomol, the Pioneer organization, the All-China Federation of Youth and the All-China Student Congress once existed in the PRC. Why are these new youth organizations being founded?

Answer: The PRC once had 30 million Komsomol members and around 100 million Pioneers. In May 1949 the All-China Federation of Youth was founded--a mass organization of the united front of Chinese youth, guided by the CCP. It was made up of the Communist Youth League, the All-China Federation of Students and other youth organizations.

But Mao Zedong was not pleased with all of these youth organizations. In place of these, the hongweibing, zaofan and hongxiaobing ("little soldiers") organizations were founded in the years of the "Cultural Revolution" and were used by the Maoists to break up the CCP, the Komsomol and so forth. The separate hongweibing, zaofan and hongxiaobing factions could not get along with one another and even fought real battles. The army was used to restore "order" and many hongweibings were sent to rural and alpine regions for long periods of time. The youth organizations founded at the time of the "Cultural Revolution" discredited themselves and were extremely unpopular among the Chinese people.

New Komsomol organizations began to be formed in the 1970's, but a Congress was not convened until October 1978. The new youth organization called a Komsomol rests totally on a Maoist foundation, as set forth by the charter of the Young Communist League of China. In 1979 the Beijing leadership attempted to extend its control over the younger generation by founding an All-China Federation of Youth, an All-China Federation of Students and a Pioneer Organization and by disbanding the hongweibing and hongxiaobing organizations. New charters were adopted at the congresses of the youth and student federations in May 1979, proclaiming the "Thought of Mao Zedong" to be the ideological basis of these organizations. The "Thought of Mao" also lies at the basis of the new Pioneer Charter.

An analysis of the youth movement in recent years and the attitudes of Chinese youth, however, indicates that Maoism's prestige is declining sharply among the younger generation. The recreated mass youth organizations have not had any significant influence on most of the young people in China as yet, they ignore their problems and they do not express the views of Chinese youth.

Question: The Beijing and foreign press have reported the rehabilitation of many representatives of the Chinese artistic intelligentsia. What are the actual scales and purpose of this action by the Beijing rulers?

Answer: There is no question that the rehabilitation of the artistic intelligentsia represents a "trump card" in the Chinese leadership's current domestic and foreign policy. It is necessary to the Beijing leaders as a means of encouraging the intelligentsia to take an active part in conducting and supporting the "modernization" policy. Besides this, rehabilitation of this type, which is inevitably connected with the exposure of crimes committed in the past in regard to workers in the cultural sphere, has served as a means of discrediting opponents in the struggle for power, while, on the level of foreign policy, it is being employed to give the regime an air of respectability and to alleviate contacts in the international arena.

The rehabilitation of the "Cultural Revolution's" victims began in 1977. This was accompanied by the "theoretical" substantiation of rehabilitation. Quoting statements made by Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, the press has repeatedly stressed that the intelligentsia is part of the working population, that it should not be considered bourgeois and, consequently, that it should not be the target of a policy of suppression and restriction. The theory concerning the triumph of the "black line" in literature and art in the 17 years prior to the "Cultural Revolution" has been branded erroneous and criminal. At the end of 1978 a CCP Central Committee decision was adopted on the total eradication of the "rightist element" label, and the "unfair and erroneous" categorization of a multitude of cultural figures as "rightist elements" in 1957 and 1958 began to be revised.

It would seem that the matter has been settled. But it is still not known whether many of those who remained alive but were seriously injured by the ordeals lasting so many years will be able to resume their artistic work.

On the other hand, in spite of the seemingly positive nature of the processes described above, it is still too early to speak of a radical change in the status of the intelligentsia in the PRC.

Finally, the general policies of the Beijing leadership and its militaristic, chauvinistic goals naturally alarm cultural figures in the PRC, the majority of whom have always been distinguished by their progressive and realistic views. Will they support this essentially antisocialist course? And if they do not, is it not likely that this "offer of a cookie" will again be succeeded by new ordeals for the Chinese intelligentsia, particularly representatives of the liberal arts?

Question: A congress of PRC cultural figures was recently held in Beijing. Why did the Beijing leadership convene this congress after a hiatus of almost 20 years? What were its results?

Answer: The fourth congress of PRC cultural figures was held in Beijing from 30 October through 16 November 1979. Union congresses were also held for writers, artists and people working in the theater and cinema who belong to the All-China Association of Workers in Literature and Art.

The desire to enlist the support of cultural figures for the course of "modernization" was clearly reflected in Deng Xiaoping's welcoming speech and in the keynote speech by Zhou Yang. In congress materials, which have now been published, there is an underlying appeal to the artistic intelligentsia to forget the bitterness of the past. Naturally, the blame for all that happened was assigned to Lin Biao and the "gang of four," who supposedly distorted Mao Zedong's "correct" teachings and directed the "Cultural Revolution" into "false channels" for their own selfish purposes. Zhou Yang stressed at the congress that the "Thought of Mao Zedong, including his ideas about literature and art, always was, is and will be the compass by which we are guided in our literary and artistic work."

It is not surprising, therefore, that the generous promises made at the congress and prior to it, "to develop democracy in literature and art," did not arouse anticipation in all congress participants. Chinese writers and artists, poet Bai Hua said, are naturally disturbed by the fact that the people who took revenge against them have not been punished by law and have not even been demoted in rank. In response to the official appeals to "write the truth" and "speak frankly," Bai Hua said: "Many frank people have lost their jobs, their freedom, the elementary necessities of life and even their heads. At the same time, many liars have easily won glory and privilege and have become dignataries. The primitive mentality has been firmly established: The liar is safe, but the man who speaks the truth is taking a risk."

There is no question that the Beijing leadership will have to make a tremendous effort to dispel the doubts of cultural workers and stimulate their artistic activity. The promotion of Zhou Yang--a man whose name is associated with the persecution of many honorable writers and artists in the late 1950's--to the position of this association's chairman is hardly likely to help.

The need to develop "cultural exchange and friendly contacts with writers and artists in various countries," which is supposed to contribute to the "fight against imperialism and hegemonism," is only mentioned in general terms in the published congress materials. This means that the PRC rulers will continue using literature and art in their fight against the Soviet Union, Vietnam and other socialist countries--that is, they will use them for purposes totally unrelated to the real interests of the Chinese people and Chinese culture.

Question: What were the results, and what is our opinion of the results, of the visit made by Chairman Hua Guofeng of the CCP Central Committee, premier of the PRC State Council, to Western Europe (15 October-6 November 1979)?

Answer: It is true that the Chinese leadership widely publicized its satisfaction with the results of the first Western European visit by a Chinese head of state in the nation's history. An analysis of the results of Hua Guofeng's meetings with Western European leaders (French, West German, English and Italian) and articles in the Western press, however, indicates the opposite. The Chinese premier was unable to attain his chief political goal--a change in the approach of the leading four Western European countries to the Soviet Union and the policy of detente. The guest was informed that Western Europe had no wish to worsen relations with the Soviet Union.

The Chinese leader's talk about the danger of "hegemonism" was only given a positive reception in London and Munich, where M. Thatcher and F. J. Strauss demonstrated a certain similarity of opinions in regard to counteracting the "Soviet threat." On the whole, however, as even the British press reported, the ultimate goals of the West and Beijing turned out to be different. Beijing's belligerent instigating stand on military detente in Europe was particularly unattractive in comparison to the new peaceful initiative set forth in a speech by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev on 6 October 1979 in Berlin. Hua Guofeng openly took the side of the United States and the particular forces in Western Europe that have given in to the pressure of the Pentagon and military-industrial NATO circles in the issue of the deployment of new types of American medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe.

One of the main objectives of the Chinese mission was to win more support from the Western European countries for the continued escalation of tension in Asia, particularly Southeast Asia. But the instability in Southeast Asia is viewed in a different way in Paris, Bonn and other Western European capitals.

Hua Guofeng's trip to Western Europe did not produce any tangible economic results either. During the course of this visit, some agreements were signed on the development of economic, cultural and consular relations and the possibility of credit for China was discussed. Not one major agreement was signed, however. The "Chinese euphoria" was replaced by the sober predictions of Western economic experts about the "moderate" development of trade with China due to internal disorder in this nation and the limited nature of its export and currency resources.

Another reason for the visit of the premier of the PRC State Council was the hope of determining the possible scales of assistance in China's military-industrial development. Hua Guofeng was indisputably pleased by the comments of some political leaders of the Western European countries about their interest in a stronger China. Margaret Thatcher officially declared the British Government's willingness to sell China Harrier fighter planes and other military equipment. It is true that the "iron lady" made the sale of weapons to Beijing conditional upon the consent of other NATO members, since the Chinese aggression against Vietnam has made sober-thinking Western politicians aware of the risk of arming Beijing. Ruling circles in the Western European countries must also take the principled position of the Soviet Union on this matter into account. This objective of Hua Guofeng's mission also remained unattained.

Question: What is the nature of the terrorist regime of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary in Kampuchea, overthrown more than a year ago by the people of this country?

Answer: When we analyze the nature of the murderous Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime, we must first consider the following facts. This regime was not the result of internal Kampuchean processes, but of U.S. armed intervention in the beginning of the 1970's and, after the April 1975 victory in the war of resistance, the intervention of Maoist China, which wanted to establish a bridgehead in Kampuchea for the accomplishment of its great-power hegemonistic plans in Southeast Asia. Chinese social-chauvinism was the successor to American imperialism here. This is why Comrade L. I. Brezhnev correctly stated that a pro-Beijing regime had taken shape in Kampuchea by 1979, a "Chinese-style" political structure, and that the mass executions of people in Kampuchea were nothing other than the Chinese "Cultural Revolution" in action on foreign territory.[1]

Immediately after the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique took power in Kampuchea in 1975, this country was inundated with more than 20,000 Chinese "advisers." Pol Pot, the Chinese chauvinists' assistant, said at that time: "Out of 8 million inhabitants, we need only 1." This extremely inhumane belief was then implemented as the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime murdered more than 3 million Khmers in 3 years and devastated the country, especially in the Kampuchean cities. The similarity to the goals of the Chinese "Cultural Revolution" is quite evident: the political intimidation of the working class, the annihilation of the intelligentsia and, what is more, the transformation of the country into one big "strategic village"--or, more precisely, a "death camp" for the Khmer people.

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[1] PRAVDA, 10 January 1979.

The declaration of the United Front for the National Salvation of Kampuchea contains the following definition of Pol Pot's social order: "The regime of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique is a regime offering a new type of slavery and has nothing in common with socialism." In essence, this was not a political regime in the strict sense of the term, but a machine for the total physical and moral annihilation of the Khmer nationality, a machine which made "living space" available to emigrants from China and huaqiao from the Southeast Asian countries, a machine which was installed and put in operation by Beijing in its own chauvinistic, hegemonistic interests.

The Pol Pot regime had no objective conditions or social base. It remained in power exclusively by means of terrorism and outside intervention and was a form of "barracks communism." Naturally, this terrorism aroused opposition in the population and among cadres. The united resistance forces stamped out this regime of genocide and slavery. The crimes of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique were revealed to the entire world. Imperialist reaction and the Beijing rulers are futilely trying to whitewash and "renovate" this bloody regime and to depict the remnants of Pol Pot's gangs as "fighters resisting foreign aggression." But the progression of Kampuchean society toward democracy and socialism is irreversible.

Question: What stand has Beijing taken in negotiations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam?

Answer: The most striking feature of the Chinese side's position in the Vietnamese-Chinese talks is Beijing's persistent utilization of these talks to exert the most flagrant pressure on Vietnam in order to achieve what it could not usurp by means of armed aggression. In place of egalitarian and mutually beneficial agreements, the Chinese side is trying to dictate its own terms to Vietnam, namely SRV recognition that it is part of Beijing's sphere of special interests (that is, hegemonistic great-power interests) in Asia and, in accordance with these interests, the implementation of a Beijing-approved policy toward Kampuchea, Laos and the world socialist community as a whole, the renunciation of its sovereign rights to the Paracel and Spratley Islands and the reinstatement of the residence rights of all huaqiao whose flight from the SRV to the PRC was revoked by Beijing.

Beijing is also using the talks as an occasion to demonstrate the "peaceful" foreign policy of Maoist China, particularly in Southeast Asia, and, in fact, to prolong the conflict and use these talks as a cover for the continuation of its aggressive expansionist policy in Indochina. The Chinese militarists have not ceased their armed provocations against the SRV and their invasions of its lands, territorial waters and skies.

Moreover, there is reason to believe that Beijing is using the talks to prepare world public opinion for a possible repetition of China's armed invasion of Vietnam. China is building up its armed forces and weapons on the Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Lao border and is openly demonstrating its willingness to embark on a new military adventure.

It is clear that the Beijing rulers have not abandoned their policy of exerting pressure on Vietnam. Under these conditions, it is difficult to expect real advances in the resolution of urgent problems in the interrelations between the two countries. Positive results can only be attained if the Chinese side takes a constructive and realistic stand and renounces the policy of flagrant arbitrariness, expansionism and hegemonism.

Question: What is the essence of Beijing's tactic regarding the ASEAN countries and what do the Chinese leaders expect to achieve here?

Answer: In its increased hostility toward the Indochinese countries and its ostentatious show of "friendship" for ASEAN, Beijing is essentially adhering to its traditional tactic of setting some Southeast Asian states against others. Mao Zedong's heirs now want to create conflict not between individual countries, but between entire groups of Southeast Asian states with differing social structures. In its pursuit of this objective, Beijing is acting in concert with imperialism and is coordinating its own policy of setting the ASEAN states against the socialist states of Indochina with imperialist policy.

Beijing is making every effort to conceal the main purpose of its policy toward ASEAN--to draw the association into the sphere of anti-Soviet and anti-Vietnamese politics by declaring the need for a "united front" against the USSR and SRV. This is the purpose of virtually all foreign policy activity by the PRC in relations with ASEAN, which has recently taken on the dimensions of a diplomatic boom. Beijing is not limiting itself to general assurances of "friendship" and appeals to "ward off" the imaginary expansion of the Indochinese countries and the USSR, but has even expressed a provocative willingness to "assist" ASEAN by military means.

The Chinese "patronage" of ASEAN is hypocritical. The Maoists are still supporting pro-Beijing groups and elements in the ASEAN countries and are doing their utmost to stimulate political and financial contacts between the huaqiao and Beijing. The Chinese rulers are simultaneously increasing their positive balance in trade with the ASEAN countries (between 1970 and 1976 alone, the total deficit in commodity turnover between the ASEAN countries and the PRC was around 2.5 billion dollars, and by the end of this century Beijing plans to increase the annual flow of currency resources out of these countries to 1 billion dollars). Beijing's actions are taken with consideration for the presence of influential rightist bourgeois and reactionary forces in the ASEAN countries, which are not averse to using China to counteract socialist forces in Southeast Asia. The supporters of a "tough" line in ASEAN are pushing the association into a trap set by Beijing, which hopes, as is well known, to rule all of Southeast Asia.

Question: What was the result of Japanese Prime Minister M. Ohira's talks in Beijing on 5-9 December 1979?

The meeting in Beijing demonstrated that, in spite of the numerous assurances of "friendship and cooperation" by both sides, there are serious differences in the Chinese and Japanese approaches to the resolution of problems in international and bilateral relations.

The PRC leadership is striving to use these talks primarily for the purpose of drawing Japan into the orbit of its own hegemonistic great-power policy and to win support for some of its actions in the international arena. But the Japanese delegation definitely refused, for example, to support Beijing's policy toward Vietnam. It appealed to the PRC to "display restraint in interrelations with Vietnam, settle the conflict through negotiations and not resort to the use of weapons." The Japanese representatives announced that their country would "keep its promise to give Vietnam economic assistance in 1980." The positions of the two sides also diverged considerably in the assessment of Soviet policy and in other matters.

Questions connected with the further development of trade and economic ties were given a great deal of attention at the talks. In spite of China's requests for 5.5 billion dollars in credit, Japan agreed in principle to negotiate only the sum of 1.5 billion, and specifically promised to extend only 200 million dollars in the 1979 fiscal year for work on six projects--the construction and remodeling of hydroelectric power stations, railroads and seaports. As for credit in subsequent years, its extension, it was announced, will depend on "concrete financial conditions" in Japan and "progress in the completion of these projects."

The press made much of the Japanese prime minister's statement that Japan will extend China all of the customs privileges set up for the developing countries from 1 April 1980 on. Nonetheless, both sides made an effort to ignore the decision to restrict imports of Chinese products to Japan.

While the Japanese delegation was in Beijing, an agreement was signed on cooperation in the investigation and exploitation of oil deposits in Bohai Gulf over a territory with a total area of 25,000 square kilometers. If this enterprise should be successful, China will sell Japan 42.5 percent of the petroleum yield for 15 years. Foreign correspondents noted, however, that the project is not likely to be completed by 1984, as the two sides have planned.

During this visit, an agreement was signed on cultural exchange. The Japanese side promised to allocate around 4 million dollars in nonrefundable aid for the organization of Japanese language studies in China. It was also announced that an agreement had been reached regarding a trip to Japan by Premier Hua Guofeng of the PRC State Council in May 1980.

During their stay in Beijing and upon their return to Japan, the leaders of the Japanese Government took pains to assure the Southeast Asian countries, particularly the ASEAN, as well as the United States and the Soviet

Union, of their intention to take a discerning approach to the development of contacts and relations with the PRC.

The results of the Japanese prime minister's visit to the PRC proved that the PRC leadership's hope of winning unconditional Japanese support for Beijing's hegemonistic course has obviously suffered a defeat. Japan displayed a certain degree of caution in its replies to Beijing's political solicitations and tried to satisfy its own interests in these talks. The reappearance of acute conflicts between the two countries does not cancel, however, the potential danger Japanese-Chinese rapprochement would pose to the cause of peace in Asia if this rapprochement would be based on an unprincipled foundation and move in directions meeting the requirements of reactionary forces.

Question: Why is it that Japanese businessmen, despite all of their caution, attach great significance to economic relations with the PRC and are financing Japanese-Chinese trade "out of their own pocket"?

Answer: China is an extremely unreliable trade partner for Japan. It has repeatedly set up unexpected barriers to the completion of transactions eagerly sought by itself by demanding the revision of terms and thereby putting Japanese companies into a difficult position. This was the case with all of the contracts signed in 1978 for a total of 2.3 billion dollars. The main reasons for this not very conscientious behavior can be found in the adventuristic nature of the current Chinese leadership's policy, the unrealistic plans for the "four modernizations" and China's overestimation of its ability to repay loans.

These transactions were only resumed in May 1979, after Japan decided to extend China yen credit amounting to 8 billion dollars, with payment to be made in yen as well as dollars. These substantial concessions were made by the Japanese side for a number of reasons. The PRC's share of Japanese foreign trade does not exceed 3 percent. But the PRC represents a sales market for the particular Japanese goods that are most difficult to sell. The PRC is quickly becoming one of the largest importers of complete sets of Japanese equipment. This impresses business and official circles in Japan. This is also the reason that Japanese companies seem to have forgotten the shock they suffered in the spring of 1979 and have increased their shipments of goods to China while simultaneously increasing imports from China, as a result of which commodity turnover in Japanese-Chinese trade in 1979 reached an impressive figure--6.5 billion dollars.

In their intensification of trade with China, Japanese ruling circles are also pursuing political goals--they hope to consolidate their own position in Asia, to "exert pressure" on the USSR, to enhance the prestige of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, to weaken opposition forces and to muffle pressing internal problems with the aid of the "China boom." But they are not deluded as to the feasibility of these goals.

The growth of Japanese-Chinese commodity turnover in 1979 was the result of temporary factors in the market and has not eradicated the major conflicts between the PRC and Japan in this field.

Question: The PRC leadership is persistently striving to establish military ties with Japan in addition to economic and political contacts. What specific steps are being taken in this field? What effect could Sino-Japanese rapprochement in the area of military policy have on the international situation in Asia?

Answer: Ever since the "treaty on peace and friendship" with Japan was signed on 12 August 1978, the PRC leadership has repeatedly proposed the establishment of close contacts between the military establishments of both countries. A month after the treaty was signed, Zhang Caiqian, deputy chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army, took a trip to Japan to discuss the establishment of regular contacts with the Japan Defense Agency.

In May 1979, Su Yu, PRC deputy minister of national defense, visited Japan. During the course of this visit, Su Yu made provocative statements about the "military threat" posed to Japan by the USSR and appealed to the Japanese Government to strengthen its military alliance with the United States, build up its military potential and develop contacts with Chinese military circles. Su Yu also declared that the PRC was prepared to purchase military technology, including equipment for the production of computerized fire direction devices.

The Japanese Government's official statements generally totally exclude the possibility of any kind of military contacts with China for the sale of weapons to China. In October 1979, however, a decision was made to send a delegation of officers from medical units to China as a kind of "trial run."

It should also be borne in mind that, along with purely military contacts, the extension of credit and loans to China for the purchase of various types of equipment, machinery and means of transport and for the financing of projects connected with the modernization and development of the infrastructure will also be of great significance in building up China's military potential. A member of the executive committee of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party, I. Nakagawa, declared in this connection on 27 November 1979, for example, that the offer of economic assistance to China "could be tantamount to military cooperation."

The desire of both countries to develop contacts of this kind gives rise to the real danger of their considerable expansion in the near future, which would have an extremely negative effect on the international political situation in Asia, severely injure the development of Japan's ties with neighboring countries, complicate the spread of detente to Asia and the Pacific region and prevent the conclusion of collective agreements on guaranteed security in Asia.

Question: What stand has Beijing taken in regard to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan?

Answer: Ever since the April revolution of 1978, the PRC has made the focal point of its relations with Afghanistan various kinds of subversive activity against the revolutionary gains of the Afghan people. The Chinese leadership is actively supporting and assisting reactionary Afghan elements both within the country and beyond its borders. Numerous articles in the foreign press have reported shipments of weapons to the Afghan rebels by the PRC, along with the United States and other Western countries. Weapons of Chinese manufacture were used by participants in antigovernment demonstrations in a number of cities in Afghanistan. China has delivered large shipments of weapons to the enemies of the Afghan revolution both directly across its common border with Afghanistan and through Pakistan. An announcement by a representative of the security service of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan stressed that Beijing is training gangs of terrorists and raiders, made up of counterrevolutionary emigre elements, on Chinese territory. According to India's LINK magazine, more than 8,000 Afghan rebels were trained in 12 camps located in Pakistan and China in just the year following the April revolution. The December issue of COUNTERSPY prints convincing data concerning the presence of Chinese Army officers and instructors in Pakistan, who are training and equipping armed formations operating against Afghanistan.

Subversive antigovernmental activity against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is also being conducted by Afghan Maoists, who look to Beijing for guidance and support. An illegal "congress" of Afghan Maoists was held in Herat in January 1979, where a decision was made to unite the efforts of separate groups and coordinate their actions for an all-out fight against revolutionary Afghanistan.

As we know, acting on the Afghan Government's persistent requests for immediate assistance in the fight against foreign aggression, the Soviet Union sent a limited military group to Afghanistan, which is being used exclusively to aid in warding off armed intervention by external forces. Beijing, however, is making every effort to denigrate the Soviet Union's friendly support and assistance of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and to discredit the purposes and objectives of the Afghan revolution.

Beijing is taking its subversive actions against the Afghan revolution in close conjunction with the forces of international imperialism and reaction, especially the United States. This was conclusively reaffirmed by U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown's trip to China. One of the central topics of discussion in his meeting with the Chinese leaders was the question of broader support for military groups invading Afghan territory from bases in Pakistan.

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AN ACTION CONFLICTING WITH THE INTERESTS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM (AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ABROGATION OF THE SOVIET-CHINESE TREATY)

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[Article by Professor M. S. Ukraintsev]

[Text] On 3 April 1979, the PRC Government announced that the Standing Committee of the Chinese National People's Congress had decided not to renew the Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance Between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, concluded on 14 February 1950, signifying that the treaty will expire in April 1980.

The Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance represents an entire era in Soviet-Chinese relations; it has also left its mark on international life as a whole.

The treaty was concluded soon after the declaration of the People's Republic of China, and the very formation of the PRC was indissolubly connected with the role played by the Soviet Union in world affairs and with its consistent support of the Chinese revolutionary cause. Mao Zedong said in 1949 that if there had been no Soviet Union, if there had been no victory in the antifascist Second World War, if--and this is of particular importance with respect to the Chinese revolution--Japanese imperialism had not suffered a defeat, and if there had been no support from the socialist states and revolutionary forces in other countries, the victory of the Chinese revolution would have been impossible.[1] The Soviet Union heartily welcomed the victory of this revolution. It was the first to recognize the People's Republic of China and establish diplomatic relations with it.

In December 1949, talks initiated by the Chinese side began in Moscow. During the course of these talks, between December 1949 and February 1950, many questions connected with the international situation and Soviet-Chinese relations were discussed, several documents were drafted and plans were made to develop cooperation by the two states and safeguard the security of the PRC.

On 14 February 1950 the Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance (for a period of 30 years), agreements on the Chinese-Changchun Railroad, Port Arthur and Dal'niy and on the extension of long-term economic credit to the PRC and other documents were signed.

The Soviet-Chinese treaty embodied the noble goals of peace and security and the lofty principles of international friendship and cooperation and represented a model of the new type of intergovernmental relations characteristic of the fraternal socialist countries. It was signed at a complex, difficult and crucial moment in the life of the People's Republic of China, when the Chinese people had just embarked on the path of socialism and were experiencing a particularly acute need for assistance and support in the accomplishment of the difficult tasks of economic and cultural construction and the defense of the young socialist state against imperialist aggression. The treaty became one of the most important conditions for the attainment of these goals. The Soviet-Chinese friendship and cooperation strengthened by the treaty, and the PRC's entry into the family of socialist countries and into the ranks of energetic fighters for peace were factors of primary importance in the Chinese people's successful struggle to peacefully build a new and independent socialist China and in the enhancement of its international prestige.

The PRC and USSR undertook joint measures to prevent the repetition of aggression and violation of the peace by Japan or any other state which joined Japan, either directly or indirectly, in its aggressive actions. In the event of invasion of one side by Japan or its allies, the other side would immediately render all military or other assistance to its utmost capability. Both sides undertook to participate in the spirit of sincere cooperation in all international events aimed at the consolidation of peace and security. They agreed to consult with one another on important foreign policy issues affecting their common interests. The treaty also envisaged the maximum expansion of economic and cultural contacts between the USSR and China. Their cooperation was to be based on the principles of equality, mutual interests and respect for one another's sovereignty and territorial integrity, just as nonintervention in one another's affairs.

In a separate document, both governments guaranteed the complete independence of the Mongolian People's Republic.

The results of the treaty came immediately. Implementing the Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, the USSR sent several aviation divisions to China in accordance with an agreement concluded at the time of the Moscow talks. Soviet pilots stopped Chiang Kai-shek's air raids on Shanghai and other locations and safeguarded the security of the entire eastern coastline of the PRC. Later, during the war in Korea, Soviet air divisions located in China protected Northeast China and the entire eastern coastline against American air attacks.[2]

Close contacts were established between the CPSU and CCP, between the two governments and between various departments in the two countries, and the regular exchange of opinions and experience was instituted. The USSR and PRC coordinated their foreign policy actions and fought shoulder to shoulder with other fraternal countries in the struggle against imperialism and for peace and international security. Economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation acquired broad dimensions.

The existence of the Soviet-Chinese alliance was the most important factor keeping the militaristic American circles responsible for the aggression in Korea from firing the flames of war into the PRC. Harry Truman, who was then the President of the United States, later wrote the following about this. "If we had tried to extend the war to China, we could have expected retaliation. Peiping and Moscow were allies, both ideologically and in accordance with their treaty. If we had attacked communist China, we could have expected Russian intervention."[3]

The firm stand of the USSR kept U.S. imperialism from dropping a nuclear bomb at the time of the so-called crisis in the Taiwan Strait in the fall of 1958, which was being insisted on, as later reports indicated, by the American military establishment. In a letter sent to the CPSU Central Committee on 15 October 1958, Mao Zedong commented: "We are deeply touched by your boundless fidelity to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and internationalism. On behalf of all my comrades who are members of the Chinese Communist Party, I sincerely thank you.... In our fight against the Americans, we have already acquired the strong support of the Soviet Union."[4]

In turn, the PRC took part in actions initiated by the USSR and other fraternal countries for the purpose of safeguarding security and peace. The PRC welcomed the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact as the necessary basis for preserving the safety of all peaceful people. Minister of National Defense Peng Dehuai, who attended the conference of the socialist countries in Warsaw as an observer representing China, said the following: "If the peace in Europe is violated, if imperialist aggressors launch a war against the European peace-loving countries, our government and our heroic population of 600 million will join the governments and populations of our fraternal countries in the fight against aggression until the final victory."[5]

The USSR and the other fraternal countries belonging to the United Nations resolutely defended, and still defend, the rights of people's China in the international arena. As early as 1950, the USSR announced that it did not recognize the authority of Chiang Kai-shek's delegation in the United Nations and demanded that representatives of the PRC be invited into this international organization. At each session of the General Assembly, the Soviet representatives insisted on the dismissal of Chiang Kai-shek's representatives and the restoration of China's rights in the United Nations.

In accordance with the agreement of 14 February 1950, the Soviet Union granted the PRC the full ownership of the Soviet section of the CCRR [Chinese-Changchun Railroad] in 1952. Many Chinese railroad workers were trained on the CCRR. In connection with the war in Korea, the PRC Government requested an extension of the Soviet presence in Port Arthur. On the initiative of the USSR, Soviet Army and Navy units were recalled from the base in May 1955, and all of the equipment in this region was transferred to China free of charge.

Commodity exchange between the two countries developed rapidly: The total in 1950 was 519 million rubles, but in 1959 it was already 1.849 billion.

Machinery, equipment, spare parts, ferrous and nonferrous metals, chemical products, petroleum and petroleum products and many other commodities essential to the development of the Chinese economy were shipped from the Soviet Union to China in large quantities. In turn, China supplied the Soviet Union with ores and concentrates of nonferrous metals, chemical products, textile raw materials and semimanufactured goods, raw materials of vegetable and animal origin, foodstuffs and industrial consumer goods.

Soviet economic assistance took the form of shipments to the PRC, on beneficial credit terms, of complete sets of equipment and materials for enterprises being built and remodeled in the PRC with the technical assistance of the USSR, the training of Chinese specialists in the USSR and the dispatch of Soviet specialists to the PRC. In all, the Soviet Union extended long-term credit to China for a sum exceeding 1,818,000,000 rubles, of which the Chinese side used around 1,816,000,000. In accordance with an agreement of 1 February 1951, offering the Chinese side a discount of 209.5 million rubles, the total credit subject to repayment was 1,737,700,000 rubles including interest. The highest interest rate charged was 1-2 percent per annum, although in world practice of that time credit was extended at much higher rates. The preferential terms of Soviet credit also included the possibility of repayment by means of shipments of traditional Chinese export goods.

Over a period of 10 years (1954-1963) the Soviet Union sent China more than 24,000 complete sets of technological documents, including the plans for 1,400 large modern enterprises and licenses for the manufacture of many industrial items, materials and machines. The use of Soviet scientific and technical experience helped China to quickly, and on a high technical level, accomplish the growth of many economic branches and laid the foundations for socialist industrialization. In turn, the use of Chinese experience in some branches of the national economy was also helpful to the Soviet Union, although the volume of documentation transmitted was not great (between 1954 and 1963 the USSR received around 2,000 complete sets of technical documents from the PRC).

Between 1951 and 1962, around 11,000 Chinese engineers, technicians and skilled workers and around 1,000 students acquired an education, scientific training and practical experience in the USSR. More than 11,000

Chinese undergraduate and graduate students received degrees from Soviet higher academic institutions (moreover, the Soviet Government paid 50 percent of the cost of their education).

At the request of the Chinese Government, more than 10,000 Soviet specialists were sent to China between 1950 and 1960. The work performed by the Soviet specialists in the PRC is a vivid example of the fraternal feelings of the Soviet people and the CPSU for the people of China. This was not a commercial transaction, as in the nations of the capitalist world, but an unselfish offer of assistance to the Chinese people in the transmission of the rich Soviet experience in socialist construction.

Soviet economic assistance helped China to establish whole branches of industry--aviation, automotive, tractor, radioelectronic, heavy and precision machine building, instrument building and various branches of chemical production, as well as to modernize and develop power engineering, the coal, petroleum, petroleum refining and pulp and paper industries, light industry, the food industry and transportation. Just recently, the organ of the CCP Central Committee, HONGQI magazine, noted that 156 central industrial enterprises were built in the first five-year plan with Soviet assistance, that this "laid the initial foundation for socialist industrialization" and that "successes were tremendous."[6]

The first clear signs of a change in the Chinese leadership's policy were apparent in 1958 and 1959. Isolated problems sprang up in the relations between the two countries. There had been differences of opinion on some matters in the past, but the two sides had reached an agreement without difficulty. Now, however, Mao Zedong and his supporters began to behave more and more capriciously and made more stubborn attempts to impose their own wishes.

During the talks between Soviet and PRC leaders in Beijing on 31 July-3 August 1958, Mao Zedong displayed an extremely unhealthy reaction to the Soviet side's decision that it would be inexpedient to comply with the Chinese regime's request for several hundred atomic submarines. Soon after this meeting, China launched hostilities in the region of the coastal islands, and the situation in the Taiwan Strait became extremely tense, giving rise to the danger of a major armed conflict. The Chinese rulers could provide only a fairly unintelligible explanation for their actions when Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko arrived in Beijing at the beginning of September 1958, in the first days of the crisis. Mao Zedong asserted at that time that, all things considered, international tension would be more convenient to our countries and less convenient to the imperialists, particularly the tension connected with events around Taiwan.

The Chinese leaders ignored Moscow's friendly advice on the conflict between China and India in the Himalayas. Moreover, when a Soviet party and governmental delegation arrived in Beijing to attend festivities commemorating the tenth anniversary of the PRC, the Chinese rulers pointedly expressed their displeasure with a TASS press release of 8 September 1959, in which the Soviet Government called upon both sides to settle their dispute in the spirit of the traditional friendship between the two states.[7]

The Chinese leaders maintained that it was not China's fault that relations between the PRC and the USSR deteriorated. They alleged that the USSR "tied the knot, and it is its job to untie it." But what actually happened?

When the Chinese leadership decided to foment a break with the Soviet Union and the socialist community at the end of the 1950's, it began to take more and more actions contrary to the Soviet-Chinese treaty. In violation of articles 1 and 4, the Chinese rulers stopped taking part in international actions aimed at the safeguarding of peace and security and began to provoke world war. Consultations between the partners on important international issues affecting the common interests of the USSR and PRC ceased to be held. Contrary to articles 1 and 2, they indulged the whims of Japanese imperialism and worked toward the creation of a Sino-Japanese alliance directed against the Soviet Union. They violated article 5, which obligated the two sides to build their relations in the spirit of friendship and cooperation and in accordance with the principles of equality, mutual interests, mutual respect for state sovereingty and territorial integrity and nonintervention in one another's internal affairs. They declared hostility toward the USSR to be the basis of state policy, made territorial claims on their neighbor and began to promote the creation of an international front for struggle against the Soviet Union. After commencing this process in 1960 with arguments over theoretical matters, the Chinese leadership later discarded this ideological pretext for its turnabout and openly agreed to an alliance with imperialism in the fight against world socialism.

The transformation of the Chinese leaders' attitude toward the treaty--from its high commendation and energetic implementation to its denunciation--was closely related to the evolution of their political course, in which the dominant position was gradually occupied by great-power hegemonistic ideas, hostility toward the real friends of the Chinese people, contempt for other countries and nationalities and a pathological hatred for anything contrary to the Maoist strategy of establishing world supremacy.

Mao Zedong said in a meeting with the Soviet ambassador in February 1963 that if the argument should continue, the "sky will not fall, grass and trees will still grow, fish will swim and women will give birth to children." Frank argument represented, in his words, a battle fought with pens, brushes and paper, and it could not kill anyone. Alas! Mao Zedong's policy led to the firing of shots on the island of Damanskiy in 1969 and the death of people on both sides. "In 10 or 15 years," Mao Zedong said in February 1965, "when the imperialists raise their hand against you or against us, we will join forces. War will immediately unite us. We are fighting because we are living in a time of peace."[8]

Now the Maoists are trying to ingratiate themselves with the imperialists as much as possible and have allied themselves with the imperialists in the fight against the socialist community and against the communist and national liberation movement.

In a talk with a group of Japanese socialists on 10 July 1964, Mao Zedong threatened to present the bill for sizable sections of Soviet territory. Since 1962, the situation on the border has become increasingly tense. The Chinese rulers have obviously been searching for a pretext for conflicts and have tried to provoke the Soviet side into firing shots, so that this could later be used to poison the mind of the Chinese people. After it became clear that Soviet border guards could not be provoked to armed conflict on the border, the Beijing ruling clique ordered Chinese border guards to open fire. This led to conflicts on Ussuri River on the island of Damanskiy in March and on the western section of the border in August 1969, ending in the utter defeat of the Chinese provocateurs. Soon after this, Mao Zedong told the president of one Asian country that all of this had been engineered expressly for the purpose of arousing hatred for the Soviet Union in several generations of Chinese.

As for the Soviet Union, its line in regard to the Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutal Assistance with the PRC was always clear and definite. We are still deeply convinced that history will give the necessary credit to this treaty, which helped the Chinese people defend the sovereingty and independence of the People's Republic of China in the most difficult years of its development and served as an important instrument for the preservation of peace and security in the Far East and the rest of the world.

Even during the years when the Chinese authorities were trying to denigrate and undermine the significance of the treaty, the Soviet Government invariably acted on the assumption that the treaty was still in force, that the obligations stipulated in the treaty for both sides were still binding and that they had to be respected by the Soviet Union. Speaking on behalf of the Soviet Government, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs L. F. Il'ichev officially informed the Chinese side of this in April 1971.

After the Soviet Union had repulsed Chinese provocations on the border, it firmly and consistently pursued the normalization of relations with the PRC. Even during the period of greatest friction in this relationship, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union did not lose sight of the main perspective: The fundamental interests of the Soviet and Chinese people coincide, and the return of Soviet-Chinese relations to the channel of friendship and neighborliness would be of tremendous importance to both countries, to the entire socialist community and to the cause of peace throughout the world. The USSR proposed that the heads of the Soviet and Chinese governments meet to seek ways of normalizing intergovernmental relations.

When Chairman A. N. Kosygin of the USSR Council of Ministers went to Hanoi to attend the funeral of President Ho Chi Minh, he expressed his willingness to make a brief stop at the Beijing airport in his flight over China and to meet with Premier Zhou Enlai of the PRC State Council. The Chinese Government consented to this meeting and it took place on 11 September 1969.

During the course of this talk, which lasted three and a half hours, the restoration of normal conditions on the border, the exchange of ambassadors, the promotion of more active economic contacts and other matters were discussed. An agreement was concluded, in general terms, that the USSR and PRC would take steps to normalize intergovernmental relations.

The Soviet Union sent V. S. Tolstikov to the PRC as its ambassador in October 1970, and he was replaced by I. S. Shcherbakov in September 1978. Chinese Ambassador Liu Xinquan arrived in Moscow in November 1970, and in August 1977 Wang Youping was appointed PRC Ambassador to the USSR.

Trade negotiations did not begin right away. It was not until June 1970 that the Chinese side responded to the USSR minister of foreign trade's thoughts concerning the commencement of negotiations and the possible volume of reciprocal shipments. In November 1970, a delegation headed by Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade I. T. Grishin went to the PRC. A protocol was signed on commodity turnover for 1970-1971. The tripling of its volume was planned (in 1970 it totaled 42 million rubles). Between 1972 and 1977 the trade volume between the two countries amounted to 210-260 million rubles a year, and in 1978 it exceeded 300 million rubles due to the transfer to world prices. The Soviet Union supplies China with some metals, civilian aircraft, machine tools, and spare parts for tractors and motor vehicles. The PRC exports nonferrous metals, cotton fabric, tung-oil, hog bristles and fruit to our nation.

In order to create an atmosphere favorable for the normalization of relations, the Soviet press ceased to print criticizing remarks about the policy of the CCP leadership. The Soviet press and radio kept this silence for several months, but Beijing was intensifying its propaganda campaign against the USSR at that time.

In line with the agreement concluded at the meeting of the heads of government concerning the institution of measures to normalize the situation on the border, Soviet border guards were instructed to do the following in September 1969:

To continue the strict maintenance of normal relations with Chinese border troops and authorities and to preserve the status quo on the border;

To always observe the procedure according to which all border issues must be settled by means of consultations, conscientiously and correctly, so that good-neighbor relations will exist on the border and the possibility of the use of weapons and force will be excluded;

Acting in line with the traditional relations of friendship between the people of the USSR and China, to conscientiously and mutually consider the interests of the population of border regions in both countries with respect to economic activity;

To refrain from propaganda against the other side on the border, including the use of loudspeakers.[9]

The Soviet side expected all of this to promote the improvement of relations between the two states and the establishment of normalcy on the border itself. The Soviet Government officially informed the Chinese side of all these measures immediately, assuming that China would take similar steps. The Chinese side soon replied that it had also taken steps in this direction. It appeared, therefore, that the mutual understanding that had been reached and the consistent implementation of the measures instituted by both sides would create the necessary conditions for the eradication of tension on the border and for the commencement of negotiations.

Not long before the beginning of the talks on border issues, on 7 and 8 October, the PRC Government published documents which repeated the previous groundless assertions that the treaties defining the present border between the USSR and the PRC were supposedly unfair. An attempt was made to blame the Soviet Union for the friction on the border, our party and nation were slandered, and it was stressed that "there are irreconcilable and fundamental differences of opinion between China and the Soviet Union" and that "the struggle between them will continue for a long time."[10]

Border talks began on 20 October 1969 in Beijing. The Soviet delegation was headed by First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V. V. Kuznetsov, and then by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs L. F. Il'ichev; the Chinese delegation was headed by PRC Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Qiao Guanhua, and later by Han Nianlong and Yu Zhan. "As you know," L. I. Brezhnev said on 14 April 1970, "the normalization of conditions on the Soviet-Chinese border is now being negotiated with the PRC Government. The Soviet Union has taken a clear and unambiguous stand in these talks. We believe it is necessary to reach an agreement which will turn the Soviet-Chinese border into a line of friendship rather than enmity. Without departing from our legal principled positions, and always defending the interests of our Soviet motherland and the inviolability of its borders, we will do everything within our power to normalize intergovernmental relations with the People's Republic of China. Naturally, as everyone knows, this does not depend only on us." [11]

The negotiations to clarify certain sections of the boundary line reached a deadlock, however, when the Chinese side, referring to some nonexistent "agreement by the heads of government," began to demand the recognition of "disputed regions" within Soviet territory and "the withdrawal of troops from areas adjacent to disputed regions."[12]

Neither at the time of the meeting of the heads of government nor in the subsequent exchange of letters between them was the achievement of positive results in the talks made dependent on the fulfillment of any kind of preliminary conditions. At any rate, the Soviet Union did not set forth any kind of preliminary conditions for the Chinese side, did not take on any commitments contrary to the interests of the Soviet Union and did not request the Chinese side to take on any commitments contrary to its interests.

What are these "disputed regions"? Why was it necessary for Beijing to invent them?

With the aid of the artificially manufactured concept of "disputed regions," the Chinese authorities are trying to camouflage the central element of their political line--great-power hegemonism and its innate territorial expansionism. The concept of "disputed regions" was engendered by Maoist dogmas along with territorial claims to parts of the Soviet Union and many other neighboring states.

The very term "disputed regions" is extremely useful to Beijing. It provides a phrase, commonly used in diplomatic speech and not indicative of any need for caution, to camouflage nothing other than territorial claims to Soviet land. The concept of "disputed regions," according to the plans of its creators, is mainly intended to shatter the existing boundary by creating huge gaps in it. Chinese representatives have frankly declared that "there is no boundary in the disputed regions," that the "Soviet-Chinese border is not a single, continuous line" and so forth. In other words, this is no longer simply a matter of clarifying the border in the "disputed regions," but of revising and changing the border as a whole.

Beijing's entire mode of behavior indicates that it is not pursuing the settlement of border issues, but the deliberate exaggeration of them for its own anti-Soviet, chauvinistic purposes.

There can be no other explanation for the loud provocative campaign to "substantiate" claims to Soviet land, which has been going on for many years in Beijing in the form of statements by Maoist leaders, numerous "studies" by scientists, dubious archaeological discoveries and the 1972 and 1979 respective editions of the "Atlas of the World" and an almanac. All propaganda tools have been put to work to lend the appearance of truth to the lies and fantasies invented in the depths of Beijing agencies.

In order to poison public opinion and to win imperialist friends, the Chinese authorities constantly scream that there is a "threat from the North," that the Soviet Union intends to "destroy" China and that this "threat" is making the successful outcome of the talks impossible.

As early as 14 March 1970, a TASS release was issued, in which attempts to cast suspicions on our nation's policy toward China were resolutely condemned. "Fabrications of this kind," the release said, "have absolutely no basis. With the aid of these, anticommunist propaganda is trying to hamper the Soviet-Chinese talks now going on in Beijing and add to the tension in Soviet-Chinese relations. The Soviet armed forces are performing their daily duties and improving their combat skills within the framework of the usual plans and programs, strengthening the defense of the Soviet State throughout all of its territory."[13] The TASS release stressed that the policy of the USSR and its government has invariably pursued the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations, the development of cooperation and the revival and reinforcement of the friendship between the populations of the two countries.

Even after this, however, the Chinese leaders continued to misrepresent the foreign policy of the Soviet Union by depicting it as a force hostile to the PRC. The campaign of "preparations for war," the measures to instill the spirit of militarism in the nation, and anti-Soviet inflammatory propaganda were escalated as intensively as before. Later, the legend about the "threat from the North" would be supplemented with a fable about the "threat from the South."

The Soviet Union reacted calmly to Beijing's slanderous attacks, adhering firmly to the line worked out at the 24th CPSU Congress: "We will not forgo the national interests of the Soviet State. The CPSU will continue its tireless fight to unite the socialist countries and the world communist movement on a Marxist-Leninist basis. At the same time, our party and the Soviet Government are deeply convinced that the improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China would be in the fundamental long-range interests of both our countries and the interests of socialism, the freedom of people and the consolidation of peace. We are therefore prepared to wholeheartedly promote not only the normalization of relations, but also the restoration of the good-neighbor relationship and friendship between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China and we are certain that this will ultimately be achieved."[14]

The Beijing lies about the USSR, particularly the legend of the "threat of attack," look particularly ridiculous against the background of the measures proposed by the Soviet Union.

As early as September 1969, when preparations for the border talks were being made in accordance with the agreement concluded by the heads of the two governments, the question of a Soviet-Chinese non-aggression pact was raised. Although the USSR and China had signed the Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance in 1950, the Soviet Union, with a view to the Chinese side's allegations that it was worried about the intentions of the Soviet side, proposed that the USSR and PRC conclude a non-aggression pact. The Soviet Government proposed that this important and serious commitment, which transcends the bounds of border settlement, be set forth not as one point of an agreement on temporary measures to preserve the status quo on the border, but in a special high-level intergovernmental act.[15]

But the Beijing leaders were interested least of all in removing their legend of the "threat" from the agenda. All of their actions were aimed only at preventing the conclusion of agreements in any form.

On 8 July 1970 the Soviet Government addressed the Chinese Government with a proposal that negotiations be conducted and an intergovernmental agreement be drafted on mutual non-aggression by armed forces, including nuclear, and on the prohibition of war propaganda and preparations for war against the other side. The Chinese Government essentially did not reply to this Soviet initiative, reiterating constantly that "talks would take place in an atmosphere of military threat" on the part of the USSR and alleging that "an atomic bomb would hang over the negotiation table."[16]

On 15 January 1971 the Soviet Government proposed the immediate conclusion of a Soviet-Chinese treaty on the non-use of force or threats of force in any form, including conventional, missile and nuclear weapons. A draft of this treaty was submitted to the Chinese Government. In particular, it said the following: "The sides undertake to avoid force and threats of force in any form whatsoever in their mutual relations during the settlement of disputes. They undertake to settle all disputes exclusively by peaceful means--by means of negotiations and consultations; the sides will not use armed forces against one another with any kind of weapon, including: a) conventional, b) missile, c) nuclear."[17]

The Chinese rulers rejected the draft, but agreed to the inclusion of a statement to this effect in the interim agreement on the preservation of the status quo on the border. The Soviet side conceded to its partners and the text of a corresponding article in the agreement on the status quo was drafted. It appeared that the matter had been settled. But the Chinese representatives erected another barrier, making their proposal conditional upon recognition of the concept of "disputed regions"--that is, they set forth a preliminary condition which would not have been acceptable to any sovereign state. In this way, both the conclusion of an agreement on the status quo and the enactment of the non-aggression commitment were left up in the air.

When official Chinese representatives realized it would be impossible to go any further and began to declare that relations between the USSR and China should be founded on the principles of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Union, still motivated by good intentions, expressed its willingness to build these relations on this foundation. This was also clearly announced on the highest level--for example, in L. I. Brezhnev's speech at the 15th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions in March 1972.

Translating this willingness into the language of absolutely specific and constructive proposals, the Soviet Union took another step in the same direction on 14 June 1973: It proposed to the Chinese leadership that a non-aggression treaty be concluded by the USSR and China. In the text of this treaty, the two sides would promise not to attack one another with the use of any types of weapons on land, on sea and in the air, and not to threaten attacks.[18]

This proposal was also rejected by the Chinese regime.

In February 1972, the Soviet side proposed the conclusion of long-term contracts and the resumption of border trade between the USSR and PRC. In March 1973 the USSR Ministry of Health proposed the revival of cooperation with China in the field of public health care. Various Soviet organizations and officials have repeatedly proposed the resumption of contacts and cooperation between academies of sciences and friendship societies, the exchange of correspondents from central newspapers and so forth. In December 1977 the USSR proposed the renewal of scientific and technical contacts.

All of these proposals, however, were either rejected or ignored. Before any problem in Soviet-Chinese relations can be solved, progress must be made in the resolution of the "border issue"--that is, even before the talks the Soviet Union will have to recognize Chinese territorial claims and satisfy other conditions. Premier Zhou Enlai of the PRC State Council said at an NPC [National People's Congress] session on 13 January 1975 that the recognition of the "disputed regions" and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from these regions was not much to ask.[19] When the Soviet side definitely refuted all of the claims dreamed up by the Chinese leadership, Beijing refused to settle other issues in Soviet-Chinese relations.

After rejecting Soviet proposals, the Chinese authorities began to escalate their anti-Sovietism and forced the Chinese people to waste their energy, funds and resources on the construction of trenches and underground shelters. As time went on, the Chinese rulers made more insistent attempts to convince their people that the Soviet Union was their number-one enemy and to isolate the Chinese people from the USSR.

On 14 March 1974 the Chinese rulers detained a Soviet helicopter and its crew, three officers, who unintentionally flew over Chinese territory in Xinjian and made a forced landing due to bad weather. The Soviet officers were imprisoned for almost 2 years and accused of espionage, but they and the helicopter were finally returned to the Soviet side in December 1975,[20] and a memo from the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowleged that the suspicions of espionage had not been corroborated. On 29 April 1976 someone committed a diversionary act against the Soviet Embassy in China by setting off a bomb at the embassy gates. Three Chinese were killed, including two militia-men on duty, and it was purely by accident that no Soviet people were injured. This action was obviously calculated to create acute conflict between the USSR and the PRC.

As for the USSR, the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th Party Congress, presented by L. I. Brezhnev, stressed that "in relations with China our party is adhering firmly to the line set forth at the 24th Congress. Experience has confirmed the accuracy of this line. We will continue to wage a struggle against Maoism, a principled and irreconcilable struggle." At the same time, it was reasserted that "in relations with China, just as with any other country, we adhere firmly to the principles of equality, respect for sovereingty and territorial integrity, nonintervention in one another's internal affairs and non-aggression. In other words, we are prepared to normalize relations with China on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence. Moreover, we can confidently say that if Beijing returns to a policy that is truly based on Marxism-Leninism, abandons its present line of hostility toward the socialist countries and embarks on the path of cooperation and solidarity with the socialist world, this will meet with the proper response from our side and will create opportunities for the development of good relations between the USSR and the PRC in line with the principles of socialist internationalism. It all depends on the Chinese side."[21]

In an attempt to aid in creating a peaceful atmosphere, in which it would be easier to seek ways of normalizing relations, the Soviet Union again stopped the publication of criticizing remarks and articles pertaining to the state of affairs in the PRC and the policy of this nation and set forth a number of new initiatives in September 1976, after Mao Zedong's death.

In a message to the Chinese leadership from the USSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers on the 27th anniversary of the PRC, the Soviet desire to normalize relations between the two countries on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence was underscored.[22] At the October (1976) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, L. I. Brezhnev declared that there were no problems in Soviet-Chinese relations that could not be resolved in a spirit of friendship.[23] On 28 November 1976, the head of the Soviet delegation at the border talks, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs L. F. Il'ichev, arrived in Beijing. During the course of the talks, he repeated the Soviet proposals aimed at the normalization of relations: the conclusion of a treaty on the avoidance of force and a non-aggression treaty, the establishment of regular contacts between ministries and departments and the resumption of cooperation in various fields. He underscored the Soviet Union's willingness to escalate the talks on the clarification of certain sections of the boundary line and to sign a new treaty so that this issue could be removed from Soviet-Chinese relations.

At that time, as later reports testify, a fierce battle was going on within the Chinese leadership, and the "gang of four" were arrested on 6 October 1976 after an attempted coup. During the campaign to expose the crimes of the "four," it was announced that they had destroyed and compromised experienced party, government and military cadres, subjected the artistic intelligentsia to brutal treatment, undermined the national economy, impeded China's scientific and technical development, objected to the study of useful foreign experience and obstructed China's international economic relations. Incidentally, during all the years that Soviet writers and the press had been pointing out what was happening in China, the Chinese side took offense and accused the Soviet Union of unfriendly attacks.

It was natural to assume that the dismissal of top-level officials promoted by Mao Zedong, their conviction for the tremendous injuries they had inflicted on China and the direct or indirect acknowledgment of the many errors of the "Great Helmsman" himself would result on adjustments in foreign policy, particularly policy toward the socialist countries.

The imperialist camp anxiously kept an eye on the new leadership to see if it would make a move toward detente in relations with the Soviet Union. The CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR frankly stated: "The benefits the West derives from the hostility between China and the Soviet Union are so obvious and so apparent in the West that even the hint of a possible decline in this hostility is disturbing."

But detente in relations with the USSR did not come about. The new Chinese leadership did not respond to Soviet initiatives. A desire to set up new barriers to the normalization of relations was apparent at the next round of border talks in November 1976-February 1977. The Chinese side again declared that relations could not be developed in any area unless the presence of "disputed regions" was recognized--that is, unless its territorial claims to Soviet land were satisfied. Moreover, it demanded the fulfillment of preliminary conditions and unilateral steps from the Soviet Union, which clearly attested to a desire to bring relations to an impasse.

Propaganda organs and officials, including top-level leaders, continued to misrepresent Soviet foreign and domestic policy. All available means were utilized to denigrate the peaceful foreign policy of the Soviet Union, the fraternal relations of the nations of the socialist community, the efforts of the USSR to consolidate friendship and cooperation between nations and its struggle against the forces of imperialist reaction and aggression.

On 19 May 1977 the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a memo to the PRC Embassy, in which the Soviet Government protested the slanderous campaign being conducted in China against the Soviet Union and issued a severe warning that the Chinese leaders would bear the full responsibility for the consequences of this campaign.[24]

At the same time, the Soviet Union consistently, just as could be expected of a nation convinced of the accuracy of its course, continued its efforts to put an end to the tension in Soviet-Chinese relations. In July 1977 the Soviet side consented to an agreement between the governments of the USSR and the PRC which would permit Chinese civilian ships to sail in Soviet internal waters past Khabarovsk when the border Kazakevich channel was too shallow.[25] and Chinese ships have been sailing past Khabarovsk since 1 September 1977. The Soviet Union simultaneously proposed that this channel be deepened and widened and expressed its willingness to supply the necessary equipment, but the PRC regime rejected this proposal.

The 11th CCP Congress (August 1977) marked the end of a crucial stage in the internal political struggle in China and took up the Maoist, adventuristic and schismatic policies of China in international affairs, with hostility toward the USSR lying at its basis. Chairman of the CCP Central Committee and State Council Premier Hua Guofeng said: "At the beginning of this year, Chairman Mao Zedong told us: 'The United States has certain interests in the world which it is striving to defend, but the Soviet Union has a thirst for expansion, and nothing can change this.... The Soviet Union and the United States are potential seats of a new world war, particularly Soviet social-imperialism, which represents a great danger.... Now that we are faced by aggression and threats on the part of imperialism, particularly social-imperialism, since the Soviet revisionists have not abandoned their hope of enslaving our nation, we must be prepared to fight.'"[26]

Beijing has persistently defended the hegemonistic theory of the "three worlds." It is adhering to the line of undermining the socialist community, the world communist movement and the national liberation movement and exploiting the conflicts between the socialist world and imperialism in the interests of Beijing's own great-power policy. In a September 1977 meeting with Manfred Werner (Christian Democratic Union), representative of the FRG Bundestag's defense committee, Deng Xiaoping called Sino-Soviet rapprochement unthinkable; he expressed the certainty that neither he nor Hua Guofeng would live to see this and added that he excluded the possibility of this "even for the future generation."[27]

Beijing has made increasingly frank statements signifying that it is imperialism's partner in the fight against the USSR, and imperialist propaganda has synchronized its campaign of hostility toward the USSR with these statements. In an article published in CHINA AKTUEL, Wolfgang Bartke wrote: "The Springer press, which was cited 8 times in 1977, is given preference, as a result of which political and propaganda schizophrenia is becoming obvious. On the one hand, China, which is pursuing confrontation with Moscow, is using the FRG press and, on the other, the Springer press and the BAYERN KURIER, which are aimed at anticommunist policy, are always the first to unconditionally join the Chinese press in its campaign against Moscow."[28]

This position was contrary to common sense and it was most damaging to the PRC. Renowned American Professor Allen Whiting said in his book "China's Future" that "both Beijing and Moscow realize that Washington is exploiting the confrontation between them, playing one side against the other."[29] American scholar Stephen Levine, expert on Sino-Soviet relations, said in an article entitled "The Soviet Factor in Sino-American Relations," published in the book "Dragon and Eagle," that "the alleviation of tension between China and the Soviet Union will return some of the funds allocated for military needs to important areas of economic development. This will also," Levine went on, "exert more pressure on the United States, which will have to make concessions to China in the Taiwan matter to keep China from taking the side of the USSR."[30] American scholar James Hsiung wrote in ASIAN SURVEY that the United States should not be in any hurry to sacrifice Taiwan, since China, which is bound by its hostile policy toward the USSR, has nowhere else to turn and will not depart from good relations with the United States.[31] In an article published in CURRENT HISTORY, D. W. Klein said: "Beijing's reconciliation with the Soviet Union would make it possible to solve the Taiwan problem: Nothing could compel the United States to abandon Taiwan more quickly than the probability of close relations between the PRC and USSR."[32]

The Soviet Union has repeatedly taken steps to alleviate the tension between the two countries.

In a 24 February 1978 message to the NPC Standing Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium announced its willingness to put an end to the present abnormal situation in relations between the USSR and PRC and to stop the dangerous process of the continued exacerbation of relations, which could have seriously negative effects on our nations and people and on the fate of peace in the Far East, Asia and the rest of the world. For the purpose of giving concrete form to the expressed desire of both sides to base their relations on the principles of peaceful coexistence and of embodying this desire in an authoritative international act, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium proposed that our nation issue a joint declaration of the principles of interrelations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China. A joint declaration of the way in which the two sides will build their relationship on the foundation of peaceful coexistence, adhering firmly to the principles of equality, mutual respect for sovereingty and territorial integrity, nonintervention in one another's internal affairs and nonaggression, could promote the normalization of our relations. The hope was expressed that, if the idea of issuing this kind of document would be acceptable to the Chinese side, a meeting of representatives of the two sides on a sufficiently high level could be held in Moscow or Beijing to draft a mutually acceptable statement as soon as possible. During the course of this meeting, Chinese proposals aimed at the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations could also be discussed.[33]

The NPC session of February-March 1978 indicated that the Chinese leadership was not only avoiding any discussion of the essence of the need to normalize relations with the USSR, but was also displaying its intention to continue conducting its hostile policy toward the Soviet Union. On the level of a PRC State agency, the NPC session reaffirmed the anti-Soviet course of the Chinese leadership, as set forth at the 11th CCP Congress, and gave this course legal reinforcement in the basic law of the nation--the constitution. Now the struggle against the USSR and its allies is not only a party norm, stipulated in the CCP Charter, but also a constitutional norm. The constitution was amended to correspond to the documents of the 11th CCP Congress, according to which the Soviet Union was declared China's number-one enemy. At the NPC session Hua Guofeng repeated the accusation that the Soviet Union has supposedly not abandoned the hope of "enslaving our nation" and connected it directly with the need to accelerate all economic and military development in the nation.[34] In this way, anti-Sovietism was associated with the so-called general objective of PRC domestic policy.

The Chinese Government responded to the Soviet message on 9 March 1978 in a note from the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Soviet Embassy.[35] It rejected the Soviet proposals. The note stipulated preliminary conditions for the improvement of intergovernmental relations, touching upon the defense of the USSR and the security of Mongolia. This signified that Beijing was still not ready for the kind of constructive dialog that would bring about positive changes in relations between the USSR and PRC and was already moving toward the culminating point of its policy of hostility toward the USSR--the denunciation of the Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance.

Imperialist circles applauded the Chinese Government's rejection of the new Soviet initiative. The newspaper of the English Conservatives frankly stated that "the conclusion of a nonaggression treaty between Moscow and Beijing would be the most frightening event imaginable in the international arena, with the exception of world war."[36]

Belligerent imperialist circles encouraged the Chinese rulers' provocative behavior. During his visit to Beijing in May 1978, Z. Brzezinski, the American President's national security adviser, wanted to learn whether Beijing was taking a firm enough anti-Soviet stand and was reassured by what he was told. The NEW YORK TIMES wrote: "In his speeches Brzezinski tried to underscore the common concern about the Soviet Union. Apparently, he was successful in his dealings with the Chinese leaders, who like his tough stand in relations with the USSR."[37] But some voices in the United States were heard appealing for caution. "President Carter and his national security adviser Zbigniev Brzezinski are acting as if," an American newspaper said, "they should reward the PRC for steps taking largely in its own interest. It even appears that they regard the weak Chinese economy and the poorly equipped Chinese Army as a blessing that will somehow strengthen the strategic position of the United States in relation to the much more powerful USSR. The fact is, however, that increased hostility on the part of the Soviet Union could harm us--and the PRC--more than Beijing could help us. For example, any military incident connected with the Soviet Union on the Chinese border would quickly compel Hua Guofeng and Carter to come to their senses and realize the kind of risk they are taking."[38]

Events in Southeast Asia also left a mark on the Soviet-PRC relationship for many years.

The U.S. aggression against Vietnam presented an excellent opportunity for the reconciliation of the USSR and PRC and the unification of their efforts for the purpose of rendering assistance to a socialist state that had become the victim of imperialist aggression. The Chinese leaders, however, rejected Soviet proposals regarding joint measures to assist Vietnam when it was resisting the American aggression. For several years, the Chinese set up barriers to block the shipment of Soviet weapons and ammunition to Vietnam through Chinese territory and disrupted the operations of the Moscow-Hanoi air line.

The Vietnamese people's victory and the rapid unification of the nation into a single Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the conduct of an independent foreign policy by Vietnam and its line of stronger unity with the socialist states displeased Beijing. Beijing was also displeased by the development of fraternal relations between Vietnam and Laos, which had begun to build socialism. The Chinese leaders became increasingly certain that Vietnam did not wish to serve as an instrument of China's aggressive policy in Southeast Asia, but, to the contrary, was opposing Chinese expansion. Beijing then began to exert more pressure on Vietnam.

Once again, the Soviet Union vigorously supported the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The determination of the SRV and USSR to resist attacks or threats of attack was reflected in the 3 November 1978 treaty on friendship and cooperation between the two countries. "We can predict," L. I. Brezhnev said when the treaty and agreement were signed, "that it (the treaty--M. U.) will displease those who do not like the idea of friendship between the USSR and Vietnam, who take advantage of the escalation of tension and who hope to break up the socialist countries. But the treaty has already become a political reality. And whether they want to or not, they will have to take this reality into account."[39]

After a period of threats and provocations, China launched armed aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on 17 February 1979 for the purpose, as Deng Xiaoping said when he visited the United States, of "punishing" Vietnam. Chinese troops intruded on Vietnamese territory on almost the entire length of the border and seized a number of populated points in the border zone. Vietnam resolutely repulsed the aggressor. The adventure cost Beijing the lives of several tens of thousands of soldiers and large quantities of military equipment; China suffered incalculable damage in the eyes of the world public, who learned more about the habits of the Chinese rulers and condemned this disgusting aggression. Instead of "punishing" Vietnam, the Chinese militarists were soundly beaten, and on 5 March Beijing had to announce the withdrawal of its troops from Vietnam. Even during the retreat, however, Chinese troops continue to destroy cities and villages, blow up bridges, pillage and loot.

The Soviet Government issued a statement on 18 February 1979, announcing that China's attack on Vietnam testified once more to Beijing's exceedingly irresponsible attitude toward the fate of peace, and the criminal ease with which the Chinese leadership resorts to the use of weapons. The Soviet Union will perform all of the obligations it took on in line with the treaty on friendship and cooperation between the USSR and SRV. Policymakers in Beijing should stop before it is too late. The USSR has resolutely demanded the cessation of aggression and the immediate withdrawal of Chinese troops from the territory of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.[40]

The Soviet Union took an active part in the extensive international campaigns of the socialist countries, communist parties, many developing states, and progressive and peace-loving organizations in all countries against the criminal invasion of Vietnam by the Chinese militarists. Measures were taken to render additional assistance to Vietnam and supply it with everything needed for the repulsion of the aggressor. The Soviet Union carried out several other important measures, which were fully understood by the Chinese rulers and which cooled their ardor. All of these measures were carried out in constant contact with the SRV leadership.

In a statement issued on 2 March, the Soviet Government warned Beijing not to take aggressive actions against the Lao People Democratic Republic.[41] The Soviet Union gave the LPDR additional assistance in strengthening its defense capability.

It was a logical consequence of China's decline to the position of imperialism's accomplice that the NPC Standing Committee announced on 3 April 1979 that it would not renew the 14 February 1950 Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance Between the PRC and USSR. The treaty had supposedly played its historic role in safeguarding the security of China and the Soviet Union, in promoting friendship and cooperation between the two countries and in defending peace in the Far East and the rest of the world, but great changes had taken place in the international situation--for example, relations between the USSR and Japan, and later between China and Japan, had been normalized, the provisions in the treaty pertaining to Japan were outdated, the commitments stipulated in the treaty had been ignored, and not through the fault of the PRC, and the treaty had ceased to be nominally in effect long ago.

In a statement issued on 4 April, the Soviet Government described this hostile act as the logical result of the extreme rightward shift in the policy of the Chinese ruling clique, their adventurism and their desire for hegemony. China's shameful aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the statement said, demonstrated how adventuristic the policy of Beijing ruling circles had become and how low they had fallen in betraying the interests of socialism.[42]

Informing the Soviet Government of its decision to cancel the treaty, the PRC Government proposed, in the same note of 3 April 1979, that talks be conducted to settle unresolved issues in the relations between China and the Soviet Union and to improve these relations. There was no rhyme or reason to Beijing's illogical position. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union, which has always advocated the normalization of relations with China by means of negotiation, agreed to enter into talks of this kind and, in a memo dated 17 April, suggested the following topics of discussion: the improvement of relations and the drafting of a document on the principles of interrelations between the USSR and the PRC as a point of departure. Later, in a memo dated 4 June, the Soviet side suggested that this document include a statement about the nonrecognition of any claims to special rights or hegemony in Asia, even for peaceful purposes. Finally, in a memo dated 23 June, the Soviet side consented, with consideration for the wishes of the Chinese side, to add the question of the development of trade, scientific and technical contacts and cultural exchange in the spirit of equality and mutual benefit to the agenda of the negotiations. The two sides agreed to entrust the negotiations to governmental delegations headed by deputy ministers of foreign affairs--respectively. L. F. Il'ichev and Wang Youping.

At the suggestion of the Chinese delegation, the two sides agreed to hold the Soviet-Chinese talks alternatively in Moscow and Beijing (the Soviet delegation agreed to this after the Chinese side consented to its proposal that future negotiations to settle border disputes also be held by turns in Moscow and Beijing). It was also decided that the delegations would work without a formal agenda, with each delegation bringing up the topics it deemed necessary. The Moscow stage of the negotiations lasted from 27 September through 30 November 1979. The talks will be continued in Beijing soon.

At the first plenary session on 17 October 1979, the Soviet delegation submitted a draft declaration on the principles of interrelations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China to the Chinese delegation.

The Chinese delegation is making the drafting of the principles of interrelations conditional upon the settlement of "unresolved issues" and the "elimination of barriers." The talks were accompanied by feverish activity on the part of Beijing, visits and negotiations, during the course of which the Chinese leaders are arranging parallel actions with the imperialist powers and appealing for the creation of an international coalition for struggle against the USSR.

It is possible that great-power and hegemonistic aims have obscured some Chinese leaders' view of the state of affairs in the international arena, but they must understand that the cancellation of the treaty by the PRC Government was an extremely rash and nearsighted step to take, as well as an extremely dangerous one for the cause of peace. China will also lose a great deal as a result of this. Many errors committed in the past are now being criticized in China. The time will come when this act will also be appropriately judged.

FOOTNOTES

1. Mao Zedong, "On the Popular Democratic Dictatorship," Moscow, 1949, p 9.

2. M. S. Kapitsa, "KNR: tri desyatiletiya--tri politiki" [The PRC: Three Decades--Three Policies], Moscow, 1979, pp 33-53.

3. H. S. Truman, "Memoirs," vol II, New York, 1956, p 382.

4. M. S. Kapitsa, Op. cit., p 170.

5. Ibid., p 79.

6. HONGQI, 1979, No 10.

7. PRAVDA, 9 September 1959.

8. Quoted in PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1974, No 2, p 72.

9. PRAVDA, 1 April 1978.

10. RENMIN RIBAO, 9 October 1969.

11. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [Following the Leninist Course. Speeches and Articles], vol 2, Moscow, 1970, p 542.

12. RENMIN RIBAO (13 March 1978) reported that an "agreement" regarding the "disputed regions" had supposedly taken place.

13. PRAVDA, 14 March 1970.

14. L. I. Brezhnev, "O vneshney politike KPSS i Sovetskogo gosudarstva. Rechi i stat'i" [On the Foreign Policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State. Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1978, pp 238-239.

15. MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', 1975, No 4, p 39.

16. M. S. Kapitsa, Op. cit., p 406.

17. PRAVDA, 21 March 1972.

18. M. S. Kapitsa, Op. cit., p 407.

19. RENMIN RIBAO, 19 January 1975.

20. PRAVDA, 28 December 1975.

21. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 11.

22. Ibid.

23. PRAVDA, 26 October 1976.

24. Ibid., 27 May 1977.

25. "Istoriya mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy na Dal'nem Vostoke 1917-1977 gody" [The History of International Relations in the Far East, 1917-1977], Khabarovsk, 1978, p 439.

26. RENMIN RIBAO, 23 August 1977.

27. DIE WELT, 27 September 1977.

28. CHINA AKTUEL, 1978, No 2.

29. A. S. Whiting, "China's Future. Foreign Policy and Economic Development in the Post-Mao Era," New York, 1977, p 26.

30. "Dragon and Eagle. United States-China Relations: Past and Future," New York, 1978, p 252.

31. ASIAN SURVEY, August 1977, vol XVII, No 8, University of California Press, p 708.

32. D. W. Klein, "The Foreign Policy of the People's Republic," CURRENT HISTORY, 1977, vol 73, No 429, p 55.

33. PRAVDA, 21 March 1978.

34. RENMIN RIBAO, 27 February 1978.

35. PRAVDA, 21 March 1978.

36. DAILY TELEGRAPH, 27 March 1978.

37. NEW YORK TIMES, 23 May 1978.

38. WASHINGTON POST, 12 September 1978.

39. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rechi, privetstviya, stat'i, vospominaniya" [Following the Leninist Course. Speeches, Addresses, Articles and Memoirs], vol 7, Moscow, 1979, p 503.

40. PRAVDA, 19 February 1979.

41. IZVESTIYA, 3 March 1979.

42. PRAVDA, 5 April 1979.

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THE PRC ECONOMY IN 1979

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[Article by V. I. Akimov, doctor of economic sciences, and V. I. Potapov, candidate of economic sciences]

[Text] 'Regulation' in Place of the 'Four Modernizations'

We know that a long-range program for the development of China was drawn up in 1978 at the First Session of the Fifth NPC [National People's Congress], pursuing the goal of turning the country into a "great and mighty power" by the end of this century. The strategic objective of "approaching the top world level" in economic indicators, of reaching this level or surpassing it, was set. In other words, it was assumed that China would be one of the world leaders in economic development by the end of the 20th century. The program of the so-called "four modernizations" was set forth as a means of attaining this objective.

The program gave top priority to the development of heavy industry, military production and transportation. It envisaged accelerated agricultural development. As the decisions of the First NPC Session stipulated, the program of "four modernizations" was intended primarily to accelerate the militarization of the country and provide a material base for the establishment of strong military-industrial potential for the purpose of turning China into a strong military power. The Chinese leadership associated this national economic guideline with preparations for war. In foreign policy, the line adopted was one approved at the Third Plenum of the CCP Central Committee in December 1978: the line of alliance with the developed capitalist countries and the "expansion of the international united front of struggle against hegemonism"--that is, against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

The fulfillment of the ten-year plan for national economic development during 1976-1985, the basic premises of which had been discussed at the First NPC Session, was supposed to be the first major step in carrying out the "four modernizations" program. This plan was based on the idea of a modified "great leap forward." Many of the economic indicators specified in the plan were inconsistent with the actual state of the national economy. Disparities between the rise in demand for material goods and the low level of their production, between consumption and accumulation, between levels of industrial and agricultural development, between separate branches of industry and so forth were ignored. The plan envisaged excessively high rates of agricultural mechanization, although neither the material nor the socialist conditions for this existed. In his report at the Second Session of the Fifth NPC, Chairman Yu Qiuli of the PRC State Planning Commission remarked that "serious disparities in the national economy have not been corrected as yet, chaos and confusion still exist in production, construction and the circulation and distribution sphere, and many consumer service problems are still unsolved."[1]

In reference to capital construction in 1978 and the beginning of 1979, RENMIN RIBAO reported that the scales of ongoing capital construction far exceeded material and financial capabilities. It will take all of the resources allocated for capital construction in the next few years just to complete ongoing projects. Existing plans were compiled without a scientific approach, contain many "gaps" and violate the comprehensive balance of material and financial resources. It was also pointed out that certain problems still exist in capital construction, such as the excessively broad scales of this work, the dissipation of forces and means and administrative confusion.[2] As a result of this, 1978 plans for the construction and start-up of large and medium-sized facilities were only 70-percent fulfilled, and 82 percent in the case of isolated projects. Although capacities for the production of 39 basic types of industrial commodities were augmented, plans were unfulfilled for 26 (coal and iron ore, rolled steel products, chemical fibers and other commodities).[3]

After the First Session of the Fifth NPC, extensive debates broke out in China over the means and methods of carrying out the "four modernizations" program, which testify to differences of opinion within the Chinese leadership on matters of economic construction. One of these debates began at the all-China conference on the law of value, at which time serious differences of opinion were expressed by various groups of participants. A heated debate broke out at the all-China conference on capital construction, at which time plans for the construction of industrial and other facilities in 1979 and subsequent years were criticized and it was recommended that the number of construction projects, present as well as future, be reduced, and that the construction schedule be revised with a view to the economic importance of each individual project.

A national economic plan and state budget for 1979 were approved at the Second Session of the Fifth NPC (18 June-2 July 1979). For the first time since the end of the 1950's, detailed reports on the fulfillment of state plans and the state budget for the preceding year and the drafts of the plan and budget for the current year were published in China. A discerning approach must be taken to the numerical indicators in these reports on plan assignments and results, as they are often based only on approximate statistics and are largely the product of the Beijing leadership's sly propaganda.

The Chinese leadership had to make substantial adjustments in its ambitious plans for rapid industrial development in 1979 and the next few years. The PRC State Council had to revise the 1979 national economic plan that was drawn up in 1978. According to reports in the Chinese press, the revised plan "assigns top priority to the accelerated development of agriculture, light industry and the textile industry and increased production and construction in the coal, petroleum and electric energy industries, transportation and the construction materials industry."[4] In the first place, the rates of industrial growth are much lower in the revised plan (according to official data, the rate dropped from 13.5 percent to 8 percent). The growth rate of light industry (8.3 percent) is supposed to exceed the growth rate of heavy industry (7.6 percent). Despite the advertised priority development of agriculture, the growth of the gross product in this branch in 1979 has been set at 4 percent (according to official data, the increment was 8.9 percent in 1978).

In the second place, the scales of capital construction were reduced for the more efficient use of capital investments. Total capital investments for 1979, including credit in foreign currency and the funds of local government bodies and agencies, have been set at 50 billion yuan, in comparison to 47.9 billion in 1978. The proportion accounted for by capital investments in heavy industry will be lower than in the preceding year (decreasing from 54.7 percent to 46.8 percent). Investments in the coal, petroleum, electric power and construction materials industries will be increased. There was a slight rise in proportional capital investments in light industry (5.8 percent as against 5.4 percent). Proportional capital investments in agriculture rose from 10.7 percent in 1978 to 14 percent in 1979.

The construction of 987 large and medium-sized facilities and the completion of the construction and start-up of 118 large and medium-sized facilities and 258 separate structures are planned. The start-up of these facilities and installations will make it possible, in particular, to increase cement production by 2.1 million tons, augment logging operations by almost 1.5 million cubic meters and increase the true capacity of ports by 11.6 million tons. In agriculture and commercial fishing, 65 large and medium-sized irrigation networks and 11 fisheries are to be built. The construction of several new railroads and auxiliary roads and the electrification of the most heavily used trunklines are planned.

In the third place, measures were envisaged to heighten the efficiency of production and ensure the stricter observance of conservation standards. In general, these were aimed at augmenting the role of economic methods of management, instituting elementary order at enterprises and in administrative and planning agencies and raising profits and profitability levels. As for specific economic problems, top priority is to be given to the alleviation of difficulties in supplying the national economy with fuel and electric power.

In the fourth place, the plan envisaged a considerable increase in exports--up to 19.2 billion yuan (14.7 percent higher than the 1978 figure), and an increase in imports of up to 24.8 billion yuan (32.4 percent higher). A sum of 4.73 billion yuan was allocated for the purchase of complete sets of equipment and new technology (3.2 times as great as the 1978 figure). All regions and departments were instructed to "make a massive effort to develop the export sector and increase foreign currency revenues."

State budget revenues and expenditures for 1979 were set at 112 billion yuan (in 1978 income was 112.1 billion and expenditures were 111.1 billion).[5] No increase in revenues was planned for 1979 for several reasons, particularly the need to finance a rise in purchase prices in agriculture and auxiliary trades, the "regulation" of the wages of some workers and employees, the reduction or cancellation of taxes in some rural regions and the expansion of public employment. One of the chief distinctive features of the 1979 state budget is its much more militaristic nature, reflected in a significant rise in military expenditures. Military expenditures planned for 1979 amount to a huge sum--20.2 billion yuan (16.8 billion in 1978). There is reason to believe that the official data published in China on military spending are considerably understated. For example, the American magazine BUSINESSWEEK, believes that if expenditures on military research and the provision of servicemen with food and clothing are taken into account, the actual amount China spends on military needs would be equivalent to 25 percent of the state budget, and not 18 percent.[6] It appears that these estimates are also understated. We can say that China is one of the world's leaders in terms of absolute volumes of military spending, while it is in 125th place among 150 yuan members in terms of per capita income (152 dollars a year).[7]

New committees and ministries were created to improve the management of the economy and individual economic branches--in particular, the Financial and Economic Committee of the PRC State Council, the State Committee for Agriculture, the Ministry of Building Materials and the Eighth Ministry of Machine Building. The ministries of agriculture and forestry and the ministries of water conservancy and the power industry were consolidated.

During the year, many national, sectorial and regional conferences were held to discuss ways of "regulating" the economy and solving current problems.

Despite all of these measures, however, the state of the economy is still fairly poor. Gross industrial production was only 5.7 percent higher in the first 8 months of 1979 than during the same period last year.[8] The situation was somewhat better in September and October. In particular, gross industrial production was 9.4 percent greater in September 1979 than in August, including a rise of 10 percent in light industry and of 8.9 percent in heavy industry. Since July, measures have been taken to intensify the development of light industry and the textile industry with a simultaneous deceleration of the growth rate in heavy industry. In the first 10 months of 1979, industrial production increased 7.4 percent, but this was still lower than the plan assignment. The Chinese press reported an increase of 9.6-22 percent in the outputs of cotton thread and fabric, synthetic detergents, chemical fertilizers, tractors, bycicles, sewing machines, wristwatches, radios, paper and cardboard. On 24 November 1979, RENMIN RIBAO reported that "little progress" had been made in "regulation." The instructions to reduce the front of capital construction have not been implemented. Many administrators have refused to reduce volumes, complaining that their sectors are "bottlenecks" limiting the development of the entire national economy. There has been a tendency toward expanded scales of capital construction.

During the second half of the year, the Chinese press repeatedly pointed out the need for a redistribution of capital investments in favor of agriculture, light industry and the textile industry. Apparently, changes in this branch are being made too slowly. The reorganization of the economic structure is also taking too long, and this structure is still dominated by heavy industry.

Problems in providing the economy with fuel, energy and raw material resources were just as pressing in the second half of the year. According to Vice Premier Kang Shien of the PRC State Council, conservation became a particularly acute issue in industry and transportation. He also announced that the output of coal, petroleum and electric power in the next 3 years "will just barely cover the needs of production development."

The anticipated improvement of food supplies did not come about. According to official data, the per capita harvest in 1979 was 300 kilograms, which "is insufficient in view of national requirements" and "there is no reason for optimism in this area."[9] The retail prices of meat, fish, eggs and other food products were raised on 1 November 1979 in China. For example, the prices of meat, fish and other seafood rose by an average of 33 percent. Therefore, the state did not take on the entire cost involved in the elevation of agricultural wholesale prices. The wages of workers and employees were simultaneously increased approximately 40 percent to compensate for the rise in retain prices. Nonetheless, the price increase had a negative effect on the life of the people and will certainly reduce the consumption of animal husbandry products. The increase in wages will not compensate for the higher prices.

It has been extremely difficult to guarantee the accumulation of state budget income. The economic effectiveness of industry, transportation and agriculture is still low. Such important problems as the need for an effective system of economic planning and management have not been solved. Judging by the decisions of the Financial and Economic Committee of the PRC State Council to organize the nationwide "investigation and analysis of economic issues" and of the PRC State Council "to intensify statistical work and subsidize organizations engaged in this work," the Beijing leadership does not have complete information about the actual state of the national economy and its problems and contradictions.

The increased wages of some workers and employees widened the gap between public purchasing power and the market's ability to satisfy demand. It has been suggested that this gap will become even wider in the next 2 years, and this will certainly escalate inflationary tendencies.

One new feature of the economy in 1979 was the encouragement of private enterprise. An effort is being made to restore and stimulate the development of the private sector, represented by independent craftsmen, small-scale merchants and the owners of small service establishments. In the middle of September 1979, the central RENMIN RIBAO newspaper reported that independent craftsmen and small businessmen had been given a "green light" in trade and the service sphere. The newspaper criticized those who described the activity of individual craftsmen as a "capitalist deviation" and explained that these craftsmen do not hire labor, are not exploiters and do "observe" existing laws. By August 1979, for example, 3,300 licenses were issued in Liaoning Province for the opening of small private industrial and trade enterprises. In October 1979 it was reported that local authorities in Guangzhou had authorized the operation of 15,000 private enterprises, and 300 citizens in Beijing were permitted to open private restaurants.

The "former" Chinese capitalists have become more active in economic life. The bank accounts, personal real estate and other assets that were confiscated during the "Cultural Revolution" were returned to them at the beginning of 1979. Representatives of the national bourgeoisie have been encouraged to take management positions in industrial and other enterprises, are being employed as skilled engineering and administrative personnel and are receiving high wages and other benefits. An official statement was made at a "discussion of CCP policy regarding the bourgeoisie" organized by the United Front Section of the CCP Central Committee in January 1979: "We must make every effort to utilize national capital to stimulate national economic development."[10] Private stock companies have come into being. The founding of a "patriotic construction company," the shareholders of which are former Shanghai industrialists and merchants, was announced at the end of September. Its immediate objective is to acquire foreign currency by constructing luxury buildings and selling them to rich overseas Chinese and their relatives. The stockholders will earn a fixed rate of interest on their capital.

The Beijing leaders are throwing open the doors of the nation to foreign capital. At the Second Session of the NPC (18 June-2 July 1979), the need for the "more vigorous use of foreign capital" was discussed. The "Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Enterprises Founded with Chinese and Foreign Capital Investments," adopted at the Second NPC Session, went into effect on 8 July 1979. This law permits foreign companies, enterprises and individuals to establish joint enterprises on PRC territory with Chinese companies, enterprises or other economic organizations. As a rule, foreign capital should represent at least 25 percent of the total investment. Foreign participants are authorized to transfer their share of net profits and all their other assets out of the country. Other privileges have also been extended. A special committee on foreign capital investments in the PRC has been created in connection with the enactment of this law. Various methods are being used to attract foreign capital--compensatory transactions, contracts for the processing of raw materials, the acquisition of parts for the assembly of finished products, and technical cooperation.

Here are a few examples. The Chinese Foreign Credit and Investment Company in Shanghai, headed by Rong Yiren, one of the most prominent Chinese capitalists, signed an agreement with the American Eaton-Shen [?] Pacific Corporation at the beginning of October. The agreement covers the next 3 years and envisages the investment of 150 million dollars in the establishment of joint enterprises and in compensatory trade.[11] The Beijing General Economic Construction Company had signed several dozen agreements and contracts by the middle of September for compensatory transactions, the processing of raw materials, the assembly of machines and so forth.[12]

Foreign businessmen are attracted to China by the cheap labor and the substantial privileges extended by the Beijing leadership.

The State of the Economy in 1979

Industry: Economic development in 1979, as mentioned above, took place in difficult and largely unfavorable conditions. As a result, the industrial growth rate was lower than in 1978 and there was no significant increase in the economic effectiveness of production, although the output of many commodities did increase to one degree or another, some technical and economic indicators were higher in individual branches and the quality of some products improved.

Data on the production plan for several types of industrial commodities for 1979 are compared to corresponding official data for 1978 in Table 1.

There is reason to believe that the data on the production of fuel and electric power in 1978 were overstated. Besides this, the substandard products of technically poorly equipped small and medium-sized enterprises were included in the total output.

Considerable difficulties in industrial development became apparent in 1979. The biggest problem was the inadequate fuel and energy base, although China occupies third place in the world in terms of absolute fuel production scales. The growing severity of the fuel and energy crisis was one of the main reasons for the disruption of the "four modernizations" program. To a considerable extent, the shortage of fuel and energy is being compounded by their extremely wasteful use. For example, the use coefficient of the heating capacity of fuel in China is only 28 percent, which is almost only half as high as in developed countries. In comparison to existing standards, there are significant overexpenditures of fuel and electric power. Annual overexpenditures amount to 40-50 million tons of coal, 3-4 million tons of oil and 20-30 billion kilowatt-hours of electric power. Up to 30 percent of the nation's production facilities (up to 50 percent in some provinces) are not being used due to the shortage of electric power. Conservation assignments for 1980 call for a savings of 10 percent in liquid fuel, 5 percent in coal and 3 percent in electric power. Despite the measures that have been taken, the fuel and energy problem will not be perceptibly alleviated in the near future, and this will certainly slow down the development of industry and the entire economy.

Table 1

Type of product	1978	1979 (plan)
Growth of gross product (%)	13.5	8
Coal (millions of tons)	618.0	620.0
Petroleum (millions of tons)	104.05	106.0
Electric power (billions of kilowatt-hours)	256.55	275.0
Steel (millions of tons)	31.78	32.0
Mineral fertilizers (millions of tons)	8.69	9.57
Tractors (thousands)	113.5	95.0

Sources: RENMIN RIBAO, 28 and 29 June 1979.

Chinese industry is experiencing increasing difficulties due to the shortage of skilled engineering and technical personnel, workers and administrators. A survey of 32 light industry enterprises in the city of Kaifeng (Henan Province) revealed that only seven enterprise directors met the necessary requirements.[13] The inadequate skills and low general educational level of the capital's industrial workers (over 80 percent of them have less than a secondary school education) have been reported by BEIJING RIBAO.[14] Labor productivity at large enterprises in China is only one-fifth as high as in developed countries. In a number of provinces, only 20 percent of the administrators in industry, transportation and finance are experienced in their field.[15]

In 1979 steps were taken to raise the professional level of workers in industry, especially administrators and engineering and technical personnel. In particular, they are now being sent to capitalist countries for training and work experience. The network of higher and secondary academic institutions for the training of specialists for industry is being expanded. It was reported in the middle of March 1979 that workers and employees would have to take professional technical examinations in 1979.[16] The transfer of personnel and the promotion of better-trained workers to administrative positions are being practiced.

In 1979 the Chinese press had much more than usual to say about the problem of product quality. In its pursuit of better quality, China is borrowing from foreign experience. Besides this, experiments are being conducted with quality control systems (for example, in machine building), "quality months" are organized, and the provision of economic and moral incentives has been instituted (the awarding of certificates of merit, medals, bonuses and so forth). The "reorganization" method is also being used, sometimes taking the extreme form of the closure of enterprises producing substandard goods. For example, in the first quarter of 1979 the Beijing Electronics Administration "reorganized" 20 plants, transferring part of their manpower and raw materials to enterprises producing goods of the required quality. In Shanghai 42 textile mills were "reorganized" (merged into 24 enterprises).

Measures were taken in 1979 to develop the cooperative (collective) sector in industry. This was done because the creation of new jobs at cooperative enterprises requires considerable less funds than at large and medium-sized enterprises. In addition, it was done in an attempt to improve consumer services. In Beijing, for example, several hundred cooperative tailoring salons, carpentry shops and other enterprises were founded in 1979. This provided work for part of the unemployed younger generation. The cooperative sector accounts for one-third of the Chinese industrial gross product.[17]

Let us take a look at conditions in the main branches of industry.

In the coal industry, limited coal production was planned, in essence, for 1979, which is totally inconsistent with the officially declared intention to "intensify production and construction" in the coal industry[18] to alleviate the acute shortage of fuel in the nation. Apparently, this was planned because the practice in 1977 and 1978 was to sharply intensify coal mining at small mines, many of which produced fuel with a high rock content, while the increase in coal output from large and medium-sized mines was far ahead of the growth of facilities for the concentration of fuel. This caused the quality of the coal output to deteriorate perceptibly. Conditions in the branch were also affected by the obviously inadequate volumes of preparatory operations and the shortage of transport. We still believe[19] that the coal output statistics published in China for 1978 (and 1977) were overstated.

In 1979 the fuller use of the potential capabilities of existing enterprises and the technical remodeling of all mines were given top priority. The Chinese press reported in May 1979 that many mining enterprises had still not matched the highest level of labor productivity in the past, although production equipment had been renovated and the level of mechanization in major mines was more than 20 percent higher than in 1966.[20] One "serious obstacle" in the development of the coal industry was the high number of accidents in the mines. According to the NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, losses of working time due to accidents totaled 25,000 man-days in just the first 8 months of 1979. This deprived the nation of 6.1 million tons of coal.

Major capital construction projects in the coal industry last year were concentrated in eight coal basis with an annual yield of more than 10 million tons of coal each. The year's increment in new coal-mining facilities was set at 13.6 million tons. Attention was directed to the increased scales and accelerated speed of preparatory operations at existing mines.

In the petroleum industry the negligible increase in oil production stipulated in the state plan for 1979 was a result, according to the official explanation, of the need to "regulate the internal balance in oil fields" and "delays in prospecting work."[21] On the whole, there was a noticeable tendency toward a constant decline in the growth rate of liquid fuel production in 1979, just as in previous years.

The objective of improvement in geological prospecting work for the purpose of finding new sources of liquid fuel was set in the petroleum industry. The output of natural gas grew more quickly in the past year than the output of petroleum, and petroleum refining increased. It was reported, for example, that the oil output was 3.6 percent greater in the first half of 1979 than in the first half of 1978, the output of natural gas was 7.4 percent greater, the oil refining volume was 6.3 percent greater and the output of the main petroleum products was 10.2 percent greater. There was a 17-percent increase in total capital construction during this period.

A conference of petroleum industry workers was held in March 1979 to stimulate the production activity of oilmen and put an end to some undesirable developments in production. The question of more intensive ideological work with the laborers in this branch was discussed at the conference. According to the official explanation, the conference was made necessary, in particular, by the fact that "there has been noticeable disregard for state and collective interests and for production development among workers recently...and there have been violations of public law and order and production procedures."[22]

Oil production capacities were to be augmented by 8 million tons in the past year. The commencement of operations, after a year of experimental testing, in the new Nanyang oil fields in the southwestern section of Henan Province was reported (geological prospecting began here in 1970, and the construction of petroleum production facilities began in 1977). Hundreds of operational and injection wells were drilled, an 850-kilometer pipeline was laid, and a transformer substation and other facilities were erected. The construction of the first section of a new petroleum-production region in the Karamai oil fields in Xinjiang was completed in the middle of the year and 30 new wells began operating. The NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY reported that a high-yield well had begun gushing on 13 August in the South China Sea, on the continental shelf near the mouth of Zhujiang River. The well is more than 3 kilometers deep and it produces light oil with a low sulphur content.

Electrical power engineering: In spite of the drought, which had a negative effect on the functioning of several hydrostations, the total output of electric energy in the first half of the year was 11.4 percent greater than in the first 6 months of 1978. There was an increase of 10-30 percent in electric energy production in 8 of the nation's 12 largest power systems.

Considerable attention was given to the improvement of the technical state of equipment and the enhancement of operational efficiency. In 1979 the plan called for a reduction of 6-7 grams in the proportional expenditures of coal on the production of each kilowatt-hour of electric energy (in 1978 average coal expenditures were 434 grams per kilowatt-hour). Losses of electric energy in power supply systems and in personal consumption are to be reduced from 16-17 percent of the total output of electric energy to less than 15 percent between 1979 and 1981. The need for the gradual conversion of thermal electric power stations from petroleum back to coal, in order to reduce expenditures of liquid fuel, was announced.

The intention to institute a single system for the distribution of electric power by the state was reported.[23] All power systems, both interprovincial and provincial, should be exclusively under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Power Industry. All departments and regions without exception must strictly limit production and capital construction in line with established energy expenditure standards.

According to data published in the beginning of September 1979, the total capacity of electric power stations in the nation exceeded 50 million kilowatts. Several dozen thermal and hydraulic power stations have a capacity of 100,000 kilowatts or more (the capacity of the largest Chinese electric power station--the Liujiaxia GES--is 1.2 million kilowatts). In 1979 there were more than 88,000 small GES's in the nation with a total capacity of over 5.3 million kilowatts. It was reported that one-fourth of China's 2,100 districts could satisfy their own energy needs primarily through their own GES's; in 113 districts, the GES capacity exceeds 10,000 kilowatts.

The construction of 40 large and medium-sized thermal and hydraulic power stations continued. The capacity of each exceeds 1 million kilowatts. Small GES's were also built. The capacities of the equipment used in the production of electric power will increase by 4.7 million kilowatts, according to the plan for the year.

Ferrous metallurgy: The steel production figure in the 1979 plan was virtually the same as in the preceding year. This was due to the shortage of fuel and energy resources and the need to emphasize "the improvement of product quality and the increased production of items in short supply."

In the first 6 months of 1979, 17 million tons of steel were smelted and 12.2 million tons of rolled steel products were manufactured. These indicators were 7.9 percent and 15.4 percent higher, respectively, than in the first half of 1978. It was reported that the annual plan had been fulfilled by 14 December 1979. Total production figures were 32.9 million tons of steel, 23.8 million tons of rolled products and 35 million tons of cast iron.

Metallurgical enterprises attempted to improve product quality and reduce expenditures of fuel and raw materials. It was treated as a grand achievement that the quality of 109 of 123 types of steel and rolled products at the Anshan Combine surpassed the highest indicators in the combine's history in the middle of 1979. Savings in the first half of the year consisted of 360,000 tons of coking coal, 150,000 tons of lubricants and 240,000 tons of cast iron and scrap steel. The average use coefficient of blast furnaces at the Shoudu Metallurgical Combine reached 2.086 (lower than 0.5, according to the methodology used in the USSR), and expenditures of coking coal per ton of cast iron decreased from 455 kilograms in 1978 to 428 kilograms in the middle of 1979. These indicators are regarded as outstanding in China.

According to the data of the Chinese press, the nation had more than 40 large and medium-sized metallurgical enterprises with an annual capacity of over 100,000 tons each, and more than 10 of these were large enterprises. There were more than ten specialized metallurgical enterprises. In addition, there were many small enterprises, poorly equipped from the technical standpoint and, as a rule, with low technical and economic indicators (for example, expenditures of electric energy per ton of steel at medium-sized and small metallurgical enterprises are 3-4 times as high as the indicators for world ferrous metallurgy and 2-3 times as high as the indicators of leading enterprises in the PRC).

China is still importing rolled metal products in large quantities. In the first half of 1979, 2.5 million tons of rolled metal products were purchased just from Japan, and plans for the second half of the year envisaged the purchase of around 2 million additional tons.

Machine building: The only machine-building product mentioned in the report on the draft national economic plan for 1979 was the tractor, with the 1979 output figure set at 95,000 which is lower than the 1978 figure (113,500). The report also mentioned the rate of increase in the output of some consumer goods. In particular, the following increases were planned for 1979 in comparison to 1978: 10.8 percent more bycicles, 8.6 percent more sewing machines, 12.7 percent more wristwatches, 23 percent more cameras and more than twice as many television sets. In the field of agricultural machine building, priority was assigned to the improvement of product quality, the production of complete sets of agricultural implements and the production and delivery of spare parts. On the whole, the development of individual branches and production units in machine building was quite uneven in 1979: Some types of production were accelerated while others were slowed down or curtailed. In the first 6 months of 1979, for example, the gross product of machine building was

9 percent greater than in the first 6 months of 1978, but the output of machine tools decreased (this process began in 1978) while the output of motor vehicles, transformers, hoisting gear and refrigeration equipment increased more than 20 percent. The output of power engineering equipment almost doubled (3.33 million kilowatts in absolute figures). Despite the general decrease in the output of conventional machine tools, the output of extremely scarce large and precision tools grew (16 percent and 8 percent respectively). In the first 6 months of 1979, 501,000 television sets were manufactured (490,000 in all 12 months of 1978).

A process which began in the second half of 1978 continued in machine building: This was the extremely complex and painful process of reorganization, aimed at elevating the technical standards of production, introducing production specialization and cooperation on a broad scale, renewing the product assortment, improving product quality and re-equipping enterprises.

According to the NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY. an all-China conference of workers in agricultural machine building was held in Beijing from 25 October through 12 November 1979. A decision was made here to increase the number of plants for the manufacture of machines and mechanisms for animal husbandry from 12 to 27, and the number of harvesting machinery plants from 15 to 17. A decision was also made to reduce the number of enterprises manufacturing the same products--for example, to reduce the number of tractor plants from 65 to 35 by eliminating the plants producing goods of poor quality.

Chemical industry: The plan for 1979 envisaged the production of 9.5 million tons of mineral fertilizers, calculated in terms of active substance--that is, 880,000 tons more than in 1978. Plans were also made to increase the output of chemical fibers by 5.3 percent and of synthetic detergents by 8 percent. By 9 December 1979, 6.6 million tons of mineral fertilizers had been produced (an increase of 21.4 percent in comparison to the same period of 1978). The output of synthetic and viscose fibers amounted to 300,000 tons.

One fundamental problem in the chemical industry is the need to reduce proportional expenditures of fuel and energy at small enterprises, which began to be built at the time of the "Cultural Revolution." In the first quarter of 1979, at 49 small nitrogen fertilizer enterprises in Zhejiang Province, expenditures of coal per ton of synthetic ammonia were reduced to 1,924 kilograms, and expenditures of electric power were reduced to 1,296 kilowatt-hours. These indicators are considered to be good because there are many small plants of this type in China which use more than 4 tons of coal and 2,000 kilowatt-hours of electric power to produce a ton of synthetic ammonia.[24]

New construction projects in the chemical industry include the Tianjin Petrochemical Fiber Plant and factories for the production of vanilon in Sichuan, Gansu, Guangxi and Yunnan. Several large enterprises have begun operating: the Anqing Petrochemical Combine in Anhui Province (annual oil refining capacity of 2.5 million tons and fertilizer production capacity of 1.14 million tons), the Chishui Natural Gas and Chemical Fertilizer Plant in Guizhou Province (1 million tons of fertilizer a year), the Dongting Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant in Hunan Province (240,000 tons of synthetic ammonia and 384,000 tons of carbamide), the Hubei Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant (240,000 tons of synthetic ammonia and 380,000 tons of carbamide) and a terylene fiber factory in Heilongjiang Province (16,000 tons).

Light industry and the textile industry were ranked second in terms of importance, after agriculture, in the national economic plan for 1979. The plan stipulated production growth figures only for certain types of products manufactured in the chemical and machine-building industries.

The 1979 plan underscores the need to give light industry and the textile industry priority supplies of fuel, energy, crude resources and other materials.

Imports of crude resources and other materials needed for light industry and the textile industry are to be 17 percent greater than in 1978. The Ministry of Light Industry has been instructed to improve the quality of 83 products. Branches of light industry and the textile industry have been authorized to independently organize the sale of products not purchased by domestic and foreign trade organizations. Heavy industry enterprises are also being encouraged to produced consumer goods. The need to organize the production of consumer goods at defense industry enterprises has been debated in the press.[25] According to reports, the production output of light industry was 14.2 percent higher in September 1979 than in September 1978, but this growth is far from enough to satisfy public demand.[26] The Chinese press has noted that in spite of the increased output of cotton fabrics, the level of consumption has not risen much (for almost 10 years the annual per capita output has remained the same). The per capita output of many food products is still low--for example, vegetable oil is produced in quantities equivalent to around 2 kilograms per capita, while the figure in many other countries ranges from 15 to 25 kilograms.[27]

According to data for May 1979, there are 70,000 enterprises in PRC light industry, but the number of persons employed in the industry is approximately 10 million (possibly, only workers). Light industry accounted for around 20 percent of the total gross industrial product. New light industry enterprises were being built in 1979.

Agriculture

In accordance with the decisions of the Third CCP Central Committee Plenum (December 1978) and the Second Session of the Fifth NPC (June 1979), more attention is being paid to agricultural development in the PRC. The "Draft Resolution of the CCP Central Committee on Some Questions Connected with Accelerated Agricultural Development," discussed at the plenum, should occupy an important place in the agrarian policy of the current Chinese leadership. The draft summed up the results of agricultural development in the last 29 years and specified concrete measures for the quicker development of agricultural production.

The Third CCP Central Committee Plenum and the Second NPC Session had to admit tnat agricultural development had been extremely slow in the last 20 years, that it had not kept up with population growth, that this rate of development did not meet national requirements, and that the problem of grain production had still not been solved. As a result, per capita agricultural output had not only failed to grow, but had even decreased. It was noted, for example, that "the nationwide per capita grain output in 1977 was slightly smaller than in 1957, and there were still more than 100 million people in rural areas whose diet was insufficient." In the years since 1957, the amount of land used for the cultivation of agricultural crops has not increased, but has actually decreased by more than 6.7 million hectares. Due to the low level of agricultural development, the peasantry is still having serious financial difficulties. For example, the average annual rural per capita income in 1977 was slightly over 60 yuan, but the income of approximately one-fourth of all members of production brigades was under 40 yuan and "in some places even simple reproduction is difficult to maintain."

The concrete steps stipulated as ways of developing production forces in agriculture included increasing state capital investments in agricultural production, which will bring the state's share up to 18 percent, increasing other forms of state financial assistance to production brigades, and using local financial revenues mainly in agriculture and in industries serving agriculture.

In an attempt to heighten the interest of collective farms in the development of agricultural production, the PRC State Council raised the state purchase prices of grain and other farming and animal husbandry products considerably after the summer grain harvest in 1979. Grain purchases were not supposed to increase in 1979, and in the future they are supposed to decrease by 2.5 million tons. Grain purchases that would inconvenience the peasants were prohibited.

In the field of agricultural modernization, plans were made to gradually change the structure of agricultural production, in which grain production has always been given top priority and the production of commercial crops, animal husbandry, forestry and other branches have been ignored. There is now an improper relationship between the two main branches of agriculture--farming and animal husbandry. Animal husbandry accounts for only around 20 percent of the gross agricultural product.

Plans were made to increase deliveries of agricultural equipment, chemical fertilizers and industrial consumer goods to rural areas, and to expand commercial trade and private subsidiary farming.

In accordance with the plan for national economic development, the PRC State Council increased proportional capital investments in agriculture from 10.7 percent in 1978 to 14 percent in 1979. Total allocations for agricultural needs, including credit and other sources, should amount to 17.4 billion yuan for the year, which is slightly higher than last year's figure.

At the same time, the Chinese Government announced that more funds would not be allocated for agricultural development in the near future. It was reported, for example, that "in the 3-year period of national economic 'regulation,' funds allocated by the state for agriculture will be limited."[28]

The question of agricultural mechanization in the near future has been reconsidered. Previously, in accordance with the ten-year plan for national economic development (1975-1985), 85 percent of all basic agricultural operations were to be mechanized by 1985. In 1979 this objective was not specified and it has not been mentioned in the Chinese press.

The present objective is a gradual increase in the output of agricultural equipment, its concentration in commercial farming regions and the drafting of comprehensive, long-range plans throughout 1979 and 1980 for the mechanization, electrification, irrigation and chemization of agriculture. The present output of tractors is obviously insufficient for the fulfillment of agricultural mechanization assignments. There was still an acute shortage of spare parts for agricultural machinery and irrigation equipment and of fuel and manpower in 1979. Repair facilities were inadequate. At present, less than 25 percent of all farm land in the nation is cultivated by machine. An equally difficult situation is taking shape in the area of agricultural chemization. Only 6.9 million tons of chemical fertilizers (calculated in terms of active substance) were produced in the nation in the first 7 months of the past year, or 17.3 percent more than in the same period of last year.

In 1979 the PRC State Council raised state grain purchase prices by 20 percent. For above-plan grain sales, the price was raised another 50 percent. The purchases prices of cotton, oil-bearing crops, pork and some other products of agriculture and auxiliary trades were raised. The prices of these products rose 24.8 percent on the average.[29] These increased purchased prices and the exemption of some production brigades with low income from the agricultural tax should increase rural income by 7 billion yuan.[30]

In 1979, despite the decision regarding the comprehensive development of agriculture, priority was still being given to the cultivation of grain crops. Approximately 80 percent of all farmland in China,[31] or an area of around 80 million hectares, is reserved for grain. "Unstable, slow development" has been characteristic of grain production for many years now.

In the first half of the year, attempts were made to guarantee a good harvest of summer grain crops, which provides the nation with around half of its total wheat and rice supplies and 35-40 percent of the gross grain yield. Besides this, the summer harvest was supposed to demonstrate the effectiveness of the steps taken by the Chinese leaders to accelerate all agricultural development. For this purpose, some workers not engaged in productive labor were transferred to grain farms in a number of regions. In some regions rice fields were reduced in size to enlarge the area sown to other grain crops.

Weather conditions in the first half of the year were unsuitable for the cultivation of agricultural crops.

Other factors having a negative effect on the harvest were "errors in administrative work," "low management standards" and the "incorrect reaction in some locations and regions" to the decisions of the Third CCP Central Committee Plenum and the Second Session of the Fifth NPC.

In 1979 the yield of early rice and winter wheat (in 8 of the 15 main regions) was slightly higher than last year's. According to the estimates of foreign experts, the gross yield of rearly rice in 1979 was below last year's level.[32]

Summarizing the results of the summer grain harvest, the Chinese press noted that the total yield was 64.9 million tons, or 5.5 million tons more than in 1978.[33] But these figures do not provide a complete picture of the total yield of summer grain crops as they apparently do not include the early rice yield. In past years, the early rice harvest amounted to 30-35 million tons. Last year it probably fell below the planned level (more than 40 million tons). On the whole, the summer grain harvest (wheat, early rice, other grain crops, sweet potatoes and potatoes, calculated in grain units), according to estimates, fell below the plan indicator and amounted to 90-95 million tons.

The relatively low growth rate of grain production in the summer created considerable difficulties in the fulfillment of the gross grain yield plan for 1979. According to official data for the last 8 years (1971-1978), the average annual rate of increase in the summer grain yield was 7.3 percent, and the rate for the fall harvest was 1.4 percent.[34] Appeals to make up for lost time, to fulfill grain yield plan indicators in the fall harvest, appeared in the press. Steps were taken to enlarge areas sown to mid-season and late-season rice and other crops. For example, areas reserved for mid-season rice were enlarged by 267,000 hectares.[35] Great hopes were placed in the fall harvest. The objective was set of overfulfilling the planned grain yield for 1979, bringing it up to 325 million tons,[36] or 6.5 percent above the officially announced grain harvest in 1978 (305 million tons). As the Chinese press reported, however, this objective was not attained, and only 315 million tons were gathered in the nation. According to our preliminary estimates, the grain yield was 275 million tons.[37]

The gross grain yield figure published by the PRC State Statistics Bureau in 1978--304.8 million tons, including sweet potatoes, potatoes and soybeans--was apparently overstated. Conditions were particularly severe in the case of commercial grain production. In connection with this, in November 1979 the PRC State Council held a conference on grain procurements, at which it was pointed out that the demand for grain was not being satisfied despite the increase in yield. At this conference, a decision was made to purchase grain over and above the plan, particularly from farms where there had been a good harvest.

Cotton is an important commercial crop in China. In the last 10 years the output of this crop has grown extremely slowly. The yield is still low, and in some regions it is even decreasing. For example, in the northern part of the nation the yield of cotton fiber in 1978 was 2.3 quintals per hectare instead of the 1973 figure of 4 quintals.[38] In some regions the cotton sowing schedule was disrupted, and in others the crop suffered from spring frosts. In 1979 the harvest of cotton fiber was the same as the year before--2.2 million tons. The press reported a relatively good harvest of tea, silkworm cocoons and fruit. The output of sugar beets, sugar cane, flax and other bast crops, as well as tobacco, was smaller than in 1978.

In 1978, according to the Chinese press, farmers gathered a good harvest of rape--one of China's principal oil-bearing crops, used for the production of around one-third of all vegetable cooking oil. By 20 August 1979, more than 990,000 tons of this crop had been delivered to procurement points, or 300,000 tons more than in the previous year. The peanut harvest appeared promising. In the main provinces where this crop is cultivated (Liaoning, Hebei, Henan and Shandong) the total area sown to peanuts was enlarged by 227,000 hectares in the past year.[39]

The animal husbandry branch is still underdeveloped. The plowing of pastures and meadows for the cultivation of grain in a number of animal husbandry regions in recent years has diminished the fodder supplies of animal husbandry. Almost none of the grain produced on the new plots is used for fodder. The livestock herd is growing too slowly.

Ever since the end of the "Cultural Revolution" the Chinese leadership has been encouraging peasants to raise hogs (hog-raising is the main source of meat) on their private farms (around 80 percent of all the hogs in the nation). This policy is having definite results--the herd of hogs in the nation is growing more quickly and, according to estimates, numbered approximately 245 million head in 1979.

The shortage of food for the population and raw materials for light industry has forced China to purchase grain, cotton and other agricultural products abroad. According to preliminary data, imports of grain, primarily wheat, in 1979 should amount to around 11 million tons--that is, more than in 1968. The chief suppliers of grain to China are Canada, the

United States, Australia and Argentina. China spends around 1.5 billion dollars on the purchase of grain abroad. Just as in past years, China continued to purchase soybeans, soybean oil and sugar. For example, purchases of soybean oil and soybean in the United States were expected to total, respectively, 78,500 tons[40] and 80,000 tons. Sugar imports in 1979, according to estimates, will remain at the previous year's level--1.5 million tons. More cotton has been purchased in recent years. These purchases amounted to 230,000-240,000 tons in 1977-1978, and around 500,000 tons in 1978-1979.

Table 2

Output of Main Agricultural Products in 1978-1979

Product	1978 (est.)		1979		1979 in % of 1978	
			Prelim. est.	Plan		
Gross grain yield[1] (millions of tons)	265	(304.8)[2]	275	(312.5)	104.0	(102.5)
Cotton fiber (millions of tons)	2.2	(2.2)	2.2	(2.4)	100.0	(109.1)
Hogs (millions of head)	235	(301.3)	245	(309.5)	104.3	(102.7)

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1. Including sweet potatoes and potatoes, converted into grain units according to a coefficient of 4:1, and soybeans.

2. The figures in parentheses are: in 1978--data of the PRC State Statistics Bureau; in 1979--plan, excluding hogs (according to data in the Chinese press for 1 July 1979). The data of the PRC State Statistics Bureau, according to many Soviet and foreign experts, for 1978 do not reflect the actual state of affairs at the present time.

In conclusion, we must say that events in 1979 have demonstrated the tremendous, sometimes insurmountable difficulties standing in the way of the accomplishment of national economic "regulation."

The changes the Chinese leaders have made in national economic management and the measures they have planned could apparently play a definite positive role in the establishment of prerequisites for economic development. But the policy of "regulation," which envisages the continuation of the Chinese leadership's course aimed at the further militarization of the country and the reinforcement of military-industrial potential with limited resources, will afford no possibility of solving, within the 3-year period earmarked, all of the complex economic and social problems that came into being in the nation after the "Great Leap Forward" and "Cultural Revolution" or to correct existing economic disparities.

FOOTNOTES

1. RENMIN RIBAO, 29 June 1979.
2. Ibid., 24 March 1979.
3. Ibid., 28 June 1979.
4. Ibid., 29 June 1979.
5. Ibid., 30 June 1979.
6. BUSINESSWEEK, 5 November 1979.
7. DAILY TELEGRAPH, 30 October 1979.
8. RENMIN RIBAO, 13 September 1979.
9. Ibid., 26 November 1979.
10. Ibid., 26 January 1979.
11. FINANCIAL TIMES, 5 October 1979.
12. BEIJING RIBAO, 16 September 1979.
13. GONGREN RIBAO, 26 May 1979.
14. BEIJING RIBAO, 13 May 1979.
15. GONGREN RIBAO, 26 October 1979.
16. Ibid., 14 March 1979.
17. RENMIN RIBAO, 30 July 1979.
18. Ibid., 29 June 1979. The total output of coal for centralized distribution in 1979 was set at 354-366 million tons in the plan.
19. PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1979, No 1, pp 66-67.
20. RENMIN RIBAO, 24 May 1979.
21. Ibid., 29 June 1979.
22. RENMIN RIBAO, GONGREN RIBAO, 1 April 1979.
23. RENMIN RIBAO, 29 June 1979.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., 31 August 1979.

26. Ibid., 23 October 1979.

27. Ibid., 27 August 1979.

28. Ibid., 29 August 1979.

29. Ibid., 22 June 1979.

30. BEIJING REVIEW, 1979, No 26, p 11.

31. JINGJI YANJIU, 1979, No 1, p 38.

32. JAPAN TIMES, 8 August 1979.

33. RENMIN RIBAO, 2 September 1979.

34. Ibid., 1 August 1979.

35. Ibid., 19 September 1979.

36. Ibid., 15 August 1979.

37. Including sweet potatoes and potatoes (calculated in grain units according to a coefficient of 4:1) and soybeans.

38. RENMIN RIBAO, 5 June 1979.

39. Ibid., 19 September 1979.

40. ASIAN WALLSTREET JOURNAL, 2 June 1979.

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CSO: 1805

PROVEN VANGUARD OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE (COMMEMORATING THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE VIETNAM COMMUNIST PARTY)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 47-52

[Not translated by JPRS]

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STRUGGLE OF THE JCP FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORMS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 53-72

[Article by Professor I. I. Kovalenko, doctor of historical sciences]

[Text] In the 1970's rapid economic growth rates in Japan were followed by depression, and then by a severe and prolonged crisis. The situation within the nation, according to Japanese Communists, was marked by the exacerbation of the structural crisis of Japanese state-monopolistic capital, which was reflected in unprecedented inflation and depression, the aggravation of the crisis of democracy and freedom and the decline of culture and education. This process was accompanied by a decline in the influence of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the debilitation of the entire system of government.

The Japanese economic crisis, which began in the first half of the 1970's, dealt a severe blow to the workers' standard of living. The nation's economic strength was in the hands of the largest financial and industrial groups--Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Fuyo, Daiichi and Sanwa. These gigantic companies control 21.9 percent of the capital of all Japanese companies and 23.9 percent of all assets. If we add the companies in which 10 percent of the assets are controlled by members of these groups, the total number of companies in their sphere of influence will rise to 8,416 and represent 41 percent of the capital of all companies in the nation and 39.9 percent of all assets.[1]

Big monopolistic capital, which has concentrated the nation's wealth in its hands, dominates every sphere of life and government activity, robs the people and encroaches upon their vital interests and political rights. It is dominant in central and local politics and forces the government to conduct a foreign and domestic policy serving the interests of monopolistic enterprises and answering their demands.

Monopolistic capital, which dominates economics totally, has also intruded boldly into the sphere of politics. The Lockheed and Grumman scandals, which represented only the tip of the iceberg, showed the Japanese public all the ugly truth about the plutocratic political machine. The overt bribery of political parties and statesmen is the other side of the coin of monopoly domination. All anticommunist parties and organizations are regularly nourished by the monopolies, which not only pay them, but even request their favorite political tunes.

Government and financial circles are trying to overcome the consequences of the severe economic crisis which overtook the nation in 1974-1975 at the public's expense by launching an organized offensive against the vital interests of the workers. The crisis was accompanied by a massive increase in the number of unemployed, which did not fall below 1 million for several years, even according to official statistics, and the mass bankruptcy of small and medium-sized enterprises (around 1,500 a month). Business circles are shaping up and reorganizing enterprises by means of mass lay-offs and more pronounced intensification of labor. Wages are being held at a low level, but prices are constantly rising. Grants and stipends are being reduced throughout the nation and medical assistance funds have been cut. At the same time, taxes are rising. The worst form of mass taxation is the rising sales tax, which, in turn, leads to a constant rise in prices and the cost of living.

While a small handful of monopolists and big capitalists freely make use of the nation's tremendous wealth, the number of poor has risen to 10 million, and most of the population has to be satisfied with a low income. Welfare payments to the disabled, the ill, single mothers, senior citizens and the victims of war, particularly the atomic bomb victims, are extremely insignificant in size. Countless tragic suicides and cases of child abandonment due to financial difficulties have become commonplace in Japan today. Environmental pollution has also become an extremely serious problem, creating additional difficulties for the average Japanese citizen.

In addition to their economic difficulties, the people are suffering from a lack of political rights. On the pretext of "defending the free society," ruling circles and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) are restricting such public rights as freedom of speech, conscience and political activity. Unconstitutional violations of civil rights can be observed at plants and enterprises throughout the nation. The administration organizes the surveillance of party members and labor activists and discriminates against them in matters involving job promotions, wages and so forth. Employers are forming "alternative unions" and are restricting the workers' right to form their own associations, they are prohibiting or restricting the political activity of members of the JCP [Japan Communist Party] and League of Democratic Youth at enterprises and they are resorting to violent despotism, employing groups of hooligans for this purpose.

In Japan, just as in other developed capitalist countries, the main conflict between reactionary and democratic forces is connected with differing interpretations of the government of the future. In the beginning of the 1970's, this conflict took extremely acute form.

The first major political battle of the 1970's broke out at the time of the gubernatorial election in Kyoto prefecture in April 1970. Labeling the JCP the number-one enemy, the government and the Liberal Democratic Party took every opportunity to prevent the only progressive candidate from winning the election. They created an alliance of three parties (Liberal Democratic, Democratic Socialist and Komeito) on an anticommunist basis and made every effort to overthrow the democratic administration of the prefecture, headed by Governor Ninagawa, which had been supported by a united front for 20 years.

The combined efforts of the Communist Party, the Socialist Party (JSP), the General Council of Trade Unions (Sohyo) and other democratic organizations, however, inflicted another serious defeat on the LDP and its allies, united on the basis of anticommunism, and caused events in this important region to develop in their favor. The Kyoto election, just as the somewhat earlier gubernatorial election in Tokyo, in 1969, proved to the people that the future belongs to the united front supported by the JCP.

Another definite victory was won when democratic forces succeeded in compelling ruling circles to conclude a new treaty with the United States, not for the long range as was the case in 1960, but through the simple renewal of the existing treaty, which provided democratic forces with the prospect of putting an end to the military-political alliance with the United States by establishing a democratic government and proclaiming a policy of peace and neutrality. The tactics employed by leftist forces under these new conditions consisted in extending the struggle against the "security treaty" into the future, instead of limiting this struggle to just the year of 1970, and pursuing the formation of a government which would cancel the "security treaty," which is hated by the entire population, and thereby relieve Japan of its dependence on the United States. In this way, the fight against the "security treaty" entered a new phase.

The projected course of Japanese action in the 1970's was precisely defined at the 11th JCP Congress in July 1970. This is a course of peace and neutrality, a course leading toward real independence, which should put an end to the Japanese-American military alliance. The congress stressed that the 1970's would be a period of confrontation between anticommunist reactionary forces striving to strengthen the alliance with the United States and pursuing the rebirth of militarism and imperialism under the conditions of this dependence, on one side, and, on the other, democratic forces pursing the establishment of a peaceful and neutral Japan. The congress noted that the extremes in this confrontation would be represented by the Liberal Democratic Party and Japan Communist Party.

The congress noted that the 1970's held the promise of the dismissal of the LDP Government through the agency of the progressive united front's platform, the formation of a democratic coalition government and the cessation of the conservative party's lengthy period of reactionary rule.

An 11th Congress resolution said that the victories won by the leftist camp in the gubernatorial elections in Tokyo, Kyoto and Osaka and the mayoral elections in Kyoto, Kawasaki and other cities vividly demonstrated that "it is precisely a united front, based on joint struggle by the JCP and JSP, that represents the only means of guaranteeing the successful advancement of democratic forces as a whole."[2]

The 11th JCP Congress charged the party with a specific task--to fight for the creation of a united front, which would stand for peace and neutrality, democracy, a rise in the standard of living and the formation of a democratic coalition government based on this front. The chief responsibility of this government, according to the JCP, would be the cancellation of the Japanese-American "security agreement," the transformation of Japan into a peaceful and neutral country, the implementation of a democratic policy, the prevention of militarism's rebirth, the protection of public life, the conduct of an independent economic policy and the democratic development of education and culture.[3]

When the JCP advocated a democratic coalition government at the 11th Congress, it did not regard this as a slogan for action which could be accomplished the next day. "This slogan," said JCP Central Committee Chairman K. Miyamoto, "is propagandistic in nature and points out what we must do next. We must not forget that the balance of power today, unfortunately, does not allow for the creation of a united front, and that our party is not a really powerful party as yet."[4]

Questions of party construction were given considerable attention at the congress, and the objective was set of turning the party into a force strong enough to implement the necessary reforms within the framework of the united democratic front's program.

The strengthening of the party's position in parliament was called the most important task facing all party organizations. The need to energize the work of party and progressive forces toward broader influence in local government was given serious consideration. The party believes that strong influence on the local level will simplify democratic forces' struggle against the existing regime and their creation of a democratic coalition government.

The JCP Congress defined the struggle for stronger influence in parliament as a policy of "popular parliamentarism," which it called the opposite of bourgeois parliamentarism. "There is no question that we have nothing in common with bourgeois parliamentarism, which ignores mass movements and suppresses them, assuming that everything will be decided by parliamentary elections. Besides this, we are not cherishing the slightest illusions about the class character, limitations and shortcomings of bourgeois parliamentarism, which is impeding the just expression of public wishes and imposing various limitations on the activities of democratic parties even within parliament. But this does not diminish the significance of popular parliamentarism whatsoever. In other words, we must seriously consider the possibility of a truly democratic, progressive system of representation--a parliament which, as our program stresses, is the highest government body both in name and in fact."[5]

"Our party has an important responsibility to the people and the truth," said JCP Central Committee Chairman K. Miyamoto at the 11th Congress. "On the basis of human liberation, or working class liberation, and respect for the democratic wishes of the majority, it must boldly and wisely make every effort to find the particular path, leading to socialist revolution and socialist construction, which will minimize sacrifices."[6]

In search of this path, the willingness of Japanese Communists to work with other democratic parties, not only during the formation of the democratic coalition government but later as well, right up to the construction of socialism, was announced at the 11th JCP Congress. The idea of guaranteeing the unrestricted existence of various political parties in all stages of the revolutionary process was proposed. "In the independent democratic Japan," a resolution of the 11th JCP Congress stresses, "freedom of action will be guaranteed to all political parties, including those which criticize or oppose the government as long as they do not take steps to destroy the democratic system of the people by force; it will also be quite natural that the party winning the majority of parliamentary seats in elections will govern the country."[7]

Guided by the decisions of the 11th Congress, in January 1971 the JCP set forth a program for the formation of a united front on the local level, based on the achievement of unity in the following three tasks: 1) to withdraw from the Japanese-American military alliance and strive for the neutralization of Japan; 2) to put an end to politics in the interests of big capital and conduct a policy aimed at the defense of human life; 3) to fight against the all-round restoration and consolidation of militarism and for the expansion of democracy. Although the "middle-of-the-road" parties (the Democratic Socialist Party and Komeito) rejected these three points and the JSP was hesitant on this matter, the JCP's practical steps to carry out this three-point program has aroused the interest of the general public.

Subsequent events confirmed the accuracy of the 11th Congress' line of uniting democratic forces in the process of anti-imperialist, antimonopoly struggle. In the two successive campaigns after the congress, which evolved into nationwide battles, at the time of local government elections (April 1971) and the elections to the House of Councillors in June of the same year, the JCP won even more public support in spite of the intensified anticommunist crusade.

As a result of these elections, the party increased its representation in local government by more than 600 deputies. In subsequent mid-term elections the number of JCP representatives in local government constantly rose, and exceeded 2,500 by May 1972. This was 3 times as many seats as those held by the Komeito Party and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP).

Resting on the united front for reform, which had been achieved in 16 prefectures on the local level, the Communists, joining forces with the Socialists, won many important victories in elections for the heads of local administrative organs and in gubernatorial elections. In five prefectures--Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka, Okinawa and Saitama--and in Kawasaki, Tachikawa and other cities, representatives of progressive forces became the leaders of local administrations.

As a result of this, the JCP, in conjunction with the JSP, became the ruling force in various regions, the population of which exceeded 30 million, or almost one-third of the nation's entire population.

In the elections to the House of Councillors, the party won more than 1.3 million more votes than in previous elections in local electoral districts. In all, the JCP was supported by 4.88 million citizens in the elections to the House of Councillors. The party began to control ten seats in the House of Councillors, and the party faction in both houses began to number 24.

The JCP's next triumph took place in the 1972 parliamentary elections, when it was able to put 38 deputies into the House of Representatives and to create a faction of 39 people in this house (including 1 deputy who ran as the candidate representing all progressive forces). Overtaking the DSP and Komeito, the Communist Party moved up to second place among opposition parties. If we compare the number of votes gathered by the JCP in these elections (5.7 million) to the number won in the same elections in 1969 (3.2 million), we can clearly see that the JCP increased voter support for its candidates 1.8-fold. This was a definite spurt ahead.

"The regression of the LDP and the rapid progression of the Communist Party," JCP documents note, "signified that, as predicted at the 11th Party Congress, a new stage has begun in the development of Japanese politics, distinguished by 'confrontation between the LDP and JCP.' It is true that ever since the general elections of 1972 the political situation in Japan has been distinguished by the JCP's rapid advancement and has taken an absolutely different direction. A serious defeat has been suffered by the anticommunist centrist line of 'alliance by two parties and one grouping,' which consisted in attempts to put together a DSP, Komeito and right-wing JSP coalition or a coalition of Socialists, Komeito and Democratic Socialists. The JCP has more influence in parliamentary procedure, and the tactic of conspiring to alienate the JSP has become impossible in parliamentary activity. Parliament is acquiring a more important role, not as the scene of bargaining and appeasement, but as a place for confrontation between LDP policy and the common demands of the people."[8]

The JCP victory in the 1972 elections brought closer the prospect of creating a united front of all progressive forces with the aim of forming a democratic coalition government. If reformist forces had been able to conclude a political agreement for the purpose of establishing a democratic coalition government and had created a united progressive front, serious changes might have taken place in Japanese politics.

The three objectives declared in 1971 (the policy of peace and neutrality, economic policy serving the public interest, and the defense of democracy), which had united communists with socialists, trade unions and other democratic forces in several prefectures in a struggle for their attainment, were made the basis of the program for progressive unity on the national level by the Japan Communist Party.

The decisions of the 12th JCP Congress (November 1973) represented a sizable step in the drafting of this program. The congress called upon progressive forces in the nation to form a democratic coalition government based on the three objectives or the principles of renewal. Explaining the purpose of this appeal, Konchiro Ueda, member of the JCP Central Committee Presidium, said at the congress that this meant the creation of a "government to defend the vital interests of the people and democratic reforms, which, within the existing constitutional framework, would attain national goals--the three goals of renewal, namely: the guarantee of Japanese sovereingty and security, peace and neutrality, and political and economic democracy. This government will conduct a nationwide policy, based on a collective program drafted by all political parties and political forces making up the united front of progressive forces."[9]

According to the JCP, the attainment of the three goals of renewal would represent a sizable portion of the work involved in defending the public standard of living and democratic reforms and in delivering the nation from the severe structural crisis it was experiencing.

Let us briefly discuss the three goals of renewal the JCP set forth as the basis of the proposals approved at the 12th Congress as part of the program of the democratic coalition government. The first goal--the policy of peace and neutrality--envisaged the abrogation of the Japanese-American military bargain; the sequential dissolution of the "self-defense forces"; the legislative reinforcement of the three non-nuclear principles (no possession, no production and no imports of nuclear weapons); the passage of a law by parliament on Japanese neutrality, including a provision renouncing participation in military blocs and prohibiting the deployment of foreign troops in Japan.

With a democratic government of national unity, the JCP proposals point out, Japan would choose the path of non-alignment and would play an active role in promoting the policy of peace and neutrality and maintaining friendly contacts with all nations and peoples, regardless of social differences. The independence and security of Japan would be safeguarded by a system of security in Asia, and later by a worldwide system of collective security.

"A democratic coalition government for the attainment of lasting peace," the decisions of the 12th Congress underscore, "would strive for the creation of an international system of collective security, in which all nations would participate, regardless of their social structure. In the near future, the government will work toward the creation of regional systems of collective security in Asia and the Pacific, in Europe, and so forth."[10]

The second goal was economic democracy. A democratic coalition government, the decisions of the 12th Congress pointed out, would take the necessary steps to democratically control and regulate the activities of large industrial enterprises and ensure balanced national economic growth, including the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises, agriculture and fishing.

These measures would not be socialist, but they would be taken for the protection of human life and human rights. The government would take immediate measures to solve problems posing the greatest danger to public life: rising prices, high taxes, low wages, environmental pollution, low welfare standards, housing difficulties and so forth.

The proposals of the JCP envisage the institution of democratic planning, which would not signify a complete transition to a planned economy, but would pursue the goal of partial economic planning under the supervision of the democratic coalition government while preserving the bases of the capitalist production method. The only exception would be power engineering, which would be nationalized. This, the congress documents state, would stem from the need to facilitate the utilization of all energy resources--petroleum, coal, hydraulic power, geothermal power, wind power, tides, nuclear power and so forth. Democratic planning would also call for changes in taxation, the budget and the financial system and the regulation of financial activity.

Explaining the purpose of these economic measures, JCP theoretician A. Kudo stresses that they "cannot be equated with socialist policy and cannot even be regarded as the first step toward a socialist economic policy.... They will represent a policy of economic democracy and the chief instrument of democratic control over the activities of monopolistic capital."[11]

The third goal was the defense of political democracy. The policy of the democratic coalition government regarding domestic reforms would be based on the protection and expansion of democratic freedoms in all spheres of sociopolitical life, including the defense of five existing constitutional principles (people's sovereingty and national sovereignty; lasting peace; basic human rights; parliamentary democracy; local self-government).

The democratic coalition government would provide for the democratic renewal of public administration and the democratic development of education, science, art and culture. The program of the democratic coalition government would also envisage the institution of democratic parliamentary control over administrative institutions, including police activities, the democratization of the structure of police departments and judicial organs and so forth.

The three progressive goals, as JCP documents noted, were intended to serve as a beacon, lighting the way to the democratic renewal of national politics and escape from the structural crisis the nation was experiencing.

The 12th JCP Congress submitted its proposals concerning the program of the democratic coalition government to other parties for examination.

It was noted at the 12th Congress that the program of a united front government should embody a community of action, goals and policy while respecting the independence of all political forces making it up. The JCP proposed that differences of opinion in the ideological sphere and the political plans of each party and political force be shelved during the discussion of the collective program for a coalition government.

The JCP regarded the formation of a democratic coalition government as one of the intermediate steps leading to the formation of a government of a national democratic united front, envisaged in the party program as a prerequisite for anti-imperialist, antimonopoly, democratic revolution. The democratic coalition government would be expected to clear the path for the arrival of the government of a national democratic united front.

The JCP did not limit its efforts to cooperation with the socialists. It felt it would be expedient to establish contacts with other forces as well, with the hope of acquiring their support for the idea of a united front. In this respect, it must be said that the JCP gave a great deal of consideration to the question of guaranteed freedom of conscience in various stages of social development and the achievement of mutual understanding with religious believers in so-called "worldly matters." The JCP believes that the creation of a united front in Japan on the basis of national accord will be impossible without the support of the religious segment of the Japanese population.

At the suggestion of the JCP, talks were conducted with the influential Soka Gakkai Buddhist society. In December 1974 a 10-year agreement was signed by the JCP and Soka Gakkai, in which the two sides undertook to defend the public interest, fight against social injustice, promote public well-being, eternal peace and the abolition of nuclear weapons, combat neofascism and defend democracy and basic human rights. When opinions regarding the means to these ends differ, the two sides should act in accordance with their own principles, but when these opinions coincide, they should act jointly. The agreement stated that Soka Gakkai would "display no hostility toward scientific socialism and communism" and that the JCP "would unconditionally support freedom of religion in any social structure, including freedom of religious propaganda."

This agreement, as JCP documents pointed out, envisaged "the possibility of progressive cooperation between the party of scientific socialism and religious organizations." Although this agreement was never implemented due to negative pressure exerted by Komeito on the Soka Gakkai leadership, its conclusion was of fundamental significance, transcending the bounds of the two parties concerned, and could have had considerable influence on further developments in the nation if the two sides had been able to put their plan to work.

Supplementing the theory of the united front with specific content, the JCP launched a campaign for national accord in 1975 with the aim of national salvation and progressive reforms. The JCP believes that the united front should not be limited to progressive parties and organizations alone, but that the prerequisites for its creation should also include dialog and debate in the broadest segments of the Japanese public in regard to fundamental problems in national development. The JCP has organized many meetings and talks with various organizations and groups. Within 1 year after the campaign "for national accord" had been launched, 45 national conferences and 4,600 local meetings had been organized.

Carrying out the instructions of the 12th Congress, the party urged the working class and all workers to wage a vigorous struggle against the onslaught of the monopolies and for their own rights and vital interests. It drafted a comprehensive program for Japan's emergence from the economic crisis by which it had been striken since the end of 1973, asking the public to judge its proposals on economic development, which set forth a specific program for the democratic reorganization of the Japanese economy and aroused great interest in all segments of the Japanese population.

In connection with the declining standard of living, the JCP coined the slogan: "Respond to the most massive postwar economic crisis with the most massive popular movement!" The party ordered communists to lead the work of organizing a powerful popular movement in defense of the vital interests of the laboring public. It drafted proposals on problems in local self-government, culture and education and submitted them to the public for examination. These proposals called for improvement in the status of municipal government employees and teachers, the democratization of education and the prevention of cultural stagnation. The JCP also raised the important issue of protecting children from the noxious effects of the mass media, demanding, in particular, the prohibition of pornographic television programs. Despite the resistance of reactionary circles, the proposals of the JCP were enthusiastically received by the democratic public and produced some concrete results (the prohibition of automats for the sale of pornographic items and so forth).

The JCP was the political force which consistently warded off attacks on the workers movement and the persecution of labor activists. In 1976 the JCP issued an appeal "For Freedom in Production." Under the influence of this appeal, workers and trade unions launched a struggle to establish democratic conditions in the production sphere and to restore the freedoms of the laboring public.

The JCP made a tremendous effort to unite unorganized workers in unions, as the presence of these workers represented one of the weak spots in the Japanese labor movement. As a result of the JCP's efforts, the number of new union members exceeded 40,000 in the 3 years following 1975. Although this is not a high figure, the very fact that unorganized workers were convinced to join trade unions represented an important step in the further expansion of the labor movement.

The party organizations of the JCP found many new ways of defending the common demands of the workers. Here are some examples. Under party supervision, a successful fight was waged for the restoration of the backward Tikuho region (Fukuoka Prefecture) which was suffering from mass unemployment. The struggle became so extensive and organized that the authorities had to adopt a comprehensive plan for the restoration of the entire region. The experience of the movement on Hokkaido is also of interest. Here, 290,000 seasonal workers were hit hard by the revision of a law on guaranteed employment. During the course of a movement initiated by the JCP, resolutions were passed in support of the workers by 119 city, town and rural legislatures. The authorities and employers had to make a number of serious concessions.

Fighting for the interests of the peasantry, the party drafted a comprehensive program for the restoration of agriculture, unequalled by the program of any other party in the nation. Using this program as a tool, the JCP instituted broader dialog with agricultural cooperatives, various peasant organizations and the broad peasant masses. As a result of the communists' efforts, around 10,000 have joined peasant unions in recent years. Rural propagandists and organizers have become more active at promoting JCP policies in rural areas.

It must be said, however, that most of the peasants are still supporting the LDP. In order to win the votes of peasants engaged in the cultivation of rice, the government subsidizes rice production, purchasing it from producers at prices exceeding the retail cost. The policy of the government and the LDP, which is aimed at winning the peasants over to their side at the expense of the government, is arousing increasing criticism from opposition parties.

The party is still giving a great deal of attention to work with intermediate and small businessmen, many of whom see the JCP as their defender and are taking a more active part in general democratic undertakings organized by the party.

The problems of youth and women must be considered when a democratic future is planned for Japan. Clubs organized by party sections and groups of the League of Democratic Youth for the discussion of current events and the role of youth have recently become quite popular among young men and women in Japan. By 1977 there were more than 12,000 such clubs in the nation, with 70,000 members. The reason these clubs became so popular was that they were a convenient form of social involvement for young people, who are searching for ideals in today's society and for lively discussions, during the course of which they can find answers to important questions.

The party hopes to conduct more intensive political work among women, who now represent one-third of all hired workers in the production sphere. In rural areas, women constitute 60 percent of the agricultural labor force. The JCP is urging women to take an active part in public life. Party documents stress the importance of converting the democratic energy of women, who make up more than half of the population, from a largely potential force into a real force serving the cause of progress.

An important part of the party's activity is political work with the intelligentsia, which is in favor of the democratic development of science and culture and of a united front for renewal. The JCP is waging a tireless struggle against cultural decay and is seeking a way out of the present cultural crisis. The party is strengthening its influence with the masses by organizing the artistic intelligentsia, which shares the party's outlook and has expressed a desire to play an active part in the struggle for the democratic renewal of Japanese society.

The party was able, for example, to organize social studies societies in many universities and, in 1976, to hold a national congress of sociologists and establish the Japan League of Social Studies Societies. This united, on the national scale, all of the societies which were once closely connected with the student movement and had a positive effect on it but had ceased their activity long ago.

Along with the quantitative increase in the number of participants in spring labor demonstrations, workers' strikes and the peasant struggle, the energization of the activity of middle population strata and the radicalization of the intelligentsia, there has also been a further expansion of the democratic movement's social base due to the involvement of more and more new population strata in the struggle and the increasing political awareness of the popular masses. One vivid example of this is the active participation of the particular segment of the population which was, until recently, directly influenced by the LDP, in the struggle against environmental pollution, cuts in agricultural production and large-scale real estate speculation.

The plan for the democratic reorganization of the national economy, which was submitted to the people by the Communist Party in 1977, has aroused great interest in Japan. The economic program of the JCP envisages measures to correct defects in the state budget, raise taxes for big capital and reduce military spending. At the same time, the JCP is demanding that the government pass the necessary laws in the public interest, alleviate the position of small businessmen and elevate the standard of living of workers, peasants and all laboring population strata.

The economic crisis of 1974-1975, which affected the interests of the overwhelming majority of Japanese, the unprecedented rise in the prices of consumer goods and galloping inflation brought about unparalleled expansion of the antimonopoly movement and created a situation in which the establishment of a united progressive front and the implementation of the JCP proposals regarding the formation of a democratic coalition government became objectives that were completely realizable in the near future, if not immediately.

Above all, it should be noted that, despite the existence of serious differences between the JCP and JSP, their policy-planning objectives had much in common, establishing a basis for broader cooperation. Most of the members of the JSP oppose American imperialism and Japanese monopolistic capital, are fighting against the resurgence of Japanese militarism and in defense of a peaceful constitution, and are demanding the dismantling of U.S. military bases and the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Japanese territory. Socialists want peace and they want Japan to be a neutral, independent democratic nation. The rank-and-file members of the JSP are pursuing a ban on nuclear weapons, seeking peace and security in Asia, supporting the national liberation movement and fighting for better living conditions for Japanese labor.

Official JCP documents repeatedly stress that joint action with the JSP will be of considerable significance for the subsequent unification of all laboring segments of the population in a united national democratic front.

The appeal to unite the forces of Japanese democrats on an antimonopoly basis and to carry out social reforms can also be found in documents of the Japan Socialist Party. The Japanese Socialists worked out the idea of forming a popular coalition government, which would replace the one-party government of the conservatives and carry out fundamental social reforms. The goals, means and methods of this coalition are set forth in the "Program for a Popular Coalition Government," adopted by the 37th JSP Congress in 1974. It sets forth the three chief political goals of the united front, which are, in general, the same as the JCP's three major objectives of democratic reform. They are, firstly, the cancellation of the Japanese-American "security treaty," the peaceful and democratic development of Japan and a struggle against the resurgence of imperialism and militarism; secondly, a struggle in defense of the life and rights of the people and against the anti-people policy of the monopolies; thirdly, a struggle to uphold human dignity through the defense of constitutionally guaranteed democratic rights, the restoration of democracy and the transformation of society, education and culture.[12]

According to the JSP, the popular coalition government should rest on the basis of an antimonopoly popular front. The democratic government should be made up of representatives of democratic organizations and movements, united in a popular front, with all progressive groups and parties making up its basis.

The existence of specific and largely similar programs of economic reform, set forth by the JCP and JSP, and their regular joint statements in defense of the public interest attest to the presence of favorable objective conditions for a more powerful struggle by democratic forces in the nation and the unification of their efforts in the fight against monopoly rule and for democracy and social progress.

Nonetheless, the JCP and other progressive forces have not been able to draft a broad program of collective action in connection with fundamental issues in the struggle against imperialism and reaction and in defense of the vital interests of the people. The difficulty of achieving united action by democratic forces stems, in particular, from the fact that the leaders of the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) have proposed the "reorganization" of opposition forces, meaning the creation of a strong reformist party, with the DSP, Komeito and the JSP right wing serving as its basis. This idea has been supported by some JSP politicians.

Reactionary forces launched a frenzied offensive against democratic and progressive forces, setting as their immediate objective the prevention of a united front with JCP and JSP participation and, as a long-range objective, the transformation of the JSP into a typical social-democratic party or its disappearance from the political scene. The maneuvers of Japanese ruling classes were aimed at ultimately isolating the Communist Party and preventing its active participation in domestic politics. The plans for the so-called reorganization of opposition parties were camouflaged behind appeals for the creation of a coalition to overthrow the LDP government, but they are actually aimed at perpetuating dissent among Japanese democratic forces and keeping them from establishing a government. If this "reorganization" should be successful, a two-party system could spring up in Japan, and this will give rise to additional difficulties in the formation of a united national democratic front.

In December 1970 a JSP congress unanimously opposed the "reorganization of opposition parties." But some of the leaders of this party have taken a vacillating stand not only on the question of an organized united front, but also on the possibility of long-term joint action with the JCP. Expressing the feelings of this segment of the party, the JSP declared a policy of "efforts, multilateral in form, to solve some problems inside and outside parliament" for the purpose of consolidating all opposition parties. It "denied the possibility of founding this unity on cooperation with any particular party."[13] In connection with this, AKAHATA reported that an analysis of these documents suggested that "the Socialist Party, on the one hand, will not only turn its back on joint struggle and on a united front of democratic forces, not only in its adherence to its present line, but also in the future, for a long period of time,...but, on the other hand, the JSP is actively pursuing the creation of a 'middle-of-the-road coalition not striving for radical change' with the Democratic Socialist Party and Komeito."[14]

Japanese Communists and Socialists have still not been able to work out a common approach to the formation of the united front. For this reason, joint JCP and JSP actions have generally been limited to isolated statements on specific matters. Nonetheless, the JCP and JSP have taken several joint measures with positive results.

In the mid-1970's, the LDP and monopolistic capital had to take immediate steps to prevent the further advancement of the JCP. All possible means were put to work to discredit the JCP and to fill the public with suspicion and worries about Japan's future. The LDP again brought up the idea of instituting a system of small electoral districts, which would guarantee it an absolute majority of deputatorial mandates with only 40 percent of the total vote; the leaders of the LDP quickly launched a movement for the organizational expansion of their party's ranks and for the augmentation of the JIYU SHIMPO press organ's group of readers to 5 million individuals. An extensive anticommunist campaign was launched once again in the nation, with the slogan "defend the free society"; additional attempts were made to put together an anticommunist coalition made up of the "middle-of-the-road" parties. In other words, desperate efforts were made to prevent the creation of a united progressive front.

Under the conditions of the crisis and contradictions of the existing system of government, according to the JCP, Liberal Democrats and their government, with U.S. support, "made the transition to a broad-scale anticommunist offensive and the policy of splitting up progressive forces to stop the regression of the LDP."[15]

This offensive, which was launched under the banner calling for the defense of the "free world," was regarded by ruling circles as a long-range strategy aimed at preserving the existing system of reactionary government. The spearhead of the attack was pointed at the Japan Communist Party.

All possible means are being used in the attack on the Communist Party, including various "cases" invented by the secret police back in the dismal 1930's, events in neighboring China, among them the notorious "Great Cultural Revolution" and "exposure of the gang of four," the claims of ruling circles to part of the Kuril Islands, which are an integral part of Soviet territory, and exaggerated commotion over questions of Japanese-Soviet fishing relations, which are settled in accordance with established international practice.

One new feature of this anticommunist campaign is the fact that financial circles are no longer limiting themselves to the offer of financial assistance to the LDP, but are actively involving themselves in the campaign, mobilizing all available forces and means to this end. They are attacking the working class, primarily progressive workers and communists. Big financial capital is participating directly and vigorously in election campaigns. With the aid of economic leverage, the business community is organizing broad support for LDP candidates, and sometimes for the candidates of centrist parties.

The police are inventing more and more slanderous rumors and lies to discredit the JCP and are supplying the bourgeois mass media with the appropriate materials for utilization for anticommunist purposes. It has been established, for example, that the research division of the cabinet of ministers conducts instructive conferences for representatives of rightist bourgeois newspapers and offers them various types of provocative information from allegedly reliable sources. In this connection, the Bungei Shunjiu Publishing Firm earned a scandalous reputation by instigating many anticommunist outbursts. Various kinds of terrorist groups are being used more frequently against party activists. These groups assault the buildings of party organizations and commit acts of physical terror.

The anticommunist offensive is not only being carried out by the LDP and the business community. Rightist opportunist leaders and backward elements from the Komeito and DSP opposition parties are joining the energetic fight against the JCP. They are allying themselves with the ruling LDP against the JCP and the left wing of the JSP. In this way, they are not only performing a great service for the LDP, but are also preventing the creation of a united front of democratic forces.

The "middle-of-the-road" parties (Komeito and DSP) advocate a united front without JCP participation and are urging the Socialist Party to reject the idea of creating a nationwide united front. The leaders of Komeito and the DSP have refused to conduct a joint struggle in dealing with such urgent matters as the "Lockheed scandal," the improvement of living conditions for the laboring public, the Japanese-American "security treaty" and others.

The combined mass demonstrations by democratic forces were weakened in the mid-1970's by the schismatic actions of Komeito and the DSP. For example, in the gubernatorial elections in Kyoto in 1974 and Osaka in 1975, Komeito and the DSP took the side of the ruling party, giving it considerable support in the fight against democratic forces.

The Maoist schismatics and their agents in Japan have inflicted severe wounds on the party and on its efforts to unite the broad popular masses for the resolution of problems facing the nation and people. The fight against Maoist subversive activity has diverted the forces and attention of party members away from their chief objectives. The party has fought an irreconcilable battle against Maoist intervention in the internal affairs of the communist and democratic movement in Japan.

"Representatives of the Chinese Communist Party," a work entitled "Fifty Years of the Japan Communist Party" stresses, "have employed the increased tendency toward the restoration of Japanese-Chinese diplomatic relations as a means of intervention in Japanese affairs. They have not only supported the subversive activity against the party by anti-party elements which blindly obey their orders, but, utilizing the social democrats who oppose communism, parties taking an intermediate stand, and even part of the LDP, have also begun to put together a political front aimed against the JCP. Exerting pressure on journalists, they have discouraged them from criticizing their domestic and foreign policy line. They have exposed themselves even more as persons indulging in great-power intervention and striving to impose their plans on the Japanese people and the democratic movement. The 'Rengo Sekigun' (United Red Army) incident also proved that these people are trying to force Japan to accept the idea of armed struggle in the spirit of the thesis that 'rifles breed authority.' The party has pointedly criticized the aspirations of the Mao Zedong-Zhou Enlai clique to a kind of 'social colonialism,' to the domination of other parties and peoples, which lie at the basis of their intervention. It has proved that a firm stand must be taken to prevent great-power intervention and to allow the Japanese people to lay their own path to the future."[16]

At the end of 1975, when ruling circles launched a particularly broad campaign of slanderous attacks on the Communist Party and its leaders, groundlessly accusing them of displaying contempt for the democratic rights of the individual, the party, which was preparing for the parliamentary elections planned for the end of 1976, held a special congress, the 13th (July 1976). The congress adopted the "Declaration of Freedom and Democracy." This document was something like a JCP charter, supplementing and amplifying the policy-planning objectives of the party and the decisions of party congresses. It stated that the Japanese people should be fully endowed with the following freedoms: freedom of existence, civil and political freedoms and national freedom. The declaration stressed that all of these freedoms were being severely restricted and suppressed in contemporary Japan. The JCP exposed ruling circles' habit of encroaching upon the elementary rights and freedoms stipulated in the constitution.

Revealing the seamy side of bourgeois democracy, the declaration called upon Japanese workers to fight for their real rights and democratic freedoms. In particular, the declaration stressed that the historic significance of the doctrine of scientific socialism was that, while attaching great importance to the political liberation of the people, it taught that the individual could only achieve real liberation by liquidating the system of exploitation. This goal could be attained by putting an end to the capitalist system and building a socialist and communist society, in which there would be no class differences or conflicts.

In our nation, the declaration noted, which is a highly developed capitalist country but is dependent on the United States, the Communist Party, defining future guidelines for social progress, sets the immediate objective of democratic renovation of the country with the aid of a democratic coalition government. It then intends to build an independent, democratic

Japan by carrying out an anti-imperialist, antimonopoly democratic revolution and progressing toward socialist revolution and, eventually, the construction of a communist society.

In a socialist Japan, the leading branches of industry and other means of production now controlled by big capital will be owned by the entire society. Production for the sake of society and the public, and not personal profit, will be the basic principle of economic activity. The workers will play an active role in the management and control of enterprises. Planned economic management, leading to the rich development of productive forces, will guarantee the people high levels of material and spiritual well-being--higher than even before.

In a developed nation such as Japan, the declaration points out, the deciding step toward the socialization of the economy consists in the socialist nationalization of large enterprises, which constitute the most important economic sector. In such branches as medium- and small-scale industry and trade, agriculture and medium- and small-scale fishing, private businesses will remain in existence and their active role in the national economy will be respected.

The JCP has set the following objective for all stages of the Japanese society's development--staunch defense of public sovereignty and free participation by the public in politics. It will guarantee freedom of thought and conscience, freedom of speech, the press, assembly and association and the freedom of workers to declare solidarity and take collective action.

In order to safeguard public sovereignty, a state structure in which the highest body will be a parliament, resting on universal suffrage, will be established and reliably protected in the independent, democratic Japan and in socialist Japan. A multi-party system will be adopted, allowing for the existence of opposition parties, and all political parties will be guaranteed freedom of action. Government will be controlled by the party or coalition of parties receiving the majority of the public vote.

The JCP believes that the protection and expansion of civil freedoms will be an essential condition for the safeguarding of basic human rights and public sovereignty. Each citizen will be granted freedom of expression, including the guaranteed freedom to utilize the mass media.

Carrying out its policy of protecting human rights and striving for a better life, democracy and freedom, the concluding section of the declaration stresses, the JCP will work toward the defense and flourishing of civil and political freedoms and the defense and development of national freedom. The all-round protection and development of these freedoms and democracy have been firmly promised by the JCP, which realizes its responsibility for the people's future.[17]

Speaking at the 13th congress, Chairman Tetsuzo Fuwa of the JCP Central Committee Secretariat said that "the workers as a class should naturally play the leading and central role in the institution of socialist reforms," but "the leading role of the working class in socialist reforms does not mean that other classes will have no opportunity to participate in these reforms or that the working class will stand above other strata of the population.... A socialist regime, uniting the broad popular masses and engendered through their support, will not only urge other social classes to participate in socialist construction but will even be based on a coalition of the forces supporting socialism, on a broad alliance uniting the working class with all classes and strata of the population."18

The elections to the House of Representatives (December 1976) and House of Councillors (July 1977), which were held after the 13th, special congress of the JCP, took place in an atmosphere of continuous massive slanderous attacks on the JCP by the bourgeois mass media, intense nationalist propaganda in the nation and the revival of anticommunist prejudices in centrist opposition parties and backward social strata. The JCP suffered a serious defeat, losing 19 seats in the House of Representatives and 4 in the House of Councillors. The party also suffered considerable injury in local elections.

The 14th congress of the JCP was held from 17 through 22 October 1977. It summed up the results of party activity since the time of the 12th congress, directing attention to the positive aspects of party activity and party achievements as well as the reasons for its lack of success in the parliamentary elections of 1976 and 1977.

As the accountability report of the Central Committee to the 14th congress noted, "at all times and in all nations, the revolutionary movement has never developed along a straight, broad and even road, it has tempered itself, achieving successes and even experiencing serious failures, moving ahead along a difficult and winding path until it discovers the path to victory. The two election upsets suffered by our party represent one of the bends in the road traveled by the entire revolutionary process."19

Admitting that progressive forces "had to retreat under the conditions of crisis and the declining political influence of the LDP," the congress stated: "The main problem here is that a united front of progressive forces has still not been established, and that these forces have not been able to reveal the prospect of a progressive future to the broad popular masses which are taking a discerning, or even negative, view of the policy of the Liberal Democrats."20

The congress reaffirmed the party's determination to continue the anti-imperialist, antimonopoly struggle, to staunchly defend the interests of the workers, to unite them and to pursue the formation of a national democratic united front, with the construction of a peaceful, neutral, democratic Japan as its immediate objective.

In connection with the attempts of Japanese ruling circles, now resting on the support of Beijing, to divert progressive forces away from their struggle against the policy of military alliances and the militarization of the country, much attention was given at the congress to the elucidation of the party's foreign policy line.

"Our party," the accountability report of the Central Committee to the 14th JCP Congress states, "heading peaceful and democratic forces, is strengthening its solidarity with anti-imperialist, peace-loving forces in all nations; it is protesting all signs of intervention in internal affairs, pressure on other countries and the policy of war and aggression conducted by American imperialism; it is demanding the dismantling of American military bases on Japanese territory and in all parts of Asia and is persistently fighting for the dissolution of all military blocs and the liquidation of all military bases in Asia, the total independence of all Asian people, the establishment of relations of peace and friendship between all states on the basis of five peaceful principles, and the creation of a genuine system of collective security in Asia, which will be participated in by all states, regardless of differences in social structure."[21]

The congress underscored the Japanese people's particular responsibility in the fight against American intervention, since the United States is using Japan as an instrument of its aggressive policy in Asia. Speakers at the congress stated that the question of liquidating the Japanese-American "security treaty" did not only concern the fate of the Japanese people, but was also an international problem, the outcome of which could affect the future of Asia. The accountability report of the Central Committee to the 14th party congress, which was presented by Chairman T. Fuwa of the Central Committee Secretariat, expressed the certainty that "the Japanese people, as a result of nationwide struggle, will throw off the yoke of the Japanese-American 'security treaty' and will complete the transition from the pro-American policy of maintaining this aggressive military alliance to the complete restoration of sovereignty and the development of the nation along the path of independent peaceful policy, the path of independence, democracy, peace and neutrality."[22]

The JCP feels that the only reasonable method of escaping the national crisis connected with the existence of the Japanese-American military alliance will be a move toward non-alignment and neutrality. The party pointed out the fact that Southeast Asia is once again becoming a principal target of U.S. global strategy. In the event of new military provocations in this region, Japan will be used as a support base by the United States and, under these conditions, the Japanese-American "security treaty" could take the most dangerous turn for the Japanese. This course of events is being stimulated by the U.S. Administration's demand that Japan take on a considerable portion of the expense of maintaining American troops on the Japanese islands and increase military and other assistance to South Korea.

The congress noted that the reorganization and reinforcement of the Japanese-American military alliance are being accompanied by the mounting danger of the rebirth of Japanese militarism. As early as the 11th congress, the JCP was already discussing the danger of the rebirth of militarism in the nation, including the possibility that Japanese troops would be sent overseas. Since that time, Japanese militarism has become much stronger; the situation has reached a point at which the Japanese parliament is debating the passage of laws to cover "extreme circumstances."

"From the domestic political standpoint," the accountability report of the Central Committee to the 14th congress underscores, "it is an extremely serious problem that the stronger underlying tendency toward fascism of the Japanese type is one and the same as the dangerous tendency toward a rebirth of militarism."[23] Proceeding from this analysis, the 14th JCP Congress stressed that the attitude toward the "security treaty" was one of the touchstones which would reveal which of the Japanese stood for progress or reaction, sovereignty or dependence and, finally, war or peace.

The 14th congress charged communists with the responsibility of launching a nationwide struggle against the dangerous development of the Japanese-American military alliance and exposing those who directly or indirectly support military alliance with the United States. The congress pointed out the fact that American and Japanese reactionary forces were being assisted by the Chinese leadership, which is persistently trying to make leftist political parties and organizations renounce their traditional struggle for the peaceful and neutral development of Japan and is attempting to involve them in its hegemonistic plans by creating an international anti-Soviet front with Japan's participation.

"The apologists of the 'security treaty,'" the accountability report of the Central Committee to the 14th congress said, "now include even those who once spoke out loudest of all for its cancellation and against the resurgence of militarism. As soon as China was motivated by strategic consideration, related to its attitude toward the Soviet Union, to praise the Japanese-American 'security treaty,' these people, blindly following China's lead, made a 180-degree turn. It must be said that this unprincipled apostasy revealed the pitiful and petty spirit of those who lick the boots of overseas forces and feel no sense of responsibility for the fate of Japan and its people."[24]

The congress proposed Japan's move toward non-alignment and neutrality, stating that only this course would provide new opportunities for the resolution of foreign political and economic conflicts now being faced by Japan.

A move toward non-alignment, in economic relations as well as politics, will benefit Japan. This kind of policy, according to the JCP, will open new avenues for economic development and simplify the resolution of the natural resource problem. "If Japan, embarking on a course of non-alignment and neutrality, resolutely renounces the previous relationship of the exploiting capitalist countries to the exploited developing countries and establishes a relationship of truly mutual goodwill and equality with the developing countries, this will indisputably offer it new ways of solving the resource problem."[25]

The 14th congress recognized the need to view the struggle for the formation of a democratic coalition government in a broader context, not limited to the decade of the 1970's. "Even if various difficulties are encountered in the advancement toward this goal," a congress resolution notes, "the formation of a democratic coalition government on the basis of the unity of progressive forces will sooner or later be accomplished by means of nationwide struggle. History is moving in this direction, and no resistance or opposition on the part of the opponents of renewal can impede this process."[26]

The question of improving party work for the purpose of expanding its ranks and ensuring success in parliamentary elections was given considerable attention at the congress.

Armed with the decisions of the 14th congress, Japanese communists began broad-scale political, indoctrinational and organizational work with the masses, which strengthened and broadened party authority and increased the workers' trust in the party. By the 57th anniversary of the JCP, which was celebrated in June 1979, the party had more than 420,000 members. The readers of the central JCP organ, AKAHATA ("Red Banner") newspaper, numbered 3 million. This is a major triumph for the JCP if we consider that the party had 40,000 members and AKAHATA had less than 100,000 readers in 1961.

Another example of the JCP's increasing influence was its great success in the latest parliamentary elections, held in October 1979. The party won 5.8 million votes and put 39 deputies into the lower house of parliament, and if the two candidates of united democratic forces are counted, the JCP faction in the lower house now consists of 41 individuals. The party is now represented by 57 deputies in the highest legislative body. The communists were particularly successful in large industrial centers--Tokyo, Osaka and Kyoto. The influence of the JCP also increased noticeably in rural regions, where the party won more than 10 deputatorial mandates. This is all the more indicative since rural Japan has always been the private preserve of conservative forces and has traditionally voted for LDP candidates.

The JCP's rapid advance in these elections was due to its slogans, popular with the masses, calling for struggle against the militarization of the country, for the abrogation of the Japanese-American military treaty and against Japanese participation in the dangerous aggressive plans of the United States and Beijing, aimed at intervention in the internal affairs of Asian and Pacific countries. During the campaign, the party firmly advocated the development of peaceful and friendly relations with the Soviet Union and exposed the truth about the provocative campaign of reactionary circles in regard to the "mounting Soviet military threat."

This rapid advancement in the 1979 elections, however, is not being regarded as any kind of final limit by the JCP. The party leadership feels that these successes are still not enough to ensure the creation of a united national democratic front and make a radical change of government in Japan a real possibility. Summing up the results of the elections, Comrade Miyamoto stressed that the number of seats won by the JCP in parliament is still insignificant if regarded in light of the enormous problems the party will have to deal with in the near future.

Between the 14th JCP Congress and the present, the JCP membership grew by 40,000, as a result of which the total membership figure is now 400,000. Although the assignments set by the 14th congress have not been carried out in full, this is the highest number of JCP members in the party's history.

The JCP has recently also been quite successful in augmenting the reading audience of the party's central press organ, AKAHATA. The number of its subscribers has now reached the maximum figure of 3.4 million.

The party educational network has also been considerably broadened and organizationally strengthened. As the draft resolution of the 15th congress points out, the number of graduates of party courses has risen to 62,000 and the number of party members attending lectures in the primary educational system has reached 162,000. Meetings of party organizations are being held on a much more regular basis (approximately half of all the party organizations in Japan meet three or four times a month).

"The entire party," the draft resolution of the 15th JCP Congress states, "is now taking part in monthly campaigns to fulfill public promises, campaigns for the propaganda of party policy and the reinforcement of party ranks and pursuing the attainment of an objective set at the 14th congress, which stipulated that party membership should reach 500,000 and the number of readers of its press organ should rise to 4 million by the time of the 15th congress.

"Building on these successes, we must do our utmost to overcome all obstacles and establish a mass vanguard party, strong enough in the quantitative and qualitative sense to successfully move ahead and triumph in the struggle for a new social administration."[27]

Japanese observers are now admitting more and more that the main confrontation of the 1980's will be one between the Japan Communist Party, expressing and defending the interests and desires of the broad laboring masses, and the Liberal Democratic Party, protecting the interests of big monopolistic capital. It is already apparent even today, however, that the JCP has become an influential force in Japanese society, supported by millions of Japanese workers, while the ruling LDP, torn apart by internal conflicts, is losing one position after another. This deep-seated tendency is not only reflected in the course of parliamentary battles, but also on other fronts of today's class struggle in Japan.

FOOTNOTES

1. ZENEI, 1977, No 419 (special issue), p 107.
2. AKAHATA, 7 July 1970.
3. ZENEI, No 312, p 293.
4. Ibid., p 124.
5. Ibid., 1970, No 312 (special issue), p 49.
6. Ibid., pp 69-70.
7. Ibid., pp 148-149.
8. Ibid., 1971, No 319 (special issue), p 27.
9. Ibid., 1972, No 329 (special issue), p 40.
10. Ibid., p 45.
11. "Nihon-no mirai-o hiraku kagakuteki shakaishugi," Tokyo, 1972, p 292.
12. "Nihon shakaito-no sanjunen," Tokyo, 1974, pp 870-871.
13. "Nihon shakaito koryonbunkenshu," Tokyo, 1978, p 306.
14. AKAHATA, 5 December 1971.
15. ZENEI, 1977, No 419, p 85.
16. "Nihon kyosanto-no gojunen," Tokyo, 1972, pp 243-244.
17. ZENEI, 1976, No 400 (special issue), pp 52-71.
18. Ibid., p 109.
19. Ibid., 1977, No 419, pp 76-77.
20. Ibid., p 35.

21. Ibid., p 84.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., p 104.

24. Ibid., p 105.

25. Ibid., p 106.

26. Ibid., p 36.

27. "Information Bulletin for Abroad. Central Committee of JCP," Tokyo, No 422, p 110.

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JAPAN AND LATIN AMERICA: THE ZAIBATSU APPROACH

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 73-81

[Article by V. P. Kirichenko, candidate of historical sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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CONTEMPORARY PROPAGANDISTS OF THE 'OPEN DOOR' POLICY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 82-89

[Article by V. N. Nikiforov, doctor of historical sciences]

[Text] Since the beginning of the 1970's, particularly in the second half of the decade, more and more books and articles have been published in the PRC on historical subjects, including topics in world history and international relations. The absolute void that existed in Chinese historical science in the second half of the 1960's, following the notorious "Cultural Revolution," is now being rapidly filled. This could only be cause for joy if the authors of the new books and articles had taken the objective and conclusive approach that is generally required of historical works. Many contemporary Chinese publications prove that, unfortunately, this is not the case.

We have before us an article published in China in 1979. Its fundamental significance is great: The author, Wang Xi, raises no less an issue than the radical reassessment of the entire history of Chinese-American relations. The article was printed in SHIJIE LISHI ("World History") magazine, in issue No 3 for 1979.

It is not only obvious that the author of the article does not wish to be taken for an orthodox Maoist, but he goes even further and almost totally discards the "Marxist-Leninist" terminological basis that was once characteristic of Maoist works, consisting of terms, phrases and quotations that were incorrectly interpreted but were nonetheless Marxist in origin; Wang Xi's article contains only one meaningless phrase about history's obligation to serve "proletarian policy." If this phrase is discounted, the article could be totally ascribed to any bourgeois author.

It was characteristic of the "scientific style" of the period of "Cultural Revolution," as all of us still remember quite well, that Mao's ideas were actually regarded as the highest criterion of truth. Contemporary works, particularly the Wang Xi article now being analyzed, are characterized by the pretense of objectivity and frequent appeals for "serious, scientific generalization," "objective scientific judgments," "serious criticism and discussion" and the "use of primary sources" (pp 16, 18).

It would seem that this approach could only be applauded. After all, what kind of historical science would we have without the conscientious treatment of sources! Who can deny that the criterion of truth is experience, and not a quotation from Mao.... Let us see, however, how these general pragmatic instructions are employed by the author of this article in his treatment of historical material.

The history of American-Chinese relations was the subject of many studies by Chinese scholars prior to 1949 and during the first period of the PRC's existence. The Soviet reader is familiar, for example, with the books of the famous Chinese historians Hu Sheng, Liu Danian and Qin Benli.[1] All Chinese progressive authors always agreed with the indisputable fact that capitalist America belonged to the category of foreign aggressors.

In the opinion of historian and philosopher Hu Sheng, reinforced by the entire content of his previously mentioned book, "the aggressive policy of American imperialism in China has as long a history as the policy of other imperialist countries. Various imperialist powers have tried to enslave China. The leading role among them for more than 50 years after the first 'opium war' was played by England. After 1894 Japanese imperialism became the chief aggressor in China. But since 1899 the struggle to dominate China has been waged under cover of the 'open door' doctrine of American imperialism, and it was at that time that the continuous years-long struggle between the United States and Japan for supremacy in China began. Whereas Japanese imperialism has long been regarded by Chinese people as their number-one enemy because of its brazen treachery, insidiousness and brutality, American imperialism has always camouflaged its brutal and bestial features with a hypocritical mask and is therefore an even more dangerous enemy."[2]

Naturally, we do not know whether the opinions expressed by Chinese scholars in the early 1950's coincide with their present views. But we do wish to point out something else here: The books published in the 1950's still exist, and no one has ever refuted their conclusions. For example, the author of the excerpt quoted was able, in our opinion, to summarize the policy from each power and to describe their proportional significance in the Far East quite well, in complete accordance with the facts and in the context of the entire history of China's relations with the capitalist powers. It is a fact that the chief imperialist forces here have traditionally been England, Japan and the United States; at the end of the 19th century Japan became the most active of these forces, and the United States took over this role later. Other powers which were conducting an imperialist policy at that time--tsarist Russia and France--are not even mentioned by Hu Sheng in his conclusion as he believed that they played a secondary role (naturally, he does discuss these states in his book).

We have cited this one work because its author, in our opinion, was able to express this idea most fully; in general, however, the same views were held by many Chinese, Soviet and other authors. Let us see what the 1979 article offers in place of this.

What is "new" in Wang Xi's discussion of this matter is primarily his ascription of primary significance to the "serious role" played by the problem of China's "territorial integrity" (p 12). The imperialist powers "for 109 years...conquered piecemeal" the territory of China, while the United States was supposedly the only one of the leading imperialist states which "did not seize Chinese territory." While the author admits that this absence of direct territorial conquests in China was the result of "apprehension and the lethargy of the U.S. State Department," opposition on the part of England and Japan and other historical causes, he nonetheless feels it is a "remarkable fact" that the United States did not have the energy to seize any tasty tidbits away from China prior to 1950.

Here is the "new" theory in a nutshell (actually, this was suggested for a long time by American imperialist historians): Russia, naturally, was the "chief enemy"; the United States was the only power which did not invade China (p 12); these are the two poles between which all elements of the history of China's relations with the outside world should supposedly be distributed from now on.

But what about the fact that the United States planned to invade China several times, even though it could not carry out these plans for a long time? This fact is unimportant to the author because he has a second theory to set forth: "The preservation of standards in international relations is nothing other than practice and reality" (p 12). Fine, the reader will say, if he is at all familiar with the "practice" of the Americans and all other imperialists in China, but what happened to this pitiful practice and "reality" in 1950, when American imperialism openly seized, and is still controlling, the island of Taiwan--the largest segment of Chinese territory populated by Chinese and still unreturned to the PRC? Or how should we interpret such historical realities as the "open door" doctrine in China, which was declared--and everyone knows this--precisely by American imperialism in 1899-1900 and which served for a long time as the legal basis for the semicolonial exploitation of China?

The answer is quite simple, the author replies: The occupation of Taiwan was nothing more than "a regrettable episode in the history of Sino-American relations," and it is fortunately now over, "now that the United States has acknowledged Taiwan to be an integral part of Chinese territory" (p 13). As for the "open door" doctrine, Wang Xi has yet another theory, a third one, which, in the author's opinion, allows for the free creation of a "new" history of American-Chinese relations.

The theory is the following (pp 13-14). From the very beginning, Wang Xi says, the "open door" policy, declared by U.S. Secretary of State John Hay, contained a fundamental contradiction. On the one hand, Hay's note recognizes the presence of imperialist spheres of influence in China and demanded "equal opportunities" for the United States. On the other, the note formally set forth the principle of respect for the territorial integrity and sovereingty of China. Wang Xi is correct in pointing out this contradiction. Moreover, he presents a long list of U.S. violations of the principle of China's territorial integrity and sovereingty: the U.S. Government's encouragement of tsarism's policies in Manchuria in 1900, its recognition of Japan's "special rights" in Manchuria and Mongolia in 1908 (the Root-Takahira Agreement), another recognition of Japan's "special interests" in China in 1917 (the Lansing-Ishii convention), and the provision of Japan with supplies of American fuel during the period of Japanese aggression in China in 1931-1941. The author of the article justifiably concludes from all this that the "open door" policy was essentially always a reflection of the U.S. desire to "safeguard and broaden U.S. economic and political interests in China. It would seem," the author remarks with a hint of embarrassment, "that the 'justice,' 'concern for others' and 'selflessness' discussed by some American historians never actually existed" (p 14).

The matter seems quite clear: The "open door" policy was essentially imperialist and colonialist (it is true that the author of the article avoids this kind of class jugdment as much as possible, but this does not change the meaning of his comments). But no, it is precisely here that the line of reasoning undergoes an unexpected reversal in the article. As we recall, Wang Xi postulated at the beginning of the article that the "open door" policy was contradictory. Now he moves on to the second facet of this policy.

The "open door" policy, he asserts, played a "definite role in the objective deterrence or postponement of imperialist aggression against our nation" (p 14). What can we say about this? The "open door" policy (which was, incidentally, formally adopted at that time by all imperialist states) was the reflection of a temporary compromise by these powers on the issue of China, and their admission of the fact that, given the existing balance of power in the Far East, no one power was capable of exploiting China all alone. But the "open door" doctrine did not in any sense signify the refusal of its creators to exploit the Chinese people. On the contrary, it sanctified this exploitation with the principle of equal "opportunities" (opportunities for exploiters). Judging by the total content of the doctrine, the preservation of China's formal "integrity" (combined with the preservation of foreign bases, concessions and spheres of influence in China!) was expressly intended to serve the goals of the collective exploitation of China by international imperialism.

As for the statement in the Hay doctrine regarding the preservation of Chinese sovereignty, what real sovereignty could there have been under the conditions of the foreign concessions and spheres of influence in China, an entire system of unfair treaties, the lack of customs independence for China, the collection of debts and contributions by force, the existence of extraterritoriality and the occupation of several Chinese regions by foreign armed troops! Under these conditions, the equality declared in the Hay doctrine for the exploiting powers represented the practical and commercial purpose of the doctrine, while the principle of "respect for Chinese sovereignty" was a formal screen or figleaf.

Naturally, it is a matter of personal taste if Wang Xi and the editors of SHIJIE LISHI prefer collective forms of colonial slavery to individual forms. But they are absolutely certain that the Chinese people do not share this opinion. At any rate, as early as 1924--that is, when the imperialists "open door" policy was at its peak--the founder of the revolutionary democratic movement in China, Sun Yat-sen, wrote: "The present condition of China is much more shameful than that of any colony. For example, Korea is a colony of Japan and Annam is a colony of France (this was then the status of Korea and Annam, or Vietnam--V. N.). Do they play a role in international relations? Certainly not. All countries treat them as slaves: Korea is treated as Japan's slave and Annam is treated as France's slave. But although Korea and Annam are slaves of foreign states, each is only the slave of a single power. China, on the other hand, is now the slave of all the great powers, since any state which maintains contractual trade relations with China acts like our master.... We are controlled by at least ten masters and, consequently, China is in a much worse position than Korea, where only Japan is the master, or Annam, where only France is the master."[3]

Hu Sheng, the Chinese historian quoted above, correctly defined the role of the American "open door" doctrine, in our opinion, as something serving not only for the legal declaration of collective imperialist rule in China, but also for the utilization of the Ch'ing dynasty's reactionary Beijing Government as an instrument of imperialism. "The powers," Hu Sheng wrote, "naturally had no intention of preserving the total independence and sovereingty of China. In their interpretation, the 'preservation of integrity' signified only the formal preservation of China's independence and the 'preservation of the integrity' of the dominant position of the Ch'ing Government, which was already totally decayed and accustomed to trading on China's interests....

"It is absolutely clear that the imperialist powers wanted to protect the Ch'ing Government, and even to preserve it, because it was their diligent slave.... Besides this, all of this helped in deceiving the Chinese people and nurturing their illusion that China was not completely lost."[4]

Liu Danian, a historian who is still famous in the PRC even now, once gathered abundant factual material which was conclusive proof of the value and purpose of the "open door" policy. "The open door policy," this author concluded, "was a reflection of the fact that the United States... was still not strong enough. It is no secret that the United States could not make the transition to a 'closed door' policy in China--that is, the policy of the open occupation of all China--until the end of World War II."[5]

On the one hand, we have volumes of special studies, an abundance of analyzed facts and substantiated conclusions. On the other, we see Wang Xi's unsubstantiated article, which asks us to ignore all previous views and turn all of the conclusions and opinions in regard to the "open door" policy upside-down. Could this article really outweigh historical analysis? The author of the 1979 article violates the first rule of objective and serious research: He disregards scientific continuity, ignoring the compulsory duty of historians to consider the discoveries of their predecessors--either by using them as a foundation for future research or by discerningly nullifying them in new research. The author does none of this.

In his above-cited book of the early 1950's, Liu Danian wrote: "Hoping to deceive the Chinese people, the American imperialists distorted the facts, constantly asserting and loudly broadcasting that the 'open door' policy, which meant actual aggression in China, was supposedly a 'guarantee' for China, a slogan aimed precisely at guaranteeing China's territorial integrity and sovereignty. But the American aggressors did not take the risk of saying a single word about their habit of resorting to this slogan simply for the purpose of undermining Chinese sovereignty, expanding their privileges in China and intervening in Chinese affairs. All of this clearly testifies to the exceptional hypocrisy, baseness and dishonesty that were long characteristic of the American aggressors."[6]

This is what a Chinese historian wrote in the 1950's. We must repeat that we do not know the present views of this author on this matter, but we must recognize the fact that the book "The History of American Aggression in China" has retained its scientific value: It is specific, the conclusions stated in the work are solidly backed up by an abundance of facts, and the author's class approach is obvious. And the author's assertion that any discussion of how the "open door" policy was aimed at preserving the integrity and sovereignty of China was motivated by the "hope of deceiving the Chinese people," is essentially a good slap in the face to such contemporary authors, like Wang Xi, who are now praising the "objectively beneficial" consequences of the American "open door" doctrine.

The fundamental difference between Wang Xi's article and the works of his predecessors is his unjustified division of the essentially single "open door" doctrine into two allegedly absolutely opposite doctrines, so as to then call the "positive" side of the "open door" policy, invented by the apologists of American imperialism, the real meaning of the doctrine, and to actually depict the negative, aggressive side of the policy as an alien admixture which only interfered with the manifestation of the doctrine in its pure form.

Confused about the reasons for the inconsistency of U.S. policy in China, Wang Xi devotes an entire section of his article to a discussion of internal conflicts in the United States, indicating that the Washington Administration was pressured at different times by groups of different states with varying degrees of interest in political activity in the Far East. Here the author ignores the fact that the disputes between these groups generally concern the rates, dates and scales of aggression in China, but could not change the essentially imperialist nature of U.S. policy.

"Actually," the author of the article states "the United States, given the need to observe...the two provisions (the recognition, on the one hand, of China's integrity and sovereignty and, on the other, spheres of influence and 'equal opportunities'--V. N.), could not implement the 'open door' policy.... When the policy was being implemented, the United States displayed its indecision, reflected in vacillation between working against or with other powers, and it was the latter that was chosen more frequently" (p 13). In Wang Xi's view, the real purpose of the "open door" policy was to give the United States a chance to fight more vigorously against its rivals in China (particularly, naturally, against Russia).

It turns out that it was not the "open door" doctrine in itself that played a negative role for China, but its inconsistent implementation, not the imperialist essence of U.S. policy in China, but the insufficient energy displayed by American imperialism in its struggle with its rivals. But what if American imperialism had found the strength to "go beyond bounds," if it had competed more vigorously with its rivals in the Far East--would this have been in the interest of the Chinese people?

By all indications, the author is trying to imply that the answer to this question would be a positive one. But history has already answered this question, and the answer was nothing like the one suggested by the author to the reader. It is a fact that U.S. ruling circles displayed sufficient determination and consistency in opposing its chief rival--Japan--during World War II and immediately afterward; it is fact that they could have occupied China in place of Japanese imperialism at some time. Was this in China's interest? The Chinese people expressed their unequivocal opinion: They rose up and threw the pro-American clique of Chiang Kai-shek out of their country, counteracting all of his patrons' efforts to prevent this.

As we can see, the entire line of reasoning in Wang Xi's article is not only unsound from start to finish, but is totally inconsistent with the facts. The "old" works by Chinese historians of the 1950's are a favorable contrast to this article. Although Wang Xi's work was printed in a historical journal and the author pretends to take a "businesslike and scientific" approach, the article does not belong in the sphere of historical science and has absolutely no scientific value.

Apparently, the article appeared in SHIJIE LISHI for purely "practical" reasons. The author defines his assigned task in the following words: "To promote mutual understanding between the people of the two countries--this is the responsibility of Chinese and American historians, and it is one they cannot delegate to anyone else" (p 17). The promotion of mutual understanding between people is a noble goal, but such methods as the distortion of historical facts and the practice of turning historical theories upside-down can hardly serve noble goals. Moreover, as Wang Xi's entire line of reasoning demonstrates, the author interprets

Sino-U.S. "mutual understanding" in a unique way; otherwise, why would he have wasted so much effort on a sophistic justification of the American aggressive "open door" policy.

Wang Xi feels it is his duty to explain to the new generation of Chinese, who do not know of the "excellent qualities" of American imperialism, that the Americans are "cheerful, upright and industrial people who are striving for the greatest efficiency in all areas" (p 17). We Soviet people share the Chinese author's good opinion of the personal qualities of the American people. But the "open door" policy in China, the justification of which is the central theme of Wang Xi's article, was not the policy of the American people, but the policy of ruling imperialist circles in the United States. Now this Chinese journal, appealing for all-encompassing rapprochement with the United States, implies in this article that the basis for this rapprochement could be, for example, some variant of a "consistently" implemented "open door" policy in China.

Naturally, the contemporary Beijing pragmatists who assigned this duty to the editors of SHIJIE LISHI, have published Wang Xi's article in the hope that the "consistent" implementation of the "open door" policy could be limited to a specific framework. In his article, Wang Xi employs the utilitarian interpretation of historical experience to specify precisely which types of American policy in China he regards as impermissible. Above all, he criticizes missionary work (pp 16-17), which is the subject of a special section. The missionaries, in Wang Xi's words, were closely connected with the entire system of unfair treaties forced on China...some of the privileges enjoyed by the missionaries in China even surpassed the privileges of foreign businessmen (for example, the missionaries' right to travel into the heart of the country and acquire property there). The influence of American religious forces on U.S. policy toward China was always negative. At the same time, the author admits that American missionaries opened academic and medical establishments in China and that many Chinese scholars and political figures were brought up under their influence.

Another section of the article, twice as long, discusses the study of China by American historians. The author appeals for mutual understanding between the United States and China: The United States must recognize the complete independence and viability of the new China, and the Chinese side is prepared to admit that the United States, with all its capitalist "defects" (in the author's words), still possesses "colossal developmental potential." Wang Xi acknowledges that American scholars are ahead of the historians of the PRC in the study of history (p 17).

In all fairness, we must give the Chinese historian credit for listing the numerous errors of American historians and discussing their biases and their justification of colonialism. "We," he stipulates, "intend to seriously discuss and criticize their hypotheses." Wang Xi makes a particularly interesting remark about the famous work by University of

Michigan Professor A. Feuerwerker, "China's Early Industrialization." "Feuerwerker," the Chinese author writes, "has put his whole soul into his work...but not one of the main theses set forth in the book is backed up by first-hand material" (p 18).

The amount of attention given to this subject in Wang Xi's article indicates that certain groups of Chinese historians believe it is their important duty to thoroughly acquaint themselves with U.S. historical science. They are already fantasizing about broader friendly contacts with U.S. Sinologists, tempting overseas work assignments at Hartford and other American scientific centers and the opportunity to examine the personal archives of the inventor of the "open door" doctrine, John Hay.

Wang Xi's remarks appear to delineate the bounds beyond which U.S.-Chinese rapprochement should not go, in the opinion of the author and the editors. In the first place, the deep ideological penetration of Chinese society by the Americans would be impermissible (this thesis, as we saw above, is set forth in the author's criticism of missionary work); in the second place, mutual understanding must be established between the PRC and the United States through the definite revision of American and Chinese historical works.

The last section of Wang Xi's article, in which he discusses the traditions of friendship both sides should cultivate, should be invulnerable to criticism. Is it not true that there were friendly and bright episodes in the relations between the American and Chinese people? We would expect the Chinese author to discuss the defense of the Chinese people by American democrats and humanitarians (such as Mark Twain) and the criticism of American imperialist policy in China by the Communist Party of the United States of America. To our amazement, however, the author says nothing about this in this section.

Instead, he provides the following examples of American-Chinese friendship (p 19): the hard labor of Chinese workers in the United States, countless numbers of whom died while building a railroad stretching across the North American continent from the East to the West; the names of the prominent American friends of Mao Zedong--E. Snow and A. L. Strong--who helped the Maoists spread the cult of Mao and falsify the history of the Chinese revolution; the name of the notorious Dr Hatema (Ma Haide), whose functions in Mao's clique of closest associates are still something of a mystery.... This, it turns out, is the category of friends the contemporary Chinese author is seeking in the United States!

There is one thing that cannot be denied about Wang Xi's article: It is consistent from start to finish. It appeals for "friendship" not with the American people, but with American imperialism. The Beijing pragmatist is prepared to justify and permit a certain degree of American colonialism in China, which he associates with the "open door" doctrine. Abandoning all of the seriousness and objectivity he advocates, the author falsifies the history of American-Chinese relations just as much as the condemned Chinese historians of the period when the "gang of four" ruled.

But truth always has the advantage over lies, and this is not an empty phrase. The Chinese people, who already said an unequivocal "no" to American colonizers and all their doctrines once, will not approve of the friendly overtures now being made to imperialists in their name.

Complex and contradictory processes are now taking place in Chinese historical science. Many customary dogmas about Mao as the executor of all great feats in modern Chinese history are becoming shaky; many of the names crossed out by the Maoists are once again being written into the book of history; the desire to write and read the truth is becoming stronger in Chinese authors and readers of historical works. Once a process has started, it cannot be stopped. The time will come when all history, including the history of American-Chinese relations, will be rewritten in China objectively.

FOOTNOTES

1. Hu Sheng, "The Aggression of the Imperialist Powers in China" (translated from the Chinese), Moscow, 1951; Liu Danian, "The History of American Aggression in China" (translated from the Chinese), second edition, Moscow, 1953; Qin Benli, "The History of the Economic Aggression of American Imperialism in China" (translated from the Chinese), Moscow, 1951.

2. Hu Sheng, Op. cit., p 302.

3. Sun Yat-sen, "Selected Works" (translated from the Chinese), Moscow, 1964, p 458.

4. Hu Sheng, Op. cit., pp 164-165.

5. Liu Danian, Op. cit., p 87.

6. Ibid., p 90.

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BEIJING'S POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 90-102

[Article by A. V. Kudryavtsev, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] The Latin American continent is one of the regions farthest away from China, and China had virtually no official relations with these countries right up to the beginning of the 1970's.[1] Nonetheless, Beijing's policy toward Latin America is distinguished by the same features as its global foreign policy line. Just as in all other regions, it is colored by the hegemonistic, antisocialist and anti-Soviet aims of the Chinese leadership.

The Chinese leadership began to display more interest in Latin America at the end of the 1950's, when the continent was rocked by stormy revolutionary uprisings. They reached their peak with the triumphant victory of the Cuban revolution, which marked the beginning of a new stage in the history of Latin America. The geographic proximity of the continent to the United States, the main imperialist power, the vulnerability of the diversity of U.S. interests in this region in connection with intense anti-American and anti-imperialist feelings and the broad scales of the liberation movement were largely responsible for Beijing's heightened interest in this region.

The objective and subjective difficulties involved in getting a foothold in the Latin American countries--their great distance from China, the tense relations between the PRC and the United States and, consequently, the hostile feelings of the majority of Latin American governments for people's China and other difficulties--did not promise Beijing any real prospect of official relations with the states of this continent. For this reason, the Chinese leadership relied chiefly on ideological penetration. Its goals consisted primarily in attempts to impose the Maoist influence on the liberation movement developing in Latin America and on its militant vanguard--the communist parties--for the purpose of strengthening its claim to leadership among revolutionary forces and to open a new front of struggle against the international communist movement. At the same time, Beijing tried to take advantage of anti-American feelings in the countries of this region, which the United States had traditionally regarded as its "strategic rear."

After failing in their attempts to impose Maoist ideas on the Latin American communist parties, the Chinese leaders openly launched a fierce struggle against them under the cover of "autorevolutionary" theses. The schismatic activity they began in 1963 in communist parties, progressive trade unions, student federations and other democratic organizations, which were founded and functioned under the conditions of a heated class battle against internal reaction, was supposed to weaken the communist parties, deprive them of mass support and, in the broader context, subvert the communist movement on the continent.

By the mid-1960's, the Chinese leadership had set up several sectarian Maoist groups in the Latin American countries, which were made up of factionists and schismatics operating within the communist parties, various petty bourgeois elements and politically immature youths. Supported by these forces, Beijing launched a noisy campaign for immediate "people's war" everywhere against U.S. imperialism and its proteges on the one hand, and against "Soviet revisionism" as a "saboteur of people's war" on the other.

Decisive opposition by the Latin American communist parties in the 1960's subverted the Chinese leadership's attempts to impose its goals on revolutionary forces and disintegrate the communist movement. But Beijing's schismatic line inflicted considerable injury on the cause of stronger unity. Latin American reaction employed, and sometimes openly encouraged, the provocative sorties of the Maoists to heap repression on the communist parties, progressive trade unions and democratic, youth and student organizations. Maoism promoted the more energetic practice of anticommunist policy by bourgeois circles and assisted them in their attempts to break up and disorient the revolutionary movement.

This process was reflected, in particular, in the publication of various "studies" in the Latin American countries in the 1960's, which were supposed to "bury" scientific socialism, as it had allegedly "collapsed" in the process of the "Sino-Soviet dispute,"[2] or to frighten the public with the danger emanating from Maoism as the "most aggressive variety" of communism.[3] There was a simultaneous noticeable attempt on the part of U.S. ruling circles to utilize Beijing's course in their regional policy. In the early 1960's, American historian and diplomat Adolf Berle was already openly advising Washington to use the "Chinese factor" to undermine the influence of international socialism in Latin America.[4] At the end of the 1960's, the American C.I.A. published a special study containing extremely promising forecasts and judgments in regard to this possibility.

Beijing's policy toward the revolutionary movement in Latin America in the 1960's was a step toward its present open alliance with imperialism in this part of the world. Under present conditions, this kind of alliance is held together not only by the objective agreement of the interests of both sides, but also by their conscious desire for closer cooperation in line with official government policy.

Since the early 1970's, when rapprochement with the capitalist world was openly advocated in the CCP after the Ninth Congress, the Chinese leadership has departed from its previous bankrupt tactic of speculating on "ultrarevolutionary feeling" and has been striving for closer relations with ruling circles on this continent, regardless of their sociopolitical leanings. Beijing has declared its willingness to conduct relations with the Latin American countries in line with established international standards, verbally excluding the possibility of flagrant pressure and intervention in domestic affairs.

As a new basis for the development of Sino-Latin American relations, Beijing has announced the collective responsibility of fighting against "superpower hegemonism," which has been declared the main obstacle in the way of the "just struggle of the Latin American people." This course, the Chinese press stressed, "has already become an irrpressible historical current."[5]

Beijing propaganda tirelessly reiterated its "firm support" for the views of the Latin American countries in the international arena, which allegedly stemmed from the "common historical fate" of China and Latin America, the fact that the PRC belonged to the "Third World" and China's "resolute rejection" of superpower ambitions. Although it had just barely recovered from the excesses of China's own "Cultural Revolution," Beijing began to demonstrate its "particular respect" for the historical heritage of the Latin American continent. The Chinese press reported the existence of cultural and commercial ties "since time immemorial" between both Pacific coastlines and even the spread of "popular beliefs" and "legends" about friendship with China in the Latin American countries.[6]

Beijing's numerous statements in favor of stronger relations with Latin America were accompanied by some practical steps. For example, propaganda about the "people's war" and the activities of local Maoist organizations was sharply curtailed; Beijing began to pointedly display concern about the continent's internal socioeconomic problems, positively assess the role of ruling circles by associating it directly with "the rapid development of the antihegemonistic revolutionary-democratic movement" and institute the broad-scale practice of large unilateral purchases of Latin American goods with immediate or even advanced payment.

An important factor which enhanced the effectiveness of this foreign policy activity was the parallel thaw in relations between the PRC and the United States. As several Latin American press organs noted, this process, in a number of cases, actually signified a "green light for progression along the same road."[7] A genuine "Chinese boom" was seen in the Latin American countries during the course of Beijing's rapprochement with

Washington. The bourgeois mass media, which had just recently used Maoism as a pretext for exaggerated statements regarding the "communist threat," began to take even greater pains to praise the "pragmatic policy" of the Beijing leadership, "which had returned China to the world community." Certain political circles began to propagandize the development of economic contacts with China as something just short of a "unique panacea, capable of solving specific problems in international trade."[8]

To carry out its plans, Beijing made use of the progressive currents in Latin American politics, which have been getting stronger since the end of the 1960's. Their chief purpose is more intensive struggle for economic independence and real political independence and an attempt to play a more important role in international affairs. It was no coincidence that one of the first countries on this continent (after Cuba) to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, in December 1970, was Chile, where the Popular Unity coalition had triumphantly taken power. A year later, relations with the revolutionary military government of Peru were normalized. Contacts were rapidly established with the young Caribbean countries which had won independence in the anticolonial struggle. By the beginning of 1980, the PRC had also established relations with Argentina, Mexico, Guiana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, Brazil, Surinam, Barbados and Ecuador, the governments of which were motivated primarily by the hope of gaining economic benefits from the development of relations with the PRC.

Beijing's move toward the establishment of intergovernmental relations with the countries of this continent, despite the multileveled nature of this process, did not change the basic, fundamental essence of its Latin American policy. The Chinese leadership still viewed relations with Latin America in the context of its great-power hegemonistic plans, aimed at penetrating this region and encouraging these countries to work toward global Maoist policy objectives.

It should be noted in particular that, in taking this course, the Chinese leadership is speculating on its parallel interests with the forces for imperialism and Latin American reaction, which are striving to prevent the further development of revolutionary, liberation, anti-imperialist and anticolonial processes in Latin America and to keep it in the position of their "strategic rear," a unique "private preserve" of confirmed anticommunism and shameless exploitation. These goals are to be attained through the methods of economic expansion, the arousal of anti-Soviet feelings and the support of reactionary dicatorial regimes. It is along the well-traveled rails of this policy that the Chinese leadership hopes to ship the baggage of its own great-power expansionist plans for the Latin American continent.

One of the chief areas of Beijing's foreign policy activity in Latin America consists in subversive operations against socialism's outpost in the Western Hemisphere--the Republic of Cuba. As early as the mid-1960's, Beijing was already striving to "punish" Cuba for its refusal to bend to the Maoist will by unilaterally making sharp cuts in exports of Chinese rice to this country and simultaneously considerably reducing purchases of Cuban sugar. The Chinese embassy in Havana distributed Maoist slanderous materials in Cuba and even tried to establish secret contacts with representatives of the country's armed forces to deceive them into betraying the government. The Chinese leadership's actions were definitely repulsed and were described by Fidel Castro in his traditional speech on the seventh anniversary of the revolution on 2 January 1966, and in the 6 February 1966 issue of GRANMA newspaper, as a scandalous example of flagrant intervention in the internal affairs of Cuba and actual participation in the imperialist blockade of the island.

Beijing's present policy toward Cuba is closely related to its growing interest in the Caribbean basin. This region, which occupies an important strategic position, is the location of a concentration of acute political, ideological and socioeconomic conflicts. The main front of these conflicts runs between the United States and socialist Cuba. The development of anticolonial, anti-imperialist movements in the region, inspired by the example of the achievements of the first socialist country in the Western Hemisphere, is arousing obvious discomfort in the United States, which regards this region as an important sphere of its economic, military and political interests or, in fact, as its southern flank and a "quarantine" zone around Cuba.[9] In the 1970's, Washington made several attempts to destabilize conditions in the countries that had chosen the path of independent development--Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guiana--striving to undermine the increasing prestige of the Cuban revolution in these countries and frightening them with the threat of armed intervention.

Beijing's foreign policy activity in the Caribbean basin is promoting imperialism's plans in this region. The Chinese leadership has displayed increased interest in this region since the mid-1970's. Its policy here is aimed primarily at creating political friction by provoking the United States into the adventuristic channel of intense confrontation with the Soviet Union and Cuba, and it is simultaneously connected with the hope of achieving stronger mutual understanding with the United States on an anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban basis.

The Chinese leadership has not given up its hope of pushing the USSR and United States into a military conflict, which it has been nurturing since the time of the 1962 Caribbean crisis. It is no coincidence that questions pertaining to Soviet-U.S. military confrontation over the allegedly mounting Soviet "military threat" invariably figure in Beijing propaganda about the state of affairs in the subregion. The Chinese press has provocatively aroused a big commotion over the "buildup" of Soviet naval strength on the Soviet "base" in the Caribbean. In 1978 it took up the popular American myth about the "danger" posed by Cuba in connection with the Mig-23 fighter planes, and a year later panic-stricken cries from Beijing--"the bear, armed to the teeth, is breaking down the doors of

America"--accompanied the slanderous campaign launched on the pretext of the presence of Soviet military personnel in Cuba.

As relations became stronger between the PRC and the United States and Chinese diplomacy became more active in the Caribbean, Beijing made increasingly overt attempts to prevent detente in U.S.-Cuban relations. As Fidel Castro stressed, it became known that, in secret negotiations with representatives of the Washington Administration, the Chinese leadership had cautioned the United States against returning the Guantanamo Naval Base to Cuba and lifting the economic blockade of the island.

The extent to which the Chinese leadership is tempted by the idea of setting the United States against Cuba and the related idea of a possible global conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is attested to by the persistence with which the Chinese leaders have complained about Washington's alleged "excessively soft" treatment of Cuba. When Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping of the PRC State Council visited the United States in January-February 1979, he openly insisted on the need to "teach it a lesson" along with Vietnam. The same idea was expressed in the beginning of May by Vice Chairmen Ji Pengfei and Wulanfu of the NPC [National Peoples' Congress] Standing Committee. Beijing's candid statements once again demonstrated how dangerous its inflammatory policy is for the cause of peace and public security. As Cuba's GRANMA newspaper stressed, the Beijing rulers' demands that the United States oppose the Cuban revolution proved once again "how far Maoist counterrevolutionary policy has regressed by attempting to form an alliance with imperialism."[10]

In 1974 a new and important step was taken in the development and substantiation of the Chinese leadership's pro-imperialist, anti-socialist policy line in the Caribbean basin. In an article entitled "The Battle of the Two Superpowers in the Western Hemisphere," Beijing openly alleged for the first time that the presence of Soviet naval forces in this region was supposedly "threatening" not only the Latin American countries, but also "the United States itself, its strategic ties between South and North America, and the Panama Canal and Strait of Magellan--these two strategic canals connecting two oceans, the Atlantic and the Pacific."[11] By circulating this kind of provocative rumor, the Chinese leadership naturally did not seriously expect to worry U.S. ruling circles, which were certainly aware of the actual state of military and political affairs in the Caribbean. The Chinese leaders expected something else: On the one hand, to make a bid for closer mutual understanding with Washington on the basis of the imaginary Soviet and Cuban "threat," and on the other, to suggest to the Latin American countries that the neocolonial presence of the United States on this continent (including military presence) was dictated exclusively by the need to counteract "Soviet expansion." The logical conclusion to be drawn from Beijing's thesis was that first it would be necessary to unite in a struggle against the Soviet Union, for the purpose of "clearing a path" for the subsequent "settlement of accounts" with imperialism.

This policy is directed not only against the Soviet Union and Cuba, but also against the vital interests of the Caribbean states and Latin America as a whole. The PRC leadership is trying to undermine their growing ties with the socialist world. Besides this, Beijing is trying to break up the united anti-imperialist front in the Caribbean. For this purpose, it is making energetic use of economic "assistance" as leverage, as well as the influence of the relatively sizable Chinese overseas bourgeoisie.

Since 1978 Chinese diplomacy has been much more active in the Caribbean countries. It has been accompanied by the escalation of the anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban campaign launched in the West. In the middle of the year, several Caribbean states and neighboring countries were visited by most impressive delegations. In June, a delegation headed by Vice Chairman Ji Pengfei of the NPC Standing Committee visited Mexico and Venezuela, and Vice Chairman Geng Biao of the PRC State Council visited Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and Guiana in July. The Chinese side has attempted to channel all negotiations with the leaders of these countries in the direction of inflammatory speculation against the Soviet Union and Cuba. The almost total lack of even indirect criticism of imperialism and colonialism in the Chinese statements was in sharp contrast to this.

Just before and during the sixth conference of the heads of state and government of the non-aligned states in Havana, Beijing intensified its slanderous attacks on Cuba in an attempt to discredit its important positive role in the movement for non-alignment and to complicate its relations with active participants in the movement, including Jamaica, Guiana, Peru and other countries. It is indicative that it was precisely at this time that imperialist circles began to start provocative debates in the developing countries over Cuba's "right" to participate in the movement for non-alignment and to organize the conference. There were also signs of obvious unanimity in the attempts of Beijing and reactionary forces in the United States to depict the victory of progressive forces in Grenada, which had overthrown the anti-people regime of E. Gairy, as a Soviet and Cuban "intrigue," allegedly connected with Soviet and Cuban attempts to "take advantage of the existing state of affairs" for the purpose of the "further infiltration of the Caribbean."[12]

All of this testifies to the Beijing leadership's intention to engineer its policy in this region with a view to closely coordinated efforts with imperialism and its support.

The present foreign policy behavior of the Beijing leadership in the Latin American countries is quite vividly illustrating that it is still deeply hostile toward the cause of revolutionary, liberating reforms on the continent. Carrying out instructions from Beijing, local Maoist groups are fighting a real war against progressive, anti-imperialist regimes. In Peru, the leaders of the Maoist "Marxist-Leninist communist party" and several other pro-Beijing groups have openly opposed the revolutionary military government which took power in 1968, calling it "reactionary" and branding its important structural reforms "false." In 1973-1974 and again in 1976, when Peruvian reactionary forces attempted a counteroffensive, the Maoists escalated their subversive activities in this country considerably. In several cities, particularly Arequipa, Puno and Cuzco, they, as well as various rightist and leftist extremist groups, provoked disorder and confrontations between some segments of the laboring population and the authorities. The far-reaching plans of the Maoists are attested to by the underground warehouses of weapons and Maoist propaganda literature discovered in some regions.

In Bolivia the Maoists tried to organize an armed struggle against the patriotic military government of J. J. Torres. Their activities made it much easier for reactionary forces to plan and carry out a rightist military coup in August 1971. Similar tactics were employed by pro-Beijing elements in other countries--Chile, Uruguay and Ecuador.

In a number of cases, Beijing has officially had to deny its involvement in provocative actions by local Maoists, demagogically complaining about their "lack of understanding" of the "dialectics" of the processes occurring in their countries. But this does not change the essence of the Chinese leadership's approach to anti-imperialist, liberating reforms. Although Beijing is passing itself off as a supporter and defender of the interests of the Latin American countries in the international arena, it is trying to force these countries to abandon their anti-imperialist aims and is provoking them into confrontation with the socialist world.

A special role in these plans is assigned to the imposition of anti-Soviet objectives camouflaged as "opposition to superpower hegemony." Virtually none of the meetings between the Chinese leaders and representatives of governmental, political and business circles, culture, science and the mass media in the Latin American countries, and even summit-level meetings (with Mexican Presidents L. Echeverria and Lopez Portillo, Prime Minister E. Williams of Trinidad and Tobago and Guianese President A. Chung and Prime Minister F. Burnham), have taken place without political advice regarding the need for more intensive struggle against the "superpowers" and, in a number of cases, overt anti-Soviet attacks. It is noteworthy that the Chinese leaders have made the most overt attempts to turn their negotiating partners against the Soviet Union in the small countries of this region, which urgently need political and economic support. By doing this, Beijing is cynically flouting the existing norms of international relations and is manifesting its great-power, dictatorial position.

The Chinese leaders attach great significance to contacts with representatives of the mass media. They are trying to turn certain publications in these countries into permanent sounding boards for Beijing propaganda and effective instruments to direct public opinion in favor of China. Beijing's hostility toward revolutionary liberation forces frequently gives it access to large Latin American publishing firms, newspapers, magazines and television networks. Making use of these, the Chinese leadership is methodically and expansively inviting editors and officials from major Latin American newspapers and magazines to visit China and are sending groups of Chinese journalists to visit these countries. In May 1978, a delegation from the NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, headed by the agency's Deputy Director Mu Qing, visited Venezuela and Guiana and indirectly made the necessary political preparations for the Latin American visits of the delegations of Vice Chairman Ji Pengfei of the NPC Standing Committee and Vice Premier Geng Biao of the PRC State Council. At this same time, the PRC ambassador in Venezuela paid a call on the editors of ULTIMAS NOTICIAS and offered the newspaper staff extensive information about the development of Sino-Venezuelan relations and the international situation.

The Chinese leadership is counting primarily on representatives of mounting Latin American bourgeois nationalism to support its foreign policy ideas. Both its right wing and a large segment of its left wing often take the same approach to anti-imperialist, liberating processes in their countries, actually interpreting them as nothing more than the "rebellion" of the "Third World" people against "international centers of power," the "rich nations" and the "superpowers." The views of these generally influential political and ideological currents are often distinguished by traces of anti-Sovietism and echoes of Maoist ideas. In Colombia, representatives of these circles, who include, in particular, the nation's former Presidents M. Pastrana and L. Camargo, are insisting on the "humane Marxism" that is allegedly preached by the Maoists and are praising Mao for his break with the fundamental Marxist conclusion regarding the historic role of the proletariat and for his break with the Soviet Union.[13]

The Chinese leadership regards the nationalistic ambitions of the grand Latin American bourgeoisie, which is striving to augment its role in the hierarchical system of the global capitalist economy at a time of anti-imperialist struggle, as one of the factors contributing to the introduction and development of antisocialist extremist currents in the developing countries. For this reason, Beijing has an interest in energizing and stimulating these processes. In connection with this, it attaches considerable significance to speculation on the attempts of bourgeois circles in some Latin American countries to grossly exaggerate the importance of demands for the international recognition of the rights of littoral states to unilaterally expand the zone of their territorial waters to 200 or more nautical miles. Along with these forces, Beijing propagandists have stated that this movement, of which the Latin American countries were the "pioneers and initiators," represents a "new page in the struggle of the Third World against great-power hegemonism" and that it has supposedly acquired "worldwide historic significance"[14] and is "spreading to Asia, Africa and even Northern Europe."

The main purpose of this Beijing campaign was to provoke friction and conflicts over the attempts at the unilateral division of the coastal zone, to undermine the foundations of international law of the sea and to create chaos and confusion in international affairs. The nature of this Chinese activity was clearly demonstrated by Beijing's position at a number of international conferences on the law of the sea, particularly the conference in Caracas in July-August 1974. It is no secret that Beijing was responsible for the radical difference in the positions of the various sides. Some Latin American representatives believed that the conference ended in failure due to the "complexity of the problems and the contradictory nature of various interests,"[15] as well as "the stand taken by the great powers." The Chinese side deliberately impeded the constructive work of the conference and began to talk about the Third World's "great victory" over the "superpowers"[16] after the conference, clearly calling upon certain states, particularly the Latin American countries, to proceed along the path of confrontation. The Chinese leadership tried to use certain other issues for similar provocative and inflammatory purposes, particularly the issue of the Latin American nuclear-free zone (the Tlatelolco Agreement).

Economic problems have recently been the center of attention for Beijing in its approach to the Latin American countries. This change reflects primarily the peculiarities of the intraregional and international situation. The movement for real economic independence has become stronger in the Latin American countries. It is being accompanied by increased activity on the part of Latin American representatives at various economic conferences, including those within the UN framework, and on the part of old and new regional and subregional trade and economic associations, such as the Andean Group, the Latin American Economic System, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and others.

The economic struggle of countries in this region has also become more anti-imperialist in nature. This desire for a new economic order based on democratic principles and the objections to uncontrolled activity by transnational corporations were expressed in the documents of the March 1975 conference of the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in Lima, the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in May 1972 in Santiago and the non-aligned conferences in August 1972 in Georgetown and August 1975 in Lima.

Although Beijing has tried to pass itself off as a supporter of Latin American economic liberation, it has actually tried to weaken its anti-imperialist potential and to turn economic issues into a sphere for the separation of the national interests of the Latin American countries and the worldwide socialist community.

Beijing persists in giving the struggle of the Latin American countries for economic independence an "anti-superpower" interpretation. The PRC press has implied that the struggle against "hegemonism" in the area of economic relations represents some kind of "crucial point" in the "national democratic revolution" in Latin America.[17] These views have been preached by Beijing in bilateral contacts with representatives of the

Latin American countries and in international economic forums in these countries. Beijing diplomacy tries to avoid the discussion of the pressing problems of the developing countries by confining all conversation to condemnation of "superpower hegemonism." At the UNIDO conference in March 1975 the Chinese delegation asserted that the "struggle against hegemonism has spread to the sphere of economics."[18]

Beijing propagandists have used every opportunity to exaggerate the "antihegemonistic" significance of new Latin American trade and economic associations and alliances of the countries exporting coffee, bananas, bauxite and other products, interpreting their activity as an example of "collective self-reliance" and "joint opposition of the superpowers." When Guianese Prime Minister Burnham met with Deng Xiapoing in March 1975, the latter made special mention of their role in the policy of using "raw material as a weapon." The Chinese leaders are not concealing their desire to direct the activities of these integrated associations into the channel of confrontation with the socialist world. To discredit Soviet economic policy in the Latin American countries, Beijing is denigrating the nature of Soviet-Cuban relations and is spreading absurd lies about the Soviet Union's wish to "lure" the Latin American countries into the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, which it regards as nothing other than "an instrument of the neocolonialist policy of social-imperialism." The expansion of egalitarian and mutually beneficial ties between the nations of this continent and the socialist community is being contrasted to the prospect of rapprochement with China and the developed capitalist powers, including the United States.

After Mao Zedong's death, the Chinese leadership took greater pains to establish and advertise its "exemplary" broad-scale relations on a commercial and economic basis with the more influential Latin American countries--Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela. At the beginning of 1977 the PRC concluded a trade agreement with Argentina, and in May 1978 it signed a series of documents on agricultural imports. In January 1974 a trade agreement was concluded with Brazil, and in November another agreement was signed on shipments of Chinese petroleum in exchange for iron ore and the products of Brazilian metallurgy.

One of Beijing's chief objectives, in addition to purely political goals, is access to modern Western technology and the diversified system of capitalist foreign economic relations. It has already established close contact with several Latin American countries in the spheres of nuclear power engineering, petroleum production and agriculture. Typically, Chinese representatives tried to establish commercial contacts primarily with branches of large transnational monopolies controlled mainly by U.S. capital. In Brazil, for example one of China's leading trade partners is the Mendes Juniors electric power company, which is only formally national and which signed a contract in Beijing in November 1978 for the construction of a hydroelectric power station in the Yangtze River canyon and agreed to supply the technology for the production of various hydraulic assemblies. In Argentina, Beijing prefers to deal with the large Bunge y Born agricultural monopoly. It is also no coincidence that the PRC trade and economic exhibit in Mexico in November 1975 was not held in the capital, but in the small Mexican city of Tijuana. Situated on the border with the United States, it is the location of the ranches of many large U.S. corporations, the assets of which include a large portion of the revenues from Latin American trade with China.

In essence, Beijing is trying to "link" its economic relations with the Latin American countries to its policy of further convergence with the United States and the developed capitalist powers. Having no opportunity to openly advise the Latin American states to ally themselves with the United States, since it discredited itself long ago with neocolonialist ambitions, the Chinese leadership has resorted to a roundabout maneuver. Beijing propaganda has persistently advocated Canada and the members of the European Economic Community as promising economic partners for the Latin American countries. This was the purpose of the itinerary of Ji Pengfei's recent visit to Venezuela, Mexico and Canada. At a September 1978 UN conference on technical cooperation between the developing countries, the Chinese delegation frankly advised the alliance of the "second" and "third" worlds. The Chinese press has repeatedly described the "advantages" of stronger ties between the Caribbean community and the European "Common Market."[19]

Despite the active support of the United States, local pro-imperialist circles and the powerful propaganda machine representing them, the Chinese leadership's efforts in the Latin American countries have not aroused the anticipated response. And this is not surprising. The tendency toward escalated anti-imperialist struggle and stronger egalitarian and mutually beneficial ties with the socialist world is constantly making progress in Latin America. This policy is regarded in the Latin American countries as an important factor in their struggle for real economic and political independence. One of the most characteristic features of this tendency is the development of direct contacts between the Latin American countries and CEMA.[20] Beijing's pro-imperialist, anti-Soviet activity in international organizations is also not working. For example, the Chinese delegation was unable to achieve the inclusion of a point in regard to the "superpowers" in the final resolution of the Lima UNIDO conference in March 1975. A similar attempt at a UN conference in Buenos Aires in September 1978 also failed. The delegates at this conference unanimously approved of the Soviet-proposed resolution on the development of technical cooperation between the developing countries.

The goals and means of Beijing's present policy line in Latin America took their most vivid and visible form in its approach to revolutionary democratic reforms in Chile. The victory of the broad popular movement in 1970 was contrary to the views and actual interests of the Chinese leadership, primarily because it contradicted the Maoist postulates denying the possibility of a variety of revolutionary avenues, including the peaceful type.[21] Naturally, Beijing's hostility toward the Popular Unity Government stemmed from more than "theoretical" differences. By making references to theory, the Chinese leadership tried to conceal its profound dissatisfaction with the development of liberation processes in Chile. The activities of Salvador Allende's Government, resting on an alliance of the workers and popular movement, in which the Communist Party of Chile played an important role, and the profound socioeconomic reforms carried out by this government objectively kept Beijing from realizing its hegemonistic, pro-imperialist ambitions.

Having no opportunity to openly oppose the popular government, the Chinese leadership decided to play a double game: To display interest in the development of relations on the one hand, and to engage in subversive activity on the other. From the very first days that the Allende Government was in power, a Maoist group--a "revolutionary communist party"--joined the active struggle against it under the demagogic slogan of "people's war." In 1971 the Chilean Maoists, following Beijing's orders, somewhat modified their activity. At a plenum of the "revolutionary communist party" central committee, a decision was made to oppose not the entire Popular Unity bloc as a whole, but just the Communist Party of Chile, as the most organized and cohesive force in the popular coalition. Provocatively accusing it of "hegemony," the Maoists tried to push the communist party out of the political arena, arouse distrust between the parties making up the coalition and to bring about its disintegration. The Chinese leadership simultaneously attempted to speculate on the success of the Allende Government by calling it an example of the implementation of Maoist ideas under Latin American conditions. Statements by Chilean Government officials were always given an "antihegemonistic" interpretation in Chinese propaganda. Even the bourgeois press in Chile admitted that Beijing hoped to develop nationalistic tendencies.[22]

Between December 1970, when diplomatic relations were established with Chile, and the middle of 1973, the PRC signed a number of trade and economic documents with the Chilean Government, including a promise of 92.5 million dollars in credit. Most of these promises remained on paper.

When it became more and more obvious that the Chilean Government would not follow Beijing's lead and when the internal political situation began to deteriorate, Beijing started to act with a view to an anticipated fascist takeover. The PRC leadership actually refused to give Chile the promised economic assistance by lamenting, as Zhou Enlai did in a letter to Salvador Allende on 23 February 1973, the "limited economic possibities of the PRC." In an atmosphere of genuine imperialist blockade, Beijing cynically cautioned Chile against outside economic support, mainly implying Soviet economic assistance.

The Chinese leadership tried to use its attitude toward the events following the military fascist coup of 11 September 1973 to demonstrate its willingness for further rapprochement with imperialism and Latin American reaction. For this purpose, it quickly abandoned all of its plans to preserve the remnants of its "revolutionary" prestige in some petty bourgeois strata. Beijing withdrew from the international campaign of solidarity with the Chilean patriots. In the days of the coup, the Chinese Embassy refused to give refuge even to the Maoists it had urged to fight against Popular Unity. As some articles in the Western press noted with truly Maoist cynicism, "At the cost of a few intellectuals who were not all that necessary, Beijing maintained its firm presence in yet another Latin American country."[23]

One characteristic feature of the present Latin American policy of the Chinese leadership is much more energetic activity to establish the closest possible relations with reactionary military dictatorships. Beijing is doing everything within its power to ensure the genuine fluorishing of Sino-Chilean relations. In 1976 and 1977 Beijing extended credit totaling around 220 million dollars to the Chilean regime.[24] A solid legal contractual basis was laid for relations with the Chilean militarists when the junta's Minister of Foreign Relations H. Cubillos visited China in October 1978, Minister of the Economy, Development and Reconstruction R. Kelly went to China in April 1979 and PRC Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Chen Jie went to Chile in June 1979. As a result of the ensuing talks, an entire series of documents was signed, particularly on the exchange of permanent military missions, the resumption of the activity of a joint commission on bilateral cooperation, an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation and large-scale commercial transactions.

All of these visits reaffirmed that the relations between the two sides were based on the solid agreement of their antisocialist and anti-Soviet interests with active imperialist patronage. In particular, for example, PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua expressed great satisfaction with the anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban position of the junta when he met with Cubillos and insisted on mutual support, related directly to the objective of forming the "broadest possible united front" for struggle against the Soviet Union. In turn, the junta's emissary fiercely attacked the USSR, Cuba and Vietnam. Judging by all indications, Beijing intends to actively promote the Chilean regime's emergence from international isolation. The Chilean press has underscored Beijing's "unsolicited" offer of "assistance to Chile in the international arena." In turn, the junta is mediating China's rapprochement with reactionary military dictatorships. As Luis Corvalan, secretary general of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Chile, stressed, Beijing's alliance with the Pinochet clique "proves that the Maoists are prepared to make any alliance, even with overt fascists, for the sake of carrying out their great-power plans."[25]

The evolution of Beijing's Latin American policy toward increasingly open and close convergence with imperialist and reactionary forces has drawn a distinct line between its interests and the interests and goals of the braod revolutionary, liberation and democratic forces in the Latin American countries. The Latin American communist parties are leading the fight against Maoism on this continent. The treacherous policy of the Chinese rulers was sharply rebuked at the conference of the communist parties of Latin America and the Caribbean in 1975 in Havana. Its final declaration, signed by 24 of the continent's communist parties, stressed that "it is the duty of all the communist parties in Latin America to fight against this policy of betraying the cause of unity and solidarity, betraying the best traditions of the world revolutionary movement."[26]

The Maoist policy of undermining and breaking up the workers movement is being opposed by such major labor associations as the Labor Confederation of Colombian Workers, the United Confederation of Peruvian Workers, and leading trade unions in Jamaica and other countries.

The Beijing hegemonists' piratical aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam aroused profound indignation in Latin America. Speaking at a mass meeting in Havana, Fidel Castro called this action "the most disgusting betrayal of the revolutionary movement in the history of the world."[27] Communist parties, major trade unions, democratic organizations and coalitions of leftist parties resolutely condemned Beijing and demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Chinese troops from the Vietnamese side of the historically determined border between the two countries. These forces included the Left Broad Front in Ecuador, the Leftist Alliance in Mexico, the "United People" Coalition in Nicaragua, the Federation of Latin American Journalists and many others. Beijing's aggression aroused alarm and apprehension in Latin American governmental circles, having a sobering effect on those which had carelessly flirted with the Chinese leadership.

Recent events have even created confusion in the ranks of local Maoists. The ideological and organizational disintegration of their schismatic groups has become more pronounced in the Latin American countries. All of this represents more proof of the profound crisis of Maoism.

The antisocialist policy line of the Chinese leadership, aimed at alliance with imperialism and reaction, is a direct threat to the successful development of the revolutionary liberation struggle in the Latin American countries. This line goes against the vital interests of the Latin American people. But the revolutionary liberation process on the continent is not developing according to Beijing's recipes. In accordance with its own distinctive features, it is developing within the bounds of general tendencies of the present era. Its historical perspective is complete national liberation and complete independence, democracy and public well-being, peace and socialism.

FOOTNOTES

1. The only exception is Cuba, with which the PRC established diplomatic relations in September 1960.

2. R. S. Mallen, "La polemica chino-sovietica y la revolucion proletaria," Mexico, 1965, p 53.

3. O. Rosarios, "China Roja--lider en America Latina?" Buenos Aires, 1965, p 140.

4. A. Berle, "Latin America: Diplomacy and Reality," New York, 1962, p 114.

5. RENMIN RIBAO, 23 January 1971.

6. BEIJING REVIEW, 1972, No 24, p 19; No 28, p 19.

7. FORO INTERNACIONAL, 1973, No 53, p 40.

8. COMERCIO EXTERIOR, 1971, No 11, p 81.

9. One symptom of this concern was the creation of a special Caribbean group in the State Department in 1977.

10. GRANMA, 24 May 1978.

11. BEIJING REVIEW, 1974, No 22, p 22.

12. BEIJING REVIEW, 1979, No 21, p 28.

13. PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, 1976, No 1, pp 48-49.

14. RENMIN RIBAO, 6 September 1973.

15. JORNAL DO BRASIL, 29 August 1974.

16. RENMIN RIBAO, 30 August 1974.

17. Ibid., 21 February 1977.

18. BEIJING REVIEW, 1975, No 12, pp 16-17.

19. RENMIN RIBAO, 1 April 1978.

20. In August 1975 a joint CEMA-Mexico commission was established. The question of also cooperating with Guiana was discussed at the 78th and 79th sessions of the CEMA executive committee in Moscow in October 1976 and in Havana in January 1977.

21. In an attempt to refute the natural character of the Chilean popular movement's success and to ignore the role of mass Chilean support for the Popular Unity coalition in the 1970 election, Zhou Enlai announced that Allende's victory was largely accidental, the result of the assassination of military Commander-in-Chief R. Shneider by rightist extremists.

22. EL MERCURIO, 31 October 1970.

23. DESTINO, 1976, No 2034, p 41.

24. PRAVDA, 7 April 1978.

25. Ibid.

26. KOMMUNIST, 1975, No 10, p 97.

27. PRAVDA, 23 February 1979.

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MIDDLE EAST POLICY OF THE PRC BEFORE AND AFTER CAMP DAVID

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 103-111

[Article by V. G. Gracheva, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] The evolution of PRC foreign policy toward national liberation movements in the Asian, African and Latin American countries in the last 20 years has been determined by the global strategy of Maoism as an ideology and policy, permeated with great-power ambitions and intended to turn China into the deciding factor in international affairs. The desire for world hegemony--this has been the focal point of Beijing policy in the last two decades. "This policy," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, at the 25th CPSU Congress, "is not only totally alien to socialist principles and ideals, but has essentially become an important reserve for imperialism in its struggle against socialism."[1]

In the Middle East, Beijing foreign policy has been engineered and conducted in line with the following "consideration." Above all, the Maoists believe that any escalation of Arab-Israeli conflicts is not likely to affect the welfare of China itself or threaten its national security. The sufficiently great distance between the Arab world and the PRC, the people in Beijing believe, gives the Chinese leaders reason not to worry about China's fate in the event of not only a new Arab-Israeli war, but even conflicts on a larger scale. Moreover, it is precisely a direct military conflict between the Soviet Union, defending the interests of the Arab people, and the United States of America, supporting aggressive circles in Israel, which would be significantly in the great-power interests of the PRC ruling clique. The destructive effects of this Soviet-American conflict, for which Beijing is hoping, should become a prerequisite for the PRC's evolution into a great power, capable of deciding world politics even before China's military-economic potential reaches a high level.

By setting themselves the objective of turning the Arab-Israeli conflict into a permanent source of international tension, the Beijing leaders are not striving at all for the restoration of peace and justice or for the victory of national liberation forces in this part of the world. The fate of the people in the Middle East is of absolutely no interest to Beijing, and for China, as Mao Zedong asserted in statements that were not for publication, it is not important "who wins" or whether "all of the Jews will be annihilated and the Palestinians disappear from the face of the earth."[2] One task of primary significance for the attainment of the PRC leadership's great-power goals, which has therefore determined Beijing tactics in recent years, is all-round opposition to the comprehensive political regulation of the Middle East crisis, the fair resolution of the Palestinian problem and the transformation of the Middle East into a zone of peace, cooperation, national independence and social progress.

In this kind of great-Han foreign policy context, Beijing's declarations about the "resolute support of the government and people of China for the just cause of the Arab people" are nothing other than a propagandistic screen for Beijing's counterrevolutionary behavior. The widely advertised Chinese "assistance to the Arabs," ASIA QUARTERLY pronounces, "is limited to the declaration of revolutionary slogans and the expression of the kind of sympathy that does not bind Beijing with any kind of commitment and does not require that any real action be taken."[3]

It is becoming increasingly difficult for the PRC leadership to conceal the gaping discrepancy between Beijing's militant statements about supporting the Arabs in their battle with Israel and the meager volume of material assistance provided by the PRC. "As for military assistance," former Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs Muhhamad Riyad said with regret, "the Chinese would be incapable of giving us this even if our nations were divided only by a narrow boundary strip."[4]

This has also been the opinion of the Israeli leaders. They--more than anyone else in the Middle East--had an interest in the Chinese "presence" and the cultivation of Maoism in the Arab national liberation movement. "The road to peace in the Middle East," said Ben-Gurion, famous political representative of Israel and international Zionism, "lies through Beijing."[5] Naturally, he was referring to the kind of "peace" that would have been acceptable to the Zionist leaders, a "peace" made possible by the suppression of the Arab national liberation movement. The spread of Maoism in the second half of the 1950's in the form of "leftist" extremism, ultrarevolutionary behavior and the absolutization of "people's war" as the "only true means of fighting Israel" gave Zionists an excuse to accuse the Arabs of "aggression"[6] and, consequently, to justify a "warning" strike against the Arab countries.

In Tel Aviv (just as in Washington) belligerent statements from Beijing aroused more approval than protest and did not impede the establishment of contacts of an official and unofficial nature. The Zionists were not at all disturbed by the fact that the Chinese press had constantly played up the PRC's "noninvolvement" in the creation of the State of Israel and the division of Palestine, thereby hoping to win the affection of the Arabs. For tactical reasons, Beijing is still officially stating that the PRC has never recognized Israel and supposedly has no intention of ever doing this. Nonetheless, it is known (although not widely) that contacts between Beijing and Tel Aviv have taken place in the form of an exchange of governmental messages, talks between PRC and Israeli ambassadors in third countries, and so forth. In June 1954, for example, late Premier Zhou Enlai of the PRC State Council met in Rangoon with David Hacohen, the Israeli ambassador in Rangoon and a prominent statesman. During the course of this meeting, the Israeli side was not only invited to send a delegation to the PRC to discuss the possibility of economic and commercial cooperation, but it was also informed that the Chinese leadership was "certain that the outcome of the talks would be favorable."[7] Beijing's intention to establish diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv was announced that same year by Zhou Enlai in an official speech at a session of the Chinese National People's Congress.[8]

It is also not a widely known fact that the Israeli economic delegation which arrived in Beijing in February 1955 was greeted quite warmly and was received, in particular, by the PRC deputy minister of trade, who expressed "particular respect for the people of Israel for their staunchness in the face of all trials" and in the "struggle for independence, in spite of many obstacles." It is clear that one of the "obstacles" for the Zionists was naturally assumed to be the Arab and, in particular, the Palestinian national liberation movement. By the mid-1950's, Israel had already demonstrated its aggressive nature by occupying dozens of Arab settlements covering a territory of more than 6,000 square kilometers and had created a source of constant tension in the Middle East. In spite of all this, even after the conference on Afro-Asian solidarity in Bandung in 1955, where the first Chinese-Arab contacts were established and Beijing had to express support for the Palestinian Arabs' fight "for human rights," the Chinese diplomats continued to assert that the PRC Government "is still striving for friendly relations with Israel."[9]

The PRC's interest in the development of ties with Tel Aviv was so serious that the Chinese ambassador in Rangoon was ordered to convey the official apologies of the Chinese Government to the Israelis for the "pro-Arab" stand taken by the PRC delegation at the Bandung conference.[10] Beijing officials were also hoping that the Israeli leadership would appreciate the total absence of criticism of Israel in the statements made by Chinese speakers at the Bandung conference in regard to the situation in the Middle East.

In the 1950's and again in the 1970's, the intensity of Sino-Israeli contacts depended directly on the position of the United States and the state of Sino-American relations. The United States' hostility toward people's China in the mid-1950's was one of the main factors which prevented Tel Aviv and Beijing from implementing their existing agreement (an Israeli ambassador to the PRC had been appointed as early as July 1950, at the time when the cabinet decided to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing).[11] The U.S. Government's "recommendations" to the Israeli Government regarding rapprochement with Beijing, as set forth by

Secretary of State J. F. Dulles, frankly advised Israel "not to establish relations with a regime close to collapse."[12] As PRC policy in the international arena acquired an increasingly apparent pro-imperialist tone, however, the American Administration's feelings about the prospect of establishing official ties with Maoist China also changed, as well as its views on the expedience of using the "Chinese card" in a confrontation between the two social systems. In the early 1970's the convergence of China with the United States of America and with anticommunist regimes defending the interests of U.S. imperialism in the Middle East became a political reality. The normalization of Sino-American relations, in turn, was followed by the news that contacts between the Maoists and the Zionists had been resumed.

By the beginning of the 1970's, officials in Tel Aviv realized that "PRC policy in the Middle East cannot harm Israel because the Chinese are not giving the Arabs any kind of practical assistance (worth worrying about--V. G.)."[13] Diplomats from Tel Aviv correctly assumed that "China has no reason to ignore Israel in its social and ideological plans. The PRC is probably much closer to Israel than, for example, to Saudi Arabia."[14] The Israeli diplomats could have added that the foreign policies of China and Israel were based on common principles promoting the convergence of the two countries at that time--namely, an extremely nationalistic approach to the setting and attainment of foreign policy objectives; pragmatism to the point of cynicism in international relations; the absence of restrictions on the choice of means to an end; the recognition of the legality of territorial seizure due to a common desire for expansion and the enlargement of spheres of influence; a contemptuous attitude toward the United Nations and the principles of international law; the use of Chinese emigres and the corresponding persons of the Jewish nationality as means of exerting pressure on the policies of other countries; a general anti-Soviet and anticommunist outlook; the attachment of strategic importance to alliance with American imperialism, and so forth. Maoist China and Israel are also united by their common hatred for the Arab national liberation movement, the cause of international detente and the struggle for disarmament and for the prohibition of nuclear tests and nuclear proliferation. The PRC's aggression against socialist Vietnam is amazingly similar to Israel's expansionist treatment of its Arab neighbors.

In its rapprochement with Israel and the United States, Beijing has gone so far that statements by its leaders have begun to sound like the Zionists' claims to Palestine as "the birthplace of all Jews"--that is, the fundamental thesis of Zionism. In a meeting with Howard Squadron, one of the leaders of the American Jewish Congress, for example, Vic Premier Geng Biao of the PRC State Council said that "the Chinese and Jewish people are united by the kind of love for their homeland that no other people feel."[15]

The Chinese leadership's move to openly reactionary positions is the logical result of the political degradation of the Maoists, who deviated from Marxism-Leninism 20 years ago--at first sharply to the "left," and later, after their claims to a leading role among the developing countries and revolutionary movements of Asia, Africa and Latin America turned out to be groundless and were rejected by the overwhelming majority of young independent states, just as sharply to the right. A country which officially describes the Soviet Union as the "number-one enemy" and the "principal and most dangerous enemy" and has completely betrayed the interests of people fighting against imperialism and neocolonialism, could only have anticommunist and reactionary regimes as its natural allies. In the Middle East these are the regimes of former Shah Pahlavi of Iran, Sultan Qabus of Oman and President Sadat of Egypt.

The change in the PRC's allies in the Middle East, where China has, by the beginning of the 1970's, reduced and, in some cases, completely cut off, its support to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, the Palestine Resistance Movement and other forces standing at the forward edge of the struggle against imperialism, had a noticeable effect on Beijing's stand on Middle East regulation, although it did not change the PRC's general views on the place and significance of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the system of Maoist foreign policy priorities and its attempt to escalate the crisis in the region to the maximum. The Maoists, who were incapable of having a deciding effect on the development of the situation in the Middle East and independently direct events in a way which would safeguard PRC's great power interests, viewed the energization of U.S. foreign policy activity in the Arab East, aimed at restoring Washington's influence and undermining Soviet-Arab relations, as something favorable to Beijing and chose a course running parallel to the imperialist one.

It is extremely indicative that Beijing's convergence with imperialism and reaction was most overt at times that were quite crucial in the development of the Arab national liberation movement and the consolidation of leftist and progressive forces in the region. For example, after the tragic events of 1970-1971 in Jordan, which gained notoriety as "Black September" and led to a severe military-political crisis in the Palestine resistance movement, Chinese representatives abroad unashamedly expressed their "disillusionment" with the inability of Palestinian organizations to wage "prolonged people's war" according to Beijing recipes and announced China's intention to cut off all military and financial assistance.[16] This kind of loyalty to Israel and the United States was also displayed by the Maoists during the "20-day war" of fall 1973. Chinese representatives in the United Nations indicated in unofficial discussions that the fate of the Arab people in this war was not the factor determining Beijing policy. In a meeting with American congressmen behind the scenes of the UN General Assembly in November 1973, Beijing diplomats, according to reports in the Arab press, assured the Americans that "the PRC will take a moderate stand in regard to the present conflict in the Middle East.... Beijing will not be disturbed by any kind of Arab defeat because this could give rise to differences of opinion between the Arabs and the USSR."[17]

On the other hand, Beijing's actual behavior (including its actions in the United Nations) during the "October war" and the Lebanese crisis of 1975-1976, and to an even greater degree in recent times, has been less indicative of a "moderate" policy in regard to the conflict than of hostility toward liberation forces and the betrayal of Arab interests. Between 1977 and 1979 Beijing was one of the few states which approved of the separate bargains launched by President Sadat of Egypt, and it was also one of the few to give Sadat military assistance and moral-political support. When the signing of the documents "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East" and "A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel" (September 1978), as well as the "peace" treaty itself (March 1979), by the leaders of Egypt, Israel and the United States marked the beginning of a qualitatively new stage in the development of the Middle East crisis and considerably complicated the conditions of struggle for the just settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Chinese leadership took the side of imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction.

What other explanation could there be for the Maoists' decision to discard their "fundamental line" in regard to methods of settling the conflict in 1978? Why did the separate talks between Egypt and Israel under U.S. auspices become acceptable as an alternative to the military solution that was regarded as the only possible solution by Chinese rulers in previous years? What were the Maoists guided by when they defined their position in regard to the Camp David documents and the treaty which consolidated the new military alliance of Washington, Cairo and Tel Aviv?

Above all, PRC ruling circles were aware of the fact that certain changes had taken place in the Middle East by the mid-1970's that had affected the balance of power in this region. Under the conditions of intensified class stratification accompanied by anti-imperialist and antimonarchic revolutions in Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Iran and the consolidation of socialist tendencies in the development of Southern Yemen, Saudi Arabian influence grew, reactionary forces became more active in Egypt, pro-Western feelings became more pronounced in several countries and an anti-communist campaign was launched in places where cooperation between various leftist and moderate parties had just recently been developing successfully.

At this same time, the growing severity of the energy crisis in the capitalist world heightened the significance of the Middle East as the principal source of oil and petroleum products. In line with these social and economic changes, U.S. foreign policy activity was more clearly aimed at safeguarding U.S. economic and strategic interests in the Middle East with the aid of military-political blocs controlled and financed by Washington. Naturally, we cannot assume that Beijing, now that it has voiced support for Camp David, will limit itself to an auxiliary role merely for the sake of staying in the United States' good graces. No, the Chinese leadership is trying to use U.S. political expansion in this region bordering on the USSR in its own interests and is urging the American Administration to adhere to a tougher line in relations with the

USSR and the particular Arab countries that are developing productive cooperation with the Soviet Union. "The Chinese," the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR noted in a report on the visit of an official PRC delegation to the United States, "appealed to Carter to use American power and prove that the United States is not a paper tiger."[18] These provocative appeals were voiced even more definitely and purposefully in an interview of Deng Xiaoping by American television correspondents. "We truly hope," Deng Xiaoping said, "that the United States will take more effective, more decisive measures to answer the challenge thrown down by hegemonism."[19]

For their part, the Maoists have made a maximum effort to assure Washington of their profound satisfaction with U.S. activity aimed at the reinforcement of antisocialist, anti-Soviet feelings in the Middle East. Here as well, the Maoist course ran parallel to the imperialist one. There was a noticeable shift in emphasis in the direction of stronger anti-Sovietism in the Chinese interpretation of the primary causes of the Middle East crisis. Chinese propaganda tried to "ennoble" the actions of the Carter Administration by implying that the United States had initiated the peace talks for the sake of stabilizing the situation in this region and preventing the outbreak of a new armed conflict between the Arabs and Israelis.[20]

The metamorphosis undergone by Beijing propaganda in 1978 and 1979 proved that Beijing attaches great significance to stronger American presence in the Middle East. The "political flexibility" of the Maoists--or, more precisely, their lack of political principles--is truly boundless: The latest Beijing publications have ascribed the United States the main role in the struggle for peace in this region, in the organization of the peace talks between Egypt and Israel, in the settlement of conflicts and so forth. Judging by Chinese information, the United States is only striving for a comprehensive settlement and is therefore filled with determination to convince Syria, Jordan and the PLO to join in the negotiations with Israel after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and begin the gradual settlement of the Middle East problem.[21] Moreover, Washington's "peace-making" activity is contrasted to the policy of the USSR, which is brazenly described by the Maoists as the main destabilizing factor in the region.

The position of the Chinese leadership on Middle East regulation at the time the Camp David agreements were signed had already been predetermined by the PRC's actual alliance with the leading Western powers on major international issues. According to Western researchers, since the beginning of the 1970's the Maoists "have taken every opportunity to demonstrate the primary significance they attach to the reinforcement of relations with the United States."[22] Vice Premier Wulanfu of the PRC State Council demonstrated, during his visit to Egypt in fall 1978, that Beijing supports and approves of U.S. policy in the Middle East, the separate talks between Cairo and Tel Aviv and the documents signed by Egypt and Israel at Camp David. In essence, this means that the Chinese Government is prepared to limit its demand for the "liberation of occupied territories" to the withdrawal of Israeli troops only from the Sinai Peninsula,[23] and it is willing to settle the Palestinian issue simply by offering the Palestinians inhabiting the West Bank of the River Jordan the rights of a "national minority" within the framework of "autonomy."

There is no question that the Maoist leadership is aware that most of the Arab countries have refused to support Sadat's policy.[24] This is why Beijing propaganda has been cautious, either publishing an "objective" narration of the facts or citing Egyptian and American politicians who have falsified the content and purpose of the Camp David talks. At the same time, the mass media in the PRC vigorously criticize Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East, urging the Arabs to counteract "Soviet expansion" and propagandizing a thesis acceptable only to Arab reactionaries--the thesis of the Soviet "threat," which is supposedly "more frightening than the threat posed by imperialism and Zionism."

The Chinese press resorts to the most shameless lies to depict the capitulation and betrayal of the Egyptian regime as "a just position in the interests of the Egyptians, Palestinians and other Arabs." The Chinese leaders, ignoring the opinion of the majority of Arab countries, which censured Cairo at a conference in Baghdad in November 1978, are cynically declaring that "China does not believe that the Arab countries will benefit in any way from taking a stand hostile to the policy of President Sadat." In the latest publications, the talks between Egypt and Israel have been extolled by Chinese propaganda as "the most outstanding event of 1978 in the Middle East."

Beijing actually applauded the "peace treaty" between Egypt and Israel, which set up the military-political alliance of Washington, Cairo and Tel Aviv and which is aimed at escalating tension between the United States and the USSR.

There is no contradiction in the fact that the Chinese leaders, for whom the Middle Eastern program still consists in escalating crisis and in provoking armed conflicts, have praised the political initiative of the United States. After all, the Egyptian-Israeli treaty largely maintains the potential possibility of new outbursts of military action in the Middle East (this is attested to by the Israeli operation in southern Lebanon and the air battles between the Syrian and Israeli air forces). Officials in Beijing hope that the Egyptian-Israeli bargain could give rise to a new wave of "leftist" extremism and terrorism in the Middle East, and that this, in turn, could be used by Israel as justification for new "repressive" operations by the Israeli chastizers--and not so much against desperate individuals as against real revolutionary detachments, particularly the national patriotic forces of Lebanon, the Palestinian resistance movement and others.

The very signing of this kind of "peace treaty," which was engineered by imperialism and Zionism in spite of the resolutions and decisions of the UN General Assembly and Security Council and which has undermined the principle calling for the observance of these decisions by UN members (and this includes China), establishes a dangerous international legal precedent: It legalizes the retention of occupied territory in the hands of the aggressors and ignores the problem of refugees. Both the former and the latter "suit" the Beijing militarists.

It was also of considerable importance to the PRC that the signing of the "peace" treaty between Cairo and Tel Aviv contributed much to the conclusion of a military agreement between Egypt and the PRC, which has been described by the Arab communist press as "Chinese aggression against the Arab people."[25] In connection with the Maoists' true attitude toward Arab interests, it is extremely indicative that Chinese weapons are being offered to Egypt at a time when Egypt is no longer in the position of confrontation with Israel, and these weapons therefore cannot be used in a general Arab struggle. On the contrary, these weapons are being sent to Egypt for the purpose of strengthening the Sadat regime within the country, helping to overcome the foreign policy isolation incurred by Cairo in the Middle East as a result of its convergence with Israel, and, if the need should arise, turning these weapons against the Arab revolutionary movement. "Indignation has been aroused by the policy of the Beijing leaders," said General Secretary Nayef Havatme of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, "who supports Sadat and are prepared to give him military assistance. Beijing's intention to supply the betrayer of the Arab race with weapons and combat equipment, which the latter probably plans to use against the national liberation movement in Africa and in the Arab world instead of against Israel, only underscores the close coordination of U.S. and Chinese actions in the Middle East in the interests of strengthening the position of imperialism and reaction and striking a blow at forces for liberation and progress." It is no wonder that the part played by the United States in the preparations for this agreement and its conclusion was called the "main" and "deciding" role by President Sadat.[26] There is no doubt that the United States would not have aided in the conclusion of any military agreement if the possibility of its use in a fight against Israel remained. The pro-American policy of the PRC in the Arab world has led, according to the American press, to a situation in which China "is actively represented in the Middle East in the military sphere for the first time."[27] The Maoists could regard this kind of joint action as U.S. compensation for the stand taken by the Chinese leadership in regard to the "peace" treaty between Egypt and Israel and American intervention in the process of Middle East regulation.

For Maoist China, the most far-reaching consequence of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty will probably be the official establishment of diplomatic relations between Beijing and Tel Aviv. The Chinese leaders have been mentioning this possibility for quite some time. As early as 1973, for example, Ji Pengfei predicted in a conversation with Italian Foreign Minister G. Medici that "the PRC will most probably stop being antagonistic toward Israel as soon as the conflict is resolved to the Arabs' satisfaction."[28] In 1978 and 1979 the Chinese leaders, realizing that supporting the American peaceful initiative in the Middle East would be important from the standpoint of PRC nationalist interests, agreed to new contacts with Israeli officials (particularly H. Herzog, Israel's permanent representative to the United Nations, Israeli Defense Minister E. Weizman and others) to "urge" the conclusion of a separate agreement between Israel and Egypt in the PRC's own interests: The signing of the "peace treaty" eradicated the formal barriers that had kept the PRC from recognizing Israel de jure.

Beijing's approval of the separate talks was properly assessed in Tel Aviv and gave rise to a new wave of pro-Chinese diplomatic activity by the Zionists. In particular, Israel's willingness to establish diplomatic, consular and trade relations was confirmed in statements by Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan. The expansion of economic cooperation between the two countries (in particular, the assistance of Israeli economic experts in the implementation of the program of "four modernizations") is already a fait accompli. As for mutual assistance in other areas, such as the collection and exchange of intelligence data, Chinese and Israeli special services have already been cooperating in this sphere for more than 1 year, and even for more than 10. Their first joint operations included attempts to organize the political assassination of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the UAR and the bombing of the American Embassy in Cairo.[29] The latest of these operations include terrorist acts, diversionary maneuvers and agitation aimed against the Iranian religious figures who are leading the antimonarchic revolution.

In the countries which do not agree with President Sadat's course, the PRC's stand on Camp David has indisputably undermined the political authority of the Chinese leadership, and this has forced the Maoists to resort to maneuvers and new declarations in support of the Arab people.

FOOTNOTES

1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [Following the Leninist Course. Speeches and Articles], vol 5, Moscow, 1976, p 459.

2. This remark by Mao Zedong was quoted in a speech by then Chinese Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua in Tianjin on 20 May 1975.

3. ASIA QUARTERLY (Brussels), 1977, No 3, p 226.

4. Ibid., p 234.

5. MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', 1978, No 4.

6. E. O'Ballance, "Arab Guerrilla Power, 1967-1972," London, 1974, p 21.

7. M. Brecher, "Israel, the Korean War and China. Images, Decisions and Consequences," Jerusalem, 1974, p 69.

8. THE NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 23 September 1954.

9. "A Sino-Soviet Perspective in the Middle East," U.S. Congress, Hearings, Washington, 1972, p 31.

10. M. Brecher, Op. cit., p 69.

11. Ibid., p 45.

12. "A Sino-Soviet Perspective in the Middle East," p 31.

13. AL-SAFA (Beirut), 12 February 1973.

14. CHINA MAIL (Hong Kong), 18 February 1974.

15. NEW YORK POST, 9 January 1979.

16. MA'ARIV (Tel Aviv), 27 July 1971.

17. AL-SHAAB (Beirut), 6 November 1973.

18. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 18 March 1979.

19. BEIJING REVIEW, 16 February 1979, No 7, p 17.

20. Ibid., 2 February 1979, No 5, p 21.

21. Ibid.

22. JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES (Beirut), August 1973, vol III, No 1, p 133.

23. Geng Biao, as the NEW YORK POST reported on 9 January 1979, frankly said in his talk with H. Squadron that "the Israelis should give up most of the occupied Arab territories." This remark does not differ in any way from the statements made by American diplomacy.

24. Taking the Arab states' sharp protests against Sadat's capitulation into account, Beijing felt it was necessary to publicly justify his "peaceful" initiative--firstly, by the severe economic crisis that had overtaken the country as a result of excessive expenditures on military needs and war losses, totaling 40 billion dollars, and secondly, by problems supposedly "created" for the Egyptian economy and defense by the Soviet Union.

25. AL-NIDA (Beirut), 8 June 1979.

26. ASH-SHARK AL-AUSAT (London), 8 June 1979.

27. FINANCIAL TIMES, 6 June 1979.

28. M. Brecher, Op. cit., p 125; JERUSALEM POST, 10 January 1973.

29. D. Richard, "The Chinese Secret Service," New York, 1974, p 457.

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COST ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET-CHINESE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION (1949-1966)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 p 112-118

[Article by L. V. Filatov, candidate of economic sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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PRESENT-DAY IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE IN CHINA

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 119-130

[Article by V. F. Feoktistov, candidate of philosophical sciences, and G. N. Yashchenko, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] The ideological struggle in the CCP, which became more intense when Maoism was established as the dominant ideology and policy in the PRC, is still a characteristic feature of domestic politics in the nation. This struggle reflects the profound ideological and theoretical crisis of Maoism, which has been unable to provide the Chinese society with a scientifically substantiated program for socioeconomic and political development. After conflicting with the objective requirements of Chinese development and encountering the growing dissatisfaction of workers with the anti-people policy, Maoism had to resort to a series of political and ideological maneuvers in an attempt to find an escape from the blind alley into which it has led the nation. The current Chinese leadership, however, is hoping to find this escape in the old and bankrupt methods of great-Han social-chauvinism, militarism and anti-Sovietism. Consequently, the ideological struggle in the CCP is still marked by hostility toward Marxism-Leninism.

When the present PRC leadership came to power, this struggle touched upon the issue of the ideological content of Maoism as a whole and, above all, the form Maoism should take as a great-power nationalist, militarist and social-chauvinist ideology--a "leftist" or rightist form.

By the beginning of the 1970's Maoism had acquired the form of an ultra-"leftist" ideology. Its main characteristic was the idea of "barracks communism" combined with the artificial exacerbation of "class struggle." The ideological and political content of Maoism was confined to the idea of "continued revolution under proletarian dictatorship." The theoretical elaboration of this idea was accompanied by propaganda of Mao's belief regarding the "class of the new bourgeoisie in the party"--his belief that "under socialism, the bourgeoisie is to be found within the party." In other words, this theory was connected with the frank and complete identification of "revolution" with the intra-party struggle of the Maoists against their political opponents. The domestic policy doctrine based on this "idea" aimed all party and governmental activity at maintaining Maoism's dominant position in Chinese society by escalating the atmosphere of permanent "class struggle." This was the practical purpose of the absolutization of Maoism's leftist ultra-revolutionary appeals.

The incompatibility of the Maoist ideological and political doctrine in its leftist ultra-revolutionary form with the program for internal political stability and production development became apparent in 1975-1976 (during the campaign for struggle against the "righist tendency to revise correct conclusions"). At that time, the ultra-"leftists" opposed all attempts to reject the aims of "class struggle" and replace them with the "three directives of Chairman Mao": study of the "theory of proletarian dictatorship," the achievement of "solidarity and unity" and the development of production. During the course of this campaign, this interpretation of the "three directives" was called a total departure from Maoism and its criticism evolved into a fierce political battle. The author of this interpretation, Deng Xiaoping, was politically discredited and once again dismissed from public office.

This last outburst of internal political strife in Mao Zedong's lifetime demonstrated that even the Maoist leadership recognized that the time had come to revise the ideological and political content of the Maoist doctrine and renounce its leftist ultra-revolutionary excesses. For this reason, in the end of 1976 the modification of the ideological and political doctrine of Maoism became the most salient feature of ideological life in the PRC. But this revision was undertaken for the purpose of strengthening the social status of Maoism and saving it from total bankruptcy, since the Maoism that had been taken to absurd lengths in its leftist ultra-revolutionary version had quite graphically exposed its incompatibility with the vital requirements of social development in the PRC and (the main consideration for Beijing leaders) provided no chance of effectively implementing the Maoist great-power chauvinist strategy. This revision was accompanied by a fierce and prolonged struggle. Various segments of the Chinese leadership disagreed over the ways, means and methods of implementing general hegemonistic plans, although these disagreements never concerned the social-chauvinist, militarist and anti-Soviet essence of the "Thought of Mao Zedong" and although they all agreed in general on the strategic objectives of his policy.

The struggle over interpretations of the "Thought of Mao" went through two stages, differing from one another both in terms of the composition of the opposing groups, the forms and methods of struggle and the depth of the revision of Maoist doctrine as a whole.

The Engineering of the First 'Updated Version' of Maoism

The first stage began in September 1976, when the new leadership headed by Hua Guofeng came to power, and ended with the 11th CCP Congress in August 1977. This was the stage of ideological (and not only ideological) struggle against the "gang of four"--a group of Mao Zedong's closest associates, who had once vigorously propagated Maoism in its ultra-"leftist" form. The "instructions" and "ideas" of Mao, calling for internal political stability and the accelerated buildup of China's military-industrial strength, became part of the current ideological lexicon. At this time, the main objective was to work out a new version of Maoism as, purportedly, the "theory of socialist revolution and socialist construction."

The nature and scales of the revision of Maoism's ideological and political doctrine were defined in the very first statements by the new leadership immediately after Mao Zedong's death. First of all, assurances were made of loyalty to the "Thought of Mao" and the firm resolve to "complete the work begun by Chairman Mao." In propaganda on ideological matters, the more active use of Maoism as an ideological weapon in the world arena immediately became apparent, and Maoism began to feed parasitically on Marxism more than ever before. Anti-Sovietism was declared the focal point of PRC foreign policy.

The propaganda about more intensive "class struggle" under socialism was curtailed, and more general questions concerning the role of the "Thought of Mao" in the history of China and of mankind in general were given primary consideration. Mao himself was extolled as a revolutionary leader and theoretician, "the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our era" and "the great teacher of the international proletariat and of oppressed nations and peoples" and his ideas were called an "encyclopedia of Marxism." At this point, two of Mao's theories were being cited as his main theoretical achievements--the "theory of continued revolution under proletarian dictatorship" and the "theory of new democratic revolution," the first of which was quite persistently associated with the struggle against "contemporary revisionism."[1]

Attempts to revise the leftist ultra-revolutionary "Thought of Mao" were most evident after the arrest of the "gang of four," the members of which were accused of "deliberately contrasting revolution with production, politics with economics and the class struggle with the production struggle," which was described as overt anti-Maoism. During the course of the campaign for criticism of the "gang of four," instructions were issued which attested to the revision of some aspects of Mao's ideological and political doctrine. In particular, Hua Guofeng's statement that "the intensive development of the socialist economy is one of the chief responsibilities of the proletarian dictatorship " replaced Mao's famous postulate which confined the proletarian dictatorship only to punitive or external functions, while the instruction that "Chairman Mao teaches us that the life of the party lies in its unity" signified a departure from the thesis regarding the inevitability of intensive intra-party struggle as a "law" of party functioning.

The course chosen by the Hua Guofeng leadership--that of overcoming the leftist ultra-revolutionary features of Maoism--was revealed quite clearly after the publication at the end of December 1976 of Mao's work "On the

Ten Most Important Relationships," which pertained primarily to questions of economic policy. Readers were informed that this work contained a definition of the "great avenue to socialist construction" and that this work represented "Chairman Mao's contribution to the theoretical treasures of Marxism." After centering its ideological work around this essay by Mao, the new PRC leadership made a sharp turn in the direction of the popularization of Mao's economic ideas, and Mao Zedong himself was depicted as the "greatest theoretician" in the field of political economy.

In this way, an uptaded version of Maoism as the "theory of socialist construction" took shape, and the domestic policy doctrine of Maoism was defined as "the dialectical combination of the objectives of revolution and production" and was amplified in the directive "to always remember Chairman Mao's instruction that the purpose of revolution is to provide scope for the development of productive forces."[2]

The publication of the fifth volume of "Selected Works by Mao Zedong" in April 1977 was an important step toward the confirmation of this new version of Maoism. Officially, the works in this volume were presented to public opinion as "theoretical summarization of the socialist revolution and socialist construction." This engendered a new tendency in apologies for Maoism--intensive speculation on the prestige of the Chinese revolution and more distortion of the history of the CCP and PRC, contrasting the experience of the PRC to the experience of the international communist movement for the sake of exaggerating Mao Zedong's "services" and in contradiction of well-known facts. Mao Zedong was given credit for all of the victories won by the Chinese people in the revolutionary struggle and in the construction of a new China under CCP supervision despite all of "Mao's lines." The fifth volume of Mao's works was called "a chronicle of the victories of this great struggle and its scientific summarization." Depicting all of the positive experience of the Chinese revolution as something inseparable from Mao's own political and theoretical activity, the Hua Guofeng leadership stressed the "innovative character" of this activity, which was supposed to serve as historical substantiation of the thesis regarding the development of Marxism by Mao Zedong. In particular, it was asserted that socialist reforms in the PRC, the credit for which was assigned completely to Mao Zedong, represented a unique "experience in the immediate (!) accomplishment of socialist reforms and socialist construction" and, for this reason, "the summarization and generalization of this experience by Chairman Mao Zedong will be of great theoretical value in the history of Marxism's development."[3]

The "great theory of continued revolution under proletarian dictatorship" was still being called the main element of the Maoist legacy. It was depicted as the latest achievement of Marxist thinking, allegedly providing a solution to a "new problem, for which there was no correct answer in the international communist movement for a long time": whether classes and the class struggle exist under proletarian dictatorship. The official press asserted that Mao Zedong, "for the first time in the history of the international communist movement, provided a scientific answer to this question pertaining to the historic destiny of the proletarian dictatorship." In this way, the new Chinese leadership did not merely put Mao on the same level as the founders of Marxism-Leninism, but even gave him, and only him, the credit for the theoretical resolution of the problem of social relations in the socialist society. As for the content of "continued revolution," it was essentially interpreted--in accordance with the same "directives of Mao"--as "class struggle against the bourgeoisie within the party" and against "the chief danger--the restoration of capitalism." Just as before, the establishment of the "great theory" was associated with the struggle against "contemporary revisionism," and an instruction was issued to "follow the precepts of Chairman Mao and finish the fight against Soviet social-imperialism,"

As for the "class struggle" under socialism, now this so-called "revolution" began to be interpreted not only as a political problem-solving process, but also as a factor "aiding in the rapid development of productive forces."

In the very beginning of 1977, Mao's appeal "to mobilize all positive factors inside and outside the nation and turn China into a powerful socialist state," from his work "On the Ten Most Important Relationships," was elevated to the status of the "basic line" of party and state activity. The propaganda about this line was constantly accompanied by reminders of "Mao's directive" concerning the need to find a "course of socialist construction suitable for Chinese conditions"[4] and differing from the Soviet course. The features of this idea about the "basic line" became distinct after February 1977, during the propaganda campaign regarding the "Anshan Combine Constitution, written personally by Chairman Mao,"[5] and later the "experience of Dazhao and Daqing," which was declared a "specific avenue of transition to communism."[6] The propaganda about the "basic line" eventually reiterated all of the tenets of the Maoist "Policy of Three Red Banners"--the "Great Leap Forward," the people's commune and the new general line (Mao's appeal to build socialism according to the principle "bigger, faster, better and cheaper"). In essence, the idea of "continued revolution" was equated with the idea of military-barracks communism.

Maoist ideological doctrine was presented in its final form in this stage of its revision in the documents of the 11th CCP Congress, the slogan of which was continuation of the "revolutionary line of Mao." The congress established Maoism as the official ideology, equating it, however, with Marxism-Leninism with the aid of the formula "Marxism-Leninism is the thought of Mao Zedong," whereas previously the "Thought of Mao" had been raised above Marxism-Leninism as its "highest point." The ideological doctrine was made up of the following components: 1) the "theory of new democratic revolution," which allegedly opened a "new avenue for the liberation of all oppressed nations and oppressed peoples in the world"' 2) the "great theory of continued revolution under proletarian dictatorship," which was passed off as the "only true" theory of socialist construction under present conditions and was defined as the "most important Marxist achievement of the present era" and a "summarization of the historic experience of proletarian dictatorship in the post-Lenin era" in China and in the rest of the world; 3) the "theory of the three worlds," serving as the theoretical basis of the antisocialist, anti-Soviet line in the international arena.

It should be stressed that the "theory of continued revolution under proletarian dictatorship" was still the fundamental basis of this new version of Maoism. The main theme of Hua Guofeng's report at the 11th Congress was the "precise elucidation" of this theory, according to which it was defined as an "integral theory"--that is, as the ideological and theoretical basis of all CCP activity, whether in the sphere of politics or in the sphere of economics. In contrast to the traditional interpretation, according to which this theory stemmed directly from Mao's postulates regarding the existence of antagonistic classes and intense struggle between them in the socialist society, Hua Guofeng said that this theory was based on Mao Zedong's "conclusions" with respect to the two types of conflicts: "basic" (between productive forces and production relations, and between the basis and superstructure) and "major" (within the superstructure).

In accordance with the thesis about "basic" conflicts, the objective of "continued revolution" was set as a means of achieving a "dialectical combination of revolution and construction" in line with Mao's idea about the "three great revolutionary movements" ("the class struggle, the production struggle and the scientific experiment"). The "class struggle" in the economic sphere began to be interpreted in line with the "Thought of Mao" of the late 1950's--that is, as a component of economic policy guaranteeing physical production growth. Instructions like the following were issued: "Stimulate production by taking revolution seriously," and "establishing internal political unity by working on the basic link (that is, 'class struggle'--Author)."

At the same time, during the discussion of "major" conflicts in the superstructure, Hua Guofeng reduced the "great theory" to the "instructions of Chairman Mao on intra-party struggle during the period of socialism," and Ye Jianying called it an "integral doctrine on struggle against individuals in the party who have power and are taking the capitalist road." Correspondingly, the "revolution in the superstructure" was confined just as before to a "class struggle," analogous to the "Cultural Revolution," which "will be reenacted many times in the future." The CCP Charter of 1977 once again records the resolution of "class conflicts" as the "basic party line for the entire period of socialism." Judging by published documents, the objectives of "construction" were never specifically discussed and the congress limited itself to general appeals for a buildup of economic strength in the spirit of the Maoist general line of "bigger, faster, better and cheaper."

Maoist ideological doctrine was later recorded in this form in the documents of subsequent congresses of PRC public organizations--trade unions, the "Komsomol" and women's federations.

Therefore, the Hua Guofeng leadership embarked on the revision of Maoist ideological and political doctrine as it existed in the mid-1970's by refusing to absolutize its ultra-"leftist" excesses and by promoting Mao's ideas about the need for internal political stability and the accelerated buildup of economic strength. In general, these ideas represent the same old concept of military-barracks communism and are aimed at more intensive struggle for the realization of hegemonistic ambitions in the international arena. The current revision has not made the slightest change in the essence of Maoism as a social-chauvinistic ideology. As a result of this modification, Mao's ideological legacy is being propagandized in full, which signifies that an attempt is being made to save Maoism from absolute disrepute, on the verge of which it was balancing in the mid-1970's.

New Stage in the Ideological Struggle and the Further Modification of Maoism

The second stage of the ideological struggle in the CCP was distinguished by a tendency toward the further revision of Maoist ideological and political doctrine in the rightist pragmatic spirit. This was no longer simply a matter of overcoming the excesses of the "leftist" version, but a replacement of the leftist ultra-revolutionary "Thought of Mao" with rightist opportunistic ideas. This tendency, the birth and development of which were connected with Deng Xiaoping's return to active political life, was aimed at the actual revision of the ideological doctrine set forth in the documents of the 11th CCP Congress and defended by Hua Guofeng. All of this led to a fierce battle between the followers of Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng, but the matter did not go as far as open political confrontation. During this stage, the struggle against the "gang of four" also began to be used to camouflage the further revision of some Maoist concepts. In essence, this was Deng's struggle for the recognition of the course of establishing a "personal theory of socialist construction," but one based this time on a combination of the "Thought of Mao" with the experience of the "four modernizations."

After the 11th CCP Congress, while the Chinese leadership was drafting the economic program for the "four modernizations," it became obvious that the course aimed at the "dialectical combination of revolution and production" had not put an end to speculation as to which of these was the decisive or main element. It was at this time that the first attempts were made to substantiate the transformation of the economy into a self-sufficient unit and the central object of party and governmental concern. This indicated a tendency toward the rejection of the Maoist principle regarding the priority of policy.

This tendency was officially recognized in the documents of the First Session of the Fifth NPC [National People's Congress] (February-March 1979), which offhandedly confirmed the "basic line" of continued "class struggle" and called the "four modernizations" the "general objective of the new historical period." In contrast to the 11th Congress' line of achieving internal political unity through "class struggle," this session declared a policy of reviving and energizing the "united front," and added yet another of Mao's "great theories" to ideological doctrine--the theory of the "united front," based on "Mao's teachings about the two types of conflicts," particularly the rightist opportunistic concept of "conflicts within the people."

A new process of the modification of Mao's ideological legacy was begun after the NPC Session for the purpose of adapting it to the policy of the "four modernizations." This policy was of a clearly defined militaristic and hegemonistic nature and, for this reason, its substantiation included the entire portion of the "Thought of Mao" which advocated the accelerated buildup of China's military-industrial strength. This issue did not give rise to any disagreements within the Chinese leadership. On the other hand, however, the policy of the "four modernizations" was too reminiscent of the "Great Leap Forward" in its methods, and this gave rise to sharp differences of opinion, particularly in regard to the instruction to "stimulate production by taking revolution seriously." Propaganda about the leading role of productive forces in social development and appeals to overcome voluntarism and utilize economic methods of administration and control were heard more clearly. Mao Zedong began to be depicted as an advocate of technological progress and the extensive use of the achievements of contemporary science, including economics, in the national economy, and an opponent of excessive egalitarianism and the "Great Leap Forward." Propaganda concerning the "experience of Dazhao and Daqing" was gradually curtailed. This aroused objections from some segments of the CCP leadership. The "economic" tendency was contrasted to the "Thought of Mao," which stressed the priority of policy. Recognition of the need for economic methods of social control, particularly financial incentives, was accompanied by a revival of the thesis regarding their auxiliary nature and the principle that "policy is the commanding force."[7] In response, this principle was attacked, the secondary importance of policy as a superstructural phenomenon was pointed out, and the view was expressed that "it is not policy that determines the direction of economic development, but just the opposite--economics determines the development of policy."[8] In turn, the opponents of this view began to assert that the "basic principle of Marxism consists in the realization that everything revolves around the class struggle," and their opponents responded by repeating the statements about the "most fundamental principle of Marxism." The fight between the supporters and opponents of the further revision of Maoist doctrine took the form of "gnosiological debate."

The debates began in early May 1978 with criticism of certain statements, ascribed to Lin Biao and the "gang of four" and characteristic of the time of the "Cultural Revolution," alleging that the "Thought of Mao" was the "highest point of Marxist development." According to the press, the purpose of the debates was to determine the "correct attitude toward revolutionary leaders and their teachings." The "theory of the highest point" was rejected as a "methaphysical view," which allegedly denied the need for the "further development of Marxism-Leninism--the Thought of Mao Zedong." As a counterbalance to this, the objective of "correcting," "enriching" and "developing" this theory and creating "new theories" was declared.[9] The debates later centered around the idea that "experience is the only criterion of truth." Statements like the following appeared in the press: No theory, including the "Thought of Mao," can serve as a criterion of the accuracy of a line or course, because the only criterion of truth is experience. In essence, this was being done to deprive Marxism-Leninism of its status as the theoretical basis of practical activity and to permit any and all revisions and, if necessary, "sifting" of the "Thought of Mao," guided only by practical considerations, after which "new theories" could be deduced from current experience. In this way, it was proposed that the "Thought of Mao" still be employed as the "banner of ideological struggle," including struggle in the international arena.[10]

The leadership's attitude toward these debates was expressed at the all-China conference on political works in the PLA [People's Liberation Army] (May-June 1978). At this conference, Hua Guofeng announced the objective of more intensive political work in line with the "Thought of Mao."[11] The essence of his position was reflected in the following theses: "The general objective of the new historical period is based on Chairman Mao's theory of continued revolution under proletarian dictatorship," for which reason it is necessary to firmly adhere to this theory and "utilize revolutionization as the leading force for modernization"; Mao's ideas about the "fundamentals of political work in the army are irrefutable," and "the main consideration at the present time is the...revival and extensive spread of the best traditions established by Chairman Mao in the field of ideological and political work in the army." This work was to be "based on the complete and precise comprehension and application of the thought of Mao Zedong." As a counterbalance to this position, Deng Xiaoping announced and tried to substantiate a policy of revising the principles and traditions of political work.[12] He said that it had been more than 40 years since Mao Zedong had established the "fundamentals of political work" and that great changes had taken place in this time, "necessitating corresponding changes in the methods, content and requirements of political work." In general, he said, this work "must acquire a new character." Deng stressed that he was advising "reliance on real facts in the search for truth," contrary to "some comrades," who were insisting on a "search for phrases by Marx, Lenin and Mao and behavior in accordance with these phrases." To substantiate his position, Deng cited the same basic tenets which Mao had once employed to substantiate the departure from Marxism on the pretext of its "creative development in line with the concrete experience of the Chinese revolution": "Reliance on real facts in the search for truth," "beliefs based on reality" and the "combination of theory with practice." These premises, according to Deng, represented the "final and basic viewpoint of the thought of Chairman Mao" and the "most fundamental principle of Marxism," guaranteeing "a correct attitude toward revolutionary leaders and their teachings."

In October 1978 the discussion began to center around "freeing the consciousness," which essentially meant acting in accordance with reality and not taking "directives" into account. Moreover, this applied primarily to the "theory of continued revolution." Under the influence of Deng's views, it was no longer "Mao's teachings about conflicts" that were regarded as Maoism's main theoretical achievement, but "the great teachings of Chairman Mao on experience," or the "theory of experience." Materials pertaining to the ideological and theoretical doctrine of Maoism no longer contained references to the "great theory of continued revolution," and the content of this doctrine was now defined as the "theory of new democracy," the "theory of the three worlds" and the "great teachings about the two types of conflicts,"[13] which substantiated the division of society not into classes, but into the "people" and the "enemies of the people." As the Chinese press underscored, the "gnosiological debate" established the ideological prerequisites for the decisions of the Third Plenum of the CCP Central Committee (December 1978).

The decisions of the Third Plenum reflected some of the results and consequences of the ideological struggle between the followers of Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng. The plenum resolved to "transfer emphasis to the four modernizations"--that is, to center party activity around economics. The end of the "class struggle" against the "gang of four" was announced. The status of the "Thought of Mao" was defined as the ideological and theoretical basis for the accomplishment of the "four modernizations." In other words, the "Thought of Mao" was recognized primarily as a "theory of socialist construction," and as later events testified, the thesis concerning the priority of "revolution" and "class struggle" was actually discarded, at least in propaganda.

Under the influence of the Third Plenum's decisions, significant changes took place in PRC ideological life throughout January-March 1979. They were marked by a tendency toward the increasingly obvious revision of the ideological and political doctrine of Maoism in line with rightist opportunism.

Firstly, since the beginning of the past year ideological life in the nation has been distinguished by the criticism of "ultra-leftist views" for almost the first time in the last two decades. It was announced that the previous definitions of the "line of Lin Biao and the gang of four" as "ultra-rightist" or "leftist in form but rightist in essence" were incorrect; the directive was issued to "thoroughly criticize the ultra-'leftist' essence" of this line.[14] Criticism was escalated to the accompaniment of appeals to "put an end to the mistaken belief that ultra-leftist views are better than ultra-rightist views." Moreover, this belief was described as the main obstacle preventing the triumph of the "correct ideology."[15]

All of this was supposed to convince the public that the rightist tendency was the "only correct" alternative to the ultra-"leftist" line of Lin Biao and the "gang of four."

Secondly, the method of mass ideological and political campaigns was openly renounced as something harmful to the nation's economic development. "The Slogan 'Stimulate Production by Taking Revolution Seriously' Can No Longer Be Used"--this was the title of an article printed in RENMIN RIBAO in March 1979, which noted that the constant ideological and political campaigns, including the "Cultural Revolution," had "represented for a long time the chief obstacle to the development of productive forces."[16]

Thirdly, propaganda stressing the continuation of the "class struggle" was actually curtailed. It was replaced by propaganda regarding the revival and energization of the "united front"--the alliance of the CCP with political parties of the national bourgeoisie living in China and abroad. The "united front" was propagandized as one of the "miraculous resources" of the CCP during the stage of "socialist revolution and socialist construction," and its energization under present conditions was called the basic guarantee of the successful accomplishment of the "four modernizations." The main theme became the "great theory of Chairman Mao on the united front"--the idea of the "new democracy," which centered around the idea of a coalition government and the concluding part of this theory--the "teachings about the two types of conflicts." Propaganda based on this "Thought of Mao" postulated the sociopolitical unity of PRC society and completely denied the antagonistic nature of relations between the national bourgeoisie and the workers. The concept "proletarian dictatorship" was given a bourgeois liberalist interpretation, and the concept "socialist democracy" was called a course toward "mutual control of the activities of the CCP and bourgeois parties within the framework of the united front."[17]

Proceeding from the same "Thought of Mao," propaganda discussed the need to consider the "economic interests of the people," including the national bourgeoisie, which began to be depicted as a friendly class which had contributed to "socialist revolution and socialist construction" and would be called upon, "under new historical conditions," to also make "its contribution" to the accomplishment of the "four modernizations." It was this reasoning that was used to substantiate the need for broader "economic democracy," particularly the replacement or "supplementation" of the proletarian, socialist principle of planned economic management with the principle of free competition, and land pricing with the free play of pricing factors in the market.[18]

The vigorous attempt to "restore" Maoism in line with rightist opportunistic views aroused suspicion in the group advocating the preservation of the ideological and political doctrine of Maoism in the form in which it had been set forth in the documents of the 11th CCP Congress. At the end of April 1979 the rightist tendency was countered by appeals for more intensive mass ideological and political work under the slogan of reviving the "best traditions of the party." An ideological campaign was quickly launched to promote "the bold and frank declaration that socialism is good." This campaign was based on "four principles": adherence to the "socialist course," "proletarian dictatorship," "CCP guidance" and "Marxism-Leninism as represented in the thougth of Mao Zedong."[19] The line of making extensive use of "economic methods," which actually signified a line of close economic cooperation with the West that would lead to the loss of the nation's economic independence, was once again countered by the line of "self-reliance." The energetic discussion of the relationship between "ideological and political indoctrination" and "economic methods" was resumed. Statements characteristic of the Maoist concept of military-barracks communism appeared in the press.

After encountering this pronounced opposition, Deng's group decided to promote its line by slightly modifying it. For this purpose, in the beginning of May 1979 it set forth the theory of the "three great movements for freeing the consciousness," which essentially denied that Marxism-Leninism had played a part in Chinese history and, consequently, refuted any attempted move toward the theory and practice of scientific communism in the PRC.[20] According to this "theory," the contemporary history of the Chinese society was divided into three eras of "consciousness-freeing"--that is, eras of the qualitative updating of ideology: 1) the "May 4th movement" of 1919, as a result of which China "became acquainted with Marxism"; 2) the "zhengfeng" movement of 1942-1945, when Marxism, in a "Sinized" version conforming to the "Thought of Mao," began to have a "tangible effect on social development in the nation," and 3) the current "great movement for freeing the consciousness," having the purpose of "making a new contribution to the progressive ideology of mankind" on the basis of "a combination of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism as represented in the thought of Mao Zedong with the specific experience of the four modernizations." Therefore, this "theory" proposes an even more radical rightist and pragmatic revision of the "Thought of Mao" than ever before. The intention to accomplish the profound qualitative updating of official ideological doctrine has been announced. On the grounds that socialism is supposedly a "new" and "insufficiently analyzed phenomenon" and that there are many "forms of socialism," the theory also appealed for the "comparison of various forms of socialism for the purpose of finding the best socialist course." The use of "ready-made forms"--or, in essence, the use of the experience of the socialist community--was discouraged. The accomplishments of the "four modernizations" was elevated to the status of a "grand revolution," "leading to corresponding multifaceted changes both in the sphere of production relations and in the superstructure." The last thesis could also be used as substantiation of the need for considerable change in the political and economic structure of the PRC.

As a result of this struggle, by the end of May 1979 the ideological campaign for the "bold and frank declaration that socialism is good" was obviously floundering, giving way to a new wave of noisy criticism of the "ultra-'leftist' essence of the line of Lin Biao and the 'gang of four."

After the Second Session of the NPC (June 1979), the tenets of the theory of "three great movements for the freeing of consciousness" began to be energetically propagandized and included in official documents, which meant that the influence of Deng's group and its "line" were growing. The Second Session of the Fifth NPC admitted, however, that the immediate accomplishment of the "four modernizations" would be impossible and announced a policy of "regulation, transformation and organization." The session also confirmed the line of using "economic methods" in their righist opportunistic interpretation by declaring a policy of the energetic use of "all expedient forms in international practice for the attraction of overseas capital," which, strictly speaking was also the aim of Deng Xiaoping.

By the end of 1979 the second round of the struggle over interpretations of the "Thought of Mao" in the Beijing leadership resulted in the appearance of a new, compromise "version" of Maoism. Although the elaboration of this version may not have been completed, its primarily rightist, nationalist and opportunist nature is already quite evident.

According to this new interpretation of Maoism, the driving force in the development of Chinese society ("major conflicts") in the current stage is not the "class struggle," but the resolution of conflicts (!) connected with the "four modernizations" under the conditions of "sociopolitical unity." Moreover, it has been asserted that the resolution of this "major conflict" will necessitate reforms both in the sphere of production relations and in the superstructure, and the character of these reforms has been contrasted to the extreme-"leftist" course. The accomplishment of the "four modernizations" is being defined as a "profound revolution."

At the same time, the new "version" also contains this "balancing" directive: "Denials of the existence of class struggle must be resisted as much as assertions that it is becoming broader and more intense." The term "class struggle" itself is not being interpreted as a struggle against any specific class or group of classes, but as a struggle against "isolated hostile elements," and it must, in the first place, "be centered around the accomplishment of the four modernizations," and not vice-versa, as was believed prior to the Third Plenum of the CCP, and in the second place, be conducted not as a broad mass campaign, but as a pursuit based on state laws.

The ideological and theoretical basis of this social policy was declared to be "Mao Zedong's teachings about the two types of conflicts," which substantiated the division of society into the "people" and "enemies of the people." Moreover, the criterion of this division would be the attitude toward the "political line"--that is, toward the policy of the "four modernizations." To illustrate the matter more clearly, an old directive dating back go the national liberation struggle was resurrected: "Unite all forces that can be united." But this was no longer to be done through "class struggle" or with the aid of the "Thought of Mao" in general, but by carrying out the program of the "four modernizations."

The social base for the accomplishment of this program was defined as the working class, the peasantry, the national bourgeoisie and, in general, "patriots supporting socialism," and attention began to be focused on members of the national bourgeoisie, since they had been "re-educated into individuals of the new type."

It was ultimately admitted that mass ideological work was "necessary along with economic methods," but it was to be conducted under the slogan of "consciousness-freeing" and in line with the appeals for struggle against "two ideological errors": "excessive respect for instructions from above" and "dogmatism."

Ideological and theoretical work emphasized the "establishment of a personal integral and complete scientific theory of socialist construction on the basis of the close coordination of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism as represented in the Thought of Mao Zedong with the great experience of the four modernizations."[21] This is how yet another formula was invented for the disavowal of Maoism's odious features and the preservation of its essence.

For a fuller understanding of the situation, it should be noted that isolated Marxist-Leninist statements are frequently, and with increasing frequency, woven into the canvas of ideological propaganda (in spite of the directives criticizing the use of "phrases" by Marx, Engels and Lenin). This "application" of Marxism, however, does not go beyond the usual bounds of Maoist ideological speculation. Marxist-Leninist tenets are generally used only as declarative reiterations of self-evident truths, which are now being used to substantiate the present Maoist course of the "four modernizations," just as "Marxism-Leninism" was once used to substantiate the thesis regarding the growing intensity of "class struggle." The actual attitude of the present Chinese leadership towards Marxism-Leninism was revealed in the directive to "establish a personal theory of socialist construction" by combining the "Thought of Mao" with the experience of the "four modernizations," in which there is essentially no room for Marxism-Leninism.

This analysis of ideological and political processes in the PRC since the new leadership came to power indicates that the entire period has been marked by intense ideological struggle, reflecting the crisis of Maoism and the restriction of the ideological parasitism which was once the main source of Maoism's existence and "reincarnation." It is for this reason that the crisis naturally led to the revision of Maoist ideological and political doctrine. Maoism is still necessary, however, to the present CCP leadership as a great-power chauvinistic ideology and militaristic practice, this time in its righist form.

This is corroborated in the materials of the Fourth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee (September 1979), in which the "Thought of Mao Zedong" is described as the "quintessence of more than half a century's experience in revolutionary struggle and the construction of a new society in China, the quintessence of the collective wisdom of the Chinese Communist Party." In addition to everything else, this statement testifies that the latest "version" of Maoism also has its limits, which are intended to protect Mao and his "thought" against the threat of absolute disrepute posed by the appeals of those who advocate the "radical revision" of Maoist doctrine.

The first updated version of Maoism, set forth in the documents of the 11th CCP Congress, was just as "leftist" in form and was based on the concept of "barracks communism" and the "theory of continued revolution under proletarian dictatorship," defining the line of intensive "class struggle" as the "basic party line during the entire socialist period." After the 11th CCP Congress, particularly after May 1978, a struggle broke out between Hua Guofeng's group, favoring the preservation of Maoist ideological and political doctrine in the form in which it was set forth at the 11th CCP Congress, and the group of Deng Xiaoping, striving to base this doctrine on the essentially rightist-opportunistic "theory of Chairman Mao on the united front" and to base CCP activity on the accomplishment of the great-power militaristic program of the "four modernizations," presupposing the revision of Maoism in line with the rightist pragmatic outlook for the purpose of adapting it to the policy of all-round collaboration with the West. The compromise that has now been reached in the CCP leadership indicates that Maoism is undergoing an increasingly obvious transformation into a righist opportunistic ideology.

FOOTNOTES

1. RENMIN RIBAO, 16 September 1976.
2. HONGQI, 1977, No 1, p 94.
3. RENMIN RIBAO, 1 May 1977.
4. Ibid., 29 December 1976.
5. HONGQI, 1977, No 3, p 92.
6. Ibid., No 7, pp 6-8.
7. GUANMING RIBAO, 16 January 1978.
8. Ibid., 17 January 1978.
9. RENMIN RIBAO, 8 May 1978.
10. GUANMING RIBAO, 11 May 1978.
11. Ibid., 5 June 1978.

12. Ibid., 6 June 1978.

13. RENMIN RIBAO, 9 November 1978.

14. Ibid., 16 February 1979.

15. HONGQI, 1979, No 2, p 7.

16. RENMIN RIBAO, 9 March 1979.

17. Ibid., 7 February 1979.

18. GUANMING RIBAO, 24 March 1979.

19. Ibid., 6 April 1979.

20. RENMIN RIBAO, 7 May 1979.

21. Ibid., 28 July 1979.

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PHILOSPHY OF MAO ZEDONG'S HEIRS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 131-144

[Article by N. G. Senin, doctor of philosophical sciences]

[Text] In the present world struggle of ideas, Maoism has become firmly entrenched in the position of a variety of anticommunism, skilfully camouflaged as a form of Marxism-Leninism. The Maoists still regard the "Thought of Mao Zedong" as their ideological guide in domestic and foreign policy, and they assign the greatest importance to his philosophical views.

The present leaders of China have declared the "banner of Mao Zedong" to be their own banner, have proclaimed Mao Zedong the "greatest Marxist of our time" and have called his "thought" the "newest addition to the theoretical treasures of Marxism-Leninism and the most valuable legacy bequeathed by Chairman Mao to our era."[1] In the new CCP Charter, the "Thought of Mao" is declared to be the party's ideological guide and the theoretical basis of party policy.

In the last 2 years, Mao Zedong's heirs have been working on the latest revision of the "Thought of Mao" in connection with their increasingly pronounced tendency toward alliance with the United States and its Western European NATO partners. In the political sphere, emphasis has been placed on preserving only those of Mao's works and statements which correspond to Beijing's present course. For this purpose, attempts are being made, on the one hand, to hush up all of the remarks in which the prospect of building socialism in China under the conditions of the existence of an imperialist system in the world was either doubted by Mao Zedong or postponed for 200-300 years, as well as remarks in which Mao Zedong once expressed positive feelings about the October Revolution and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, his appeals for struggle against imperialism and for the international unity of China with the socialist community and the international communist movement are being discarded.

On the level of ideological theory, emphasis has been placed on purging the "Thought of Mao" of all mutually exclusive and logically conflicting opinions on the pretext of an "integral treatment" of the "Thought of Mao," as well as on the selective analysis of these opinions on the pretext of a "concrete-historical" approach to them, and so forth. Moreover, Mao's heirs are displaying a clear tendency to relieve themselves of all responsibility for the practical and theoretical "errors" of Maoism, for the propaganda of the Mao Zedong cult of personality, which took monstrous and pathological forms, for the abnormal effects of this cult of personality on the Chinese people and for the endless ideological campaigns which exhausted the working masses, and to shift all of the blame to their deposed ideological and political opponents--Lin Biao and the "gang of four." They are hypocritically accusing Lin Biao and the "gang of four" of calling the "Thought of Mao" the "highest point" of Marxism-Leninism, of replacing Mao's gnosiological directive to "look for the truth in real facts" with the statement that "everything that Mao Zedong said was the truth," as if they were declaring the "Thought of Mao" to be the criterion of truth instead of seeing experience as this criterion, and so and so forth. All of this loud propaganda, the purely pragmatic purposes of which are quite apparent, has taken on the dimensions of a new ideological and political campaign, the largest so far, on a nationwide scale.

More and more speculative allegations of this kind are being made in China. Naturally, we have no intention of defending Lin Biao or any of the discredited "four." All of them are also to blame for the shameful pages of the history of China under Maoist rule. But the blame must be shared by the present leaders of China, who are singing the praises of Mao Zedong, are declaring his banner their own and have taken a vow to "resolutely defend" this banner and "pass it on from generation to generation."

The Chinese leaders recently launched a loud campaign called "the freeing of consciousness." This campaign has been officially linked with the struggle against Lin Biao and the "gang of four." Actually, however, this represents a necessary escape-valve to alleviate the pressure of the ideological tyranny which reigned in China when Mao Zedong's group was in power. Chinese colleges and universities have revived the practice of competitive student admissions, and the normal academic terms and curricula are being restored. The Chinese Academy of Sciences is resuming its activity. It has been divided into two parts: the Academy of Sciences, which deals with the natural sciences, and the Academy of Social Sciences, which deals with philosophy, economics, law, literature, history, archaeology and other branches of the humanities. Scientific journals which were banned during the period of "Cultural Revolution" are being published again--ZHEXIUE YANJIU ("Philosophical Studies"), LISHI YANJIU ("Historical Studies") and WEN-SHI-ZHE ("Literature, Art and Philosophy"). A new journal is being published--SHEHUE KEXIUE ZHANGXIAN ("The Social Studies Front"). All-China symposiums have been convened on philosophy, history, political economy and other social sciences.

All of these "innovations" could be given a positive interpretation if they reflected a real process of democratization in China which could bring the nation out of the shadow of Maoism. The present Chinese leadership, on the contrary, is striving to use these partial changes to alleviate the accomplishment of its militaristic and hegemonistic course and to acquire new arguments for the substantiation and justification of its own policy, hostile to socialism and alien to the interests of the Chinese workers.

The philosophy of the present Chinese leaders is the philosophy of Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong himself said repeatedly that he supported the philosophy of Marxism--dialectical and historical materialism. In the CCP Charter adopted at the 11th Congress, Mao Zedong is depicted not only as a consistent materialist, but also as a staunch fighter against idealism and metaphysics, against revisionism, dogmatism and empiricism.

The claims of Mao Zedong and his present heirs can be countered with V. I. Lenin's comment that philosophers should not be judged by their self-advertising, but by the degree to which they actually solve major theoretical problems, the company they keep and the content of their teachings in the past and the present.[2]

With consideration for this instructive remark by V. I. Lenin and for the appeal of the new Chinese ideologists to "search for truth in reality," we will attempt to determine what Mao was trying to teach his disciples and followers and what he actually did teach them.

As early as 1963, Mao said the following in one of his "directives": "Philosophy must be taken out of the classrooms and textbooks; philosophy must become a sharp weapon in the hands of the masses." This was followed in 1964 by the notorious philosophical debate over the "splitting of the whole," which, in turn, served as ideological preparation for the "Cultural Revolution," the spearhead of which was aimed primarily at the most aware, most intelligent segments of the population.

Assaults on the most highly trained and experienced Marxist philosophical cadres were accompanied by a mass campaign for the publication of articles supposedly written by machine-tool operators and peasants from people's communes. The articles discussed such topics as "The Philosophy of Selling Watermelons," "The Philosophy of Accounting," "The Philosophy of Hog-Raising," "The Philosophy of Ping-Pong," "The Dialectics of Vehicle Safety" and so forth. Even the special academic journal ZHEXIUE YANJIU ("Philosophical Studies") had to uphold the general line and reported on its pages that workers and peasants supposedly did not need "book philosophy" because they themselves were "natural materialists and dialecticians" and learned philosophers would only confuse them.

The line of vulgarizing philosophy by organizing a campaign for the publication of "philosophical" articles ascribed to workers and peasants was one of Mao Zedong's usual methods, which he used extensively for demagogical purposes to demonstrate his "blood-relationship" to the masses and, consequently, his right to speak on behalf of the masses.[3]

Mao Zedong used this speculative adaptation to the feelings of the backward masses as leverage in his domestic policy. In the beginning of the 1970's, Chinese propaganda made public a resolution noted by Mao Zedong on a particular document, calling this note a "directive." The resolution stated that "the lowest strata of the population are the smartest, and the highest are the stupidest." The political purpose of this resolution was revealed in an article entitled "The Lowest Strata of the Population Are the Masters of the Nation," written by a worker on the party committee of a tractor plant and printed in GUANMING RIBAO newspaper. The article said: "The 13-year history of our plant is the history of a struggle against the 'highest strata' constantly waged by the 'lowest strata,' holding high the banner of Chairman Mao's brilliant resolution; it is the history of the constant triumph of the materialist theory of reflection over the idealistic theory of transcendentalism."[4] To substantiate the hypothesis that the "lowest strata are the smartest people," the author of the article states that their social status "makes them more capable than others of understanding the thought of Mao Zedong and, with the aid of this thought, actively transforming the world."[5]

The article suggested, just as all other Chinese propaganda, that the "philosophical thought" of Mao Zedong would help in distinguishing true Marxism from pseudo-Marxism and in finding the correct path between right and "left" and would teach how the class struggle should be waged. For this reason, the attitude toward the "Thought of Mao" was declared the criterion for distinguishing between "smart" and "stupid."

The second tendency in the propaganda of Mao Zedong's "philosophical thought" was an attempt to justify the Maoists' unprincipled struggle with a so-called "class line" and to lend the philosophical "Thought of Mao" a proletarian "class nature," although it was no more proletarian than the disgraceful "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" launched by Mao and his followers in the second half of the 1960's.

The Maoist "class approach" to social issues can be illustrated by statements printed in central and provincial press organs. For example, an editorial of a newspaper published in South China said: "Under the conditions of proletarian dictatorship, the class enemy hides behind the cloak of Marxism-Leninism. He spreads rumors, spreads the poison of revisionism and opposes the revolutionary line of Chairman Mao. Frauds raised the red flag to oppose the red flag. These people, engaging in idealism and metaphysics, passed themselves off as Marxists but eviscerate and distort the spirit and essence of Marxism-Leninism and oppose the class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat."[6]

It is easy to see where the Maoists expected to find their "class enemies" and on whom they were taking revenge by labeling them "capitalist roaders" and branding them idealists and metaphysicians. Incidentally, these methods of discrediting and then destroying, or trying to destroy, opponents were once used by Mao Zedong against representatives of the CCP in the Comintern, who had established contacts for the Chinese revolution with the international communist movement. It was against these individuals that tirades like the following were directed: "An individual cannot understand any phenomenon unless he comes into contact with it--that is, unless his personal life (or experience) takes place under the conditions of this phenomenon."[7] It was the Chinese internationalist communists with the best Marxist training that Mao Zedong contemptuously called "bookworms," "know-it-alls" and "dogmatists" and chose as the target for his poison arrows in the 1930's.

Mao Zedong's article, "Against the Pedantic," written back in 1930, was published for the first time in 1964. In this article, Mao expressed what he had suppressed for almost 35 years--that is, his concealed hatred for Marxism. "The pedantic method of studying the social sciences," he said, "is the most dangerous.... Many of those who have read Marxist 'volumes' have betrayed the revolution."[8]

As we can see, it was no coincidence that Mao Zedong drew a logical connection between his ideological and political opponents and the people who had "read Marxist 'volumes'" and were branded "traitors to the revolution" by Mao. Qu Qiubo, Wang Ming, Liu Shaqi and many others fell into this category.

Both the attempt to pass the vulgarized Maoist philosophy off as Marxism and the desire to justify the arbitrary Maoist policies by means of a false class position served an ignominious goal--the defense, at all costs, of the Maoists' group views, reinforced by nationalistic ambitions, primarily to the detriment of the interests of the Chinese people, the cause of socialism and the interests of the international revolutionary movement.

This is what Mao Zedong taught his followers. The company kept by Mao Zedong and his followers can easily be discerned from this.

The present Chinese leaders, who are Mao Zedong's successors and who have inherited his political line and ideology, are trying to take a selective approach to the "Thought of Mao" and to his philosophy, but have nonetheless retained the essence of these ideas in its authentic form. The philosophical remarks of Mao Zedong that are now being circulated by Chinese propaganda were set forth in the recently published fifth volume of his "Selected Works."[9]

Let us take a closer look at some of Mao's philosophical comments that were first published in the fifth volume of his "Selected Works." We must remember that the materials included in this volume date back to the best years of China's development after the declaration of the PRC, back to the years of socialist construction, heightened public enthusiasm and the all-round flourishing of science and culture. In these years, the major works of Marx, Engels and Lenin were retranslated and published, dozens of scientific journals published articles on Marxist-Leninist philsophy, and special publications printed translations of the best philosophical articles by Soviet and other foreign authors. Lively discussion of the essence of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, its place in social life and so forth took place throughout the nation.

The positive tendencies in Chinese spiritual life, which were greatly stimulated by the general revolutionary renovation of social life in the nation, beginning with the triumph of the people's revolution, could have developed successfully in subsequent years as well if the "Selected Works of Mao Zedong" had not been published in the early 1950's, with the officially prescribed dogmatic attitude toward these works and the instruction to study the theoretical legacy of the founders of scientific communism exclusively through the prism of the "Thought of Mao Zedong."

Countless commentaries were written on the philosophical works of Mao Zedong "Regarding Practice" and "Regarding Conflicts," which were first published in the first volume of his "Selected Works." The critical spirit of Marxism was deliberately dimmed by the apologetic interpretation of all statements made by Mao Zedong, including remarks on philosophy. This was also promoted by the fact that the "Thought of Mao Zedong" was depicted in propaganda as nothing other than a form of Marxism-Leninism.

Naturally, even at that time Mao Zedong had serious ideological opponents in China, who did not agree with his interpretation of philosophical issues or his claims to "creative" Marxism. This is attested to by the variety of philosophical debates conducted in the nation at that time and the problems at the center of these debates.

On the basis of his false and dogmatic premise--that matter and spirit were allegedly in a state of dialectical conflict with one another--Mao developed his thesis regarding the "eternal nature" of the struggle between materialism and idealism. "Materialism and idealism in philosophy," Mao said in his speech at the all-China conference of party committee secretaries in January 1957, first published in the fifth volume of his "Selected Works," "represent the union of opposites and are fighting with one another. In addition, there are dialectics and metaphysics, which are also contradictory entities and struggle against one another. When we discuss philosophy, we cannot ignore these two pairs of opposites....

"Actually, in any nation there are idealism and metaphysics, there are poisonous weeds.... We, on the other hand, are frankly acknowledging the struggle between materialism and idealism, between dialectics and metaphysics, between sweet-smelling flowers and poisonous weeds. This struggle will continue forever."[10]

This line of reasoning, which was typical of Mao, is of interest not only because it laid an ideological basis for the subsequent attacks on philophical cadres in China, who took a Marxist-Leninist stand, for the purpose of discrediting them and eliminating their vigorous opposition of Mao

Zedong's directives. The publication of this material by Mao's heirs was obviously necessary to them for the "theoretical substantiation" of their anti-Soviet political line, which had been declared the official party and state line.

Questions of Maoist dialectics--or, more precisely, pseudo-dialectics--occupy an important, if not the central, place among Mao's philosophical comments in the fifth volume. Mao was not stingy with his orders: "The entire party should begin the earnest study of dialectics and insist on using the dialectical method as a guide in their activity";[11] "We must gradually disseminate dialectics so that everyone gradually learns how to apply the scientific, dialectical method";[12] "The premise of the union of opposites must be propagandized, as well as dialectics. I believe that dialectics should be taken out of the narrow bounds of the philosophical community and disseminated among the broad popular masses."[13]

Although these insistent appeals mentioned dialectics, reference is not being made to scientific dialectics, but to dialectics in the Maoist interpretation.[14] Mao saw his pseudo-dialectics simply as a convenient weapon, a means of "skillfully applying the tactic of using conflicts" to attain specific political goals. Here are some examples.

Mao Zedong, for example, had to lay a "theoretical basis" for the anti-Soviet slant of his policy in the mid-1950's and, simultaneously, for his great-power ambitions. For this purpose, he propounded a "dialectical" thesis: He alleged that although China and the Soviet Union were socialist countries, they represented "conflicting entities" by virtue of dialectics. This was his reasoning. "The Soviet Union," he said, "differs from China in terms of ethnic composition. The October Revolution took place there 39 years ago, and it has only been 7 years since we took power throughout our entire country. As for concrete experience, here the difference is also vast. For example, our agricultural collectivization, in contrast to the Soviet process, is passing through several stages; our policy toward capitalism is different from the Soviet one; our market price policy is not the same as the Soviet; interrelations between agriculture, light industry and heavy industry are settled by us differently than in the Soviet Union; institutions and regulations within our army and our party differ from the Soviet. We have told them that we do not agree with some things in their country and do not approve of some of their measures."[15]

The differences between the countries in terms of specific historical conditions, traditions and methods of solving all types of problems are natural and inevitable. But it is absolutely unscientific to lay a philosophical basis, the dialectical law of the unity and struggle of opposites, under differences of this kind. This is a vulgarization of dialectical materialism. But as we know, it is precisely the category of "difference" that lies at the basis of Mao Zedong's own understanding of the contradictory nature of phenomena and the law of the unity and struggle of opposites.

Here is another example Mao Zedong used to illustrate his idea of dialectics. "Water," he said, "is a combination of two elements--hydrogen and oxygen. It cannot consist of only hydrogen without oxygen or, conversely, of only oxygen without hydrogen.... Any chemical compound is nothing other," Mao continued, "than a union of opposites, elements differing in nature. The same applies to social phenomena. The central and local constitute a union of opposites, and each department along with other departments also constitute a union of opposites."[16]

This primitive gibberish is still being fed to all of the Chinese, and workers throughout the nation are forced to sit at meetings for hours after work and collectively search for the "profound meaning" invested in this statement by their "great teacher."

If it is true that in a contradiction--a union of opposites--one side cannot exist without the other, then, according to Mao Zedong's logic, oxygen cannot exist without hydrogen and hydrogen cannot exist without oxygen. And what are the "two sides" of the contradiction that make up a chemical compound? What is the institution in public life that opposes, for example, the bank, the school, the post office and so forth?

Mao was not setting forth his philosophy at a poultry farm, but at a plenum of the CCP Central Committee. And the main feature of his statement was not the philosophical wisdom of the party leader, but the ideological and political preparation of party administrators for a transition to an anti-Soviet course. He was slandering the Soviet Union and the Great October Socialist Revolution and offhandedly declaring that it had ceased to serve as an example to other countries and had "nothing more to teach," that "Leninism has already been essentially discarded" in the USSR, and so forth.

These remarks were made in November 1956.

Anti-Sovietism combined with great-power arrogance was also apparent in the abovementioned speech by Mao Zedong at the all-China conference on party committee secretaries in the beginning of 1957. In this speech, Mao philosophized about Sino-Soviet relations: "Do not think that communist parties cannot disagree. How could there be a world without disagreement? Marxism is the doctrine of disagreement, of contradictions, of struggle.... There are at present a few conflicts between China and the Soviet Union. The Soviet way of thinking and modes of behavior and their traditional customs are different from ours. Therefore, we must work with them.... Contradictions always exist. And if the situation now is tolerable in general, we can search for areas of agreement and postpone the discussion of differences. If they persist in going even further, the day will come when we will put all our cards on the table."[17]

This is the tone Mao Zedong taught his teachers and followers to take in discussions with Soviet people back in the mid-1950's.

Mao also used the prism of contradiction to examine the question of study in foreign countries and the use of their experience for China's needs. Moreover, even here he examined the contradictions in line with traditional Chinese dialectics: plus and minus, good and bad, and so forth. Each race, nation and individual, he said, has positive and negative features, merits and shortcomings. The only exception to the rule, according to Mao, was China. He elevated its shortcomings to merit status. China's economic backwardness and its low level of scientific and cultural development were not only not a drawback, but, according to Maoist dialectics, were stimulating social progress.

"From the standpoint of development, this is not at all bad," Mao said. "Poverty stimulates revolution, while it is difficult for a rich man to take an interest in rebellion. Nations with high levels of scientific and technical development are usually too arrogant. We, on the other hand, represent a blank piece of paper on which it is convenient to write."[18]

On the basis of this "philosophy of backwardness," Mao arrogantly issued instructions, telling people what they should learn, who they should learn it from and how they should learn it. Actually, as is evident in the fifth volume, he denied the need to study the experience of socialist construction in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

Attacking political figures in China who insisted on the need to study the Soviet experience in socialist construction, Mao called them "dogmatic" with "no opinion of their own." He accused them of being one-sided and wanting to view life in the Soviet Union only in a positive light--that is, of not noticing the second side--the shortcomings. Directing attention to this second side without even describing it, Mao Zedong made a new series of anti-Soviet attacks and advised the Chinese to thoroughly "study the progressive science and technology of the capitalist countries."[19]

When Mao's heirs made an effort to publish his "Selected Works" as quickly as possible because they contained statements corresponding to Beijing's present policy line, they were obviously preparing public opinion to coldly accept their plans to break off relations with the socialist countries and ally themselves with imperialist forces, which was completely consistent with Mao's own policy in the last years of his life.

The world public does not know the degree to which the theoretical substantiation of the Chinese leadership's betrayal of the principles of proletarian internationalism and international solidarity in the struggle for peace, democracy, national liberation and social progress was elaborated by Mao Zedong himself from the mid-1950's on, and to what degree it was the work of the present Chinese leadership. In any case, the fifth volume provides conclusive evidence that the Mao Zedong quoted here was an experienced political double-dealer and hypocrite, who surreptitiously treated the Soviet Union abominably while publicly vowing "eternal friendship," taking every opportunity to exploit the general Chinese working public's sincere feelings of gratitude, affection and friendship for the Soviet Union.

In this connection, it would be helpful to cite several public announcements made by Mao Zedong at various times, in which he acknowledged the role of the Soviet Union and its all-round assistance to the Chinese people in their revolutionary struggle and in the construction of socialism in China.

Just before World War II, when the CCP leadership realized that the Chinese revolution was an integral part of the unified global revolutionary process, with the Soviet Union in the lead, Mao Zedong wrote the following: "The situation now is absolutely clear: If there is no policy of alliance with Russia, no alliance with the socialist state, then there will certainly be a policy of alliance with the imperialists, there will certainly be an alliance with imperialism.... The imperialists intend to fight the USSR, to fight the communists. If you ally yourselves with them, they will demand that you "go North and fight" and nothing will remain of your revolution."[20]

When the Chinese revolution needed an ally to triumph, and this ally could only be a socialist state--that is, the Soviet Union--Mao Zedong understood that alliance with the imperialists would mean the death of the revolution. And he expressed this view quite clearly.

In 1949, in the last stage of the Chinese people's liberation struggle, Mao Zedong acknowledged the decisive role played by the Soviet Union in guaranteeing its (China's) victory and in consolidating it. In the article "On the Democratic People's Dictatorship," he wrote: "If the Soviet Union had not existed, if World War II, which was directed against fascism, had not ended in victory, if Japanese imperialism had not been totally defeated..., the international reactionary forces threatening us would naturally be inestimably greater than they are now. Could we," Mao asked, "have been victorious under these circumstances?" He then quite reasonably replied: "Of course not. And even if we had won a victory, we would not have been able to consolidate this victory. The Chinese people have had too much experience in this."[21]

Mao Zedong's conclusion was absolutely correct and aroused doubts in neither the enemies nor the friends of China. During the first decade of China's socialist development, Mao Zedong, who headed the People's Republic of China, made several public admissions of the invaluable assistance the Soviet people had given the Chinese people in building a new socialist society, free of oppression and exploitation, and of the Russians' fraternal sharing of their own multifaceted experience in overcoming difficulties and their guarantee of peaceful skies over China. At that time, he did not make any public statements about China's conflict with the Soviet Union and did not say that the Soviet experience represented a "negative" example for China. On the contrary, when he spoke at a reception in Beijing in spring 1957 in honor of Chairman K. Ye. Voroshilov of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, Mao said something quite different: "The Soviet people have accumulated exceptionally rich experience in the struggle for a socialist revolution and the lengthy period of socialist and communist construction. This experience is of tremendous value to the workers of the entire world. The Chinese people learned much of value from the Soviet Union both in the revolutionary struggle of the past and the socialist construction of the present. The Chinese people will continue to earnestly study Soviet progressive experience to accelerate socialist construction in China."[22]

At that time, Mao did not call upon the imperialist powers and all reactionary forces in the world to join China in a united front for struggle against the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community. On the contrary, in the same speech he made assurances of the eternal and inviolable ties of friendship between the two populations and of the strong unity of China and the USSR against imperialist aggressive forces. "Imperialist aggressive forces," Mao Zedong said, "have always taken every opportunity to subvert and undermine the unity and friendly relations between our two countries. But the facts prove that their shady intrigues could never have come to pass. There is nothing in the world that can disunite us. The friendship between the 8 million people of China and the Soviet Union is eternal and inviolable."[23]

Statements of this kind by Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders are being hushed up in Beijing now. They were not included in the fifth volume either, but Mao's heirs eagerly take every opportunity to cite Mao's remarks of the 1950's which, along with his newest "theories" and directives, allow them to adapt Mao's views to their own present anti-Soviet line, their alliance with imperialist forces against the socialist community and the international workers movement and their support of the most reactionary regimes in the world in their struggle against the national liberation movement. The present rulers of China are also using Mao's ideological legacy for their domestic policy which is contrary to socialism and the interests of the general working public in China.

When Hua Guofeng presented the accountability report at the 11th CCP Congress, he cited V. I. Lenin's famous remark that "the dialectics of history are such that the theoretical victory of Marxism forces its enemies to wear a Marxist disguise." This remark was addressed to the "gang of four," but it applies directly to the Maoists who are pretending to carry on the ideas and cause of Marx and Lenin. Hua Guofeng quite groundlessly gives Mao Zedong credit for supposedly "revealing the natural laws governing the development of socialist society" and "creatively applying" the law of the unity and struggle of opposites to the analysis of socialist society and thereby establishing the "great integral theory of continued revolution under proletarian dictatorship." The essence of this "new" theory is that, under socialism, which covers a fairly long period, "classes, class conflicts and class struggle are constantly present, the struggle between the socialist and capitalist lines is constant and the danger of capitalist restoration is constant."[24] The main classes involved in this struggle are supposed to be the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, allegedly constituting the major conflict in socialist society. This is what necessitates fierce class struggle and continued revolution.

Despite the present Chinese rulers' assertions that Mao Zedong "inherited, defended and developed Marxism-Leninism" and that the "theory of continued revolution under proletarian dictatorship" occupies a "particularly important place in the history of the development of Marxism" and represents the "greatest contribution to Marxism in the socialist period" and so forth, Mao's unconvincing discussions of class antagonism and class struggle in the socialist society and the need for continuous political revolution in this society, in the form of planned upheavals like the "Cultural Revolution," right up to the point of total communism, can only jokingly be described as a "creative development" of Marxism-Leninism; they represent only an extremely wretched revision of Marxism-Leninism and serve only as a screen to conceal the departure from Marxism-Leninism.

The founders of scientific communism theoretically proved, and the practice of the world liberation movement irrefutably corroborated, that class struggle is inevitably present in class-antagonistic society. When the working class wins political power and the revolutionary transformation of bourgeois society into a new socialist society begins, the working class does not curtail the class struggle against deposed but still present classes. It continues the struggle, but it continues it, as V. I. Lenin pointed out, "under different circumstances, in a different form and by different means."[25] The struggle continues throughout the entire period of transition from capitalism to socialism, until all hostile classes have been eliminated.

V. I. Lenin gave us a precise and thorough explanation of the term "elimination of classes." "The elimination of classes," he said, "will mean that all citizens will have the same relationship to the means of production throughout society. It will mean that all citizens will have equal access to work with public means of production, on public land, in public factories and so forth."[26]

When the bases of socialism have been laid--that is, when exploitative classes have been eliminated and public ownership of the means of production has been established in all sectors of the national economy--there is no longer any reason for class struggle within the nation in the economic, political and social spheres. All questions in these spheres will be decided by peaceful means on the basis of the sociopolitical unity of the society. In particular, cultural, ideological and educational issues in the socialist society will be resolved by peaceful means.

Mao Zedong's chief error in this case (if we can even discuss any of his specific errors) was that he did not recognize the fundamental difference between the period of transition from capitalism to socialism and the period of the construction of socialism as the first phase of communism. For him, the period of transition was the entire period from the time when the working class won power to the time of communism's final triumph. Moreover, although he realized that political power during the period of transition to socialism could only be embodied in a proletarian dictatorship, he concluded that the chief function of this political structure would have to be coercion since this was a dictatorship. Mao always regarded coercion as a means of preserving individual authority. It was precisely this kind of coercion that he was talking about when he referred to "class struggle."

Mao Zedong ignored V. I. Lenin's important statement that the forms, methods and means of class struggle by the working class, when it was controlling the machinery of state, would be qualitatively different from those existing prior to the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship, and that the chief function of proletarian dictatorship would not be coercion, but the organization and construction of a new and classless society.[27]

For Mao Zedong, just as for his heirs, the essence of proletarian dictatorship consisted in unlimited coercion under the guise of "continued revolution," in continuous and intensive "class struggle" and in the suppression of "class enemies"--that is, all persons opposing the leadership's policies.

In order to reinforce his own position and that of the clique which came to power in China after Mao Zedong's death, Hua Guofeng made a pretense of carrying out Mao Zedong's "political wishes" by advocating, at the last CCP Congress, "people's war" on a broad front against the supporters of the discredited "gang of four," and declared that the class struggle was the "deciding link" in the nation's domestic policy. "The grand-scale class struggle for the exposure and criticism of the 'four,'" he announced from the congress rostrum, "is now the principal driving force in the development of our cause."[28]

We must remember that the terms "class enemy" and "enemy of the people" were never invested with their immediate social import in Mao's political jargon. In essence, they served only as abusive labels which were applied to all those with whom Mao had personal scores to settle or those who did not agree with his faulty reasoning. Mao even hung the label of "class enemy" on such political figures in China as Gao Gang, Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao, men he had called his "comrades" for decades. They became the victims of his insidious intrigues.

During the period of "Cultural Revolution," Mao Zedong hung the label of "class enemy" on his opponents, who were also called "capitalist roaders"--that is, "individuals in positions of leadership who are taking the capitalist road." This category of "class enemy" included the administrators of party organizations on all levels, public agencies, public organizations and so forth--that is, the heads of the main "headquarters" on which Mao ordered "all-out attack."

In the last part of his life, after the excesses of the "Cultural Revolution," Mao Zedong, who had, with his own voluntaristic behavior, created truly antagonistic conflicts in the Chinese society between his antisocialist line and the vital interests of the workers, began to search for his "enemy" within the communist party that he himself had reorganized. Criticizing his successors for conducting a "socialist revolution" without knowing who their "enemies" were, Mao blasphemously explained to them that the "enemy" was the bourgeoisie, which could be found "within the communist party itself."

Mao's last explanations poured balm on the wounds of his present successors. They rid themselves of their chief political opponents by using "classic" Maoist methods, branding them with labels which simultaneously discredited and smothered them. "Zhan Chunqiao is a Kuomintang spy, Jiang Qing is a traitor, Yao Wenyuan is a hostile class element and Wang Hongwen is a new bourgeois element."[29] Needless to say, this was an excellent funeral wreath from the "students" to their adored "great teacher"! Now it is the turn of thousands and thousands of other people who are not needed by the regime.

In the end of 1978, after the Third CCP Central Committee Plenum, the Chinese leaders declared a line of "liberalizing" class policy within the nation. Contrary to Mao Zedong's directives and their own instructions, as set forth in the materials of the 11th Congress, the Chinese leaders announced that "fundamental changes" had taken place in the Chinese class structure: Landowners, rich peasants and capitalists, they say, have ceased to exist as classes; "most of the representatives of these classes who were able to work have become workers and, consequently, the class struggle "has ceased to be the main conflict in Chinese society."

We will not try to decide whether the judgments of the Chinese leaders were more faulty before or after the 11th CCP Congress. We are more interested in the reason for the sudden metamorphosis of the Chinese leaders' views. Their explanation for the change in China's international position is due to China's "new and important successes in the creation of an international united front against hegemonism and in the development of friendly relations with countries in all parts of the world."[30] Among these successes, particular emphasis is placed on the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese treaty "on peace and friendship" and the normalization of relations with the United States.

The alliance with international imperialism on an anti-Soviet basis, which has been elevated to the status of government policy, has also been reflected in Beijing's domestic policy. In order to achieve "grand-scale unity" in the nation, the Chinese bourgeoisie has regained the freedom to engage in private enterprise, capitalists have regained their assets and confiscated property, and foreign capital is permitted by law to engage in economic activity in the nation on an equal partnership basis. Corresponding steps have also been taken in the political sphere. The last group of "rightist elements" convicted of "subversive activity" in the 1950's was recently vindicated, the description of the "gang of four's" activity as "ultra-rightist" has been changed to "ultra-leftist," the "hundred flowers" slogan has been revived as the principal line in art and science, and the

Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, now headed by Deng Xiaoping, has resumed its activity, with pronounced emphasis on stronger ties with "huaqiao" living in different parts of the world.

This "liberalization" of class policy has taken on the nature of a campaign. Appeals for intense class struggle have not been removed from the agenda in China, but the spearhead of class struggle is now pointed at those who do not agree with the absolutely righist and strictly pragmatic line of the present Chinese leaders. Chinese propaganda explains that this spearhead is now pointed at "counterrevolutionaries," "enemy agents," "political degenerates," "opponents of modernization" and other "class enemies of various types," with whom the "proletarian dictatorship will have to deal for a long time."[31]

The political persecution of the last two decades in China has shown that anyone and everyone can be categorized as a "class enemy" and subjected to repressive action. This is particularly true now that the main criterion used in defining the "class enemy" is the attitude toward the present leadership's policy of "modernization." Anyone who accepts and supports this policy is a "friend" and anyone who does not accept it and "undermines" it is an "enemy," against whom the punishing hand of Maoist justice, speculatively called proletarian dictatorship, is turned.

By declaring "class struggle" the deciding link of their policy, Mao Zedong's heirs hope to establish "universal order" and achieve unity, solidarity and stability in the nation. This alone testifies that they feel insecure about their present position. The current Chinese leaders also feel insecure about the future of their nation. It is true that under the loudly advertised slogan of "modernization" in all spheres of social life, they are promising to "put foreign things at China's service," but in essence, they are hoping to turn China into a powerful state, which they even call "socialist," by the end of the century with the all-round support of worldwide imperialism.

Nonetheless, no matter how much the Maoists speculate on the Marxist terms "proletarian dictatorship," "socialism" and "communism," they do not really believe in socialism, in its scientific import or in communism, just as Mao himself did not believe in them. The report by Ye Jianying at the 11th CCP Congress on changes in the CCP Charter explain the basic policy-planning objectives of the party and quite clearly declared, with references to Mao's instructions, that "as long as imperialism exists, the socialist state cannot enter the communist stage."[32]

Moreover, the same report mentioned another of Mao's instructions, in which he cast doubts on the creation of a communist society even after imperialism would be completely eliminated and the entire world would enter the socialist phase. Mao Zedong's explanation for these doubts was that the bourgeoisie would continue to live even after it had been deposed and would make every effort to break up the communist party.

Mao's present successors have armed themselves with this capitulating line of his.

Mao's heirs link the existence of imperialism with the absolute inevitability of war. "Chairman Mao Zedong told us that war would be inevitable until such time as imperialism and social-imperialism as a social structure would be abolished."[33]

Slandering the Soviet Union and calling it a "social-imperialist superpower" allegedly preparing to attack China, Hua Guofeng took pains at the 11th party congress to "prove" that world war cannot be avoided because this is an objective law which does not depend on human wishes. Mao Zedong's allegation that war is an extension of the policy of peace, stemming from his philosophical thesis that the state of peace inevitably alternates with the state of war, has even been cited as unique "theoretical" reinforcement.

On the basis of these and other "theoretical" postulates of their "great teacher," Mao Zedong's disciples and successors are doing their utmost in conjunction with imperialist aggressive forces, to impede international detente and prevent the mobilization of progressive forces to put an end to the threat of world war, which they see as a means of carrying out their aggressive expansionist plans.

The present Chinese rulers are not only marching virtually in the front lines of the propagandists of a new world war, but they are also initiating armed conflicts with neighboring countries. The war launched against socialist Vietnam, the continuous and increasingly intense military provocations on the borders with Vietnam and Laos and the all-round support that is being given to the remnants of Pol Pot's gangs in Kampuchea testify that the Chinese hegemonists are not limiting themselves to verbal intimidation of their southern neighbors, but are actually endangering peace and security throughout Southeast Asia and are creating a dangerous source of global conflict.

An analysis of the philosophy of Mao Zedong's heirs suggests that Mao did not teach his disciples and successors Marxism, as they are implying in Beijing, but deviation from Marxism, or pseudo-Marxism, the nucleus of which is the same old great-power chauvinism and belligerent hegemonism that are directly reflected in Beijing's policy.

This policy, however, must be classified as hopeless. The propaganda about the inevitability of a new world war is arousing more and more negative response throughout the world. This propaganda is discrediting China as a great state and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the main purpose of which is precisely the guarantee of world peace. Moreover, this war propaganda is being conducted in China by a small group of people in power, and not by the population of this country. The great population of China has not yet expressed its views on this matter, but it will do this sooner or later, and these views will be of indisputably tremendous significance.

The Soviet Union's fundamental line in regard to the policy of the present Chinese leadership and its ideological basis--the "Thought of Mao"--was expressed in the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and in many subsequent announcements by the CPSU and the Soviet Government. This line consists in, on the one hand, uncompromising struggle against Maoist policy, which is alien to socialist principles and ideals, and Maoist ideology, which is incompatible with Marxism-Leninism, and, on the other, an open invitation to normalize relations between the two countries on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

FOOTNOTES

1. Hua Guofeng, "Political Report at the 11th All-China CCP Congress,"--"Eleventh All-China Congress of the CCP (Documents)," Beijing, 1977, p 6.

2. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Completed Collected Works], vol 18, p 228.

3. This kind of vulgarization of the Marxist philosophy is also one of the responsibilities of today's official propaganda organs in China. For example, the August issue of BEIJING REVIEW for 1978 reports: "The Chinese press advocates the fuller use of the theory of 'splitting the whole' or the 'theory of the two sides' in the analysis of our work--that is, the examination of weak points as well as strong points. Chairman Mao employed this theory to provide us with a vivid description of the basic law of dialectical materialism, the law of the unity of opposites." Several banal examples are presented in the article to illustrate Maoist "dialectics"--see BEIJING REVIEW, 1978, No 34, p 28.

4. GUANMING RIBAO, 18 May 1971. The "theory of reflection" refers here to Mao Zedong's empirical gnosiology, and the theory of "transcendentalism" refers to the philosophical position the Maoists ascribe, without any justification whatsoever, to their ideological and political opponents--Wang Ming, Liu Shaqi, Chen Boda and others.

5. Ibid.

6. CHINA NEWS ANALYSIS, 14 May 1971.

7. Mao Zedong, "Selected Works," vol 1, Moscow, 1952, p 512.

8. "Selected Works of Mao Zedong," series "B," Beijing, 1964, p 21.

9. The fifth volume of Mao Zedong's "Selected Works" was published in a huge edition in April 1977. It consisted of 70 works covering the period from September 1949 through November 1957, and 46 of these

works were being published for the first time. The collected materials were carefully analyzed and edited by a special commission of the CCP Central Committee, headed by Hua Guofeng. A characteristic feature of the publication of this volume was the inclusion of anti-Soviet attacks dating back to the mid-1950's and remarks attesting to China's willingness to establish close ties with the capitalist West. The new Chinese leadership attaches exceptional significance to the fifth volume.

10. Mao Zedong, "Selected Works," vol 5, Beijing, 1977, p 440.

11. Ibid., p 459.

12. Ibid., p 520.

13. Ibid., p 628.

14. For more detail, see N. G. Senin, "Sophistry Disguised as Dialectics," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1975, No 3.

15. Mao Zedong, "Selected Works," vol 5, p 407.

16. Ibid., pp 406-407.

17. Ibid., pp 437-439.

18. Ibid., p 367.

19. Ibid., p 365.

20. "O chem umalchivayut v Pekine?" [What Are They Concealing in Beijing?], Moscow, 1972, p 26.

21. "O novoy demokratii" [On the New Democracy], Moscow, 1960, p 100.

22. PRAVDA, 18 April 1957.

23. Ibid.

24. "Eleventh All-China Congress of the CCP (Documents)," pp 30-31.

25. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 39, p 15.

26. Ibid., vol 24, p 363.

27. Ibid., vol 38, p 385.

28. "Eleventh All-China Congress of the CCP (Documents)," p 79.

29. Ibid., p 26.

30. "Communique of the Third CCP Central Committee Plenum," BEIJING REVIEW, 1978, No 52, p 8.

31. "Fundamental Changes in Class Position of China," BEIJING REVIEW, 1979, No 46, 47.

32. "Eleventh All-China Congress of the CCP (Documents), p 179.

33. Ibid., pp 64-65.

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CSO: 1805

MAO ZEDONG'S REVENGE AGAINST HIS OPPONENTS IN 1930-1931

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 145-156

[Article by A. S. Titov]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1805

BEIJING RATTLES THE SABRE

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 157-162

[Reprint from UNEN (MPR)]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1805

HO CHI MINH--THE PATRIOT, THE COMMUNIST, THE MAN (COMMEMORATING THE 90TH ANNIVERSARY OF HIS BIRTH)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 163-171

[Article by Ye. V. Kobelev]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1805

THE CASE OF DENG TUO: REHABILITATION OR APPROPRIATION OF AUTHORITY?

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 172-178

[Article by A. N. Zhelokhovtsev, candidate of philological sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1805

ZOU TAOFEN--PROMOTER OF SINO-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 179-186

[Article by S. R. Belousov]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1805

AGAINST THE REVIVAL OF JAPANESE MILITARISM

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 187-190

[Review by P. I. Rybakov of a series of books by Hayashi Shigeo]

[Text] In recent years there has been a noticeably increased tendency toward militarization in Japan, into which the nation is being propelled by rightist political circles expressing the interests of the monopolistic bourgeoisie. From year to year, military spending increases, military cooperation with the United States is broadened and ties with NATO and China are strengthened. The escalation of militaristic hysteria in the nation is being justified by the imaginary "Soviet military threat."

The peace-loving Japanese public is well aware of the danger of this course and the need to energize the struggle for peace. The growing desire to resist the revival of Japanese militarism is attested to, in particular, by the publication of a series of three books by Hayashi Shigeo, Japan's famous fighter for peace. The appendix of each book contains the texts of numerous documents.

The first book[1] exposes the plans of Japanese ruling circles to institute emergency legislation which would give the military establishment a free hand and grant it extensive powers to mobilize human and material resources for military preparations. The author proves that Japanese ruling circles actually began to draft bills of this type long ago under the cover of various research projects. The author stresses that the plans of the Japanese military command were first reflected in the "Three Arrows" operational plan prepared by the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) in 1963 (p 3). Documents drafted in 1964 on the basis of this plan envisage measures to intensify militaristic propaganda, augment the composition of companies and units, create stocks of ammunition and raw materials, enlist the services of the population for various military duties and use private resources and facilities in the interests of the armed forces (pp 6-10).

The author correctly points out that the attempts of ruling circles to pass emergency legislation have been connected primarily with Japanese-American military-political cooperation, particularly the "U.S. policy of maintaining its influence in South Korea" (p 14). It was no coincidence that the attempts to pass these laws were made at the time when the Japanese-South Korean treaty was signed in 1965 and in connection with the adoption of a joint declaration by the heads of the U.S. and Japanese governments in 1969. The current intense activity of military circles has been accompanied by closer U.S.-Japanese military-political cooperation.

The author stresses that these bills were not drafted for the purpose of defending Japan, which is not being threatened by anyone, but for the purpose of establishing dominion over other countries. To corroborate this conclusion, Hayashi cites historical examples (p 5). For instance, the passage of laws on the general mobilization of the country, on the development of the defense industry and on the institution of a compulsory draft in the past were connected with Japan's preparations for wars against tsarist Russia and China, and later with the intervention against Soviet Russia. During the period of preparations for the "great war in East Asia," a series of emergency laws were also passed.

According to S. Hayashi, Japanese ruling circles have already implemented some of the provisions of this emergency legislation without waiting for their enactment. Preparations are being made for the institution of a compulsory draft in the nation. For example, since 1966 the enlistment of volunteers in the armed forces has been conducted in accordance with the so-called "system of organized recruitment" (soshiki boshyu), in line with which recruiting stations have at their disposal "lists of individuals in active military service and the reserves, former servicemen and individuals who have expressed a desire to enter the military and are of age" (p 6). These measures testify that the necessary conditions for mobilization are already being prepared in peacetime and that the bases are being laid for enlisting the services of the population in times of crisis.

The author stresses that grand-scale projects in Japan, ostensibly for alleviating the consequences of natural calamities, actually envisage the enlistment of the civilian population for various military duties, and the use of material resources and means of transportation and communication belonging to private firms for this purpose (pp 7, 146-152). The existing system envisages the creation of rescue teams and brigades throughout the nation for medical assistance. The armed forces already have the right, even in peacetime, to utilize means of transport, particularly the ferry boats of private companies, to transport military equipment and personnel, and to use public and private buildings and schools to accommodate personnel during the course of military exercises. Plans have been drawn up to establish a thoroughly organized civil defense system (p 7).

At present, numerous organizations for assistance to the armed forces are operating within the nation, including the Society To Assist the Self-Defense Forces (Jieitai kyoryokukai), the Society for Cooperation in Defense (Boei kyoryokukai), the League of Friends of Native Places (Goyu remmei) and others; they actively help in military propaganda and the cultivation of the militarist ideology. In the event of war, these organizations will be prepared to give the armed services rear support and will constitute the basis of civil defense subunits.

The author notes that ruling circles have recently launched a broad propaganda campaign in the nation to "heighten public awareness of national defense issues"--in other words, the ideological brainwashing of the population in the militaristic spirit has become more intensive. Expenditures on these measures increase from year to year. Just the allocations for the propaganda section of the prime minister's office rose from 100 million yen in 1960 to 11.1 billion yen in 1978 (p 10)--that is, they increased more than 100-fold. The association set up as part of the JDA in 1973 is already conducting broad-scale propaganda to encourage public opinion to favor militarization and preparations for war.

After public opinion has been properly won over, the government intends to begin revising the existing constitution. This will be done in line with the wishes of the United States, which has requested Japan to make a greater contribution to bilateral military cooperation (p 15). In particular, plans have been made to amend existing laws so that Japan will be able to include its own subunits and units in the forces of the United Nations (p 118). This, as S. Hayashi points out, should be regarded as a loophole for the evasion of constitutional provisions and the acquisition of opportunities to send troops abroad.

The proposals drawn up by the JDA for the reorganization of military administrative agencies are also part of the preparations for a state of emergency. They envisage, in particular, the creation of a joint armed forces staff, the peacetime creation of a central intelligence agency to collect, analyze and assess military information, the expansion of the functions of the national defense council, the creation of a public security commission to be headed by the prime minister and to consist of leading cabinet ministers, and so forth.

In the second book,[2] the author analyzes the process by which Japanese-U.S. military cooperation has become more intense in the postwar period. The author exposes the essence of Japanese-American military cooperation, its nature and its objectives at various times. The "Three Arrows" plan already envisaged joint Japanese-American operations in the event of a large-scale armed conflict on the Korean peninsula. The United States was granted complete freedom in the use of military bases on Japanese territory and Japan was made responsible for blocking the Tsushima Strait, providing for the air defense of South Korea, repairing military equipment and supplying South Korean troops with certain types of weapons.

In amplification of the "Three Arrows" plan, the JDA later drafted specific plans for joint combat operations: the "Flying Dragon" (1964-1965) and the "Buffalo Run" (1966). The "Flying Dragon" was a plan for interaction by Japanese and U.S. armed forces in combat operations on Okinawa. "Buffalo Run" was a plan for a joint operation on the Korean peninsula. According to these documents, Japanese armed forces would enter into combat as part of the "UN troops" immediately after the adoption of a government decision and would essentially be put under the jurisdiction of the American command. Japanese armed forces would have the responsibility of defending the air and water expanses and sea lanes connecting Japan with Korea, Okinawa and Taiwan (p 13). The creation of a united agency to coordinate U.S.-Japanese combat operations was envisaged.

Military cooperation between Japan and the United States, the author points out, is now being further developed. After the "Basic Principles of Cooperation Between Japan and the United States in the Military Sphere" were ratified by the Japanese Government and the national defense council on 28 November 1978, the chief of the JDA ordered the drafting of a plan for joint combat operations, which was called a "new variant" of the "Three Arrows" plan (p 14). According to the author, the new plan envisages closer interaction by the two sides and the assumption of additional responsibilities by Japan. According to an admission made by K. Ito, former JDA department head, on 4 July 1978 at a meeting of the budget committee of the lower house of parliament, the new plan should focus more on, "firstly, the comprehensive use of the ground troops and air and naval forces of Japan; secondly, the elimination of shortcomings in the equipping of Japanese armed forces; thirdly, the assumption of additional responsibilities by Japan in joint operations by Japanese and American troops" (pp 14, 15).

As the author points out, "the present strategy of the United States in Asia and the Pacific consists in guaranteeing its military presence in the region, agreeing to semi-ally relations with China under the conditions of Soviet-Chinese confrontation and, with Japan's assistance and on the basis of a U.S.-Japanese-Chinese alliance, ensuring itself superiority to the Soviet Union in the current balance of power" (p 15). Ruling circles in the United States are striving to take advantage of every opportunity to "overpower the national liberation movement, hamper its development, ensure the supremacy of U.S. imperialism in Southeast and South Asia and in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions," preserve the division of the Korean population and strengthen the alliance connecting the United States with Japan and South Korea (p 15).

According to the "Basic Principles of Cooperation Between Japan and the United States in the Military Sphere," this cooperation envisages joint combat operations in the event of the "danger or threat of an armed attack on Japan," Japanese participation in offensive combat operations in the air and the sea near the Japanese Islands and the offer of Japanese military facilities to U.S. armed forces for joint use in the event of tension in the Far East (p 15).

Therefore, Japan has taken on the responsibility of safeguarding, in conjunction with the United States, "security" in Asia and the Pacific, which attests to qualitative changes in the scales of their military cooperation in line with the Japanese-American "security treaty." Actually, all of Asia and the entire Pacific zone have now become the object of joint action by Japanese and U.S. armed forces.

Japan has taken on the commitment of "defending" all water within 900 kilometers of the Japanese Islands and sea lanes for a distance of up to 1,850 kilometers. Japan has promised to "close" all three straits leading to the Pacific Ocean to the Soviet naval fleet "in the event of extraordinary circumstances," which should guarantee the U.S. fleet freedom of action in the Pacific and thereby enhance the effectiveness of hostilities against the Soviet Armed Forces (p 17). The author concludes that the "Basic Principles" are of cardinal importance primarily to the United States.

The "Joint Defense Plan" is also still in the draft stage. The compilation of its operational section is being supervised by the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, while the political portion is being supervised by the defense agency chief. In 1980 the basic research guidelines should be determined, and this is to be followed by the drafting of variations of possible combat operations, the conduct of joint operations and the distribution of responsibilities between the armed forces of Japan and the United States.

The adoption of the "Basic Principles" has been accompanied by the further intensification of Japanese-American military and political cooperation and the coordination of foreign policy positions (p 20). The establishment of the principles of Japanese-American military cooperation, which has aroused the desire to revise several Japanese laws or to amend them substantially, will naturally, as the author correctly points out, further augment militaristic tendencies in Japan (p 20) and bring about significant changes in the entire system of Japanese-American military cooperation in the 1980's.

In the third book,[3] S. Hayashi examines questions connected with the use of armed forces for the purpose of "safeguarding public security"--that is, in the interest of preserving the existing political structure in the nation. The author points out the antidemocratic nature of the Japanese armed forces, which, in accordance with the "Self-Defense Forces Act," are being used to suppress the democratic movement and guarantee monopoly domination of the country. During the course of the gradual restoration of the armed forces--the creation of a reserve police corps and its subsequent transformation into a security corps and, later, into "self-defense forces"--it was announced that their chief responsibility would be to "defend the nation against direct and indirect aggression" (pp 10, 11). The term "indirect aggression," S. Hayashi states, unequivocally implies the suppression of public demonstrations for individual rights and better living conditions. When the armed forces were being created, measures were taken to perfect the function of public repression: The appropriate decrees and laws were passed, close ties were established between the JDA and the public security commission, interaction by armed forces and police was organized and responsibilities connected with the suppression of public demonstrations were distributed among branches of the armed services (pp 10-11, 18-29).

In the 1970's, the system for preserving "law and order" continued to be perfected: The armed forces were directed to not only assist the police, but also to participate directly in punitive actions against the democratic movement in the nation. As a result of this, the armed forces and the police began to interact more closely and efficiently.

The intensification of the democratic struggle has motivated ruling circles to use the armed forces to combat this movement. It is indicative that operations for the suppression of the democratic movement are envisaged in all of the plans drafted each year in military headquarters, although this has been kept strictly confidential. Plans for struggle against democratic forces call for the use of tanks, armored carriers, helicopters and tear gas.

In conclusion, the author stresses that the emergency legislation being promoted by ruling circles is partly aimed at guaranteeing favorable conditions for the armed suppression of the democratic movement in the nation, the restriction of public rights and the transformation of Japan into a militaristic state (pp 15-16).

FOOTNOTES

1. Hayashi Shigeo, "Kokka kinkyuken-no kenkyu" [A Study of the Emergency Powers of Government], Tokyo, 1978, 178 pages.

2. Hayashi Shigeo, "Zembun-Mitsuya sakusen kenkyu" [The Drafting of the "Three Arrows Operation"], Tokyo, 1979, 139 pages.

3. Hayashi Shigeo, "Tian kodo-no kenkyu" [A Study of the Activities of Public Security Agencies], Tokyo, 1979, 135 pages.

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INDIAN OCEAN: ZONE OF PEACE OR THEATER OF COMBAT?

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 190-193

[Review by V. P. Kozin of the books "Politics of the Indian Ocean Region: The Balance of Power" by F. A. Vali, New York, 1976, XV + 272 pages, and "U.S. Strategy in the Indian Ocean: The International Response" by Monarajan Bezboruah, New York, 1977, XVII + 269 pages]

[Text] The problem of safeguarding security in one of the most important parts of the world--the Indian Ocean region--has been debated more and more frequently in many countries in recent years. The interest in this issue is completely understandable: In our day the Indian Ocean region provides the world with much of its basic raw materials, particularly oil, and contains around 50 sovereign states (one-third of the UN membership), with a population exceeding 1 billion. It is therefore natural that the guarantee of real peace and stability in the Indian Ocean region would be in the interest of many of the world's peoples. In this connection, world public opinion is interested primarily in two questions: What are the possible ways of implementing the famous proposal to turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace? What effect will the foreign military presence in this region, which still exists, have on the future of the people inhabiting the region and on world peace? A great deal of literature on the Indian Ocean issue has been published in the West. The monographs being reviewed also deal mainly with this subject.

The authors of both monographs (F. Vali, an American of Hungarian descent, and M. Bezboruah, an Indian living in the United States) agree that the Indian Ocean region is playing an increasingly important role in the system of international trade, economic and political relations by virtue of its "geopolitical and geostrategic position" (F. Vali, p 41) and "the possibilities it offers for control over the vast territories adjacent to it" (M. Bezboruah, pp XV-XVI). They base their ideas, however, on different political premises: Vali advocates a "show of strength" by the leading Western nations in the Indian Ocean, while M. Bezboruah supports the idea of the "moderate" or "limited" military presence of non-littoral states. Consequently, the conclusions stated in these works also differ.

In his analysis of U.S. activity in the Indian Ocean region, F. Vali singles out five factors which, in his opinion, explain the U.S. interest in preserving its political and military presence here: "The desire to promote stability and economic development in the countries of this region; the preservation of the status quo, which would please allies and friends; capital investments in the amount of 10 billion dollars (excluding military aid); the traditional interest in ensuring the freedom of the seas; the strategic interest in ensuring the freedom of the seas; the strategic consideration that the northern part of the Indian Ocean could be used for the launching of ballistic missiles" (p 185). Vali rationalizes the need to maintain the so-called "balance of power" in the region, which he divides into the "balance of external power," made up of the non-littoral states of the region, and the "balance of local power," consisting of the littoral and mainland states. Vali feels that maintaining the "balance of external power" will prevent "hegemonism" in the region. Justifying the U.S. military presence here, he implies that it serves as some kind of stabilizing factor in the "balance of local power" and should therefore be preserved (p 52). In this connection, it is interesting that Vali remarks that the notorious gunboat diplomacy (in our day, as we know, the United States has transformed it into "aircraft carrier diplomacy" by modernizing its technical and combat equipment) should be regarded as "useful." "The presence or appearance of naval forces (American--V. K.) can lend support to foreign policy measures and influence friends and enemies. These forces can be used for friendly or hostile intervention in events taking place far from their own shores; ...in peacetime, naval ships and the carrier fleet can be used as a threat, can constitute an ocean blockade and can aid in an embargo or landing operation," he points out (p 58).

Bezboruah has a somewhat different interpretation of the matter. In his opinion, the factors attracting the American military establishment to the third-largest ocean in the world are the following: "The need to fill a vacuum," which supposedly appeared in this region after Great Britain's departure from its positions "east of the Suez" at the end of the 1960's; the desire to "cover the Indian Ocean with the nuclear umbrella"; the safeguarding of "guaranteed shipments" of major strategic raw materials, primarily oil; and the need to monitor "vitally important sea lanes." Besides this, U.S. strategy in the Indian Ocean region, according to M. Bezboruah, is also colored by the prevailing opinion in Washington that the United States can influence the course of events here "only with the aid of naval forces" (pp 35-38, 52). Relating the history of the American military penetration of the Indian Ocean, M. Bezboruah recalls that it began during World War II, and that U.S. naval ships have virtually never left this ocean since the creation of the "Middle East operational U.S. naval unit" (1948), stationed in Bahrein (pp 33, 51). He feels that in our day the Indian Ocean has a "special place in U.S. strategy" and that this strategy is "based on long-range plans of action with far-reaching goals" (pp 33, 57).

As we know, the people of the Indian Ocean basin are particularly disturbed by the many foreign military bases and installations located in the region, which constitute an important element of the permanent military presence of the United States, Great Britain and France. Vali, in complete accordance with his line of reasoning, advocates the retention of U.S. military bases in this ocean, including the naval and air force base on the island of Diego Garcia, because he believes that "in a region of possible combat these bases are still necessary, both for the fleets located here and for fleets operating in far-off regions" (pp 58, 174).[1]

In contrast to F. Vali, who regards the Diego Garcia base as an alleged "ordinary communications center" (he deliberately repeats the stock phrase that is often used in U.S. congressional debates on the question of enlarging the base on the island), Bezboruah believes that this base represents the "focal point of U.S. strategy in the Indian Ocean." The question of using the island for military purposes was considered in the U.S. Defense Department's drafts of the "Strategic Island Theory" back in the late 1950's, Bezboruah says. Even then, this question was regarded "as a point of departure for defining the nature of U.S. naval operations in peacetime and naval combat missions in wartime" (p 53). It is for this reason, M. Bezboruah writes, that, from the time when the question of building a military base on the island of Diego Garcia was first discussed in the U.S. Congress, it was clear that the plans of U.S. military strategists for Diego Garcia envisaged "much more than the establishment of an ordinary communications center" (p 62). This approach differs from the view of the American researchers and officials who are trying to imply that the base serves peaceful goals, and not aggressive ones. In particular, F. Vali makes this statement (p 232). By the time Bezboruah's book was published, the military base on the island of Diego Garcia could accommodate aircraft carrier units and strategic aviation and service nuclear submarines. The nature of the military installations on the island at the present time and the proposed forms of their use in the future (including their use as a base for the U.S. 5th Indian Ocean Fleet) leave no room for doubt that Washington intends to have a huge strategic military center in the very middle of the Indian Ocean for the conduct of large-scale combat operations.

Bezboruah's position on the question of creating an independent U.S. fleet permanently based in the Indian Ocean is of definite interest (this question, according to reports, was debated once again in the military circles of the Carter Administration in spring 1979). According to the author, the creation of a fifth U.S. fleet in the Indian Ocean is a possibility because the Pentagon, which advocated the preservation of the permanent U.S. naval presence in this zone, will not agree to send operational units of the 7th Fleet to this ocean, as this would considerably reduce the capacity of the latter to carry out "combat missions" in the Pacific. Explaining his negative feelings about the creation of a separate U.S. fleet in the Indian Ocean, Bezboruah writes that this "would escalate the rivalry between certain powers and institute the spending of billions of dollars on new operational units and hundreds of millions of dollars on their annual maintenance" (pp 229-230). It should be noted that recent events have corroborated some of M. Bezboruah's conclusions in regard to the possibility of more pronounced U.S. aggression in the Indian Ocean zone. In addition to creating a permanently based fifth fleet in the Indian Ocean, the Pentagon has already decided, in principle, to create an expeditionary "rapid response" corps, numbering 110,000, for transfer to some parts of the Indian Ocean, primarily the Persian Gulf zone.

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[1] For more about the Diego Garcia base, see "Diego Garcia--U.S. Military Base in the Indian Ocean," ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, 1979, No 1, pp 84-86.

Separate sections of the books by F. Vali and M. Bezboruah are devoted to the analysis of Soviet interests in the Indian Ocean. The complete distortion of the Soviet stand on the Indian Ocean issue is characteristic of Vali's work. Clutching onto the hackneyed myth about of the notorious "Soviet threat," he tries to ascribe absolutely inappropriate functions to a small group of Soviet ships (for example, the prevention of oil shipments), and presents an entire list of "Soviet military bases" in the ocean, although statements of this kind are completely groundless and have been officially refuted by many Indian Ocean states. It has been the principled line of the Soviet Union to refuse to construct military bases in the zone. This was quite authoritatively announced from the rostrum of the 25th CPSU Congress by L. I. Brezhnev.[2] On the other hand, F. Vali not only tries to describe the numerous U.S., British and French military bases located in all parts of this ocean as harmless installations, but also makes every effort to understate the actual quantity of these bases. It is known, however, that these states already have close to 20 large military bases and installations. If smaller bases and the bases of this "trio's" allies are counted, this figure would appear even more impressive. As a speaker noted in the Australian Senate, there were 33 U.S. military bases and installations in this nation alone in 1976.

In his investigation of Soviet interests in the Indian Ocean, M. Bezboruah concludes that they can be explained by the Soviet desire to maintain trade and economic relations with the countries of the zone, engage in the extraction of products from the sea, ensure access between its European and Far Eastern ports and counteract the threat of nuclear attack (pp 132, 135-138). On the basis of data published in U.S. congressional documents, Bezboruah concludes that the combat strength, composition and sphere of operations of Soviet naval ships in the Indian Ocean are much smaller than those of U.S. ships, and if the activities of the United States' allies--Great Britain, Australia and South Africa--in the ocean are considered, the level of Soviet military presence in the zone is much lower than the U.S. level (pp 98, 102). He states that "the essence of the Soviet military presence in the Indian Ocean reflects the Soviet determination to have a low level of presence of a defensive nature in the region" (pp 117, 147-148).

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[2] L. I. Brezhnev, "Report of the CPSU Central Committee and Current Party Objectives in the Sphere of Domestic and Foreign Policy," Report to the 25th CPSU Congress, 24 February 1976, Moscow, 1976, p 28.

After examining China's policy in the Indian Ocean, both authors predict that it will be able to send its naval ships to the ocean for long periods of time in the future (up to the present time, Chinese ships had only appeared in the ocean in April 1970). In Vali's opinion, China has a relatively strong naval fleet for this, ranking fifth in the world in terms of the number of ships and third in terms of the number of naval personnel; besides this, China's military contacts with Pakistan and several other states bordering on the Indian Ocean, the show of Chinese military strength in adjacent seas, the "reaching out" to the Malacca Strait--one of the ocean's most important waterways, and so forth are quite indicative (pp 193-195).

Bezboruah writes that China views the Indian Ocean region "from the standpoint of ideological, strategic and political prospects" (p 159). Pointing out the long-term of Chinese interests in the zone, he also issues a warning regarding the possible appearance of Chinese submarines and other types of naval forces in the Indian Ocean in the future (p 164). In addition, China will support Washington's plan to build up its naval forces in the ocean because the American military presence in this region is "useful to China from the standpoint of its long-range interests." In turn, the United States, in exchange for China's agreement with its policy in the Indian Ocean region, will assist China in safeguarding its own "interests" (pp 162-163).

Japanese interests in this part of the world are dictated, as F. Vali and M. Bezboruah unanimously state, by economic considerations. They differ, however, in their predictions regarding the possibility of the future appearance of Japanese naval forces in this ocean. Whereas Vali feels that the main obstacle keeping the Japanese navy from entering the ocean consists of "constitutional restrictions" and a "shortage of enthusiasm" (p 208), Bezboruah asserts that the Japanese naval forces have "significant opportunities" to extend their sphere of military activity to the Indian Ocean and that constitutional obstacles can be "easily bypassed" (p 166).

In reference to the military presence of some NATO countries in the Indian Ocean, M. Bezboruah quite carefully writes that their policy of a "show of military strength" in this region and, on the whole, their negative attitude toward the idea of turning the ocean into a zone of peace suggest that they are prepared to maintain a "strong military presence" in the Indian Ocean (p 167). We must say that the intensity of tactical and combat preparations by the naval forces of the leading NATO countries has escalated noticeably in the Indian Ocean in recent years.

We absolutely cannot agree with F. Vali's statement that the idea of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace is an "impossible dream" (pp 62, 237). Naturally, if the Indian Ocean becomes a "separate theater of operations," as F. Vali views it, and if the foreign military presence in this region becomes stronger and the network of military bases and installations is expanded, it is obvious that serious obstacles will be set up on the road leading to the implementation of the zone of peace idea. Bezboruah also distorts the principled foreign policy line of the Soviet Union when he asserts that the USSR does not support this idea (p 144). The Soviet Union is taking an active part in its implementation along with other states. This is attested to by many CPSU and Soviet Government documents and speeches by Soviet leaders and diplomats. The position of the Soviet Union in regard to the zone of peace in the Indian Ocean has been set forth repeatedly in the last 9 years (that is, after the question was included in the UN General Assembly agenda in 1971). It is also no secret that the USSR has taken a constructive stand in negotiations with the United States in regard to the Indian Ocean, during the course of which it has favored the limitation and subsequent reduction of military activity in the ocean. The transformation of the Indian Ocean into a zone of genuine peace, security and productive cooperation, with consideration for the interests of all states concerned, and without any violation of the general standards of international law, particularly the principle of free shipping, and under the conditions of the total dismantling of foreign military bases in the region, would aid considerably in extending the process of detente to other parts of the world.

In conclusion, we can say that although the authors of these works approach the Indian Ocean issue in different ways, their works as a whole do not present an accurate picture of the nature, goals and progress of the famous proposal to turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. In this respect, they are typical bourgeois historical works on the Indian Ocean issue. This makes the need for a Soviet scientific study, which would introduce clarity into the question of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of genuine peace and cooperation, all the more urgent.

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A SENSE OF JAPAN

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 193-196

[Review by A. I. Mamonov, candidate of philological sciences, of the book "Kavabata Yasunari. Ocherk" (Kavabata Yasunari. An Essay) by N. T. Fedorenko, Moscow, 1978, 272 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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JAPANESE FISHING INDUSTRY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 196-199

[Review by R. D. Khlynova, candidate of economic sciences, of the book "Rybnoye khozyaystvo Yaponii" by N. K. Kutsobina, Moscow, Nauka (Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1979), 261 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1805

USEFUL AID

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 199-200

[Review by A. A. Moskalev, candidate of philological sciences, of the book "Drevnekitayskiy yazyk. Teksty, grammatika, leksicheskiy kommentariy" (The Ancient Chinese Language. Texts, Grammar and Notes on Vocabulary) by M. V. Kryukov and Huang Shuying, Moscow, Nauka, 1978, 512 pages with illustrations]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1805

'FROM THE LONG MARCH TO AGGRESSION'

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 201-204

[Review by M. D. Popov of the book "A hosszu menetelestol az agresszioig" (From the Long March to Aggression) by F. Varnai, Zrinyi katonai kiado, Budapest, 1979, 248 pages]

[Text] An understanding of present events in China obviously requires a look at the past, at the factors which led the nation so far out of the mainstream of historical development. The dangerous abnormalities of the "Chinese phenomenon" disturb and worry not only progressive politicians and statemen, but also all people who want to live in peace and harmony. This phenomenon is attracting the attention of historians, philosophers and journalists, who are trying to understand it and expose it. This is the second time Hungarian journalist Ferenc Varnai has dealt with this subject. His first book, "The Maoist Path," published by the Kosut Publishing House (also available in a Russian translation), is a unique biography of Maoism. Exposing the petty bourgeois essence of Maoism, the author writes: "The Maoists entered into conflict with Marxism-Leninism, with proletarian internationalism, and while their attacks are now directed against the Soviet Union and the CPSU, this is only because the CPSU has been the most consistent defender of these principles and the policy of the USSR represents the embodiment of internationalism and the major obstacle in the way of Maoist ambitions."[1]

In his new book "A hosszu menetelestol az agresszioig" (Zrinyi Publishing House, Budapest, 1979), Varnai demonstrates, with the aid of documents and eye-witness accounts, that the path of the renegades does not end with betrayal, but goes on to aggression and to the creation of a situation endangering world peace and public security. The fact that the Beijing leadership is conducting a policy of rapid arms buildup while simultaneously rejecting all initiatives aimed at the alleviation of international tension is causing people throughout the world to wonder whether China's intensive militarization will lead to war and whether its move to the camp of international reaction will disrupt the balance of power in favor of the opponents of detente, freedom and independence.

In connection with this, many people are wondering how this could have happened to China, a nation whose population and army once fought a heroic battle against Japanese imperialism, deposed the bourgeois feudal regime of Chiang Kai-shek and, in the first years after the establishment of the popular government, were extremely successful in economic construction, assisted by their economic, political and military alliance with the socialist countries. The answer to this question can be found in the history of the CCP, where there has been a continuous overt or covert struggle by supporters of the Marxist-Leninist, internationalist policy line against non-proletarian, nationalistic elements and petty bourgeois revolutionaries who have only learned isolated Marxist slogans.

"The fact is," Varnai writes in the preface to his book, "that conflicts between internationalist and nationalist elements had already sprung up in the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and had become quite acute by the late 1920's and early 1930's. At the end of the 1950's, unfortunately, the great-power chauvinistic course triumphed, and it is this course that has distorted the features of the People's Republic of China for two decades now" (p 4).

The Maoists themselves primitively divide their history into two periods--the "period of defeats," when Mao Zedong was not yet the head of the party, and the "period of victorious Chinese revolution," when the ideas of the "great helmsman" began to be propagated in the party. In reality, however, the origination and development of Maoism went through four basic stages--and Varnai corroborates this with documents and facts.

The development of Mao Zedong's anti-Marxist ideas took place mainly during the period from the 1920's through 1934. The author feels that 1935-1959 was the period of Mao's struggle for a leading position in the Chinese revolutionary movement and the army. In the 1960's and early 1970's the Maoists launched a struggle for the leading role in the international communist movement and, when they were unable to attain this goal, severed relations with the communist movement and the socialist community. In the second half of the 1970's they openly allied themselves with extremist imperialist forces, announced a united front of struggle against the Soviet Union and launched aggression against one of the socialist countries--Vietnam--in an attempt to gain the assistance of the Western nations in the modernization of the Chinese army and economy and in the establishment of a material and technical base for their great-power chauvinistic policy.

At first, the Maoists tried to make their departure from the position of internationalism and their betrayal of the ideals of Marxism-Leninism look like a "conflict with Moscow," for which the "Soviet revisionist leadership" was to blame. Their subsequent behavior proved, however, that they were not only opposing the Soviet Union, but also trying to break up the socialist community by setting the fraternal nations in opposition to the world's first socialist state. Therefore, this was not a conflict between two parties or two nations. In their attempt to undermine the unity of the socialist countries, the Maoists have conducted a differentiated policy toward them, trying to energize nationalist, anti-Soviet forces. Now they are implying that the socialist countries, which have solved many of their problems with the selfless aid of the Soviet Union, are supposedly kept on a Soviet leash. In a speech at an NPC [National People's Congress] meeting, CCP Central Committee Chairman Hua Guofeng openly advised the socialist countries, for example, to "fight against threats, intervention, subversive activity and control on the part of the superpowers, particularly the Soviet Union." In the same speech, he slanderously called the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact Organization "instruments of Soviet domination" (p 170). After the 10th CCP Congress, the Maoists launched a rabid anti-Soviet campaign, provocatively declaring that the Soviet Union was preparing to attack China. "While they were spreading this slander," the author notes, "they agreed to ally themselves with any and all forces in the interests of struggle against the Soviet Union, the socialist community and the solidarity of the international workers movement" (p 139).

Ferenc Varnai turns to history not only to remind the reader of educative events and facts in the past, but also to define the class nature of the forces that were able to prevail in the Chinese leadership and trace their behavior patterns. It is no secret that an important role in the Chinese revolution was played by the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the positive services of which, from the Long March to the routing of Chiang Kai-shek's forces, are not doubted by anyone. But it is alarming--and the author points this out to the reader--that the Maoists are applying the laws of wartime to the period of peaceful construction, cultivating "military communism" and "military democracy" and substituting voluntarism for a scientific approach to the resolution of national economic problems. The fact is that they have always regarded the army as a more effective means of winning power than the party (p 151). As early as 1938, Mao Zedong said: "With a rifle, it is fully possible to set up party organizations.... Anyone who wants to take over the government and hold on to it must have a strong army."[2] In connection with this, the author recalls Lenin's words about the need to "learn all, without the slightest exception, forms or aspects of public activity" and about the folly of attaching primary significance only to military methods and the army.[3]

The non-Marxist, petty bourgeois approach of the Maoists to the issue of authority was already apparent during the period of civil war and the fight against the Japanese occupation, when it was particularly urgent that all national and patriotic forces be united in a single resistance front. They stubbornly adhered to this view after the victory of the revolution and the establishment of a popular government. In August 1958, at a meeting in Beidaihe, Mao Zedong announced the need to institute an "atmosphere of military communism" (p 75). This "military communism," as an ideal--in the Maoists' opinion--form of social organization, signifies the rejection of the Leninist principle of financial incentives and the replacement of this principle with excessive egalitarianism. The militarization of the entire Chinese society on the model of the PLA and the regulation of all public life in the spirit of "barracks socialism" were given priority. All of this is fundamentally inconsistent with Marxism-Leninism.

"In the life of any particular nation, naturally, it may come to pass," Varnai writes in connection with this, "that the equal distribution of small commodity supplies can only be guaranteed through the institution of strict measures" (p 82). As an example of this, the author mentions, in particular, the necessity for a system of military communism in the USSR in the years of civil war. "During the course of the Chinese revolution," he says, "it was just as natural to use this method to provide the liberated regions and the troops of the fighting Red Army with the necessary supplies. But I am referring to something quite different, to the actual discrediting of communism. Communism, Marxism-Leninism teaches us, does not mean poverty or the equal distribution of meager supplies of food and commodities, but abundance and the provision of each individual with material goods according to his needs. And this cannot be attained through the primitive organization of labor or the militarization of the masses, but through the development of modern productive forces" (p 82). This, as Lenin stated, calls for organization, on which "all contemporary science and technology" can rest. "The mention of rifles in this connection is the height of absurdity."[4]

The Maoists never cease the "mention of rifles." They feel that complex economic and political problems can be solved by organizing society on the army model. Even in Mao's lifetime, the army was called the "school" of his ideas, and the army also became the main force in conducting the "Cultural Revolution." In a letter to Lin Biao, for example, Mao Zedong spoke of turning the army into a "great school," in which the soldiers, in addition to learning about politics, military science and culture, would study agriculture, auxiliary trades and industrial production, both for the satisfaction of personal needs and for exchange for goods in the state sector. (p 111). It is true that the economic impact of this activity was negligible. More attention was paid to the plan to assign the functions of government agencies to the army in the event of a broad-scale attack on Mao's political opponents. And this did come to pass.

The exclusive role of the army in national life is also attested to by other facts. Varnai stresses that virtually all economic, political and cultural life in the nation is controlled by military units. Real power in the provinces is concentrated in the hands of generals, who usually command military districts and head local government at the same time (p 180). Such slogans as "Rifles engender power," "Learn from the army" and "The army is the school of Mao Zedong's Thought," which have nothing in common with the Marxist interpretation of the party's role during the period of socialist construction in China, are not only being declared, but are also being implemented. The army is superior to the party in the PRC. Varnai cites the following data in his book: More than 40 percent of the members of the CCP Central Committee are army men, 10 of the 23

Politburo members are military men, and 3 of the 5 members of the Standing Committee, which actually governs the nation, are simultaneously holding top-level military positions (p 161).

"Barracks socialism" could be regarded as China's internal affair if the Chinese leaders only rattled their rifles. But the fact is that the Maoists oppose the policy of peaceful coexistence, call international detente a "great fraud," talk incessantly about the inevitability of a third world war, lay claim to the territory of neighboring countries and provoke military conflicts. They stubbornly reject all initiatives aimed at disarmament.

Varnai lists three reasons for the Maoists' interest in the arms race. First of all, this race serves as justification for the militarization of the country--according to UN data, PRC military expenditures exceed 40 percent of the state budget. Secondly, the arms race, in the Maoists' opinion, is slowing the economic and social development of the countries they regard as their opponents. Thirdly, Beijing is opposed to disarmament and is striving to involve even the developing countries in the arms race, as this would be a heavy burden on their economies and would help to strengthen Chinese influence in these countries (pp 164, 167).

Moreover, under the conditions of the arms race the Maoists can hope to gain the assistance of the imperialist states in building up and modernizing China's military potential.

Peace-loving people are particularly disturbed by the Chinese leadership's views on nuclear weapons and nuclear war, which are the direct opposite of the international communist movement's views. The Maoists, Varnai stresses, deny the possibility of preventing thermonuclear war, reject the policy of peaceful coexistence by states with differing social structures and see no connection between the struggle for peace and the development of the revolutionary and national liberation movement. Advocating preparations for a nuclear war, in which, according to their estimates, half of mankind would be lost, they do not believe in the ultimate triumph of socialism over capitalism in worldwide economic competition (pp 98-99).

A large section of the book deals with the modernization of the Chinese army. The Chinese regular armed forces number, according to the author's data, 4,325,000 (3,625,000 in ground forces, 400,000 in air and air defense forces and 300,000 in the navy and naval aviation). Besides this, militarized forces include the armed militia--7 million individuals, making up 75 divisions and 10 regiments--the millions of members of the urban militia and the construction-production corps (almost 4 million) and the 70-100 million people making up the so-called base militia, where they undergo combat training (p 179). The author describes the main types of troops and presents interesting data on their organizational structure, military equipment and combat capability.

The Maoists realize that their present army is not strong enough to attain their expansionist goals. For this reason, they have drawn up a program for the modernization of the armed forces and have enlisted the help of Western experts in carrying out the program.

"Chinese military delegations are making one 'fact-finding trip' after another to the NATO countries," Varnai writes. "The purpose of these trips is partly the purchase of modern weapons and partly--and this is of no less importance to the Chinese defense industry, the technical backwardness of which became more pronounced during the years of the 'Cultural Revolution'--the acquisition of licenses and technological documents. Besides this, the Chinese military leaders have received an opportunity in the West to learn about the experience of the NATO nations in the military organization and control of troops" (p 207).

The goal of the technical modernization of the army is also being served by such measures as the creation of a special committee to enlist the help of Chinese technical experts living abroad, to invite scientists living in the United States to visit China for an unspecified length of time, particularly scientists working in the field of nuclear physics, precision engineering and the aerospace industry, and to send Chinese students to technical institutes in the Western countries.

The road of betrayal of the socialist cause, the interests and goals of the international communist and workers movement and the national liberation struggle has led the Maoists directly into the camp of the enemies of peace and progress. Their expanding ties with the nations of the North Atlantic bloc have won China shameful repute as the "16th member of NATO." "In an attempt to change the global balance of power, the promoters of cold war," the author writes, "are prepared to aid in the modernization of Chinese military potential in the hope of containing, with China's help, much of the military strength of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries" (p 222).

The Maoists, however, have gone even further, to the logical conclusion of their shameful biography. Launching aggression against socialist Vietnam, they exposed themselves completely as the enemies of peace, democracy and progress. Analyzing the reaction of the world public to this treacherous action, the author writes: "We can frankly say that the aggression against Vietnam was the result of Beijing's great-power chauvinist policy, which has nothing in common with socialism and, in fact, is obviously hostile to it. China has reached the point of direct and overt economic, political and even, as the aggression against Vietnam proved, military struggle against socialism" (p 222).

Under present circumstances, Ferenc Varnai writes in conclusion, China has three alternatives. If it wants to return to the road of real progress and socialist construction, it must resume its friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. On the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence, it can also normalize at least governmental relations with the nations of the socialist community, which have always been prepared to agree to this. The third path, which China has been following in recent years, is the path of anti-Soviet, nationalistic and adventuristic policy aimed at alliance with world reaction. "This is why the struggle against Maoist ideas and practices," Ferenc Varnai stresses, "is inseparable from the struggle against imperialism and for the triumph of the cause of peace and security, for the purity of scientific socialist principles and for the preservation of the Chinese revolution's achievements. In essence, this struggle is one of the ways of rendering international assistance to the revolutionary cause of the Chinese people" (pp 241-242).

FOOTNOTES

1. F. Varnai, "The Maoist Path" (translated from the Hungarian), Moscow, 1979, p 14.

2. Mao Zedong, "Selected Works," vol 2, Moscow, 1953, p 388.

3. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 41, p 81.

4. Ibid., vol 36, pp 272-273.

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SOVIET-JAPANESE ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE IN TOKYO (DECEMBER 1979)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 205-206

[Report by V. A. Krivtsov, doctor of historical sciences]

[Text] The first Soviet-Japanese round table conference on the "Role and Responsibilities of the Public in the Movement for Stronger Friendship Between the People of the Soviet Union and Japan" was held in Tokyo on 4-9 December 1979.

The delegation representing the Soviet public was made up of T. B. Guzhenko, chairman of the board of the USSR-Japan Society, minister of the maritime fleet of the USSR and deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet (he was also the head of the delegation); N. T. Fedorenko, editor-in-chief of INOSTRANNAYA LITERATURA magazine and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences; V. B. Spandar'yan, trade representative of the USSR to Japan; V. A. Krivtsov, deputy director of the Institute of the Far East of the USSR Academy of Sciences; V. A. Matveyev, IZVESTIYA political correspondent; V. A. Syrokomskiy, first deputy editor-in-chief of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA; and B. P. Lavrent'yev, department head at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The conference was also attended by a delegation of CPSU party workers touring Japan, headed by Director A. G. Yegorov of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, by Soviet embassy personnel and by representatives of the Soviet press and the state television and radio broadcasting system (around 50 in all).

The Japanese side was represented at the conference by prominent Japanese public spokesmen, members of parliament (including Chairman H. Ishida of the parliamentary Japanese-Soviet Friendship Association, Chairman M. Akagi of the Japanese-Soviet Friendship Society and others), the heads of the majority of organizations and societies maintaining friendly relations with the USSR, representatives of the business community, the intelligentsia and youth and women's organizations, and numerous representatives of the press (around 100 in all).

After the plenary session, at which H. Ishida and M. Akagi spoke for the Japanese side and D. S. Polyanskiy, Soviet ambassador to Japan, and T. B. Guzhenko presented speeches on behalf of the Soviet side, the conference split up into discussion groups. There were four such groups. The first discussed the movement for friendship between Japan and the USSR (this meeting was participated in by T. B. Guzhenko, N. T. Fedorenko and B. P. Lavrent'yev); the second dealt with questions of Japanese-Soviet economic ties (participated in by V. B. Spandar'yan); the third concerned international developments and the situation in the Far East (V. A. Matveyev and V. A. Krivtsov); the fourth discussed the development of cultural and scientific exchange between the USSR and Japan (N. T. Fedorenko and V. A. Syrokomskiy). At the concluding plenary session, the leaders of the discussion groups presented reports and a conference communique was adopted.

Problems in Soviet-Japanese political, economic, cultural, scientific and technical relations were earnestly discussed at the plenary sessions and group meetings, and speakers stressed that their successful development would be inseparable from efforts to consolidate peace and public security, stop the arms race, particularly in the case of nuclear arms, promote disarmament, deepen detente and extend it to all parts of the world, and that the development of these relations would contribute to peace and security in the Far East and Asia and promote the cause of world peace. The Soviet delegation consistently made it known that Japan and the USSR must immediately begin work on a document stipulating the principles of relations between the two countries, based on good-neighbor contacts and mutually beneficial cooperation, and continue to develop economic and technical ties, expand scientific and cultural exchange on a long-term basis, both through governmental and through public channels, and promote deeper mutual understanding and stronger trust between the people of the USSR and Japan.

Members of the Soviet delegation cogently and logically explained to the Japanese conference participants the groundlessness of Japanese claims to Soviet territory, the absurdity of allegations that the buildup of Soviet military strength in the Far East will endanger Japan and the mistaken nature of current assessments of PRC foreign policy and the situation in Southeast Asia.

The Soviet delegation met and talked with Secretary General Ito of the Japanese Cabinet of Ministers, Chairman Yasui of the Japanese House of Councillors, Chairman Nado of the Japanese House of Representatives, Transportation Minister Chizaki, President Hiraoka of MAINICHI newspaper and the leadership of the Japan-USSR Society (Horie and others). During these talks, official representatives of Japan made positive comments about the conference and its communique, stressing that all opportunities for Japanese-Soviet friendship had not yet been exhausted and that concerted effort to take advantage of these opportunities would be important. They said the soil should be prepared for the development of good-neighbor relations and cooperation between Japan and the USSR. They also brought up the "territorial question" in one form or another and similar related issues.

Members of the Soviet delegation worked extensively with representatives of the Japanese press and television. In addition to appearing on television, the head of the delegation granted interviews to the largest Japanese newspapers--ASAHI, MAINICHI and YOMIURI. At the end of the conference, the heads of the Soviet and Japanese delegations held a special press conference.

On 7 and 8 December, delegates V. A. Matveyev, V. A. Syrokomskiy and B. P. Lavrent'yev attended the first Soviet-Japanese symposium in Kumamoto and Fukuoka to discuss the development of friendly ties between the USSR and Japan. The Japanese side was represented by more than 80 activists from the Japanese-Soviet Friendship Society. The symposium adopted a joint document censuring the Japanese-American security treaty and the anti-Soviet campaign in the Japanese press and calling for the development of Japanese-Soviet friendship.

Delegates also met and spoke with representatives of the Japanese public, the business community, the intelligentsia, students and writers.

In general, we can say that the first round table conference in Tokyo was successful and was conducted in an atmosphere of mutual understanding. The main result of the conference was the adoption of a communique which included the statement that the USSR and Japan must begin work as soon as possible on a document stipulating the principles of relations between the two countries on the basis of neighborly and mutually beneficial cooperation in the interests of the Soviet and Japanese people and the cause of peace and security in Asia. The conference demonstrated that there is a stronger tendency in Japan toward more active Japanese-Soviet relations and a search for ways of overcoming existing difficulties and an increasing desire for greater mutual understanding and trust. The conference directed the attention of large segments of the Japanese public, government and parliament to the need for better Soviet-Japanese relations.

The Japanese press gave the conference and its results extensive coverage. The ASAHI, YOMIURI and MAINICHI newspapers printed long interviews with the head of the Soviet delegation. Soviet-Japanese relations were also the subject of several editorials.

Despite the fact that the bourgeois press frequently repeated the usual government line, the general tone of press articles was favorable, the importance of Japanese-Soviet relations was underscored and, to a considerable extent, the communique's appeal for negotiations to conclude an agreement on good-neighbor relations and cooperation was supported.

The results of the first Soviet-Japanese round table conference suggest that this kind of conference is helpful and productive and will aid in consolidating the Japanese who are in favor of good-neighbor relations and cooperation with the USSR.

The individuals who participated in the conference acknowledged the expediency of holding this kind of round table conference in Japan and the Soviet Union on a regular basis to make the general public aware of the need for better Soviet-Japanese relations.

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